Review - Paul Brass, An Indian Political Life: Charan Singh and Congress Politics, 1937 to 1961 (New Delhi, 2011)
by Uday Chandra
Forthcoming in Contemporary South Asia 22 (3), 2012
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Seen by:Review - James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed (New Haven, 2009)
by Uday Chandra
Religion and Society: Advances in Research, Vol. 2 (2011), pp. 194-96.
Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2
The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.
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Seen by: and 14 moreMoving Away from Unanimity: Ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
by Carlos Closa
RECON Online Working Paper No. 2011/38
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) removes the unanimity... more
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) removes the unanimity requirement for entry into force. This innovation is possible because, technically, the TSCG I not an EU Treaty. It is not constructed as a reform of the EU Treaties following article 48 which prescribes unanimity. So far, EU treaty revision locked in firmly the unanimity requirement creating a Catch 22 situation: unanimity can only be removed unanimously. This, together with an adherence to a “strict construction” in the interpretation of EU law and the relative absence of instances of ratification failures may explain the permanence of the requirement. As the basic rule of constitution making, several criticisms can be labelled against unanimity.
This paper discusses the rule of unanimity in three parts: it presents, firstly, the origins and maintenance of the rule through the successive treaty reforms happened in the EU and it presents also the theoretical alternatives proposed. The second part of the paper raises various arguments against unanimity: the factual outcome of the practice of unanimity, its effect on the model of constitutional rules of the Union, the issue of consent and the possibility of externalising the effects of unanimity. The third part presents and discusses the provisions in the existing draft on reinforced economic union. The conclusion argues in favour of any rule short of unanimity, since its most important property will be to transform the dynamics of the ratification process.
DRAFT: ¿Modificando el mayoritarismo? Los orígenes del umbral electoral del 40 por ciento
by Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Cordero
DRAFT: ¿Modificando el mayoritarismo? Los orígenes del umbral electoral del 40 por ciento. Co-authored with Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq. Published in "Revista Parlamentaria", Vol. 12, N° 2, agosto de 2004, pp. 239-262 (Asamblea Legislativa, C. R.).
RESUMEN: Este artículo explora los alcances políticos detrás del establecimiento del umbral del cuarenta por ciento... more
RESUMEN: Este artículo explora los alcances políticos detrás del establecimiento del umbral del cuarenta por ciento para elegir a los presidentes en Costa Rica. Desde 1936, el candidato victorioso debe obtener una mayoría simple de votos y al menos el cuarenta por ciento de los votos válidos para ser elegido presidente. En contraste con los otros sistemas de mayoría simple, este sistema de mayoría calificada fomenta la elección de presidentes con apoyo del votante mediano. Con la excepción de las elecciones del 2002, el umbral del cuarenta por ciento también ha prevenido de que candidatos de terceros partidos hayan obligado a una segunda vuelta ronda. Este artículo sostiene que cada uno de los componentes principales del sistema, segunda ronda (1926) y umbral del cuarenta por ciento (1936), no involucró mucha transacción política. De manera bastante extraña, los partidos políticos —que típicamente apoyaron reformas si éstas promovían sus intereses de reelección— apoyaron dos reformas para ganar en estabilidad republicana. De hecho, el establecimiento de un sistema de mayoría calificada del cuarenta por ciento con segunda ronda en 1936, fue parte de un esfuerzo mucho más amplio por establecer reglas de sucesión política aceptables para llegar a un fluido e intensamente competitivo sistema de partidos, que gradualmente eliminó el papel intermediario de cuerpos representativos en la escogencia presidencial. Este hallazgo sugiere que las instituciones duraderas tomen tiempo para ser construidas y que éstas no siempre son producto de la previsión o de astutos cálculos.
ABSTRACT: This article explores the politics behind the establishment of the 40 percent threshold for electing presidents in Costa Rica. Since 1936, the victorious candidate must obtain a plurality of votes and at least 40 percent of the valid votes to be elected president. In contrast to other firstpast-the post systems, this qualified majority system foments the election of presidents supported by the median voter. With the exception of the 2002 election, the 40 percent threshold also prevents third-party “spoiler” candidates from forcing the holding of a runoff election. This article argues that each of its principal components, that of a majority runoff system (1926) and the 40 percent threshold (1936) did not involve much of any political bargaining. Oddly enough, parties that typically supported reforms if they promoted their reelection interests backed two reforms to advance the stability of the republic. Indeed, the establishment of a 40 percent qualified plurality system with second round runoff by 1936 was part of a much broader struggle to establish rules of political succession acceptable to a fluid and intensely competitive party system, one that gradually eliminated the role of intermediate, representative bodies in presidential selection. This finding suggests that durable institutions take time to construct and that they are not always the product of foresight or clever calculation.
