Comparative Military Systems

Estudio Organizacional de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional SEDENA

by Paloma Mendoza

Cartel del Segundo Congreso de Alumnos de Posgrado, UNAM

La Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional SEDENA en las Relaciones Civil-Militares de México. Estructura de la SEDENA.... more La Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional SEDENA en las Relaciones Civil-Militares de México. Estructura de la SEDENA. Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos, Fuerzas Armadas
Mexico´s Military, Mexican Armed Forces, Civil-Military Relations, structure of the Mexican armed forces

Estudio Organizacional de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional SEDENA

by Paloma Mendoza

Cartel del Segundo Congreso de Alumnos de Posgrado, UNAM

La Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional SEDENA en las Relaciones Civil-Militares de México. Estructura de la SEDENA.... more La Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional SEDENA en las Relaciones Civil-Militares de México. Estructura de la SEDENA. Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos, Fuerzas Armadas
Mexico´s Military, Mexican Armed Forces, Civil-Military Relations, structure of the Mexican armed forces

Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian Military?

by Keir Giles

March 2012

The process of transformation of the Russian military, under way since 2008, is intended to turn the Armed Forces of... more The process of transformation of the Russian military, under way since 2008, is intended to turn the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the atrophied remnant of the Soviet Armed Forces into a usable military tool for the 21st century. This includes radical reform of command and control systems at all levels up to the supreme command.



Previous conclusions on the nature of post-Soviet Russian military command and control systems may therefore no longer be valid. This is significant for Russia's overseas partners who wish to understand the nature of a potential Russian reaction to any challenge which can be interpreted as a military threat.



In particular, understanding of the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff needs to be updated following the dramatic contraction of both bodies and redistribution of their functions.



The emergence of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as an additional body exerting control over the military also needs to be considered, when examining how decisions affecting the Armed Forces are made at the highest level.



Lower down the chain of command, the creation of the new Joint Strategic Commands also bears directly on the nature of decision-making on employment of forces, in ways which appear still debatable even within Russia but which are of critical importance for close neighbours of Russia.



The example of the early stages of armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 could suggest that the Joint Strategic Commands are in part intended to ensure closer control over small units, in order to reduce the potential for independent and uncontrolled activity.



This paper seeks to introduce the new landscape of military decision-making in Russia, in order to raise key questions over the nature of the new command and control systems which are critical for a full understanding of how, when and in what manner Russia's Armed Forces may be used in the future.

Mexico´s Defense Plans (DN-III-E)

by Paloma Mendoza

Resumen

El presente artículo propone una revisión de los Planes de Defensa Nacional de México,... more Resumen

El presente artículo propone una revisión de los Planes de Defensa Nacional de México, centralizándonos en el Plan DN-III-E que se enfoca a la atención de la población civil afectada por fenómenos naturales y provocados por el hombre en el marco de las cinco misiones generales del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexica-nos. Este Plan considera el despliegue militar desde el nivel local hasta el nacio-nal como respuesta a las emergencias masivas que puede sufrir la población en coordinación con las autoridades civiles de protección civil.

Palabras clave: Defensa Nacional, Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas, Ejército Mexi-cano, Relaciones Civil-militares, protección civil.

Abstract

This is an analisis about the expansion of the military´s rol as guarantor of na-tional security by means of the national defense plan three (DN-III-E), ap-proached in the civil population assistance in emergency caused by natural phe-nomenon.

Key words: National Defense, Mexico´s Military, Mexican Armed Forces, Civil-military relations, population assistance.

The New Egypt: A Return to Dictatorship?

by Nivien Saleh

Article written for Miller-McCune, October 20, 2011

Analysis: The military strongmen who oversaw Egypt’s political hierarchy for six decades hover ominously over the... more Analysis: The military strongmen who oversaw Egypt’s political hierarchy for six decades hover ominously over the nation’s new democracy. Nivien Saleh argues the U.S. has the power to pry the generals’ fingers off the levers of power...

Pay and allowances in the Russian Armed Forces: a guidance note

by Keir Giles

June 2007

* Western views of the Russian Armed Forces traditionally hold that Russian military pay is disastrously... more * Western views of the Russian Armed Forces traditionally hold that Russian military pay is disastrously inadequate.

* But headline figures for Russian military pay scales bear little relation to what servicemen actually earn.

