Defence and Security

'Defence-lite is sound policy', Ideas@The Centre, vol. 5, no. 19, May 2012.

by Benjamin Herscovitch

Nato Smart Defence: Smart Defence Starts with Common Goals

by Tabish Shah

Peer-review op-ed article published in Atlantic Community (April 2012)

NATO’s Smart Defense initiative requires more than simply technological projects. The success of Smart Defense relies... more NATO’s Smart Defense initiative requires more than simply technological projects. The success of Smart Defense relies on NATO finding common strategic goals before Members are willing to come together and pool and share their military resources.

A survey of the Greek defence industry

by Apostolos Rafailidis

Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 14(4), pp. 311 – 324, Aug. 2003
co-authored with Christos Kollias

Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence and its defence burden is the highest... more Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence and its defence burden is the highest among EU and NATO members. To meet the demand for military hardware it relies almost exclusively on imports, ranking among the largest conventional arms importers in the world. Despite efforts to develop a domestic defence industry, indigenous production only covers a limited proportion of Greece's demand for military equipment. The majority of weapons, including sophisticated and technologically advanced systems, are imported from the major arms producers. This paper critically surveys the Greek defence industrial base, its structure and recent performance, and assesses its future options.

Thinking Strategically About Sanctions

by Olivier Schmitt

Paris Papers N°4, IRSEM

Students of sanctions tend either to use a vocabulary coming from strategic studies without recognizing all the... more Students of sanctions tend either to use a vocabulary coming from strategic studies without recognizing all the implications of such a use or to describe strategic concepts without naming them. After having justified the relevance of a strategic analysis of sanctions by underlining their common political and coercive nature, an analysis of sanctions using strategic concepts leads to interesting findings and a research agenda proposal for broadening our understanding of the use of sanctions in world politics.

Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian Military?

by Keir Giles

March 2012

The process of transformation of the Russian military, under way since 2008, is intended to turn the Armed Forces of... more The process of transformation of the Russian military, under way since 2008, is intended to turn the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the atrophied remnant of the Soviet Armed Forces into a usable military tool for the 21st century. This includes radical reform of command and control systems at all levels up to the supreme command.



Previous conclusions on the nature of post-Soviet Russian military command and control systems may therefore no longer be valid. This is significant for Russia's overseas partners who wish to understand the nature of a potential Russian reaction to any challenge which can be interpreted as a military threat.



In particular, understanding of the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff needs to be updated following the dramatic contraction of both bodies and redistribution of their functions.



The emergence of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as an additional body exerting control over the military also needs to be considered, when examining how decisions affecting the Armed Forces are made at the highest level.



Lower down the chain of command, the creation of the new Joint Strategic Commands also bears directly on the nature of decision-making on employment of forces, in ways which appear still debatable even within Russia but which are of critical importance for close neighbours of Russia.



The example of the early stages of armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 could suggest that the Joint Strategic Commands are in part intended to ensure closer control over small units, in order to reduce the potential for independent and uncontrolled activity.



This paper seeks to introduce the new landscape of military decision-making in Russia, in order to raise key questions over the nature of the new command and control systems which are critical for a full understanding of how, when and in what manner Russia's Armed Forces may be used in the future.

"Politics of the Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Turkey" PILDAT Background Paper, 2009

by Volkan Aytar

"Politics of the Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Turkey" PILDAT Background Paper, 2009

Given Turkey's peculiar civil military relations and the country's continuous transition to democratic consolidation,... more Given Turkey's peculiar civil military relations and the country's continuous transition to democratic consolidation, it is important to see how Turkish democratic institutions, such as the Parliament and Parliamentary Committees engage in a democratic oversight of the defence sector. Does the Turkish Parliament have the powers, systems and processes in place to oversee the Defence sector? How effectively are the powers, sysmtems and processes uses? This paper had been especially commissioned by PILDAT and authored by Volkan Aytar answers  the above questions.

