Conflict, violence and peace building
The Teachings of Petr Chelčický and Its Reception in the Tradition of the Czech Philosophical Thought
by Jan Čížek
Jan ČÍŽEK, The Teachings of Petr Chelčický and Its Reception in the Tradition of the Czech Philosophical Thought, Czech and Slovak Journal of Humanities – Philosophica 1/2011, ss. 49-59.
The paper deals with the teachings of the Czech thinker Petr Chelčický. The research focuses on his theologizing... more The paper deals with the teachings of the Czech thinker Petr Chelčický. The research focuses on his theologizing philosophy, which was rather neglected in the previous philosophical and historical works dealing with his thought. The author focuses on basic aspects of Chelčický’s teachings as his rejection of all forms of violence and the idea of Christocentrim. The main interest of the author is the analysis of the reception, de-viation or re-reception of Chelčický´s philosophical and theological thought from the first generation of the Unity of the Brethren to John Amos Comenius. According to the author, Comenius’ work can be interpreted as a completion of the triad reception (characteristic of the Czech context up to the mid-nineties of the 15th century) – de-viation (delimitated in fact by the 16th century and the first two decades of the following century) – analogy (being represented by the last bishop of the Unity of the Brethren).
Peace Begins at Home by Gina Messina-Dysert
Originally published on the Feminism and Religion project
I began my career in the field of social services as a woman’s advocate for rape and domestic violence... more
I began my career in the field of social services as a woman’s advocate for rape and domestic violence survivors. The motto for an organization I was employed with early on was “peace begins at home,” a significant point that must be acknowledged. While much attention around women’s involvement in peacebuilding efforts have been focused at the macro level, there has been little consideration of women’s efforts towards peace at the micro level. Certainly, women’s involvement in formal peacebuilding processes at the larger public level is crucial. This being said, we must not undermine the leadership roles that women play in their homes, their families, and their religious and immediate communities, and how those roles can have an incredible impact on greater society.
I would like to start off by defining “peace.” It is a word that we all use quite frequently and often with different meanings...... Some would claim that peace equates the cessation of conflict.
What is complexity governance and how can this be implemented in a world complexity observatories grid?
What is complexity governance and how can this be implemented in a world complexity observatories grid?
Complexity governance is the governance of any human
relation (complexity pattern) on a peer-to-peer (complexity expression) level.
This peer-to-peer relationship gets massively monitored and deformed by the influence of the system of violence. The system of violence is based on trauma and its effects on human behavior. Trauma is automatically regulated and activated within
society by the system of violence, as a complex system. As humans do not regulate voluntarily their complexity, nature cares for the regulation of human complexity by the means of the violence system. Nature regulates human complexity for the sake of the balance of all natural systems. This interest is not contrary but also not in favor of human species.
First priority in order to take over control of this natural function is to behave as to reduce trauma influence on human social construction worldwide (complexity symptom caused by complexity patterns). Consequently, human beings need to start
regulating their complexity at the same speed at which they reduce trauma rates. In order to achieve the goal of reducing the influence of violence on society, trauma needs to be driven below the necessary critical level leading to war. The necessary
critical level is defined in clinical/medical terms. The estimate is that this level is 30% of traumatic experience and epigenetic aberration in any human population. How can we best attain this goal? Establishing a grid of complexity governance run by civil population, by normal citizens, because they are the complexity producers.
For this purpose, people will have to be trained. The training will follow a guidance described in 7 steps1. Every citizen on the planet will have the possibility to undergo complexity governance training within the next 50 years. Volunteers are on their way, and this is a very natural procedure in civil society. The situation is different for state forces like Military and police. They would like to be involved and encouraged to be the first training in complexity governance. Their job is to maintain security and to reduce violence world wide, and their role will have to be enforced by law because they act within institutions. They are in fact the first ones who need and wish to take on the mission and lead a war against the violence system, systematically and with full conviction. But, they need to redefine their enemy as defined by laws that are not yet designed for this purpose. For this reason, legal systems defining democracy need to incorporate the understanding for the existing violence system as a system, as to back up state forces mission. This can be done in agreement with Global Civil Society, if citizens take on their responsibility in the process.
