David K Lewis

Taxnomy of some mainstream theories of modality and possible worlds

by Adam Tuboly

The taxonomy does not contain the conceptual, dispositional, power-theoretical (recent aristotelian), Kantian (Sellarsian-Brandomian) and a lot of other options about modality on the "no" branch of "Should we analyse modality in terms of PW?". On the other branch I take Lewis as the only possible-worlds realist, hence ersatzism is a special kind of possible-worlds antirealism.

Counterfactuals and chance: reply to Williams

by Dylan Dodd

forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy

I reply to J. R. G. Williams' critique of my criticism of his and David Lewis' answer to counterfactual skepticism. I reply to J. R. G. Williams' critique of my criticism of his and David Lewis' answer to counterfactual skepticism.

It Matters how you Slice it: Identity, Social Ontology, and Decomposition

by Robert Barnard

Paper version of talk for 2012 SSPP

Call the proposal that composition is identity the composition thesis.  This proposal is central to many... more Call the proposal that composition is identity the composition thesis.  This proposal is central to many contemporary discussions of the mereology of ordinary objects.  In this paper I consider three problem cases for the composition thesis, intensional entities, entities with essences, and social objects.  I suggest that while the first two cases can be addressed fairly easily by advocates of the composition thesis, the status of social entities is more problematic.  I argue that social entities are not mereologically composed, but are capable of being multiply decomposed.  I suggest that this is compatible with Searle’s suggestion that social entities realize socially constituted functional roles.

Concrete Impossibilia, draft

by Martin Vacek

The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals

by Aidan McGlynn

Forthcoming in Analysis. Please see there for the final version.

Early commentators on David Lewis’s account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some... more Early commentators on David Lewis’s account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis’s account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis’s account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can take our intuitions about these examples at face value without any major departure from Lewis’s approach to counterfactuals.

Real impossible worlds: the bounds of possibility

by Ira Kiourti

Limited Conventionalism About Morals

by Marinus Ferreira

In this paper I present limited conventionalism, which is the weakest manner in which conventions could feature in our... more In this paper I present limited conventionalism, which is the weakest manner in which conventions could feature in our moral reasoning: if there are any moral issues which are settled by convention, then they will include cases like those I describe here. My claim is that, unless every moral issue could be settled from general principles, what we might call the ‘underdetermination problem’ will arise, where your general moral principles can't decide among a set of equally good but mutually exclusive courses of action. Here I demonstrate that any underdetermination problem solution, giving those involved a way to work their way through the problem to the mutual satisfaction of everybody, is going to count as a convention in the sense analysed by David Lewis.This has the important and interesting result that part of the content of our evaluative terms is conventional. My argument for that point goes as follows: if general principles don't settle every moral question, then underdetermination cases arise; what is at issue with these cases is how to apply the general principles and the evaluative concepts they are framed in; underdetemination problem solutions specify particular ways to apply those principles and terms; any underdetermination problem solution is going to count as a Lewisian convention; thus, conventions are part of what makes up the content of our evaluative terms.

Do Fundamental properties Give an Explanation of Qualitative Similarities between Ordinary Objects? (In Japanese)

by Reina Saijo

recently published in Prospectus, 13, Philosophy Department of Kyoto University.
(non-reviewed)
original title「D.ルイスの基礎的性質としての自然的性質はものの類似性を説明できるのか」

Modal Realism and the Meaning of 'Exist'

by Ted Parent

draft only

Here I first raise an argument purporting to show that Lewis’ Modal Realism ends up being completely trivial. But... more Here I first raise an argument purporting to show that Lewis’ Modal Realism ends up being completely trivial. But although I reject this line, the argument reveals how difficult it is to interpret Lewis’ thesis that possibilia “exist.” Four natural interpretations are considered, yet upon reflection, none appear entirely adequate. In particular, under the three different “concretist” interpretations of ‘exist’, Modal Realism looks insufficient for genuine ontological commitment. Whereas under the “multiverse” interpretation, Modal Realism ends up being incompatible with each of axioms S5 and B. I close by entertaining a more general problem from which the present interpretive issues seem to arise.

