Concepts

Contours of time: Topographic construals of past, present, and future in the Yupno Valley of Papua New Guinea

by Kensy Cooperrider

Co-authored with Rafael Núñez, D Doan, and Jürg Wassmann

Time, an everyday yet fundamentally abstract domain, is conceptualized in terms of space throughout the world’s... more Time, an everyday yet fundamentally abstract domain, is conceptualized in terms of space throughout the world’s cultures. Linguists and psychologists have presented evidence of a widespread pattern in which deictic time—past, present, and future—is construed along the front/back axis, a construal that is linear and ego-based. To investigate the universality of this pattern, we studied the construal of deictic time among the Yupno, an indigenous group from the mountains of Papua New Guinea, whose language makes extensive use of allocentric topographic (uphill/downhill) terms for describing spatial relations. We measured the pointing direction of Yupno speakers’ gestures—produced naturally and without prompting—as they explained common expressions related to the past, present, and future. Results show that the Yupno spontaneously construe deictic time spatially in terms of allocentric topography: the past is construed as downhill, the present as co-located with the speaker, and the future as uphill. Moreover, the Yupno construal is not linear, but exhibits a particular geometry that appears to reflect the local terrain. The findings shed light on how, our universal human embodiment notwithstanding, linguistic, cultural, and environmental pressures come to shape abstract concepts.

Numbers without number lines in an indigenous group of Papua New Guinea

by Kensy Cooperrider

Co-authored with Rafael Núñez and Jürg Wassmann

Background
The generic concept of number line, which maps numbers to unidimensional space, is a fundamental... more Background
The generic concept of number line, which maps numbers to unidimensional space, is a fundamental concept in mathematics, but its cognitive origins are uncertain. Two defining criteria of the number line are that (i) there is a mapping of each individual number (or numerosity) under consideration onto a specific location on the line, and (ii) that the mapping defines a unidimensional space representing numbers with a metric — a distance function. It has been proposed that the number line is based on a spontaneous universal human intuition, rooted directly in brain evolution, that maps number magnitude to linear space with a metric. To date, no culture lacking this intuition has been documented.

Methodology/Principal Findings
By means of a number line task, we investigated the universality proposal with the Yupno of Papua New Guinea. Unschooled adults did exhibit a number-to-space mapping (criterion i) but, strikingly, despite having precise cardinal number concepts, they located numbers only on the endpoints, thus failing to use the extent of the line. The produced mapping was bi-categorical and metric-free, in violation of criterion ii. In contrast, Yupnos with scholastic experience used the extent of the segment according to known standards, but they did so not as evenly as western controls, exhibiting a bias towards the endpoints.

Conclusions/Significance
Results suggest that cardinal number concepts can exist independently from number line representations. They also suggest that the number line mapping, although ubiquitous in the modern world, is not universally spontaneous, but rather seems to be learned through — and continually reinforced by — specific cultural practices.

Spatial attention is driven by mental simulations.

by Diane Pecher

Van Dantzig, S. & Pecher, D. (2011). Spatial attention is driven by mental simulations. Frontiers in Cognition, 2:121.

Congruency between word position and meaning is caused by task induced spatial attention.

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., van Dantzig, S. Boot, I., Zanolie, K., & Huber, D. E. (2010). Congruency between word position and meaning is caused by task induced spatial attention. Frontiers in Cognition, 1:30.

Representation of categories: Metaphorical use of the container schema.

by Diane Pecher

Boot, I. & Pecher, D. (2011). Representation of categories: Metaphorical use of the container schema. Experimental Psychology, 58, 162-170.

In the present study we investigated whether the mental representation of the concept categories is represented by the... more In the present study we investigated whether the mental representation of the concept categories is represented by the container image schema (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In two experiments participants decided whether two pictures were from the same category (animal or vehicle). Pictures were presented inside or outside a frame that should activate the container schema. We found that performance to pictures was
influenced by the frame in congruence with the metaphorical mapping (same category – inside bounded region; different category – not in same bounded region). These results show that the concept categories is metaphorically represented by containers.

Numbers in Space: Differences between concrete and abstract situations.

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., & Boot, I. (2011). Numbers in Space: Differences between concrete and abstract situations. Frontiers in Cognition, 2:121.

Abstract concepts: Sensory-motor grounding, metaphors, and beyond.

