The Past is in Front of Us: The Great Mahele, racial formation, and resistance
work in progress
In 1848, the common-property land trust system which had existed in Hawaii for hundreds of years was abolished,... more In 1848, the common-property land trust system which had existed in Hawaii for hundreds of years was abolished, replaced with Western European-style fee simple land tenure. This effective privatization of all the kingdom's land, the Great Mahele, irrevocably changed the status of the Hawaiian people and laid the path for the overthrow of the monarchy, the annexation of the kingdom by the United States, and the continued subordination of the Native Hawaiian people. The legacy of the Mahele invokes discourses of sovereignty, self-determination, state control, capitalism, and colonialism. In the following paper, I am to explore these linkages. Beginning with a history of land use in Hawaii, this paper will explain how the Mahele dispossessed the Hawaiian people and continue with an exploration of racial formation, articulation and land, before identifying land as a locus of Native Hawaiian resilience and resistance.
Non-Timber Forest Product Management in Southern Laos: The Necessity of Considering Complex Tenure Arrangements
by Ian Baird
Ian G. Baird and Somphong Bounphasy (2005)
From Source book
32 views
Seen by:Open to All?: Reassessing Capture Fisheries Tenure Systems in Southern Laos
by Ian Baird
Ian G. Baird
Pages 57-75 In: Ruddle, Kenneth. & A. Satria (eds.) (2010), Managing Coastal and Inland Waters: Pre-Existing Aquatic Management Systems in Southeast Asia. Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York.
21 views
Seen by:Private, Small Groups or Communal: Dipterocarpus Wood Resin Tree Tenure and Management in Teun Commune, Kon Mum District, Ratanakiri Province, Northeastern Cambodia
by Ian Baird
Ian G. Baird
Society and Natural Resources 23 (2010): 1-16
Dipterocarpus wood resin is an important non-timber forest product for the ethnic Brao and Tampuon people from Teun... more Dipterocarpus wood resin is an important non-timber forest product for the ethnic Brao and Tampuon people from Teun Commune, Ratanakiri Province, northeastern Cambodia. While wood resin tree tenure is typically private, whether in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, or Malaysia, in Teun Commune wood resin trees are managed privately, by small groups, and communally, thus providing a unique opportunity for comparing the conditions of wood resin trees managed under different tenure arrangements. This study indicates that wood resin trees managed by small groups and communally are in better condition than those managed privately. Locals believe that this is because everyone has more of an interest in not damaging communally managed trees, and that members of the communities are subject to social factors that influence the behavior of wood resin tappers. The long-term impacts of logging on wood resin tree management are also discussed.
81 views
Seen by:Institutions for Managing Ecosystem Services
Co-authored with J. Allen, J. DuVander, E. Ostrom
Published in 2011
Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem
co-authored with Stephen W. Salant and Stephan Schott
The common-propertyproblemresultsinexcessivemining,hunting,andextractionof
oil... more
The common-propertyproblemresultsinexcessivemining,hunting,andextractionof
oil andwater.Thesamephenomenonisalsoresponsibleforexcessiveinvestmentin
R&D andexcessiveoutlaysinrent-seekingcontests.Weproposea‘‘Partnership
Solution’’toeliminateoratleastmitigatetheseexcesses.Eachof N playersjoinsa
partnershipinthefirststageandchooseshiseffortinthesecondstage.Undertherules
of apartnership,eachmembermustpayhisowncostofeffortbutreceivesanequal
shareofthepartnership’srevenue.Theincentivetofree-ridecreatedbysuch
partnershipsturnsouttobebeneficialsinceitnaturallyoffsetstheexcessiveeffort
inherent insuchproblems.Inourtwo-stagegame,thisinstitutionalarrangementcan,
under specifiedcircumstances,inducethesocialoptimuminasubgame-perfect
equilibrium:noonehasaunilateralincentive(1)toswitchtoanotherpartnership(or
create anewpartnership)inthefirststageor(2)todeviatefromsociallyoptimalactions
in thesecondstage.Thegamemayhaveothersubgame-perfectequilibria,buttheone
associatedwiththe‘‘PartnershipSolution’’isstrictlypreferredbyeveryplayer.Wealso
propose amodificationofthefirststagewhichgeneratesauniquesubgame-perfect
equilibrium.Antitrustauthoritiesshouldrecognizethatpartnershipscanhavealess
benignuse.Byorganizingascompetingpartnerships,anindustrycanreducethe
‘‘excessive’’outputofCournotoligopolytothemonopolylevel.Sincenopartnerhasany
incentivetooverproduceinthecurrentperiod,thereisnoneedtodetercheatingwith
threats offuturepunishments.