* This is because pay for all servicemen is made up of two parallel basic components, plus a large number of allowances, extras, and increments.

* It is therefore almost always misleading to generalise about Russian military pay.

Military Service in Russia - No New Model Army

by Keir Giles

May 2007

* Pay and conditions for Russian servicemen, especially those on contract service, have seen substantial recent... more * Pay and conditions for Russian servicemen, especially those on contract service, have seen substantial recent improvements.

* Continuing high-profile reporting of rights abuses and violence masks initiatives taken to improve rights and welfare.

* The move to one-year conscript service will disrupt the system of dedovshchina; but it is unlikely to uproot this kind of bullying altogether as it is not a purely military phenomenon in Russia.

* The Russian Armed Forces are not adapting fast enough to the challenges of recruiting professional servicemen.

Russian Military Transformation - Work in Progress

by Keir Giles

December 2010

Russia’s Baltic Fleet, and troops based in Kaliningrad Region, have been absorbed into an entirely new military... more Russia’s Baltic Fleet, and troops based in Kaliningrad Region, have been absorbed into an entirely new military command structure as part of the ongoing overhaul of the Russian Armed Forces. With effect from 1st September 2010, the Baltic and Northern Fleets, Kaliningrad, and the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts have been amalgamated into a new Western Military District, with headquarters in St Petersburg.

It is now just over two years since Russia embarked on the most radical programme of military reform it had seen since the end of the Soviet Union, and in many respects since long before that. The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 provided the impetus for the long-overdue creation of a distinct form for the Russian military, as opposed to a continuing existence as a pale remnant of the Soviet Armed Forces. The process of transformation now under way has affected the military, and individual servicemen, at all levels from the General Staff to newly-enlisted conscripts, and the emerging form of the new Russian forces fully justifies their claim to a “new look”.

Russian regional commands

by Keir Giles

Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? Russia's Military Plans Versus Demographic Reality

by Keir Giles

October 2006

In 2008, Russia halved the term of conscription into the armed forces from two years to one, while attempting to... more In 2008, Russia halved the term of conscription into the armed forces from two years to one, while attempting to retain the overall size of the forces.

This 2006 CSRC paper noted that this plan implied doubling the number of conscripts drafted each year, but that demographic change in Russia meant there would not be enough healthy 18-year-olds to do this. A number of grounds for deferral of conscription were to be abolished, but this would still not provide anything like enough conscripts. Recruitment and retention on contract service appeared insufficient to fill the gap. Furthermore, the timing of the change-over to one-year conscription threatened major disruption and upheaval in the armed forces.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010

by Keir Giles

February 2010

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed... more Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”.

Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia.

Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems.

Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine.

Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear.

The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”.

Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army.

Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.

“Information Troops” – a Russian Cyber Command?

by Keir Giles

March 2011

Appraisals of Russian military performance during the armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008 noted, among other... more Appraisals of Russian military performance during the armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008 noted, among other deficiencies, poor performance in Information Warfare (IW). This led to calls in informed commentary for the creation of dedicated “Information Troops” within the Russian armed forces, whose  duties would include what we would define as cyber operations. This stemmed from a perception in parts of the Russian Armed Forces that the "information war" against Georgia had been lost.

No such entity has appeared in the Russian order of battle, but the public discussion and military comment is informative. Prospects for the appearance of “Information Troops” have been discounted both officially by the FSB and privately by Russian
military officers. Arguments put forward against a unit of this kind include the unsuitability of servicemen for advanced cyber operations, and the ready availability and deniability of talented civilian volunteers. But at the same time Russia’s EW troops are seeing their role and profile evolve in a manner which suggests they may be acquiring at least some IW capability.

The Russian approach to IW differs from our own, and there are  specific perceived internet vulnerabilities which further affect the Russian approach to cyber operations, and prompt Russian pushes for treaty arrangements governing cyberspace.

This paper draws on unclassified open-source media and interviews with serving Russian military officers to consider the Russian military view of cyber operations as a subset of information war, and the prospects for creation of “information troops” (whether given this name or not) in the context of ongoing Russian military transformation. Informal links with volunteer and co-opted cyber forces are also considered.