Communities and Media in the Aftermath of Conflict - Participatory productions for reconciliation and peace
Paper presented at the Conference ‘Cultivating Peace: Contexts, Practices and Multi-dimensional Models’, 17-19 May 2012, Centre for Peace Studies, University of New England, Armidale, Australia
A reality characterised by a lack of dialogue among groups can be regarded as a fertile ground for the setup of... more
A reality characterised by a lack of dialogue among groups can be regarded as a fertile ground for the setup of community media, where people are given the means for self-expression and succeed in identifying problems and solutions through debate. After a civil conflict, tangible schemes for rebuilding infrastructures should be accompanied by a social renewal aimed primarily at re-establishing a structure among civil society. Within this context, interventions striving to achieve reconciliation at the inter-group level gain particular relevance.
The introduction of participatory approaches to communication emerging from the evolution of Communication for Development as a discipline, have led to the rise of new form of community media productions that have come to be known as participatory media. After providing an illustration and definition of participatory media, this paper seeks to demonstrate the crucial role that this type of productions can play in communities in the aftermath of a civil war or inter-communal violence.
The article begins with an overview to the notion of participation in development and its link to a new model of development communication, based on the pursuit of social change. This will open the path to a discussion on the rise of the media produced by local communities and their use in developing contexts. A review of some of the literature in this field will assist in distinguishing and defining a specific set of community media that sees the direct participation of local community members as the primary element of their production. Subsequently, an analysis of the role of the media in the light of conflict transformation theory will show how media outputs created through participatory methodologies of video, photography and theatre can be regarded as effective tools for dealing with the hostility and grief that linger after a civil conflict, as they provide those channels of communication and storytelling that are needed for effective development interventions aimed at community reconciliation. Examples drawn from projects implemented in developing countries will be brought forward to demonstrate the impact these productions can have in re-connecting groups affected by violence.
Catharsis and Violence: Terrorism and the Fascination for Superlative Destruction
(2012) “Catharsis and Violence: Terrorism and the Fascination for Superlative Destruction”. Boleswa Journal of Philosophy, Theology and Religion. Vol. 3, No.3, 2012, pp. 172-184, ISSN 1817-2741
This paper investigates human interest in simulated, mediated and real violence, especially in the context of... more This paper investigates human interest in simulated, mediated and real violence, especially in the context of terrorism, by following a synthetic-transdisciplinary approach bridging research findings on aggression and violence from areas such as philosophy, religious studies, art theory, cultural critique, psychology, anthropology and ethology. The findings suggest that certain acts of superlative destruction, e.g. the 9/11 terror attacks, can be rendered as numinous acts and as imitatio dei. The paper claims that the fascination for superlative destruction (FSD) is an anthropological datum. Depending on the circumstances, the distanced experience of simulated, mediated or real violence may lead to an experience of catharsis, a discharge of particular suppressed emotions. But the relation of violence and catharsis is delicate due to the potential and evidenced risk of copy-cat effects regarding such aggression.
Have You Ever Been in Bosnia? British Military Travelers in the Balkans since 1992
Journeys: the International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing 12:1 (2011): 63-92
Tens of thousands of British military personnel traveled in former Yugoslavia as peacekeepers between 1992 and 2007.... more
Tens of thousands of British military personnel traveled in former Yugoslavia as peacekeepers between 1992 and 2007. The settlements where British forces established their military presence and supply chain were conceptually far from former Yugoslavia’s tourist sites, but military travelers made sense of them by drawing on the commonplaces of previous travel accounts and the lessons of pre-deployment training.
British military travelers constructed themselves as often frustrated helpers in Bosnia who struggled with political limitations on their activities but found satisfaction in improving socio-economic relations at the level of the immediate community. For troops, long otiose periods in a stabilizing and startlingly cheap country engendered a touristic sensibility. This paper draws on published memoirs and more than fifty new oral history interviews with British peacekeepers and their Bosnian employees to illustrate how British military travelers drew on, perpetuated and changed the patterns and representation of British travel to the Balkans.
