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Seen by:Brain death, philosophical anthropology, and the body-mind problem
Published in: S. Shôji, A. Tamaoka. (ed.): Proceedings of [sic] International Congress on Ethical Issues in Brain Death and Organ Transplantation, Tsukuba, Nov. 1-2, 2003. Tsukuba 2004, pp. 24-36.
In the 'classical' literature in favour of the normative concept of brain death (i.e. brain death as an ethically and... more In the 'classical' literature in favour of the normative concept of brain death (i.e. brain death as an ethically and legally valid criterion for the death of human beings), references to modern philosophical anthropology and body-mind-theory are conspicuously absent. Given the fact, evidenced by this very literature itself, that the normative concept of brain death touches directly on our understanding of what it means to be human, this absence of philosophical theory is peculiar at least. In my presentation, I give an evaluation of the concept of brain death in the light of 20th century discussions on philosophical anthropology and body-mind theory, with a focus on 'rationalist' Continental philosophers like E. Cassirer and H. Plessner. The normative concept of brain death comes in two forms. One assumes that the death of the brain signifies the end of organic life. This notion will be discussed in terms of Plessner's theory of the organism as a positional entity. It will be argued that singling out dysfunction or destruction of the brain is not a correct way of asserting death. A second version of the brain death concept takes brain death to signify the end of personal, and hence, social life. Its analysis requires a theory of the body that differentiates and integrates its biological, personal, and social dimension. Such a theory will be briefly sketched out with reference to Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The notion of brain death as 'death of the person' will be analysed accordingly. It will be shown that, and why, the life of a person is coextensive with the perceptible life of the body.
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Seen by:The Relation between Language and Thought according to Hegel
Slightly re-elaborated english version of the article “La relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento en el Sistema hegeliano”, published in Oliva Mendoza, Carlos (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, Experiencia y Fenomenología, Ediciones de la Facultad deFilosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2010, 21-33. (I read this paper at the "Workshop Kant-Fichte-Hegel", Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University, Belgium, June 24, 2011)
La relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento en el Sistema hegeliano
En: Oliva Mendoza, Carlos (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, Experiencia y Fenomenología, Ediciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2010, 21-33.
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Seen by:Contingent borders, ambiguous ethics: Migrants in (international) political theory
The article engages a critical analysis of liberal theory in the context of transnational migration. Normative... more
The article engages a critical analysis of liberal theory in the context of transnational migration. Normative arguments provided by liberal-cosmopolitan and liberal-communitarian authors are contrasted. While sympathetic to such approaches, we argue that traditional liberal theory has attempted to downplay the contingency and resultant ambiguity of many of its moral precepts. Historically contingent borders underpin neat universal categories like ‘‘citizen’’ and ‘‘refugee,’’ which fail to reflect the diverse and contested experiences of migration. But such ambiguities need not undermine liberal approaches. Indeed, a proper engagement with the problematic and uncertain realities of migration can provide a spur to a more thoroughgoing ethical praxis. We draw on the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty to outline an approach to migration that remains open to the contingent construction of terms like ‘‘migrant,’’ ‘‘refugee,’’ and ‘‘asylum-seeker.’’ By extending Rorty’s concept of sentimental education, we provide an imaginative and politically
challenging set of agendas for the ethics of migration.
Hegel contra Schlegel; Kierkegaard contra de Man
by Ayon Maharaj
PMLA 124.1 (January 2009), 107-126.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel developed an influential theory of irony that anticipated... more At the turn of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel developed an influential theory of irony that anticipated some of the central concerns of postmodernity. His most vocal contemporary critic, the philosopher Hegel, sought to demonstrate that Schlegel’s theory of irony tacitly relied on certain problematic aspects of Fichte’s philosophy. While Schlegel’s theory of irony has generated seemingly endless commentary in recent critical discourse, Hegel’s critique of Schlegelian irony has gone neglected. This essay’s primary aim is to defend Hegel’s critique of Schlegel by isolating irony’s underlying Fichtean epistemology. Drawing on Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony in the final section of this essay, I argue that Hegel’s critique of irony can motivate a dialectical hermeneutics that offers a powerful alternative both to Paul de Man’s poststructuralist hermeneutics and to recent cultural-studies-oriented criticism that tends to reduce literary texts to sociohistorical epiphenomena.
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Seen by: and 22 moreThe Specter of Hegel in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria
by Ayon Maharaj
Journal of the History of Ideas 68.2 (April 2007), 279-304.
Coleridge rarely mentions Hegel in his philosophical writings and seems to have read very little of Hegel's work. Yet... more Coleridge rarely mentions Hegel in his philosophical writings and seems to have read very little of Hegel's work. Yet I argue that Coleridge's criticisms of Schelling's philosophy—as recorded in letters and marginalia—betray remarkable intellectual affinities with his nearly exact contemporary Hegel, particularly in their shared doubts about Schelling's foundationalist intuitionism. With this background in place, I seek to demonstrate that volume one of Coleridge's Biographia Literaria is a radically self-undermining text: its philosophical argument, far from slavishly recapitulating Schelling's philosophy, remains haunted by a quasi-Hegelian skepticism toward intuition even as it advances intuition as the foundation of its theoretical edifice.