Two Concepts of Property: Ownership of Things and Property in Activities
by Hugh Breakey
The Philosophical Forum 42(3): 239-265
I argue there is a distinct and integrated property-concept applying directly, not to things, but to actions. This... more I argue there is a distinct and integrated property-concept applying directly, not to things, but to actions. This concept of Property in Activities describes a determinate ethico-political relation to a particular activity – a relation that may (but equally may not) subsequently effect a wide variety of relations to some thing. The relation with the activity is fixed and primary, and any ensuing relations with things are variable and derivative. Property in Activities illuminates many of the vexing problem cases arising in property theory. Communal, intangible, fugacious, hunting, fishing, customary and recreation property rights are not ersatz instances of owning things – they are paradigms of Property Protected Activities. The same is true of the functioning of property in various aspects of contemporary law, its application in philosophical arguments such as Locke’s, and much of its historical application prior to the Nineteenth Century. By illustrating how one stable concept can resolve this myriad of otherwise puzzling cases, I argue that Property in Activities is as important and influential a concept as Ownership of Things.
"Governing the Commons" – The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, by Elinor Ostrom
student assignment
What do resources like air, water and fi sh have in common? They do not have an owner, they are not naturally... more What do resources like air, water and fish have in common? They do not have an owner, they are not naturally restricted to and for usage. But they can be used by many individuals or institutions. So they get often called common resources or common pool resources. The useage of this resources can be done by different technologies, by different intesity in place and time, and so they can get overused. If this happens, the involved actors face a problem. Hence, in many cases they decide to establish an instutution, a set of rules for usage of the resource. In her book “governing the commons“ Elinor Ostrom analysis this problems. It was the fundament on which her Nobel Prize is build. The paper in hand gives an introduction to the mastermind's book.
117 views
Seen by: and 1 moreForest Law in the Palestine Mandate: Colonial Conservation in a Unique Context
by David Schorr
forthcoming in MANAGING THE UNKNOWN (Uwe Luebken & Frank Uekötter eds.)
89 views
Seen by:Public Property and Private Use Rights: Exclusive occupation of the coastal marine area in New Zealand
To be published in Klaus Bosselmann and Vernon Tava (eds), Water and Sustainability in Australasia, New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law Monograph Series, Vol. 3, Auckland, 2011.
[Copy of Chapter sent to printer following gramtical and formatting revision by editors. Includes author's revision of Part III concerning imperium (radical title) and dominium (absolute title).]
In New Zealand individual rights to occupy the coastal marine area are conferred under the Resource Management Act... more
In New Zealand individual rights to occupy the coastal marine area are conferred under the Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”). Coastal occupation is best understood as a private use right over public property. The conferral of private rights over property has lead some to define occupation as a property right. It is not an absolute property right. Such rights do not exist within contemporary legal systems. It does, however, display a number of characteristics that we would otherwise identify as belonging to the bundle of rights normally associated with private property.
Any comparison of coastal occupation rights to private property needs to be tempered by recognition that the coastal marine area is vested in the Crown and may not be alienated under the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (“FSA”). There is also a presumption under the RMA in favour of public access to the coastal marine area. The neoliberal approach to land based activities under the RMA is reversed in the coastal marine area, and private occupation is prohibited unless allowed by a plan or a resource consent. Furthermore, the extent to which resource consents are recognised as being either real or personal property is governed by the RMA. These statutory restrictions signal that occupation rights within the coastal marine area have a statutory origin.
Nevertheless, when occupation rights are broken down into their component parts it is apparent that they include rights to exclude, possess, use and transfer. This entitles consent holders to take actions to protect those rights under property related headings such as trespass and non-derogation of entitlement. Coastal occupation rights are not, therefore, either purely statutory or property based rights. This raises the question, what kind of rights are they? This paper concludes they are something new, and might be best considered, at least from an academic standpoint, as a hybrid right that confers both statutory and property rights to a public resource.
Keywords:
Allocation, coastal, exclusive, private, property, public, occupation, ownership, use, right.
205 views
Seen by:The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
Co-authored with Maja Schlüter and Simon Levin
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of... more
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a
social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource, we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where
norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
29 views
Seen by:Running together or alone? Institutional and socio-technical analysis of Water Management at the Thabina Irrigation Scheme, South Africa
Veldwisch, G.J.A. (2004). ‘Running together or alone? Institutional and socio-technical analysis of Water Management at the Thabina Irrigation Scheme, South Africa’, working paper prepared for the International Water Management Institute (IWMI).
This document embodies the results of research conducted between November 2003 and March 2004 at the Thabina... more
This document embodies the results of research conducted between November 2003 and March 2004 at the Thabina Irrigation Scheme in Limpopo Province, South Africa. The objective of the research was two fold: (1) to gain a better understanding of the formal and informal control of water by users of the Thabina Irrigation Scheme and (2) to develop and test a methodology and framework for institutional analysis that is complementary to the SMILE approach and applicable to research at other irrigation schemes.