Understanding the Sustainability of Insurgency Conflict in Thailand
Working Paper
This paper seeks to model the insurgency conflict in the three southern border provinces of the Kingdom of Thailand:... more
This paper seeks to model the insurgency conflict in the three southern border provinces of the Kingdom of Thailand: Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. In so doing it will explore the sustainability
of the conflict by representing it in terms of a conflict life cycle that is responsive to complexity and change. The cycle arises from the cybernetic viable systems theory of “living systems”, and is able to foster a better understanding of what is happening empirically on the social level in these provinces, in respect to a situation characterized as one of incessant conflicts. This conflict model that arises suggests that there is an interconnection between the agents involved, and their
individual and interactive dynamics. The conflict involves five types of politically related behaviour that occurs between two interactive agents: the state (engaged in searching for and
making arrests of insurgents) and the insurgents (engaged in violent acts of shooting, bombing and arson). These agents are studied to the end of being able to determine the precise interactive nature of the political conflict in which they are engaged. In carrying out this investigation both quantitative and qualitative approaches are used. The research is carried out in three stages. In the first stage, time series techniques are used to determine inferentially whether the conflict is both rational and involves interactive behaviours. Stage two adopts the Weibull distribution technique to assess the political conflict. In the third stage, a statistical analysis is conducted of the conflict
situation in political terms. Finally it is explained how the model and the methods used in this paper may be used to deal with intractable conflict in other social environments, and incidentally
track the likelihood of conflicts being sustainable. Other agencies could utilize this approach in examining other political conflicts so as to be better able to prepare suitable approaches to coping with intractable conflicts to the end of fostering sustainable peace processes.
Symbols of Power in Rituals of Violence: The Personality Cult and Iconoclasm on the Soviet Empire’s Periphery (East Germany, 1945–61)
published in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 13, Number 1, Winter 2012, pp. 47-88.
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Seen by: and 8 moreEgyptian military’s loss of popularity brings ultras in from the cold
By James M. Dorsey
It took Egypt’s military brass less than six months to first isolate street-battle... more
By James M. Dorsey
It took Egypt’s military brass less than six months to first isolate street-battle hardened soccer fans, the country’s most militant opponents of military rule, and then restore their waning popularity amid mushrooming protests demanding an immediate return of the armed forces to their barracks and a transition to civilian government.
The ultras– militant, highly politicized, violence-prone soccer fans modeled on similar groups in Italy and Serbia – chanting "Where are the Baltagiya (thugs)? The Revolutionaries are here" and “Tantawi is Mubarak,” joined this weekend thousands of protesters in a confrontation with security forces in Cairo near the defense ministry.
The timing of the protest could not have been more symbolic – the 84th birthday of ousted President Hosni Mubarak with whom the protesters have come to equate Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the head of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
The health ministry said a soldier was killed and more than 400 people injured in clashes between the protesters and security forces barely three weeks before the first scheduled presidential elections since the toppling of Mubarak more than a year ago. A group of doctors aiding wounded protesters said two demonstrators had died of shotgun wounds.
The government declared a night curfew in the area around the defense ministry in Cairo’s Al Abbasiya neighborhood. Similar protests occurred in other Egyptian cities, including Alexandria and Suez. An effort by protesters to defy the curfew was repelled in part by residents of Abbasiya, a stronghold of support for Mubarak and the military.
The joining of forces of Salafists – proponents of return to life as it was at the time of the Prophet Mohammed --, Islamists, youth and left wing groups and ultras in their demand for an end to military rule in defiance of a warning by SCAF that it would not tolerate protests near the defense ministry or military facilities symbolizes the military’s misreading of the public mood.
The coming together of protesters of all walks of life was a far cry from the scene in late November and early December when protesters on Tahrir Square first called on the ultras to protect them against attacks by security forces but then abandoned them as they fought vicious street battles with the police in a street just off the square. Some 50 people were killed at the time in the fighting and more than a thousand wounded.
The then isolation of the youth groups and ultras – respected for their years of resistance in the stadiums to Mubarak’s brutal security forces and celebrated for their key role in toppling the hated leader -- reflected growing protest weariness at a time that the public retained confidence in the military despite its brutality, was frustrated by the lack of economic fruits of their popular revolt and longed for a return to normalcy that would put Egypt back on the path of economic growth.