L'Agence européenne de défense et la coopération dans le domaine capacitaire

by Alain De Neve

Les partis et la politique de défense

by Alain De Neve

Technology Strategy and Defense Industry: an evolutionary approach

by Apostolos Rafailidis

1st International Conference on Defense, Security and Economic Development in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, Technological Education Institute of Larissa, Greece 22 – 24 June 2001
co-authored with Giannis Tselekidis

In the E.U. regulations there are no constraints concerning government policies for the support and ... more In the E.U. regulations there are no constraints concerning government policies for the support and  development  of  national  defence  industry,  very  much  unlike  what  is  true  for  the  civilian  sector.
Consequently, defence industry may constitute for E.U. member countries the main area in which gov-ernment technology policy can play a significantly discriminant role.
Defence industry can constitute a tool for the development of the critical mass of a country’s technological capabilities, both with defence and civilian applications.
In the Greek case, two more facts need to be taken into account: (a) the country’ s defence ex-penditures are significant, rendering the country a major international player and, (b) many of the exist-ing  domestic  high  technology  firms  are  also  active  in  the  defence  market  (or  were  indeed  established
targeting at this market at the first place).
However, considering the efforts of the: (a) E.U. to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy  and,  (b)  Western  European  Union  for  the  consolidation  of  the  Western  European  Armaments Group, it seems that the possibility of local governments to pursue an active national technology poli-cy,  through  the  support  of  the  defence  industry,  may  diminish  in  the  future.  Thus,  the  time  to  act  is now.
In the authors’ view, given the limited technological capabilities of Greece, a technology poli-cy  should  be  formulated  around  international  defence  cooperation  programs.  The  ultimate  purpose  of participating  in  such  programs  should  be  the  transfer  and  assimilation  of  essential  and  fundamental
technological and organizational capabilities and skills. The ultimate goal is the leverage of the coun-try’ s technological capabilities, through diffusion.
If the country is to become truly integrated into the international industrial complex (deep in-tegration),  and  move  away  of  the  role  of  the,  often  uninformed,  customer  (shallow  integration),  it should pursue the fastest technological accumulation possible. The aim should be, on the one hand, the closure of the technological gap separating it from other countries and, on the other, the preparation for the next techno – economic paradigm so that it will have the capacity: (a) to recognize it early on and,
(b) become part of it on better terms, when international firms, in their pursuit of faster growth and de-velopment, will be seeking true partners.

Offsets as a Technology Strategy Tool: technology transfer through cooperation in Greece

by Apostolos Rafailidis

2nd International Conference on Defence, Security and Economic Development, Technological Education Institute of Larissa, Greece 18 – 20 June 2004

Industrial Participation (IP) appears to be gradually replacing offsets as a term in the literature referring to... more Industrial Participation (IP) appears to be gradually replacing offsets as a term in the literature referring to defence procurement. IP implies some sort of industrial cooperation between buyer and supplier of defence equipment, while at the same time technology transfer  is often thought as the most suitable and acceptable tool of IP. The first part of this paper is an effort to define technology transfer, through the study of concepts like technology, know – how, know – why, knowledge, technological accumulation and learning. The main point made is that the study of the results of technology transfer offsets should also include “soft” parameters, and mainly the learning achieved on the part of the buyer. Following this logic, the second part of the paper presents some empirical evidence from firms of the Greek defence industry. The focus is on some of the factors that may affect the success of technological learning through cooperation agreements. More specifically, 31 cases of technological cooperation involving technology transfer to and from these firms are examined in respect to: (a) their longevity, (b) their complexity, (c) the technological distance between the partners and, (d) the technological and other motives and goals driving Greek firms. It is thought that these are four of the parameters that have an immediate effect on the success of the technology transfer process.