The report first describes the approach used which consists of both a framework for analysis and a methodology. It draws mainly from existing material on collective action in common resource management and more specifically collective action in smallholder irrigation systems. It is complemented with an understanding of irrigation systems as networks composed of heterogeneous material i.e. technical, managerial and social aspects are not separated but analysed as a whole. A qualitative approach is chosen that focuses on water users, their relations to infrastructure and its link with patterns of governance.
Following this, a case study of the Thabina Irrigation Scheme is presented. Between 1998 and 2001 the Scheme was rehabilitated as a pilot of the Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes in the Limpopo Province. A Water Users’ Association and Management Committee were set up under the same programme and management responsibilities turned over to the Committee. A previous study conducted at the Scheme made use of the SMILE approach and indicated a significant economic/agronomic diversification tendency (Perret et al., 2003). The same study also acknowledged the importance of some institutional issues and the availability of water. This report elaborates on these issues.
The institutional and water sharing practices are presented in four steps. Firstly, an official account of water sharing is given. This sketches the situation as it was supposed to be, an idealised and simplified scenario. Secondly, the reality as experienced by ‘the water users’ is portrayed. This already identifies some difficulties in water sharing. Following this the various levels of organisation are described and analysed. Finally, the differences between water users are identified and interpreted from four different perspectives.
The main results of the study may be summarised as follow:
Although the official account suggests that there should be enough water at Thabina, in reality there seems to be a situation of strong water stress. This situation was partly created during (re-)design of the Scheme. For example, a 60% overall efficiency was used in the design calculations while in reality the field efficiency was only 15%.
The off-take structures from the main into the sub-canals consist of a check structure in the main canal and a number of pipes in the side of the main canal, just upstream from the check structure. All pipes release a discharge of about 7 l/s. There is thus no proportional relation between the area served by a sub-canal and the design discharge at its inlet. Furthermore, five of the sub-canal units have a wrong layout, three with too little pipes and two with too many.
During rehabilitation a stretch of the main canal had been covered with concrete slabs to restrict water use in the residential area and to prevent sand and objects from falling in. However, many slabs have broken and fallen into the canal and thus block the flow of water. At other places there seem to be obstructions under the slabs. Clearing these obstructions could increase water flows in the main canal up to three times.
As discharge to the sub-canal is independent of discharge in the main canal, the layout of these off-take structures leads to water shortages at the tail-end. In such a system, water shortages are not equally spread but affect only users at the tail-end as water in the main canal becomes depleted before reaching this section. In practice this means that more than half the Scheme receives water less than five months a year.
From a farming perspective, the sub-canal has the biggest influence on water supply although it is not recognised as an organisational unit. The lowest organisational unit is the ward, a cluster of three to five sub-canals. Hydraulically seen, the ward is not a logical unit of organisation as there is no common entry point.
The length of the main canal and its 18 off-takes make the Scheme organisationally and technically difficult to manage. Moreover, the strong tail-end effect and absence of a sanctioning system for illegal use by head-enders is highly political. Although an elected Management Committee (MC) exists, its representation, accountability and information sharing seem to be poor.
Four situations leading to specific strategies have been identified. They are represented visually on two axes: commercialising farmers versus subsistence farmers and head-enders versus tail-enders. Although not absolute there seems to be a relation between subsistence farming and the tail-end and commercial farming and the head-end. It illustrates that water shortage prevents people from adopting a more commercial approach towards farming. However, the existence of subsistence farmers in the head-end indicate that more water does not automatically lead to commercialisation.
Analysing the most important enabling conditions for sustainable self-management of common property resources, provides both a long list of conditions enabling emergence as well as a long list opposing emergence. On a balance the conditions point towards non emergence. The existence of a strong heterogeneity of interests and the failure to fulfil these different interests at Scheme level imply the existence of a variety of individual strategies to get water.
The report proposes four changes to overcome the constraints to collective action and self-management. These are (1) increasing the water available to the users, (2) land reform to increase flexibility and security in land tenure, (3) improvement of representation of all farmers in the MC and (4) creating clarity on the role of Government in local water governance.
Finally, the approach used should be seen to complement the SMILE-approach although steps can be taken to better integrate the two. Concurrent use of the two approaches will strengthen both as a deeper understanding at the early stages of the SMILE-approach will assist in defining more relevant farmer typologies and improve the reliability of data gathered through questionnaires.
Redressing inequities through domestic water supply; a “poor” example from Sekhukhune, South Africa.
Post Uiterweer, N.C.; M.Z. Zwarteveen; G.J.A. Veldwisch and B.M.C. van Koppen. 2006. Redressing inequities through domestic water supply; a “poor” example from Sekhukhune, South Africa. In: S. Perret, S. Farolfi and R. Hassan (eds.): Water Governance for Sustainable Development: Approaches and Lessons from Developing and Transitional Countries. London: Earthscan, 55–74.