In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein: Toward a Recuperation of Hegel's Metaphysics of Agency
by Ayon Maharaj
Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 11.1 (Fall 2006), 225-255.
This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home... more This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home with oneself in one's other." I first briefly isolate the inadequacies of some dominant interpretations of Hegelian freedom and proceed to develop a more adequate theoretical frame by turning to Theodor Adorno. Then I interpret Hegel's notion of the freedom of the will in the Philosophy of Right in terms of his speculative metaphysics. Finally, I briefly examine Hegel's treatment of agency in the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to establish important continuities between the early and late Hegel.
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Seen by:Śrī Harṣa contra Hegel: Monism, Skeptical Method, and the Limits of Reason
by Ayon Maharaj
Forthcoming in Philosophy East and West
This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes... more This essay brings Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) into dialogue with Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), identifying salient points of affinity and divergence in the monistic metaphysics and skeptical methodologies of two thinkers working in entirely different traditions and separated by over six hundred years. Remarkably, both Śrī Harṣa and Hegel attempt to defend a monistic standpoint exclusively by means of a sustained critique of non-monistic philosophical positions. I will argue, however, that Śrī Harṣa and Hegel diverge sharply in their specific views on the powers and limits of philosophy and on the precise nature of monistic reality. In stark contrast to Hegel, Śrī Harṣa claims that the non-dual reality of Brahman lies beyond reason and hence rejects the very possibility of a philosophical justification of monism. Moreover, while Hegel drives a wedge between thought and empirical praxis by assuming the radical “independence of reason,” Śrī Harṣa insists that how we think and reason depends on the nature of our mind, which is itself conditioned by how we live.
Call for papers - The Inner Revolution (16th and 17th century) [English version]
by Lo Sguardo - Rivista di Filosofia
This tenth issue of Lo Sguardo will be dedicated to the “inner revolution” of he 16th and 17th century; in particular it will delve into the matter of the interiorization of the world” and the development of an “individual interiority” in the period included betweenthe end of the Renaissance and the early modern Age. With this purpose the issue will consider the “psychology of the soul” livering over the role of the “auxialiry faculties” –such as memory, imagination, fantasy – in relation to the notion of apprehensio, to the practice of spiritual exercises and to the concept of homo faber sui.
Accepted languages: English, French, Italian, Spanish, German
Deadline for the delivery: September, 10th 2012
Please feel free to contact us for any further informations: redazione@losguardo.net
http://www.losguardo.net/index.html
http://www.losguardo.net/public/collabora/collabora.html
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Seen by:Agamben's Fictions
Philosophy Compass 7.6 (2012)
This article argues that Agamben’s conception of fiction is crucial for understanding his recent works. I suggest that... more This article argues that Agamben’s conception of fiction is crucial for understanding his recent works. I suggest that the key to understanding Agamben conception of fiction is to be found in a few curious remarks at the end of Language and Death. These remarks explain why the distinctions between life and death, animal life and human life, bare life and political forms of life, the outlaw and the sovereign, and the norm and the exception that continue to preoccupy Agamben are all fictions. After considering Agamben’s account of these fictions and their relation to the relevant passage in Language and Death, the article explores the ways Agamben thinks the fictions that govern human action and social life might be unworked.
The Future of Speculation?
in Cosmos and History, Vol 8, No 1 (2012)
The emergence of a philosophical movement amidst the precarious situation of 'continental philosophy' is today... more
The emergence of a philosophical movement amidst the precarious situation of 'continental philosophy' is today notable. Whilst welcoming a turn to questions of speculation and realism, this article will contend that speculative realism has misplaced the concept of speculation. Its quasi-naturalism prevents it from relating ‘necessary contingency' to any future-oriented task. What, then, is the future of speculative realism? I will examine the extent to which the phenomenon may at least prompt a self-problematisation of historical materialism, amidst the ongoing problem historical totalisation.
My case study is Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (2006), for the reason that it allows for a clear comparison between ‘Schellingian naturephilosophy' and its competing, Hegelian and Hegelian-Marxist alternatives. Hegel's speculative philosophy of history faces a set of problems of its own. In contrast to Grant's reading of Schelling, an examination of the relationship between Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and the middle Schelling can address some of these problems. An alternative future to research on speculation is outlined.
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Seen by: and 21 moreReality Chunking
by David Roden
Review of Manual Delanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason, London: Continuum, 226 pp. Forthcoming in Deleuze Studies.
"Commentary on Henry E. Allison’s 'Autonomy and Spontaneity in Kant’s Conception of the Self'"
class paper written February 24, 2010
