Daniel Dennett

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

Too much ado about beliefs

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Dokic, J. & Pacherie, E. (2007) Too much ado about beliefs. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6: 185-200.

Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to... more Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/ appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett’s third doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the firs two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett’s doxological commitment is in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming.

Function and Content Reconsidered

by Marcin Miłkowski

draft for Content and Consciousness 2.0

In this chapter, I show that the theory of content as sketched in Daniel Dennett’s Content and Consciousness is,... more In this chapter, I show that the theory of content as sketched in Daniel Dennett’s Content and Consciousness is, contrary to appearances, quite different from the later developments in teleofunctional biosemantics. There are reasons to believe that his earlier theory fares in some respects much better than theories he later endorses. In contrast to Millikan's notion of function, Dennett's notion of functional structure is not historical (diachronic). Just because of that, his functional account of content is also not purely dependent on historical considerations. Note that according to Dennett, historically-dependent content is causally irrelevant, and its role in the explanation of behavior may be merely heuristic. The early account of Dennett stresses that the content is ascribed to the system by tracing the normal causes and effects of events, states and structures all the way to both the afferent and efferent peripheries. By relying on the notion of afferent/efferent peripheries, he requires, in fact, that the content be relevant for guiding the behavior. Just because of it, his early theory of content is closer to such proposals as the guidance theory of representation (GTR) of Anderson and Rosenberg and interactivism of Bickhard. Such a construal of content, notably, does vindicate the notion against current anti-representationalism in cognitive science. Yet the broad conception of function makes it really hard to justify claims about malfunction, and, consequently, misrepresentation.
I argue that the early theory should not be abandoned in favor of Millikan’s account of representation. Instead, I propose two relatively minor amendments: another construal of function along broadly Dennettian lines, and explication of his requirement of intensionality-sensitivity of representational explanations in terms of contrast-classes in causal explanations, as vindicated by Jim Woodward. The resulting conception is then tested by analyzing two cases.

Filozofia Jako Inżynieria Odwrotna: Rzecz O Naturalizmie Daniela C. Dennetta

by Marcin Miłkowski

Przegląd Filozoficzny NS, 2 (50) / 2004, s. 75-89

A most rare achievement: Dennett’s scientific discovery in Content and Consciousness

by Don Ross

Forthcoming in C. Munoz-Suarez & F. De Brigard, eds., CONTENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 2.0

The paper re-visits Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), after four decades of developments... more The paper re-visits Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), after four decades of developments in cognitive science and related disciplines. It first argues that in that book Dennett reported a scientifically significant discovery about what minds are. This initially seems implausible, because at first sight C&C presents as an exercise in pure philosophical analysis of everyday discourse about the mental, and that is a profoundly unlikely method for achieving scientific progress. However, a reading of the text and its context is proposed that explains this apparent miracle. The pure philosophical analysis indulged in C&C merely serves to blunt the force of previous philosophy, for the benefit of those who might find it persuasive. Thereafter, the positive discovery for which Dennett deserves credit comes as a specimen of the only kind of contribution to objective knowledge to which any philosopher (qua philosopher) can aspire: unification of empirical findings. The paper then argues that because C&C does not try to integrate its unifying suggestions with any considerations from physics, it fails to offer a satisfying metaphysical account of the mental, even though most philosophical readers would see that as having been one of its central ambitions. Two decades after he wrote C&C, however, Dennett showed how to begin to close that gap. The paper closes with reflections on differences between Dennett's view of the potential contribution of philosophy to science and the view of James Ladyman and Don Ross.

The Self As Narrator

by J. David Velleman

Published in John Christman & Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (2005)

On Daniel Dennett's theory of the self as a "center of narrative gravity" On Daniel Dennett's theory of the self as a "center of narrative gravity"

Awareness, Mental Phenomena, and Consciousness A Synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal

by Teed Rockwell

Published in "Journal of Consciousness Studies" Fall 1996

Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence... more Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness.(MDM) This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the question "how do you get experience out of meat?" actually fragments into at least three different questions.

(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?

(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?

(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?

Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.