Ontic Terms and Meta-Ontology, or: On What There Actually Is

by Ted Parent

draft only

Terms such as ‘exist’, ‘actual’, etc., (hereafter, “ontic terms”) are recognized as having uses that are not... more Terms such as ‘exist’, ‘actual’, etc., (hereafter, “ontic terms”) are recognized as having uses that are not ontologically committing, in addition to the usual commissive uses. (Consider, e.g., the two interpretations of ‘There is an even prime.’) In this paper, I identify five different non-commissive uses for ontic terms, and along the way I attempt to define (by a kind of via negativa) the commissive use of an ontic term, using ‘actual’ as my example. The problem, however, is that the resulting definiens for the commissive ‘actual’ is itself equivocal between a commissive and a non-commissive reading, and thus I consider other proposals for defining the commissive use, including two proposals from David Lewis. However, each proposal is found to be equivocal in the same way—and eventually I argue that it is impossible to define an ontic term unequivocally. Even so, this is not meant to overshadow the fact that we can understand an ontic term as univocally commissive, in certain conversational contexts. I close by illustrating the import of these observations for meta-ontology, especially for Hirsch’s “superficialist” view.

Tensed Statements and Four-Dimensionalism: Ontological Assumptions of Stage View(In Japanese)

by Reina Saijo

published in "Philosophical Inquiry", The Japan Forum for Young Philosophers, 36: 85-97, 2009
(non-reviewed, in Japanese)

Note on the incompleteness of an axiom system in Lewis' Counterfactuals

by Thomas Hendrey

Published (with some minor editing and formatting adjustments) in 'Bulletin of the Section of Logic' 40(3-4), 2011. (Of course my thanks to BSL for permission to put this here.)

I give a simple proof that an axiomatization of VC given in the
original printing of Lewis’ Counterfactuals is... more I give a simple proof that an axiomatization of VC given in the
original printing of Lewis’ Counterfactuals is incomplete. I then
briefly discuss its relationship to other axiomatizations Lewis gave.

Two Types of Counterpart Relations: Can I be an Angel?

by Reina Saijo

published in Research Journal of Graduate Students of Letters, 11 (2011), Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers.
(non-reviewed)

The main question of this paper is whether any modal properties are ascribed to an object or not. According to David... more The main question of this paper is whether any modal properties are ascribed to an object or not. According to David Lewis’ counterpart theory, the answer is yes only if we provide appropriate contexts where counterpart relationships are held between possible objects. This sort of counterpart relations is mind-dependent. On the other hand, the answer is no only if counterpart relations are determined by Lewis’ theory of natural properties. This sort of counterpart relations is mind-independent. I shows that there are these two types of counterpart relations in Lewisian metaphysics. Moreover, I point out that the range of mind-independent counterpart relations corresponds to that of possibly nomological possibilities.

Any sum of parts which are water is water

by henry laycock

HUMANA.MENTE
International Journal of Philosophical Studies founded in Florence in 2007. Official journal of the Italian Philosophical Society

Issue 19 - December 2011
COMPOSITION, COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSATION
The idea behind this issue is to offer a representation of the most recent theories and position which are emerging in the debate and take David Lewis as their main theoretical source, critical target, or point of departure

ABSTRACT. Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving... more ABSTRACT. Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving more like sets than like Aristotelian substances. However, the mereological notions of ‘part’, ‘composition’, and ‘sum’ or ‘fusion’ appear to find concrete realisation in the actual semantics of mass nouns. Quine notes that ‘any sum of parts which are water is water’; and the wine from a single barrel can be bottled and distributed around the globe without affecting its identity. Is there here, as some have claimed, a ‘natural’ or ‘innocent’ form of mereology? The claim rests on the assumption that what a mass noun such as ‘wine’ denotes – the wine from a single barrel , for example – is indeed a unit of a special type, the sum or fusion of its many ‘parts’. The assumption is, however, open to question on semantic grounds.