Orde Wingate And The British Army, 1922-1944: Military Thought and Practice Compared and Contrasted

by Simon Anglim

Orde Wingate,'Guerrilla'Warfare and Long-range Penetration, 1940–44

by Simon Anglim

A draft copy of the paper summarising the development of Orde Wingate's military thought, post-Palestine, published in 'Small Wars and Insurgencies', Volume 17 No.3, September 2006.

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his... more Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate’s own official writings on this subject reveals that long range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situation regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins’ doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

Major General Orde Wingate's Chindit Operations in World War II - Historical Case Study for the Operating without a Net Project

by Simon Anglim

This paper was authored by me in 2008-2009 for the SCITOR consultancy as part of a research project for the US Department of Defense on how modern military forces can operate dispersed and without a reliable communications network.

  Major General Orde Charles Wingate formed his Long-Range Penetration Groups, or 'Chindits' in order to carry... more   Major General Orde Charles Wingate formed his Long-Range Penetration Groups, or 'Chindits' in order to carry out operations against Japanese lines of communication and other vulnerable points behind their lines in occupied Burma in 1942.  These units, as of necessity, worked dispersed, in rough country, with no lines of communication of their own and just a limited number of radios to exercise command and control.  Wingate overcame these deficiencies via resupply by airdrop and by intensive training with the intention of enforcing a common tactical doctrine and procedures for many other important activities, so they could perform to his satisfaction without supervision from above.  He also practised a clear form of 'mission command' tolerating a high level of initiative from his subordinate commanders and allowing them to find their own solutions to any tactical problems they encountered.

Special Forces - Strategic Asset

by Simon Anglim

Draft copy of the paper I published in 'Infinity' No.2, March 2011, on the strategic utility of Special Forces

Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out... more Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out of proportion with their size and that if conducted by conventional units may have disproportionate negative impact on policy.  The aim of Special Forces is to deliver high precision at lower risk and cost than might otherwise be possible.
The very need for Special Forces has been questioned.  The author has been told at various times that Special Forces leech away the best people from the rest of an army, that there is nothing they do in general war that a well-trained infantry unit cannot do, that their role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism would be performed better by armed police, and that they survive and prosper thanks to the ‘elite force’ image they project, yet which has been their undoing more than once thanks to the hubris it can generate.  The paper is an unapologetic rebuttal of those arguments and a case for Special Forces being a vital strategic asset performing functions others cannot.

Callwell versus Graziani: how the British Army applied 'small wars' techniques in major operations in Africa and the Middle East, 1940–41

by Simon Anglim

This is a manuscript copy of a paper I published in 'Small Wars and Insurgencies', Volume 19 No.4, December 2008

The period 1940-41 saw British forces in North and East Africa, and the Middle East, defeat considerably larger... more The period 1940-41 saw British forces in North and East Africa, and the Middle East, defeat considerably larger Italian and Vichy French forces in the Western Desert, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Syria. A key factor in this was the use at the operational and tactical level of fast-moving mobile forces, operating dispersed and with considerable initiative devolved upon junior commanders. This has been put down to a range of influences - Liddell Hart, Percy Hobart, Eric Dorman-Smith, etc, but this paper demonstrates its origins in the 'small wars' practices of the inter-war years, upon which a major influence was Major General Callwell's much-cited, but not often read tome, 'Small Wars'.

Martial Law and Military Power in the Construction of the South African State

by Jonathan Hyslop

Chaoplexic Warfare or the Future of Military Organization

by Antoine Bousquet

International Affairs - Volume 84, Issue 5, pages 915–929, September 2008

Scientific methods and concepts have been exerting a powerful influence on the exercising of armed force since the... more Scientific methods and concepts have been exerting a powerful influence on the exercising of armed force since the Scientific Revolution and the dawn of the modern era. In association with the respective technologies of the clock, engine and computer, the scientific theories of mechanism, thermodynamics, and cybernetics have all in turn been recruited to shape distinct approaches to the challenges of imposing order on the chaos of the battlefield. Today, it is on the basis of the new sciences of chaos and complexity that the latest regime of the scientific way of warfare is being erected. Chaoplexic warfare draws on the study of nonlinear phenomena of self-organization to propose a radical decentralization of armed forces through the adoption of the network form. For all its present flaws, network-centric warfare and its operational concepts of self-synchronization and swarming mark an important step on the path to chaoplexic warfare.