The ultras’ increasing marginalization was evident in their lonely battle in recent months to demand justice for the 74 soccer fans killed in early February in a soccer brawl in Port Suez, the worst incident in Egyptian sporting history that was widely seen as an effort by the security forces to teach the militants a lesson.
Security forces failed to intervene in the brawl in which pro-government thugs armed with sticks and knives were believed to have been involved. The government has charged 61 people, including nine security officials, with responsibility for the incident. The incident led to the cancellation of this season’s top two soccer competitions. A majority of the dead were supporters of Al Ahly SC, Egypt and Africa’s foremost soccer club.
A series of unpopular measures widely seen as an effort by the military to manipulate the outcome of the presidential election to ensure that a civilian-led Egypt is governed by a president and government sympathetic to safeguarding the role of the armed forces in politics and its stake in the economy and shield them from external oversight has over the past week brought protesters back in to the streets in ever growing numbers.
The measures included the banning of popular Islamist politicians and others from standing for president and culminated in an attack by thugs on anti-military protesters last Wednesday that left 11 people dead, some of them shot, others reportedly with their throats slit. Like in the case of Port Said, few doubt that the military at the very least had turned a blind eye to aggression by unidentified pro-regime thugs.
The mounting tension has strengthened the resolve of the ultras to force justice for their fallen comrades in Port Said and press for an end to military rule. In a show of unity in March, ultras of crowned Cairo arch rivals Ahly and Al Zamalek SC warned that they would sacrifice their lives to achieve their goals.
The statement at the end of a historic meeting between the two groups who have bitterly fought each other since their inception in 2007 suggested a sea change in Egypt’s soccer politics and a cementing of relationships among rival groups that have the organization and street battle experience to turn the military’s effort to mold Egypt in its image into a bitter and bloody struggle.
State-owned Al Ahram newspaper warned earlier this year that the ultras were “a time bomb ticking due to lack of justice for fallen comrades following the Port Said disaster.”
In a statement almost two months after the Port Said incident, Ultras Ahlawy said: “You can call us thugs, you can call us crazy, but we will be crazy to regain our rights, either through legal avenues or with our bare hands. We are ready to die for our rights; we are ready to add to the toll of 74 deaths.”
The ultras bring to the demonstrations against the military in Al Abbasiya the same degree of fearlessness, recklessness and abandon that they brought to last year’s mass protests on Tahrir Square that forced Mubarak to resign after 30 years in office.
"The government has turned the ultras into their enemy. That was a mistake. The ultras are passionate; they don’t have a specific agenda and don’t want to be labeled politically. They go into battle with abandon impervious to what it may produce,” said Mohammed Gamal Bashir aka Gemyhood, a founder of the UWK and author of a recent Arabic-language book about the ultras who is widely seen as the movement’s Egyptian godfather.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
Potential Lives, Impossible Deaths: Afghanistan, Civilian Casualties and the Politics of Intelligibility
The number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan has increased dramatically in recent years as the International... more
The number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan has increased dramatically in recent years as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has tried to put down the Taliban insurgency. Reports of civilian casualties are, however, frequently dismissed as being examples of Taliban propaganda or blamed on the actions of enemy fighters, while the tragic loss of civilians is rarely marked or even acknowledged within the dominant frames of war. At first glance, the fact that civilians are so easily expendable appears to be at odds with the humanitarian intentions underpinning the war. However, I argue that the rhetoric of humanitarianism operates to preclude Afghans from appearing as recognizable human beings, foreclosing the possibility that they possess a life worthy of protection. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler, I will trace the ways in which Afghans have been reduced to the status of absolute victims, denied the very essence of their humanity and therefore a publically grievable death. By effectively constructing them as the living-dead, existing in a state of abeyance, Afghans have been exposed to a deathly logic in which their lives are expendable in the quest to make them liveable once again.
call for papers-Metamorphosis of the Arab World-Political Geography and Alternative Maps
by barış çoban
Metamorphosis of The Arab World:
Political Geography and Alternative Maps
Editors: Barış Çoban, Barış Erdoğan
The so-called "Arab Spring", recent social movements in the Arab world, which can also be described as the "return of the oppressed", have attracted international attention on the Middle East and Arab world. The Middle East, North Africa and Turkey have been profoundly affected by this political and social metamorphosis. The objective of this project is to discuss “metamorphosis of the Arab world” in the context of international relations, politics, sociology, economics and communications and so on by the contribution of several academicians, researchers, politicians and journalists.
