« Trois traits négatifs de la misericordia dans le second livre du De Clementia de Sénèque »
by Guillaume Flamerie de Lachapelle
publié dans: Les Études Classiques 74(4), 2006, p. 309-318.
Dans Clem., II, 5-6, Sénèque insiste, plus encore que la tradition stoïcienne, sur les travers de la misericordia. Il... more Dans Clem., II, 5-6, Sénèque insiste, plus encore que la tradition stoïcienne, sur les travers de la misericordia. Il la sépare radicalement de l’attitude honorable en niant qu’elle puisse naître du spectacle que constitue la peine subie par les seules gens qui ne la méritent pas, en refusant d’admettre que le sage peut verser des larmes devant ce spectacle, en l’associant, non plus seulement à l’aegritudo, mais aussi à une forme de metus qui empêche un élan généreux vers autrui. Cet absolu rejet de la misericordia met en valeur la clementia et rend plus nette sa démonstration à l’intention de ceux qui, comme peut-être Néron lui-même, risquent de confondre les deux notions.
Touching bodies, touching hearts: bodily boundaries and the limits of compassion
Emotional Geographies Conference, 2010, UniSA
This presentation examines how bodily contact was used to appeal to affective response in the case of the Australian... more
This presentation examines how bodily contact was used to appeal to affective response in the case of the Australian national hanged in Singapore for drugs-related charges in 2005 – Nguyen Tuong Van – examining the possibility that 'touching bodies touch hearts'. Examining this notion of the body as focal in a selected corpus of Australian and Singaporean print journalism, the use of 'touch' (as the meeting point, or point of encounter) is interrogated for how it might operate to place body against body.
In the 'Van' case, the relations of bodies, the variable access of bodies to the encountering and touching of one another might be seen as a key journalistic entry to the case – through a pervasive focus upon the accused's mother, twin, friends, lawyers and the nations involved. Here, relations of bodies are examined for how they are mediated by 'feeling', as in the 'touch' of compassion: 'Compassion can be a touchy subject, touching, as it does, on what touches the heart by seeming to put us in touch with something other than ourselves while leaving us open, in the process, to being read as an easy touch' (Edelman, 2004, p 159).
It interrogates how 'contagion' is taken up in the case with regard to these embodied 'feelings' in, for instance, attempts to spread compassion through the proliferation of the image of Nguyen's handprint. This image was mobilised as part of a symbolic 'sea of hands', calling the public to represent their compassionate response to the case through this image, demanding humanitarian responses, representing also Nguyen's (in)ability to touch his mother before execution.
Of particular interest is what this case might reveal about bodily boundaries and the limits of compassion in determining bodies that matter. Arendt's 'collective responsibility', as responsibilities due to membership in a collective such as in the nation, is placed against the call to compassion. 'We call compassion what I feel when somebody suffers; and this feeling is authentic so long as I realize that it is, after all, not I but somebody else who suffers' (Arendt, 2003, p 148).
The Context of Clinical Research and Its Ethical Relevance: The COMPAS Trial as a Case Study.
Co-authored with Dr Matteo Mameli.
Am J Bioeth. 2012 Jan;12(1):39-40.
Dynamic empathy: A new formulation for the simulation theory of mind reading
Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 52–63
The controversy between the theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST) has evolved so that it is often hard to tell... more The controversy between the theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST) has evolved so that it is often hard to tell exactly what the difference is between a simulation and a theory. I believe that this distinction was originally inspired, and can be freshly reconceived, as the distinction between verbal abstractions and concrete pictures. I argue that the multi-dimensional spaces described by connectionist neuroscience are best understood as pictures of a special sort. These multi-dimensional pictures do not have the limitations of ordinary three-dimensional pictures, and are capable of performing many of the cognitive functions that were traditionally thought to be the exclusive domain of abstract linguistic concepts. Consequently, there is a real possibility that a pure simulation theory could actually explain some sophisticated kinds of social cognition, without having to rely on a hybrid that combines simulations and theories. Paradoxically, such a pure simulation theory would not actually use simulations in the strictest sense of that word, because something can be a simulation only if it is verbally labeled as a copy of something else. Rather this kind of social cognition would establish vector transformations between perception and behavior without requiring any verbal labels at all. This would mean that the emotions caused by perceptions of other people would not be simulations of other people’s emotions, but rather the same emotion transferred by a kind of emotional contagion.