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Renewing the Russian Federation
by Paul Pryce
Published by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, May 2012
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Seen by:Authoritarian crises and democratic transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa
This research proposes an analysis of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy (TD). TD has been the subject... more
This research proposes an analysis of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy (TD). TD has been the subject of many researches, in particular since the end of the 1960s. This research attempted to identify the roots of those regime changes. Most researchers agree that TD is initiated by a conflict or crisis which affects the very legitimacy of the regime. These conflicts have been defined differently according to different authors: new versus old elites, civil society versus the authoritarian regime (RA), or between reformers and hardliners within the RA.
In this research, we criticize this consensus among Africanists. By applying the theoretical framework developed by Schmitter and O’Donnell in “Transition from Authoritarian rule” to the Benin, South African and Togo cases, this research will demonstrate the important how pro-reform forces within authoritarian regimes are a key feature of successful transition to democratic in Africa
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Seen by:DRAFT: Legal Opportunity Structures and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics
by Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Cordero
DRAFT. Forthcoming in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, April 2006, pp. 525-551. Bruce M. WILSON and Juan Carlos RODRÍGUEZ CORDERO. © 2006.
How does institutional change in established democracies affect the distribution of political power in society? The... more
How does institutional change in established democracies affect the distribution of political power in society? The new constitutional court in Costa Rica allows the authors to analyze the effects of judicial reform on the capacity of politically marginalized groups to safeguard their constitutional rights. Particular attention is paid to homosexuals, AIDS patients, and labor unions. They argue that it was not the establishment of the court as such but rather the specific rules regulating access to and cost of approaching the court that enabled marginalized groups to push for their rights and effectively circumvent the traditional policy-making process. Although these groups did not win all their cases, they have nonetheless been able to achieve considerable success in the protection of their previously denied constitutional rights. The legal reform partially redistributed power in society from policy makers to social groups and individuals.
Keywords: legal opportunity; institutional change; constitutional
court; marginalized groups; gays, people living with AIDS, Costa Rica.
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Seen by:La reforma judicial en la era de globalización: La Corte Constitucional como contrapeso
by Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Cordero
Co-authored with Bruce M. Wilson. Ponencia preparada para la reunión anual de la Latin American Studies Association (LASA) en Dallas, Texas, del 27 al 29 de marzo de 2003.
Las instituciones financieras internacionales han financiado la mayor parte de la reforma judicial en América Latina,... more Las instituciones financieras internacionales han financiado la mayor parte de la reforma judicial en América Latina, con el objetivo de limitar los poderes económicos de los Estados y estimular el desarrollo de libres mercados y la globalización. Esta ponencia examina el impacto de la reforma judicial en Costa Rica sobre las políticas económicas y sociales del país y evalúa la pregunta: ¿Es la nueva Corte Constitucional facilitadora u obstáculo de la globalización en Costa Rica?
Straddling the Divide: Conservatism and Populism in Harper’s Canada and Howard’s Australia
Written with Dave Snow, University of Calgary. Presented at Canadian Political Studies Annual Conference, Wilfred Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada, 16-18 May, 2011. Later version to be published in Commonwealth & Comparative Studies.
In 2003, future Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper delivered a speech in the Canadian House of Commons regarding... more In 2003, future Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper delivered a speech in the Canadian House of Commons regarding the Iraq war that plagiarized from then-Australian Prime Minister John Howard (Weeks and Taber 2008). Harper and Howard, as it turns out, have far more in common than some borrowed words. Despite governing a decade apart in very different economic circumstances, both leaders identified policies to satisfy two factions within their respective centre-right parties – social conservatives and classical liberals. Moreover, in framing these policies to the electorate, both Harper and Howard made frequent appeals to populism, using wedge politics and “dog whistling” to divide the community between “ordinary” Canadians/Australians and an “out-of-touch” elite. When it came to uniting their base to defeat and subsequently stifle their opposition, Harper and Howard pursued remarkably similar strategies with respect to both policy content and political messaging.
Straddling the Divide: Mainstream Populism & Conservatism
Co-authored with Dave Snow, University of Calgary. To be published in upcoming issue of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics.
This article builds on the insights of Sawer & Laycock (2009) to explore similarities in the use of populist... more This article builds on the insights of Sawer & Laycock (2009) to explore similarities in the use of populist discourse by former Australian Prime John Howard and current Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. While Sawer and Laycock label this discourse ‘market populism’ and focus on economic issues, we argue that Howard and Harper’s populism is better understood as ‘mainstream populism’ due to the equal importance of sociocultural issues in their discourses. To demonstrate, we consider the treatment of issues such as immigration, multiculturalism, the culture wars, criminal justice, and childcare. We further suggest that such populist policies were used to satisfy rival wings of their respective parties – neoliberals and social conservatives – that do not always share the same priorities.
Populism in Comparative Focus: Latin America and the Asia-Pacific
To be presented at the Latin American Studies Congress, San Francisco, 24-26 May 2012. Draft only. Do not cite without permission.