The geography of the Arab world is in a process of metamorphosis and consequently traditional structure of the Arab world, its power structure, power relations, politics and social relations have been fluctuated by the hand of the global super power(s). In fact, “All that is solid melts into air", this expression summarizes clearly what is happening in the Middle East and North Africa. The possible outcomes and/or result of this ongoing process are vague, and it needs to be discussed with its all aspects.
As a result, our focus is on “metamorphosis” of the Middle East and the Arab world, since it simultaneously means “metamorphosis” of the world. This book project aims to address and discuss transformation and subsequent reformation of societies and changes in the political geographies and mental maps of the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey from past to present with a multi-voice and multi-layer approach.
(Papers can be submitted in English, French and Turkish)
Deadline for Abstracts: June 1, 2012
Deadline for Full Paper: December 25, 2012
(Please use APA style)
E-mail:
barishc@gmail.com
baris.erdogan1974@hotmail.com,
Editors:
Barış Çoban (Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of Communication Studies, Dogus University, Turkey)
Barış Erdoğan (Assist Prof. Dr., Department of Political Sciences, Yeni Yuzyil University, Turkey)
Métamorphose du monde arabe:
Géographie politique et des cartes alternatives
Editeurs: Barış Çoban, Barış Erdoğan
Les mouvenents sociaux recents apparus dans une large partie du monde arabe, appellés communement «printemps arabe», peuvent également être décrit comme le «retour de l'opprimé», ont attiré l'attention internationale sur le Moyen-Orient et le monde arabe. Le Moyen-Orient, l'Afrique du Nord et la Turquie ont été profondément touchés par cette métamorphose politique et sociale. L'objectif de ce projet est de discuter «la métamorphose du monde arabe » dans le contexte des relations internationales, politique, sociologie, économie et communication et ainsi de suite par les biais de la contribution de plusieurs universitaires, chercheurs, politiciens et journalistes.
La géographie du monde arabe est dans un processus de métamorphose et par conséquent la structure traditionnelle du monde arabe, sa structure de pouvoir, les relations de pouvoir, la politique et les relations sociales se sont gravement écroulés par la main de la(des) puissance(s) mondiale(s). En fait, «Tout ce qui est solide se dissout dans l'air", cette expression résume bien ce qui se passe au Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord. Les résultats possible et / ou résultat de ce processus en cours sont vagues, et ils doivent être discuté dans tous ses aspects.
Par conséquent, nous nous concentrons sur la métamorphose du Moyen-Orient et du monde arabe, puisqu'elle constitue à la fois la métamorphose du monde. Ce projet a pour objectif d'aborder et discuter de la transformation et la réforme de ces sociétés ainsi que les modifications de la géographie politique et cartes mentales du Moyen-Orient , de l'Afrique du Nord et de la Turquie du passé au présent, avec un multi-voix et une approche multicouche.
Transmission des propositions et date limite
Vorte propositions doit etre transmise a baris.erdogan1974@hotmail.com ou barishc@gmail.com au plus tard le 1er juin 2012. Les articles peuvent être rédigés en anglais, français ou en turc
ECHEANCIERS
- Date limite de réception des propositions : 1er juin 2012
- Date limite de réception des articles : 25 décembre 2012
Information technique
Les propositions, d’un maximum de deux pages, en format Microsoft Word ou PDF, 12 points, devront contenir: le titre de la proposition; le sujet; le nom de l’auteur ou des auteurs; l’institution ou organisation à laquelle vous êtes attaché
Articles
- les articles ne pourront dépasser, avec leur bibliographie, 30 000 caractères, espaces non compris;
- ils devront inclure un résumé de 150 mots maximum qui devra être présenté en français, en anglais ou en turque;
Editeurs :
Dr. Barış Çoban, maitre de conférence, le département de communication, l’Universite de Doğuş, Turquie.
Dr. Barış ERDOGAN, maitre de conférence adjoint, le département des relations internationales l’Université de Yeni Yüzyıl, Turquie.