Altruism, Pity and Compassion: Significant (and Ignored) Differences. Part TwoCompassion
I wrote this paper many years ago, when I was heavily influenced by Nietzsche, and somewhat sympathetic to Ayn Rand. My views have changed considerably since then, although I still endorse most of the last section on compassion. The paper "Stakeholders and Safety nets" more accurately expresses my current views on this topic.
Sharing the Burden: Rabbi Simḥah Zissel Ziv on Love and Empathy
Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 30, no. 2 (2010): 151-169.
Searching for Compassion in an Uncompassionate World.
PsycCRITIQUES review of Field Notes on the Compassionate Life: A Search for the Soul of Kindness by Barasch. PsycCRITIQUES review of Field Notes on the Compassionate Life: A Search for the Soul of Kindness by Barasch.
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Seen by:King Kong: The effects of film, imagery and literature on perceptions of gorillas
Winner of Critical Animal Studies Undergraduate Dissertation of the Year 2010
The purpose behind this thesis is to examine the presentation of gorillas in disciplines, such as photography, film... more
The purpose behind this thesis is to examine the presentation of gorillas in disciplines, such as photography, film and literature that have the power to evoke emotion and influence human perceptions of gorillas. It is also to determine how effectual these written or visual narratives can be in their description of an animal few of us will ever come across in person: How true is it that gorillas are fierce? How true is it that they are gentle? Where do these contradictory perceptions come from? How persuasive are photographs, films and books about gorillas in making us believe one thing over another? The visual and written narratives considered in this thesis are both works of fiction, such as jungle films and, especially, King Kong as well as scientific references to real-life events, such as those documented by Dian Fossey in her memoirs. The more well-known references, for example to King Kong and the life of Dian Fossey, are anchored by wider concerns about aged myth and lingering false beliefs that emerged from older narratives about gorillas. This thesis is also concerned with more contemporary questions about the motivation behind widespread compassion for animals that is spurred on by stories told often about favoured species like gorillas, or halted by stories not often told about less favoured species.
Doden dieren alleen om te overleven? (Do Animals Only Kill for Survival?)
by Titus Rivas
Published in Gezond Idee!, Fall 2002, nr. 55, p. 26.
Problematisering van mededogen (Problematization of Compassion)
by Titus Rivas
Published in Vega!, nr. 68, Spring 2006, pp. 22-23.
From Homininity to Humanity: Compassion from the Earliest Archaics to Modern Humans
by Andy Needham
Spikins, P., Rutherford, H. and Needham, A. (2010) 'From Homininity to Humanity: Compassion from the Earliest Archaics to Modern Humans' in Time and Mind, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 303-325.
We are increasingly aware of the role of emotions and emotional construction in social relationships. However, despite... more We are increasingly aware of the role of emotions and emotional construction in social relationships. However, despite their significance, there are few constructs or theoretical approaches to the evolution of emotions that can be related to the prehistoric archaeological record. Whilst we frequently discuss how archaic humans might have thought, how they felt might seem to be beyond the realm of academic inquiry. In this paper we aim to open up the debate into the construction of emotion in early prehistory by proposing key stages in the emotional motivation to help others; the feeling of compassion, in human evolution. We review existing literature on compassion and highlight what appear to be particularly significant thresholds in the development of compassion for human social relationships and the evolution of the human mind.
Do compassion and other emotions make us more intelligent?
Forthcoming in Think: Philosophy for Everyone (2011)
In the past, emotions have had a bad press from philosophers and theologians. This is often because they have been... more
In the past, emotions have had a bad press from philosophers and theologians. This is often because they have been regarded as deceptive, misleading and irrational. In modern culture, there has been a backlash against this, with some people saying that we should make decisions using our ‘heart’ (our emotions) as well as our ‘head’ (our intellect). However, in both cases, intellect and emotions are seen as being two separate things, and, moreover, as being two separate things that are often at war with one another.
In this paper, I question this separation between the intellect and the emotions, focusing on our experience of compassion. I begin by arguing that compassion and other emotions make us more intelligent. Furthermore, I argue that emotions provide a unique or non-substitutable form of intelligence – that is, a form of intelligence that cannot be gained by other, non-emotional, means. I then argue that the separation between the head/intellect and the heart/emotions is incorrect. Finally, I argue that emotions should be regarded not only as a source of knowledge, but also (like non-emotional beliefs) as a potential form of knowledge in their own right.
The conclusions of this paper have implications for our understanding of human nature, and for our ethics, particularly in relation to how we make (and how we should make) decisions. For those of us who are Muslims, Christians, or Jews, the conclusions of this paper also has implications for our view of God.