The Greek Defence Industry: From Pious Hope to Hard Realities: A Survey

by Apostolos Rafailidis

6th Annual Middlesex Conference on Economics and Security, London, UK 21st – 22nd June 2002
co-authored with Christos Kollias

Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence. Its defence burden is the highest among... more Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence. Its defence burden is the highest among EU and NATO members. Greek military spending has continuously exhibited a steady upward trend. During the post-bipolar era, while most countries have reduced their defence budgets, Greek military spending has grown in real terms by about 35% while, the corresponding change for total EU and NATO military expenditure was –12% and –23.4% respectively. For military hardware, Greece relies almost exclusively on imports. According to SIPRI data during 1996-2000 Greece ranked as the seventh importer of major conventional weapons in the world. Its total imports for this period amounted to about $3665 millions. In the past the development of an indigenous arms production capability was seen as an important step towards achieving a minimum degree military of self sufficiency and thus reduce its dependence on external suppliers of military hardware. The driving forces behind this policy of import substitution were a) the arms embargo during the military dictatorship and b) the fact that Greek defence planners felt that in case of an arms confrontation with Turkey (its mainly rival but at the same time NATO ally) Greece could not rely on its arms suppliers (mainly the USA and West European countries) and that it could be faced with a slow down in equipment and spare parts thus hindering its military effort. A number of industries were thus set up. They were mostly joint ventures between the Greek state and foreign arms producing companies. Most prominent cases were the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB), the Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO), the Hellenic Vehicle Industry (ELBO). About three decades after the original ambitious plans, Greece has achieved a limited degree of import substitution in weapons requirements in such areas as ammunition, portable infantry weapons, jeeps and trucks, APCs and IFVs, and in airplane and helicopter maintenance. These however represent only a small proportion of the needs in military hardware. The majority of weapons systems are still imported including fighter planes, MBTs, helicopters, naval units, electronic equipment etc. All of which are of crucial determinants of the fighting capability of the Greek armed forces. Similarly, plans for extensive co-production agreements have not fully materialized while export performance has at best been limited. Currently the Greek defence industry is comprised of about 80 companies with a yearly turnover of more than 1,4 bn.€ and employing more than 16200 people. Most of the major indigenous military producers have for a number of years been facing important problems, of both financial and technological nature.
This paper attempts to address some important questions concerning the Greek arms industry. For example, why has Greece, despite its importance as a major importer and, until recently, the favourable conditions in the global defence market (the huge downturn that has however started to reverse during the last two years) not been able to succeed in its import substitution policy in defence procurement and thus effectively supporting the indigenous defence industry? Why do foreign firms have to look for capable local partners each time a Greek defence program is executed, and not vice versa? That is, why are Greek firms not capable of searching for, and assembling, industrial groups of local and foreign firms, in order to pursue the opportunities that appear in the local defence market? The paper surveys the Greek defence industry and its development over the last decades and discusses the options available to it in order to overcome its current problems. Emphasis is placed upon the technological capabilities of the local firms and upon the role that the defence procurement process can possibly play in augmenting these, so as to embed Greece in the current techno – economic paradigm.

Mil-OSS WG3: Open Technologies for National Defense

by Michael Russell

Think open source technology (and the overriding security and information assurance needs of military customers) are mutually exclusive? Think again.

“Mil-OSS connects and empowers an active community of civilian and military open source software and hardware... more “Mil-OSS connects and empowers an active community of civilian and military open source software and hardware developers across the United States. This grassroots movement is a collection of diverse patriots that work for and with the Department of Defense and believe in adopting open technology innovation philosophies to effectively defend our nation.”

A Systems Approach to Strategy and Execution in National Security Enterprises

by Richard Hodge

Further information available from the author:
E1: Richard.Hodge@unisa.edu.au
E2: Hodge.rj@me.com
T: +61 418 866 542

Due to the low resolution of the pdf translation, figures such as Fig 4-4 have not printed properly.

This thesis was conducted part time over nine years while the author was engaged in full time employment at a senior... more This thesis was conducted part time over nine years while the author was engaged in full time employment at a senior executive level.

This thesis presents a contribution to the field of strategy and execution for large, complex organisations in the national security sector. Enterprises in this sector may be public and/or private. They are characterised by the critical functions they deliver to deal with serious and unusual emergencies or provide critical national infrastructure. For example, Defence, emergency services, transport security, health care, banking and finance, customs and border protection – they all prepare for serious and unusual activities although this is not the activity that occupies the majority of their time. They help to define our national character here and abroad.