Arap Dünyasının Dönüşümü:
Siyasetin Coğrafyası ve Alternatif Haritalar
Editörler: Barış Çoban, Barış Erdoğan
Arap ülkelerinde yaşanan ve “Arap Baharı” olarak adlandırılan, “bastırılmış olanın geri döndüğü” kitle hareketleri sonrasında tüm dünyanın gözü yeniden Ortadoğu ve diğer Arap ülkelerine odaklandı. Ortadoğu, Kuzey Afrika ve Türkiye yaşanan siyasal ve toplumsal bu dönüşümden derin bir biçimde etkilenmekte. Bu sürecin uluslararası ilişkiler, siyaset, sosyoloji, ekonomi ve iletişim vb. alanları bağlamında tartışılmasını amaçlayan bu kitap projesi, farklı disiplinlerden akademisyen, araştırmacı, siyasetçi ve gazetecilerin katkılarından oluşacaktır.
Söz konusu coğrafyada bir yılı aşkın bir süredir küresel iktidar(lar)ın da farklı biçimlerde müdahil olduğu toplumsal hareketler geleneksel iktidar yapılarını, siyaset biçimlerini ve toplumsal ilişkileri parçalamakta. Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika’da “katı olan her şey buharlaşmakta”. Bu coğrafyada kurulma aşamasında olan yeni düzende siyasi ve sosyal aktörlerin bu buharlaşmanın ardından nasıl bir katılaşma süreci izleyeceği ise şimdilik belirsiz ve üzerinde çok boyutlu olarak düşünülmesi gereken bir konu.
Sonuç olarak, odak noktamız Ortadoğu’nun ve Arap Dünyasının dönüşümüdür, çünkü bu dönüşüm eşzamanlı olarak dünyanın dönüşümüdür. Bu kitap projesi Ortadoğu, Kuzey Afrika ve Türkiye coğrafyası bağlamında tarihten günümüze siyasal ve zihinsel haritaların değişimi ve toplumların dönüşümünü çoksesli, çok katmanlı bir yaklaşımla ele almayı ve tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır.
(Makaleler Türkçe, İngilizce, Fransızca dillerinde yazılabilir)
Makale Başlığı ve Özeti Gönderimi Son Tarih: 1 Haziran 2012
Tamamlanmış Makale Gönderimi Son Tarih: 25 Aralık 2012
(Makaleler APA formatına göre yazılacaktır.)
İletişim:
barishc@gmail.com
baris.erdogan1974@hotmail.com
(Barış Çoban, Doç. Dr. Doğuş Üniversitesi, Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi, İletişim Bilimleri Bölümü)
(Barış Erdoğan, Yrd. Doç. Dr., Yeni Yüzyıl Üniversitesi, İktisadi İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü)
call for papers-
Metamorphosis of the Arab World-
Political Geography and Alternative Maps
Metamorphosis of the Arab World-
Political Geography and Alternative Maps
Métamorphose du monde arabe:
Géographie politique et des cartes alternatives
Arap Dünyasının Dönüşümü:
Siyasetin Coğrafyası ve Alternatif Haritalar
[Article] MATEOS, O. (2009): “Vargas Llosa y el regreso de Kaplan”
by Oscar Mateos
In: Rebelión, 18 de febrero
[Book chapter] MATEOS, O. (2011), “Entre el “nuevo barbarismo” y la ‘maldición de los recursos’”
by Oscar Mateos
In: VVAA. África, continente ignorado, Fundación Seminario Investigación para la paz, Zaragoza
Este libro realiza una aproximación interdisciplinar a la realidad del África Subsahariana, desde distintas... more
Este libro realiza una aproximación interdisciplinar a la realidad del África Subsahariana, desde distintas perspectivas: histórica, política, socioeconómica, cultural y religiosa, y de relaciones exteriores; analiza también la conflictividad y los modelos de acción humanitaria y de cooperación vigentes.
[...]
CONCLUSION: NEITHER BUILT NOR FORMED – THE TRANSFORMATION OF POST-CONFLICT STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
Statebuilding and State-Formation: The political sociology of intervention, Edited by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara,Published 17th February 2012 by Routledge
This is a pre-print version. Get the book via the link above.