Why Does God Care if I Believe in His Existence?

by Shaun Miller

Exploring Christian Identity with Paul Ricoeur

by Tom Uytterhoeven

When I was young, I dreamed about becoming a knight. In retrospective, this seems nothing but a fantasy. But when I... more When I was young, I dreamed about becoming a knight. In retrospective, this seems nothing but a fantasy. But when I look at my six-year old son, I wonder if this almost forgotten dream really was just imagination. When he has his cardboard helmet on, looking for the monster under the stairs, he doesn’t imagine himself to be ‘Tuur, Knight of The Round Table’; he just is this fearsome warrior and protector of the poor and weak. The monster under the stairs is not just a shadow. As long as Tuur is a knight, the shadow is a monster (and the stairs are a deep, dark cave). As Ricoeur would say: “seeing as is being as.”  It’s just one example of the power of human imagination. Human beings seem to be capable of building up their own world, with themselves as the centre of gravity that holds it all together. And we thank this capacity to our culture, with language as its vector.  We live in the world we tell to ourselves about. We are what we tell ourselves, and each other, to be. Like the definition of a spider is its web, we are defined by the stories about ourselves.  With Ricoeur’s elaboration on the relation between people and language as a guide, it will become apparent that talk about God has to find new ways to maintain its metaphorical strength, if it wants to be loyal to its referent.

Vertrouwen op God. De religieuze ruimte van Ambrosius van Milaan

by Tom Uytterhoeven

De Amerikaanse filosoof Daniël Dennett stelt dat religie en politiek zich met elkaar ver-binden. Tijdens het... more De Amerikaanse filosoof Daniël Dennett stelt dat religie en politiek zich met elkaar ver-binden. Tijdens het ontstaansproces van religie zou het één van de strategieën worden van politieke machthebbers om de controle over hun samenleving te behouden door “an alliance between the political leaders and the priests, [...], in which, first of all, the leader is declared to be divine, or descended from the gods, or, [...], at least having “a hotline to the gods”.” In dit werk wil ik deze stelling kritisch bekijken. Volgend aspect wil ik kort verkennen: kan de geschiedenis van de kerk op het einde van de vierde eeuw, tussen het edict van Milaan (313)  en de edicten van Theodosius (391-392),  beschreven worden als de alliantie tussen een religieuze traditie en politieke leiders? Vanuit drie belangrijke ge-beurtenissen tijdens Ambrosius’ episcopaat zal ik besluiten dat als deze strategie vanuit politieke hoek al kan worden onderkend, ze niet noodzakelijk door het christendom wordt gehonoreerd. De oorzaak hiervan zie ik in Ambrosius’ visie op de relatie tussen het poli-tieke bestel van zijn tijd en het Rijk Gods. Die visie stelt ook de band tussen instituut en inspiratie scherp.

A liberdade evolui. E o determinismo?

by Porfírio Silva

A liberdade evolui. E o determinismo?, Crítica (http://www.criticanarede.com/), Outubro de 2005

Vrije wil en verantwoordelijkheid in evolutionair perspectief

by Arno Wouters

Published in Maureen Sie (ed.) Hoezo vrije wil? (2011). In Dutch.

I improve on Dennett's account in *Freedom Evolves* of how the ability to act for reasons can exist in social... more I improve on Dennett's account in *Freedom Evolves* of how the ability to act for reasons can exist in social organisms involved in a Darwinian struggle for life. To this I add a functionalist (cum pragmatist, cum conseqentialist) argument for the thesis that acting for reasons is a good way to elaborate the notion of free will as what is required for moral responsibility (in Dutch)

Faith In Control: Militant Atheism, Epistemological Bigotry and State Violence

by Adam Goodwin

To be published in The Wrongfulness of Terrorist Actions: An Interfaith Perspective. Mission Viejo: Nortia Press, 2011 (forthcoming)

The neo-atheist movement has enjoyed increased attention since 2001 (Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006; Harris, 2006;... more The neo-atheist movement has enjoyed increased attention since 2001 (Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006; Harris, 2006; Hitchens, 2008). This attention has been fuelled by an increased awareness of ‘Islamic-bred terrorism’ after the 9/11 attacks. The neo-atheist movement has sought epistemological certitude in its Enlightenment-inspired objective to adhere to the scientific method—one based in a materialist empiricism—and articulate their epistemological hegemony by discrediting alternative world views, particularly focused on the monotheistic religions. However, this epistemological critique is actually a result of a deterministic structuralist view on human affairs. I argue that rather than ask epistemological questions, they should refocus their critiques on questions of praxis and extend them to their logical ends. In doing so, I argue they will find that in place of traditionalist approaches to understanding social organization on intersubjective terms, the neo-atheist hegemony favours an institutionalist approach to rational social organization under the state structure. This essay draws on Feyerabend (1978, 1993) to argue that such epistemological bigotry produces a justification for authoritarian practices ostensibly premised on state security, but also furthering a neo-liberal secular capitalist order protected by state violence (Chomsky 1969, 1973, 1978, 1979, 1986).