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Boot, I., & Van Dantzig, S. (2011). Abstract concepts: Sensory-motor grounding, metaphors, and beyond. In B. Ross (Ed.). The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol. 54 (pp. 217-248). Burlington: Academic Press.

In the last decade many researchers have obtained evidence for the idea that cognition shares processing mechanisms... more In the last decade many researchers have obtained evidence for the idea that cognition shares processing mechanisms with perception and action. Most of the evidence supporting the grounded cognition framework focused on representations of concrete concepts, which leaves open the question how abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing. One promising idea is that people simulate concrete situations and introspective experiences to represent abstract concepts [Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher, & R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking (pp. 129–163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.], although this has not yet been investigated a lot. A second idea, which more researchers have investigated, is that people use metaphorical mappings from concrete to abstract concepts [Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press.]. According to this conceptual metaphor theory, image schemas structure and provide sensory-motor grounding for abstract concepts. Although there is evidence that people automatically activate image schemas when they process abstract concepts, we argue that situations are also needed to fully represent meaning.

Verifying Visual Properties in Sentence Verification Facilitates Picture Recognition Memory

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Zanolie, K., & Zeelenberg, R. (2007). Verifying visual properties in sentence verification facilitates picture recognition memory. Experimental Psychology, 54, 173-179.

According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of... more According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. We investigated whether recognition memory for pictures of concepts was facilitated by earlier representation of visual properties of those concepts. During study, concept names (e.g., apple) were presented in a property verification task with a visual property (e.g., shiny) or with a nonvisual property (e.g., tart). Delayed picture recognition memory was better if the concept name had been presented with a visual property than if it had been presented with a nonvisual property. These results indicate that modality-specific simulations are used for concept representation.

Perceptual Processing Affects Conceptual Processing

by Diane Pecher

Van Dantzig, S., Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. Cognitive Science, 32, 579-590.

According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (Barsalou, 1999), modality-specific simulations underlie the... more According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (Barsalou, 1999), modality-specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property-verification task in alternation. Responses on the property-verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This finding of a modality-switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems.

Similarity is closeness: Metaphorical mapping in a conceptual task

by Diane Pecher

Boot, I. & Pecher, D. (2010) Similarity is closeness: Metaphorical mapping in a perceptual task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 942-954.

The conceptual metaphor theory states that abstract concepts are represented by image schemas from concrete domains.... more The conceptual metaphor theory states that abstract concepts are represented by image schemas from concrete domains. In the present study we investigated the mapping for SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS using tasks with nonlinguistic materials. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants decided whether two squares were similar or dissimilar in colour. The spatial distance between the squares was varied. Performance to similar colours was better at shorter distances, whereas performance to dissimilar colours was better at longer distances. In Experiments 3 and 4 participants made distance decisions to similar and dissimilar colours squares. Performance was not affected by similarity. These results show that metaphorical mappings can be found even beyond the context of linguistic metaphors and that the mapping between SIMILARITY and CLOSENESS is
asymmetrical.

Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Van Dantzig, S., & Schifferstein, H. N. J. (2009). Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 914-919.

According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We... more According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We investigated whether this overlap is due to conscious perceptual imagery. Participants filled out questionnaires to assess the vividness of their imagery (Questionnaire on Mental Imagery) and the extent to which their imagery was object oriented and spatially oriented (Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire), and they performed a mental rotation task. One week later, they performed a verbal property verification task. In
this task, involvement of modality-specific systems is evidenced by the modality-switch effect, the finding that performance on a target trial (e.g., apple–green) is better after a same-modality trial (e.g., diamond–sparkle) than after a different-modality trial (e.g., airplane–noisy). Results showed a modality-switch effect, but there was no systematic relation between imagery scores and modality switch. We conclude that conscious mental imagery is not fundamental to conceptual representation.

Evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming in conceptual implicit memory tasks

by Diane Pecher

Zeelenberg, R., & Pecher, D. (2003). Evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming in conceptual implicit memory tasks. Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 80-94.

