Collective Intentionality

Collective Intentionality in Economics: Making Searle Relevant for Game Theory

by Cyril Hédoin

Working paper

Is collective intentionality really primitive?

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Pacherie, E. (2007). Is collective intentionality really primitive?. In M. Beaney, C. Penco & M. Vignolo (Eds.), Mental processes: representing and inferring, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, pp.153-175.

Framing Joint Action

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 2: 173-192, DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5.

Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally... more Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert's account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman's account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach's version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.

Problems of Circularity in Theories of Collective Intentionality

by Jo-Jo Koo

[Feedback most welcome; please do not cite or refer to this draft without permission.]

Theories of collective intentionality are a currently fashionable way of analyzing the nature of human sociality or... more Theories of collective intentionality are a currently fashionable way of analyzing the nature of human sociality or collective phenomena in contemporary analytic philosophy. Three of its most prominent proponents are Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and John Searle. Despite their current popularity, however, I argue in this paper that they are each faced with different problems of circularity within their frameworks of analysis. If so, this result should lessen the appeal of theories of collective intentionality as adequate accounts of the nature of human sociality or collective phenomena.

Intentions as complex entities

by Marco Mazzone

M. Mazzone 2011. “Intentions as complex entities”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 767-783.

In the philosophic and cognitive literature, the word 'intention' has been used with a variety of meanings which... more In the philosophic and cognitive literature, the word 'intention' has been used with a variety of meanings which occasionally have been explicitly distinguished. I claim that an important cause of this polysemy is the fact that intentions are complex entities, endowed with an internal structure, and that sometimes different theories in the field are erroneously presented as if they were in conflict with each other, while they in fact just focus on different aspects of the phenomenon. The debate between Gallese's embodied simulation theory and Csibra and Gergely's teleological stance hypothesis is discussed as a case in point, and some misunderstandings occurring in that debate are analyzed. The thesis that intentions are complex entities is argued for by shedding light on the following aspects of intentions: conscious control; perceptual (and not only motoric) representations of end-states; attributions of value to those representations; appreciation of the rational relationships between means and ends.

Distributed Intentionality. A Model of Intentional Behavior in Humans

by Marco Mazzone

M. Mazzone, E. Campisi in press. “Distributed intentionality. A model of intentional behavior in humans”, Philosophical Psychology.

Is human behavior, and more specifically linguistic behavior, intentional? Some scholars have proposed that action is... more Is human behavior, and more specifically linguistic behavior, intentional? Some scholars have proposed that action is driven in a top-down manner by one single intention–i.e., one single conscious goal. Others have argued that actions are mostly non-intentional, insofar as often the single goal driving an action is not consciously represented. We intend to claim that both alternatives are unsatisfactory; more specifically, we claim that actions are intentional, but intentionality is distributed across complex goal-directed representations of action, rather than concentrated in single intentions driving action in a top-down manner. These complex representations encompass a multiplicity of goals, together with other components which are not goals themselves, and are the result of a largely automatic dynamic of activation; such an automatic processing, however, does not preclude the involvement of conscious attention, shifting from one component to the other of the overall goal-directed representation.

How to Share an Intention

by J. David Velleman

Published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1997)

A theory of shared intention A theory of shared intention

Comment on Raimo Tuomela. Joint action: How Rational? How irreducible?

by Cédric Paternotte

Analyse & Kritik (2011) 33(1):87-92.

In his 'Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several... more In his 'Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.

Group Mind

by Georg Theiner

Georg Theiner & Rob Wilson, “Group Mind” – Draft entry for:
Byron Kaldis (eds). Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage, 2013.

Review of John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality

by Kevin Magill

Scroll down to p. 43 in pdf. Published in Radical Philosophy, 83, May/June 1997.

Joint actions and group agents

by David P. Schweikard

Philip Pettit and David P. Schweikard

Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they... more Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of consistency and rationality in adequate measure. The main discovery in the recent theory of group agency is that this result is not easily achieved; no regular voting procedure will ensure, for example, that a group of individually consistent agents will display consistency in group judgments.

Social Space and the Ontology of Recognition

by Italo Testa

Draft, published in: Heikki Ikäheimo & Arto Laitinen (eds.), Recognition and Social Ontology. Brill Books, 2011 (pp. 287-308)

In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, regarding the very constitution of the social... more In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, regarding the very constitution of the social space of interaction. I concentrate on the question of whether certain aspects of the theory of recognition can be translated into the terms of a socio-ontological paradigm: to do so, I make reference to some conceptual tools derived from John Searle's social ontology and Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics. My strategy consists in showing that recognitive phenomena cannot be isolated at the level of human interaction, and are, rather, in part proper to animal interaction as well. Furthermore, it is argued that recognitive powers are constitutive powers more basic than deontic ones and play a role much broader than the one they in fact assume in Searle and in Brandom.

Hegel's Naturalism

by Italo Testa

Paper given at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, University of South Carolina, October 24-26, 2008 forthcoming in the Conference Proceedings, Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, SUNY Press (2012)

The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between... more The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. This relates to Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality - living reality - and different levels of description of it. This implies, moreover, that it is possible to ascribe some form of naturality also to the social body of institutionalized ethical life. Hegel’s position can thus be characterised as a kind of aristotelian social naturalism: this, at bottom, is the combined meaning of the Hegelian theses that soul is the substance of Spirit, and habit its universal form.