Three Theories in The Contemporary Problem of Universals (In Japanese)

by Reina Saijo

published in The Kyoto Graduate Journal for Philosophy, Tetsugaku-Ronso, 38 (2011) supplement : S73-84 (non-reviewed and in Japanese)
original title 「現代普遍論争の諸相––普遍者・クラス・トロープ––」

Against advanced modalizing

by Josh Parsons

forthcoming in _Defensor Rationis: Essays in honour of Colin Cheyne_, ed. James Maclaurin (2011)

Higher-order one-many problems in Plato’s Philebus and recent Australian metaphysics

by Cathy Legg

This paper is now published online by the Australasian Journal of Philosophy

We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually... more We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one-many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and part, and thereby construct three new “problems of the one and the many” (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus-Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy.

"When Do I Get My Money?" A Probabilistic Theory Of Knowledge. PhD thesis 2011

by Jonny Blamey

PhD thesis KCL 2011. Examiners Jon Williamson and Luc Bovens, final supervisor David Papineau.

The important claim in this thesis is that it is rational to vary your degree of belief relative to what is at stake.... more The important claim in this thesis is that it is rational to vary your degree of belief relative to what is at stake. This allows a probabilistic theory of knowledge that can answer scepticism and avoid Gettier problems. It provides a decision theory that explains the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox and gives an empirically adequate account of decisions under risk, whilst providing a probability measure that conforms to the Kolmogorov axioms. The probabilistic theory of knowledge thus vindicates the intuition that the same evidence can yeild knowledge at low stakes but not at high stakes.
At the heart of the theory is the Stake Size variation principle. This is a development of Ramseys theory of probability. The Stake Size Variation Principle give a measure of evidential support that is commensurable with measures for good. This allows a two dimensional account of evidential strength in terms of the point probability and the evidential value. The evidential value then determines how resilient the point probability is in the face of changes in stake size, as well as changes in evidence. The SSVP thus equates knowledge with value via the expectation principle.
There are two main arguments for the SSVP.
Firstly there is the contextualist argument that the scope of alternatives that need to be eliminated by the evidence can expand with an expansion of the stakes. In otherwords, it is wise to consider more possibilities when the stakes are high before settling in certainty.
Secondly there is the information theoretic argument based on the work of Kelly Jnr, which shows the inevitability of a downward drift and eventual ruin if one bets at the objective probability. This is due to the logarhythmic nature of growth.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of inductive certainty, showing how the SSVP can give an adequate account of how inductive certainty is possible.     

On the Analytic Continental Divide In Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy

by Babette Babich

“On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s Speaking Language, and Philosophy” in C. G. Prado, ed., A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books. 2003) pp. 63-103.

To Exist and to Count: a Note on the Minimalist View

by Francesco Berto

Co-Authored with Max Carrara

Sometimes mereologists have problems with counting. We often don't want to count the parts of maximally connected... more Sometimes mereologists have problems with counting. We often don't want to count the parts of maximally connected objects as full-fledged objects themselves, and we don't want to count discontinuous objects as parts of further, full-fledged objects. But whatever one takes "full-fledged object" to mean, the axioms and theorems of classical, extensional mereology commit us to the existence both of parts and of wholes – all on a par, included in the domain of quantification – and this makes mereology look counterintuitive to various philosophers. In recent years, a proposal has been advanced to solve the tension between mereology and familiar ways of counting objects, under the label of Minimalist View . The Minimalist View may be summarized in the slogan: "Count x as an object iff it does not overlap with any y you have already counted as an object". The motto seems prima facie very promising but, we shall argue, when one looks at it more closely, it is not. On the contrary, the Minimalist View involves an ambiguity that can be solved in quite different directions. We argue that one resolution of the ambiguity makes it incompatible with mereology. This way, the Minimalist View can lend no support to mereology at all. We suggest that the Minimalist View can become compatible with mereology once its ambiguity is solved by interpreting it in what we call an epistemic or conceptual fashion: whereas mereology has full metaphysical import, the Minimalist View may account for our ways of selecting "conceptually salient" entities. But even once it is so disambiguated, it is doubtful that the Minimalist View can help to make mereology more palatable, for it cannot make it any more compatible with commonsensical ways of counting objects.