Moral obligations of states
published in Applied Ethics Series 2011
The starting point of the paper is the frequent ascription of moral duties to states, especially in the context of... more The starting point of the paper is the frequent ascription of moral duties to states, especially in the context of problems of global justice. It is widely assumed that industrialized or wealthy countries in particular have a moral obligation or duties of justice to shoulder (financial) burdens of poverty reduction or climate change adaptation and mitigation. But can collectives such as states actually hold moral duties? If answering this affirmatively: what does it actually mean to say that a state has moral obligations or duties of justice? In this paper I argue that states can be considered collective (institutional) agents which can hold moral duties. If a collective (for example a state) holds moral duties this entails duties for its individual members. I show how depending on their position within the collective these duties differ.
Joint Responsibility without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis
In Compatibilist Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism, eds. Jeroen van den Hoven , Ibo van de Poel and Nicole Vincent, Springer 2011, pp. 181–199.
http://www.springerlink.com/content/978-94-007-1878-4#section=941030&p
This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for outcomes over which they... more This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for outcomes over which they have no individual control, a family that resists standard ways of understanding outcome responsibility. First, the agents in these cases do not individually facilitate the outcomes and would not seem individually responsible for them if the other agents were replaced by non-agential causes. This undermines attempts to understand joint responsibility as overlapping individual responsibility; the responsibility in question is essentially joint. Second, the agents involved in these cases are not aware of each other's existence and do not form a social group. This undermines attempts to understand joint responsibility in terms of actual or possible joint action or joint intentions, or in terms of other social ties. Instead, it is argued that intuitions about joint responsibility are best understood given the Explanation Hypothesis, according to which a group of agents are seen as jointly responsible for outcomes that are suitably explained by their motivational structures: something bad happened because they didn’t care enough; something good happened because their dedication was extraordinary. One important consequence of the proposed account is that responsi-bility for outcomes of collective action is a deeply normative matter.