A consequence of national security enterprises (NSEs) needing to plan for substantial, unlikely events is that the evaluation and feedback on the strategy and its implementation is neither immediate nor easy to achieve. It has long been recognised that strategy formation for NSEs is both challenging and often felt to be poorly executed in acquisition programs and poorly connected to daily operations.

This thesis draws on knowledge of strategy practice in Defence and other NSEs, business strategic planning and systems approaches to management. It synthesises a conceptual model for an integrated strategy framework and an associated methodology that directs practice. This is validated by two case studies that illustrate the utility of the methodology in different areas of concern: defence and health. These studies inform the refinement of the methodology, which is then tested in a further three minor case studies.

The thesis concludes with an analysis of what has been learned through the research program and how the work significantly contributes to the field through the presentation of an integrated strategy framework and how it can be used to inform strategy practice not only in national security enterprises but in all substantial businesses, where survival and growth are important.

The price of modern maritime piracy

by Sami Bensassi

The EU between "pooling & sharing" and “smart defence”: making a virtue of necessity?

by Giovanni Faleg

CEPS Special Report, May 2012, co-authored with Alessandro Giovannini. Available from: http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu-between-pooling-sharing-and-smart-defence-making-virtue-necessity

The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s capability to act as... more The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s capability to act as a provider of global security. This paper assesses the extent to which pooling & sharing (P&S) of military capabilities is a viable plan to boost collective capacity-building and offset the heavy budget cut-backs, drawing impetus from the NATO ‘smart defence’ agenda. Although multilateral cooperation is proven more efficient than the status quo through the lens of economics, and a set of external stimuli would facilitate deeper military integration, the paper acknowledges that a fully-fledged EU defence market remains difficult to attain due to short-term political and strategic considerations. However, piecemeal progress in specific areas is possible and viable, if political conditions are met. The last section of the paper offers some policy recommendations towards a pragmatic and feasible roadmap for P&S.

How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?

by Sami Bensassi

Tyushka, A. (2010). Security and defence relationships between Ukraine and the European Union. Modern Ukrainian Politics, 20, 326-335

by Andriy Tyushka

Ukrainian Version

Military Service in Russia - No New Model Army

by Keir Giles

May 2007

* Pay and conditions for Russian servicemen, especially those on contract service, have seen substantial recent... more * Pay and conditions for Russian servicemen, especially those on contract service, have seen substantial recent improvements.

* Continuing high-profile reporting of rights abuses and violence masks initiatives taken to improve rights and welfare.

* The move to one-year conscript service will disrupt the system of dedovshchina; but it is unlikely to uproot this kind of bullying altogether as it is not a purely military phenomenon in Russia.

* The Russian Armed Forces are not adapting fast enough to the challenges of recruiting professional servicemen.

Russian Military Transformation - Work in Progress

by Keir Giles

December 2010

Russia’s Baltic Fleet, and troops based in Kaliningrad Region, have been absorbed into an entirely new military... more Russia’s Baltic Fleet, and troops based in Kaliningrad Region, have been absorbed into an entirely new military command structure as part of the ongoing overhaul of the Russian Armed Forces. With effect from 1st September 2010, the Baltic and Northern Fleets, Kaliningrad, and the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts have been amalgamated into a new Western Military District, with headquarters in St Petersburg.

It is now just over two years since Russia embarked on the most radical programme of military reform it had seen since the end of the Soviet Union, and in many respects since long before that. The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 provided the impetus for the long-overdue creation of a distinct form for the Russian military, as opposed to a continuing existence as a pale remnant of the Soviet Armed Forces. The process of transformation now under way has affected the military, and individual servicemen, at all levels from the General Staff to newly-enlisted conscripts, and the emerging form of the new Russian forces fully justifies their claim to a “new look”.

Russian regional commands

by Keir Giles