The global performance state: a reconsideration of the Central Asian ‘weak state’
A pre-publication paper, forthcoming in the Beyer, Rasanayagam and Reeves volume, 'Performing Politics in Central Asia', under review
Extract: 'We are faced with a contradictory picture regarding the sovereign state which was brought forth unexpectedly... more Extract: 'We are faced with a contradictory picture regarding the sovereign state which was brought forth unexpectedly after the unraveling of the Soviet Union in 1991. The state seems at once omnipresent and perennially absent, omniscient and powerless, omnific and wholly lacking in productive capacity. What is the significance of these gigantic flag-poles and the proliferation of images of statehood across the capitals and countrysides of Central Asian states? Are they merely a symbolic gloss deployed to conceal institutional failure and the lack of the basic materials of statehood (armed forces, balanced budgets and so forth)? Or do they point to a deeper reality of the conditions of statehood in an era of ‘reputation management’ and increasing global connectedness of new media and vastly increased rates of overseas development assistance? This paper seeks to address, conceptually and empirically, this tension found in Political Science studies of Central Asian and other post-colonial states.'
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Seen by:Від перекладача [Preface to:] Ми не є українофілами. Польська політична думка про Україну і українців. Антологія текстів
by Serhiy Hirik
Published as a preface to the book: Ми не є українофілами. Польська політична думка про Україну і українців / Упор. П.Коваль, Я.Олдаковський, М.Зухняк, перекл. С.Гірік. - К.: Вид. дім "Києво-Могилянська академія", 2012.
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Seen by:Conflicting visions of society spark Israeli and Egyptian soccer violence
By James M. Dorsey
Fan violence has sparked match cancellations on both sides of the Arab-Israeli... more
By James M. Dorsey
Fan violence has sparked match cancellations on both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide.
The stakes for Egyptian and Israeli soccer fans are high – the nature of the society they want to live in and in some cases the very existence of some of their financially troubled clubs – even if the two groups are likely to agree on little more than their passion for the game.
For militant Egyptian soccer fans the battle is about securing the goals of last year’s popular uprising that toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, ending military rule and saving clubs from financial ruin as a result of initial suspension and ultimate cancellation of Egypt’s top two tournaments. A majority of Egyptian fans, who favor a more pro-Palestinian Egyptian foreign policy, have little empathy for their Israeli counterparts whom they see as thugs, many of whom are racists with their anti-Arab and anti-Muslim chants attitudes.
The Egyptian view is not unfounded even if leaders of the Egyptian ultras – militant, highly politicized, street battle-hardened fan groups modeled on similar organizations in Italy and Serbia – are struggling to keep their rank and file whose cry for dignity is often expressed in clashes with security forces under control.
Israeli soccer brawls over the past month ranged from pure hooliganism and violent clashes between players to attacks on Palestinians and more moderate Jews outside the confines of the stadium. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Sunday called for a crackdown on violence on the soccer field, after fighting broke out on Friday between players of Hapoel Ramat Gan and Bnei Lod. "If there's violence, there will not be soccer. We must uproot this violence in order to return to games that spectators can enjoy, myself among them,” Mr. Netanyahu told a cabinet meeting according to The Jerusalem Post.
The incident in Ramat Gan followed thousands of Hapoel Tel Aviv fans rioting on the pitch after their team lost to Maccabi Tel Aviv.
A few days later, two fans of Maccabi Petach Tikvah attempted to attack a referee. In late March a Hapoel Haifa player was hospitalized after being headbutted by a Maccabi Petach Tikvah coach and then kicked in the head by a team associate. The two most onerous incidents involved militant anti-Arab fans of financially troubled Beitar Jerusalem, Mr. Netanyahu’s notorious club, in which supporters first attacked Palestinian workers and shoppers in a Jerusalem mall and later a Jewish woman who protested against their racist attitude. Police were severely criticized for failing to intervene in the mall attack.