Consciousness Raising: The Critique, Agenda, and Inherent Precariousness of Contemporary Anglophone Atheism

by Christopher R. Cotter

Full citation: Cotter, Christopher R., 2011. “Consciousness Raising: The critique, agenda, and inherent precariousness of contemporary Anglophone atheism.” International Journal for the Study of New Religions 2 (1): 77-103.

Atheism, as a subject in its own right, has received comparatively little scholarly attention in the past. This study... more Atheism, as a subject in its own right, has received comparatively little scholarly attention in the past. This study begins by unpacking the term “atheism,” specifying an appropriate timescale and limiting the scope of the investigation
to the work of four key authors. Their critiques of religion are considered and common themes under the appellation “dangerous religion” are discerned. The author then pursues a closer reading of the texts, discerning what agenda is promoted in opposition to the heavily criticized “religion,” and discussing contemporary atheism in relation to Enlightenment values. Finally, the author examines why contemporary atheism fails to state its agenda more explicitly. The main players are shown to be individuals, with different foci that cannot be encapsulated by labels such as “Enlightenment.” Indications emerge of a “consciousness raising” agenda, resulting from various factors that make contemporary unbelief a particularly organizationally “precarious” phenomenon—a precariousness enhanced by an implicit ambivalent attitude to certain aspects of Christianity, and a correlation with Enlightenment, Romantic and New Age concerns.

Choosing between the long and short informational routes to psychological explanation

by Marc Champagne

Published in Philosophical Psychology.

Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of... more Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as an explanatory desideratum, and thus regards the informational noise which accrues at higher levels of description as patently unacceptable. Yet, since it is unlikely, as Ross et al. (2007) have recently suggested, that anything remains once we subtract the appeal to patterns, I argue that the ubiquity of informational compression in scientific explanation seriously undermines the claim that talk of the mental could be eliminated.

Emergent Representations: Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Mind

by Joe Faith

DPhil thesis in Computer Science and Artificial Intellgence, Sussex University, 2000. Examined by Daniel Dennett and John Maynard Smith

This thesis is the result of a simple conviction: since minds are produced by brains then surely studying brains will... more This thesis is the result of a simple conviction: since minds are produced by brains then surely studying brains will tell us something about issues in the philosophy of mind? Moreover, if minds are also produced by our evolution and history then surely studying these will also tell us something about minds? Of course I am not the first to suggest these lines of inquiry but they have both usually lead to anti-realist scepticism about our ability to know the world. We seem to be stuck in a Faustian bargain in which we can only gain scientific knowledge at the expense of philosophical doubt.

This thesis is an attempt to break this bargain, in which I start from the conviction that we can know the world, and then ask what kind of science, both natural and social, can make sense of this ability. We do not just need a philosophy of mind that fits our science, we also need a science that fits our philosophy of mind. We must fiddle with both sides of the equation in order to get a fit. In the course of this fiddling I challenge reductionist and empiricist assumptions about science, I question the philosophical tradition that dates back to Frege’s ‘linguistic turn’, and I draw parallels between Marx’s theory of history and Darwin’s theory of natural selection. The result is a realist philosophy of mind that is built on our ability to interact with and change the world, rather than on our ability to contemplate it passively.



CONTENTS


PART I: MATTER
Re-examining two basic principles of how science understands complex systems

2 Anti-Reductionism
2.1 Reductionism and Materialism -- p9
2.2 Anti-ReductiveMaterialism -- p11
2.3 Downwards Causation -- p14
2.4 Conclusion -- p17

3 Naturalisation
3.1 Descriptions and Biases -- p19
3.2 Naturalisation -- p21
3.3 Theoretical Terms, Dispositions, and Causal Explanation -- p23
3.4 Laws and Exceptions -- p27
3.5 Prediction and Induction -- p29
3.6 Conclusion -- p31

PART II:MIND
Applying this new take on complex systems to brains and epistemology

4 Brains and Behaviour
4.1 Neuropsychology and Neuroethology -- p33
4.2 Representation and Explanation -- p37
4.3 South Coast AI -- p39
4.4 Conclusion -- p45

5 Intentionality: The Insides
5.1 Opening the Black Box -- p46
5.2 Anti-Turing -- p48
5.3 Externalism -- p52
5.3.1 Epistemological Externalism -- p53
5.3.2 Metaphysical Externalism -- p54
5.3.3 Brains-In-Vats -- p58
5.4 Emergent Representation -- p59