Previous studies have failed to find evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming (e.g., presentation of... more Previous studies have failed to find evidence for long-term cross-language repetition priming (e.g., presentation of the English word "frog" does not facilitate responding to its Dutch translation equivalent "kikker" on a later presentation). The present study tested the hypothesis that failure to find cross-language repetition priming in previous studies was due to the use of tasks that rely primarily on lexical or orthographic processing of the stimuli instead of conceptual processing. Consistent with this hypothesis we obtained reliable cross-language repetition priming when conceptual implicit memory tasks were used. The present results support theories of bilingual memory that assume shared conceptual representations for translation equivalents. In particular, our results support the concept mediation model as they indicate that bilinguals access the conceptional representation directly from the L2 lexical representation (i.e., without first accessing the L1 lexical representation).

Sensorimotor simulations underlie conceptual representations: Modality-specific effects of prior activation

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2004). Sensorimotor simulations underlie conceptual representations: Modality-specific effects of prior activation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 164-167.

According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of... more According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. Simulations are componential in the sense that they vary with the context in which the concept is presented. In the present study, we investigated whether representations are affected by recent experiences with a concept. Concept names (e.g., APPLE) were presented twice in a property verification task with a different property on each occasion. The two properties were either from the same perceptual modality (e.g., green, shiny) or from different modalities (e.g., tart, shiny). All stimuli were words. There was a lag of several intervening trials between the first and second presentation. Verification times and error rates for the second presentation of the concept were higher if the properties were from different modalities than if they were from the same modality.

Verifying different-modality properties for concepts produces switching costs

by Diane Pecher

Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Verifying conceptual properties in different modalities produces switching costs. Psychological Science, 14, 119-124.

According to perceptual symbol systems, sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows... more According to perceptual symbol systems, sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows that sensorimotor phenomena should arise in conceptual processing. Previous studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing, then verifying the properties of concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For example, verifying a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud)
should be slower after verifying a property in a different modality
(e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than after verifying a property in the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no instructions to use imagery. Nevertheless, switching modalities incurred a cost, analogous to the cost of switching modalities in perception. A second experiment showed that this effect was not due to associative priming between properties in the same
modality. These results support the hypothesis that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing.

Semantic context effects and priming in word association

by Diane Pecher

Zeelenberg, R., Pecher, D., Shiffrin, R. M., & Raaijmakers, J. G. W. (2003). Semantic context effects and priming in word association. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 653-660.

Two experiments investigated priming in word association, an implicit memory task. In the study phase of Experiment 1,... more Two experiments investigated priming in word association, an implicit memory task. In the study phase of Experiment 1, semantically ambiguous target words were presented in sentences that biased their interpretation. The appropriate interpretation of the target was either congruent or incongruent with the cue presented in a subsequent word association task. Priming (i.e., a higher proportion of target responses relative to a nonstudied baseline) was obtained for the congruent condition, but not for the incongruent condition. In Experiment 2, study sentences emphasized particular meaning aspects of nonambiguous targets. The word association task showed a higher proportion of target responses for targets studied in the more congruent sentence context than for targets studied in the less congruent sentence context. These results indicate that priming in word association depends largely on the storage of information relating the cue and target.

Two-Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning

by Laura Schroeter

In this survey article, I focus on whether 2D semantics can fully capture the epistemic and semantic phenomena that... more In this survey article, I focus on whether 2D semantics can fully capture the epistemic and semantic phenomena that seem central to individuating meanings. After outlining the motivations for 2D semantics as a response to externalist thought experiments, I argue that the approach faces an internal tension in fully vindicating the traditional role of meaning. I contrast the 2D theory's broadly descriptivist approach to meaning individuation with a relational approach.

Bootstrapping our way to samesaying

by Laura Schroeter

forthcoming in a special issue of Synthese.

This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning... more This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers’ substantive understanding of the reference. Traditional accounts of meaning have trouble simultaneously satisfying both constraints. I suggest that relationally individuated meanings provide a promising way of avoiding this tension. On relational accounts, we bootstrap our way to de jure co-reference: the subjective appearance of de jure co-reference helps make it the case that two token representations really do co-refer.

Operationalizing Symptom Distress in Adults With Cancer: A Literature Synthesis

by Teresa Goodell

Bien Común (Borrador del rastreo de un concepto)

by Diana Monroy-García

Ejercicio de rastreo en los cambios del concepto "Bien Común" Ejercicio de rastreo en los cambios del concepto "Bien Común"

Justicia (Borrador del rastreo de un concepto)

by Diana Monroy-García

Ejercicio de rastreo en los cambios del concepto "Justicia" Ejercicio de rastreo en los cambios del concepto "Justicia"