The situation in nationalist Israel and post-Egypt could not be more different the laxity of the Israeli police notwithstanding. Yet, they are similar when it comes to the lack of political will on both sides of the Egyptian-Israeli divide to tackle soccer violence as well as governments’ failure to create an environment in which politically motivated violence is viewed as unacceptable. To be sure, the Israeli Football Association (IFA) has responded firmly to player violence but despite being the only soccer body in the Middle East and North Africa to have launched an anti-racist campaign has been lenient in meting out punishments for politically motivated violence.
The IFA last month significantly reduced Beitar's punishment for soccer violence from three home games out of town and one behind partly closed doors to on the grounds that the measure would not change fan behavior. With the worst disciplinary record in Israel’s Premier League, Beitar has faced since 2005 more than 20 hearings and has received various punishments, including point deductions, fines and matches behind closed doors because of its fans’ racism.
Beitar’s matches often resemble a Middle Eastern battlefield. It’s mostly Sephardic fans of Middle Eastern and North African origin, revel in their status as the bad boys of Israeli soccer. Their dislike of Ashkenazi Jews of East European extraction rivals their disdain for Palestinians. Supported by Israeli right wing leaders, Beitar traces its roots to a revanchist Zionist youth movement. Its founding players actively resisted the pre-state British mandate authorities. Beitar is Israel’s only leading club never to have signed an Israeli Palestinian player because of fan pressure despite the fact that Palestinians are among the country’s top players.
By contrast, Egyptian teams already reeling from the cancellation of the Premier League in February following the death of 74 fans in a brawl in the Suez Canal city of Port Said fear financial disaster as a result of Sunday’s looming annulment of the Egypt Cup. The Egyptian Football Association (EFA) has appealed to the country’s military rulers, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to step in after a refusal by the interior ministry, which controls the police and the security forces. The refusal was prompted by the security forces’ reluctance to engage with deeply hostile, militant soccer fans because clashes would further damage their already tarnished image as the executioners of the former Mubarak regime and the military.
The military and the police have done little in the 14 months since Mubarak’s departure to polish the image of the security forces by projecting a willingness to reform the police, holding officers accountable for their actions and being seen to investigate the Port Said incident that allows the chips to fall where they fall. The trial against 61, people including fans and nine security officials, accused of responsibility for Port Said was suspended at its opening last week after disruptions by family and friends of the dead.
Police reform is a tough pill to swallow for the Egyptian military. The military “find themselves in a classic Catch-22 situation with regards to police reform. If they listen to the aspirations of the people and fully reform the police, they lose a valuable tool of state control. Should reform take place, where would the buck stop? Real reform in state institutions might later have personal ramifications for SCAF itself, as Egyptians are already calling for civilian control over the military, which may lead to investigations of the military junta down the line. On the other hand, should SCAF choose not to fully reform the police, they risk continued clashes with the people, who no longer fear the police - and consider it one of the last remaining bastions of the old regime,” said Adel Abdel Ghafar, a PhD scholar at the Australian National University and scion of a prominent Egyptian soccer figure, writing on Al Jazeera.com.
Granted, the Israeli police does not have the problems of their Egyptian counterpart. But if the stakes in Egypt are a more transparent, more accountable society, in Israel they are the very democracy that the Jewish state prides itself on, which increasingly is less based on tolerance and respect for diverging opinions and ethnic and religious minorities and ever more so on intolerance and the brutalizing effects of 45 years of occupation of Palestinian lands.
Violence in Israel is not limited to the soccer pitch. A senior Israeli military officer was celebrated by Israel’s right wing after attacking on camera a bicycle protester on the West Bank on camera in the same week as the Ramat Gan incident. Youths on a Tel Aviv beach taunted and abused a mentally disturbed woman inviting her to have sex with them.
The battles in Egypt and Israel are fought on multiple battlefields of which soccer is an important one. That puts the onus not only on governments but also on soccer associations, club management and last but not least world soccer body FIFA, which so far for all practical matters has looked the other way by at best issuing lame protests that Israelis and Egyptians can ignore because there is no price to pay.
With an inept military more concerned about its perks than the country’s future in charge in Egypt and an Israeli government that includes many Beitar Jerusalem supporters, little can be expected beyond at best demands for law enforcement from the highest authority in the country.
That means that the national soccer federations, FIFA and the regional associations, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and the Confederation of African Football (CAF), more than ever need to step up to the plate.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