The study of populism has long suffered from a kind of academic ‘ghettoization’, whereby analyses of Latin American... more
The study of populism has long suffered from a kind of academic ‘ghettoization’, whereby analyses of Latin American populism and European populism have often remained isolated, each building up their own distinct conceptual approaches. However, recent advancements in the field have sprung from tearing down these walls and bringing Latin American and European populisms in comparative focus with one another. The result has been extremely beneficial, leading to broader understandings as to how populism varies in different contexts, as well as sharpening our broader theoretical understanding of the topic. While this approach is to be applauded, it is only the beginning of what needs to be done if the theory of populism is to be continually refined. Further cross-regional analyses are required.
One region that has remained particularly under-analysed when it comes to populism is the Asia-Pacific. In order to correct this, this paper will seek to compare populism in this region with Latin American populism. It will ask what similarities, if any, link Latin American populists like Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales with populists like Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand or Pauline Hanson in Australia? How have they constructed ‘the people’ in their different contexts? Have they used similar tactics in their attempts to hold onto political power? And what does this reflect about the more general relationship between populism and democracy? In doing so, this paper will seek to overcome the literature’s ‘Atlantic bias’, and continue the important process of broadening the scope of cross-regional analyses of populism.
The Impact of Regime-Type on Health: Does Redistribution Explain Everything?
by Simon Wigley
Co-authored with Arzu Akkoyunlu
Many scholars claim that democracy improves population health. The prevailing explanation for this is that democratic... more Many scholars claim that democracy improves population health. The prevailing explanation for this is that democratic regimes distribute health-promoting resources more widely than autocratic regimes. The central contention of this article is that democracies also have a significant pro-health effect independently of public redistributive policies. After establishing the theoretical plausibility of the non-distributive effect a panel of 153 countries for the years 1972 to 2000 is used to examine the relationship between extent of democratic experience and life expectancy. We find that democratic governance continues to have a salutary effect on population health even when controls are introduced for the distribution of health-enhancing resources. Data for 50 autocratic countries for the years 1994 to 2007 is then used to examine whether that press freedom has a positive impact on life expectancy independently of government responsiveness.
Political Sociology and Contemporary China: State-society Images in American China Studies
by David Wank
Journal of Contemporary China, v. 7, n. 18 (July, 1998): 205-227.
The Europeanization of Ratification Procedures: Towards a EU-Wide Constitutional Convention?
by Carlos Closa
Instituto Portugués de Relaçoes Internacionais Working Paper N.º 8
he word “Europeanisation” has acquired so many meanings that it is difficult to disagree with Olsen that it is not... more
he word “Europeanisation” has acquired so many meanings that it is difficult to disagree with Olsen that it is not very useful in theoretical terms (Olsen; 2001). In this context, it results unavoidable a previous clarification of the meaning in which it is used here, even though the object of this paper is not a theoretical inquiry on the concept, but rather an assessment on whether the process has happened.
Europeanization means the impact of the EU on the domestic structures or, in other words, the political system. Since the object of this inquiry refers to the ratification of the EU constitution, the inquiry can be framed along the following question: what is the influence of the EU norms on domestic processes of ratification? The response is immediate. EU ratification rules do not seem prima facie to impose constraints on national ones and, hence, impact could not be easily identified. If Europeanization is defined as the transformation brought about by the impact of EU level on the national one, then, it has not happened. However, a different model of “europeanisation” has happened: member states show signs of a trend towards converging in certain models of ratification. Naturally, this does not mean that all they use the same procedures and in the same form. It means, rather, that they watch closely each other and they adopt and adapt their own ratification procedures according to the learning of what other member states have done.
The paper reviews this argument in the following sections. Firstly, it examines briefly the changes that the draft constitution introduced and compares it with the American model of ratification. It then examines the three main procedures for ratification to asses whether some convergence can be appreciated. This paper discusses the three procedures used for ratification (constitutional reform, parliamentary ratification and referendums) as well as the actors involved (constitutional courts and political parties) with the aim of mapping out the eventual emergence of a “constitutional convention” on the ratification of the Constitution. The underlying inquiry seeks to establish whether ratification of the EU Constitution produces an Europeanization of procedures. It finally ponders the extent to which we can refer to “Europeanisation” of ratification procedures understood as an increased convergence among Member States.
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Seen by:The value of institutions: mandate and self-mandate in the convention process
by Carlos Closa
Politique Européenne 13 2004
This paper discusses the specific impact of the Convention. The central argument seeks to demonstrate that... more This paper discusses the specific impact of the Convention. The central argument seeks to demonstrate that “institutions do matter”. Institutions shape the behaviour of actors to the point of altering even their preferences (March and Olsen, 1984) and, certainly, students of EU constitutional politics have reflected on the influence of EU institutions in past rounds of reform (Christiansen, Falkner, et al. 2002, Sverdrup 2002). Without denying the value of these arguments, they assume a concept of institution close to that of organ. Thus, these authors pay attention to the capability of EU institutions to affect the process of reform of the Treaties. This reductive understanding blurs a more comprehensive vision of the institutional setting. New institutionalism understands institutions through a wide connotative load that includes formal and informal rules, explicit and implicit norms of behaviour, patterns of interaction etc, additionally to organs or administrative units.
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