6 Intentionality: The Outsides
6.1 Sense and Reference -- p61
6.2 Non-Conceptual Content -- p65
6.3 Affordances and Objects -- p68
6.4 Conclusion -- p70

PART III: NATURAL HISTORY
Putting this in the context of natural selection

Functions and Norms
7.1 Functional Explanation and Darwinian Norms -- p73
7.2 The Function of ‘Function’ -- p75
7.3 The Function of Behaviour -- p77
7.4 Conclusion -- p78

The Role of Genes in Natural Selection
8.1 Evolution and Mendelian Inheritance -- p80
8.2 Nature and Nurture -- p82
8.3 Inheritance and Mechanism -- p86
8.4 Evolution and Development -- p88
8.5 Conclusion -- p90

9 The Role of Vehicles in Natural Selection
9.1 Burying Vehicles -- p92
9.2 Counting Genes -- p94
9.3 Counting Replicators -- p97
9.4 Fitness -- p101
9.5 Conclusion -- p102

PART IV: SOCIAL HISTORY
And understanding how social history fits in

10 Social Evolution
10.1 Natural and Social History -- p105
10.2 Memes and Vehicles -- p107
10.3 Memes and Power -- p110
10.4 Marx’s Theory of History -- p112
10.5 Memes and Symbols -- p116
10.6 Lamarckian Inheritance and Signalling -- p119
10.7 Memes and Adaptation -- p121
10.8 Conclusion -- p122

11 The Good, The True, The Beautiful
11.1 Truth and Success -- p125
11.2 Scienti?c Objectivism -- p128
11.3 Ethical Relativism -- p130
11.4 Conclusion -- p133

Bibliography

Qualifying Qualia Through the Skyhook Test

by Tere Vadén

Whether We Have Free-Will and Whether It Matters

by John Ostrowick

My full Master's dissertation, provided here for convenience and so that I don't have to maintain its presence in multiple locations. It contains the Libet article above, in an early draft form, as well as some interesting material on Dennett's Multiple Drafts.

Please note: this paper has NOT been published in any journal. It is a full dissertation from a course (MA).

There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives,... more There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

The Timing Experiments of Libet and Grey Walter

by John Ostrowick

South African Journal of Philosophy, vol 26 no 3. (2007). Presented at International Conference for Humanities in Hawaii in 2005, as well as various colloquia - one at the Law School at Wits University, Johannesburg, and at a Philosophy symposium at Rhodes University.

The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett) provide evidence... more The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett) provide evidence that our actions are caused by non-conscious brain events beyond our conscious awareness. Normally, we assume that our conscious choices lead us to do things. If these researchers have interpreted their evidence correctly, it may be that we lack free-will, for we could not control a non-conscious brain state. Libet however provides evidence that agents can “change their minds” just before performing some action. He felt that this was the elbow-room for free-will. But it may be inconsistent for him to suggest this, since his evidence indicates that there is no room for conscious choice. In this paper we discuss these results and various objections to the interpretation of the work.

Što nas evolucijska psihologija može naučiti o našoj sklonosti nadnaravnom? (What can evolutionary psychology teach us about our propensity towards the supernatural)

by Igor Miklousic

Članak je objavljen u Mjesečniku za popularizaciju znanosti hrvatskog prirodoslovnog društva Priroda, 5/11, broj 1001.

Published in monthly popular science publication by Croatian natural sciences society "Priroda (Nature)"

Kao što nam socijalna i kognitivna psihologija već godinama uspješno demonstriraju; ljudi su skloni vjerovanju.Uz to i... more Kao što nam socijalna i kognitivna psihologija već godinama uspješno demonstriraju; ljudi su skloni vjerovanju.Uz to i loše procjenjujemo vjerojatnosti, vrednujemo subjektivna iskustva puno više od znanstveno dokazanih činjenica, brzopleti smo u stvaranju uvjerenja i još tvrdoglaviji kada ih treba promijeniti. Ono što sada zasigurno znamo je da u svemu tome prste ima naša evolucijska povijest i iz nje je proizašla psihološka konstitucija s kojom se eto moramo nositi.Ovaj članak je pregled značajnijih suvremenih spoznaja kognitivne i evolucijske psihologije i antroplogije, te novog polja kognitivne znanosti religije, koje nam napokon daju odgovor na pitanje zbog čega smo toliko skloni vjerovanju u nadnaravno i kako je točno tekao proces evolucije homo paranormalisa i njegovih paranormalnih vjerovanja.