Understanding the Social Constitution of the Human Individual

by Jo-Jo Koo

Dissertation

What does it mean to say that the human individual is socially constituted? I argue that the very capacity to be a... more What does it mean to say that the human individual is socially constituted? I argue that the very capacity to be a human agent and self must draw on a shared public understanding of the practices, norms, and roles that renders this capacity intelligible in the first place. Contrary to what we commonly assume, interpersonal interactions cannot serve as the basis for an adequate understanding of human sociality. For in order to engage in such interactions, individuals have to be already socially constituted.

In Part I, Ch. 1, of the dissertation, I elaborate and endorse two theses of Philip Pettit’s regarding how we should think about the social constitution of the individual. First, we should not think the latter consists merely in the fact that human beings depend causally, materially, psychologically, institutionally, etc., on one another for their survival and minimal flourishing. Second, establishing that the individual is socially constituted turns on showing how some basic capacity that is central for being human cannot be actualized absent this constitution, not how this individual is somehow subservient as a part or aspect of some larger social whole. Pettit, however, identifies the capacity in question as the capacity to think, which (he argues) is social insofar as it rests on a basis of social interactions. Against that, I argue that the relevant capacity is our very ability to be in the world.

I spell this out in Ch. 2 by drawing on Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time. I argue first that the social constitution of the individual can be adequately understood only when it is seen as an inherent aspect of what is required for a human being to be in the world at all. I then explain the crucial function of the shared public normativity on the basis of which the individual makes sense of things in the world, including herself and her relations with others. I show how the individual is socially constituted in that her understanding of this normative intelligibility is at once what makes available and what constrains the attitudes, actions, self-understandings, and projects that she can adopt. Contrary to its initial appearance, this understanding of the social constitution of the individual does not preclude resistance to norms, but is what actually renders this resistance intelligible in the first place. I conclude this chapter by addressing some familiar objections raised by some philosophers in the “continental” tradition (e.g., Sartre, Buber, Theunissen, Rentsch, Levinas) against a Heideggerian conception of human social existence.

In Part II of the dissertation, I consider various forms of the interactionist understanding of human sociality that I argued against, on general grounds, in Part I. In Ch. 3, I sketch and criticize the interactionist accounts of collective intentionality that Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and John Searle provide. I argue that these accounts are not only problematic by being either explanatorily circular or incomplete, but fundamentally flawed by assuming that individual agency can be intelligible and fully self-sufficient apart from its social constitution in the sense worked out in Part I.

In Ch. 4 I examine how Donald Davidson’s commitment to a form of interactionism shapes his account of successful linguistic communication and the objectivity of thought. I show that shared practices in the Heideggerian sense do not fall into the target range of Davidson’s attack on the idea that communication presupposes shared practices; moreover, shared practices in the Heideggerian sense actually enable the occurrence of such communication in ways that Davidson unjustifiably downplays. I trace his lack of appreciation of the significance of shared practices in this sense to his commitment to an interactionist conception of sociality. This commitment is also at work in his appeal to “triangulation” as a necessary condition for the objectivity of thought. I argue that this appeal, even on its own terms, either does no actual explanatory work or leaves mysterious how triangulation is supposed to be a necessary condition of thought.

In Ch. 5 I consider in greater depth how normativity connects with the social constitution of the individual. I approach this topic by sketching the contrast between individualist and communalist conceptions of rule-following that stem from divergent readings of the later Wittgenstein. I examine in particular the views of Michael Luntley and Meredith Williams, two sophisticated defenders, respectively, of individualism and communalism about the normativity of rule-following. Luntley mounts a devastating attack against standard appeals to the community as the source of normativity. In response, I take what is right about Luntley’s positive account of normativity and, contrary to what he holds, show how it actually coalesces with Williams’s best thinking about the social dimension of normativity. The result is a conception of normativity that not only integrates well with the Heideggerian conception of the social constitution of the individual, but deepens our understanding of the connection between normativity and normalization in this constitution.

Anti-Social Engineering the Hyper-Manipulated Self

by Brian Taylor

When one does philosophy, one dismantles strings of concepts into their respective parts to examine both the parts... more When one does philosophy, one dismantles strings of concepts into their respective parts to examine both the parts themselves and the relationships the parts have with each other. This semantic reduction provides us the best possible opportunities for finding truth. This was exactly the type of skill Brian Taylor needed to write his new book Anti-Social Engineering the Hyper-Manipulated Self, postpaper publishing, ISBN: 978-0-557-99909-5 http://stores.lulu.com/postpaper

The book began as a series of blogged essays in a response to the “Authenticity” movement presented by the like of Eckhart Tolle, Andrew Cohen and to a lesser extent, Dr. Phil. These men, and others, were coming to conclusions on the idea of authenticity that were, among other things, subjective fallacies, rife with interpretation and possibly counterproductive. On the other side of the coin we had skeptical guru Michael Shermer or perhaps Richard Dawkins making up one half of the “four horseman of the non-apocalypse.” These men, “scientists,” were and still are guilty of the same faults as their spiritual counterparts, interpretations rather than knowledge. Brian Taylor wanted to know, “Are there any actual answers in the arena of the self and its power?” As it turns out, reality is far stranger than ever before known and we actually know so much less than we think we do, if it can be said that we know anything authentically, at all.

After four years of research into our ideas about the self through the ages, the sciences of the self and what the self is, this book comes to the conclusion that the modern self, you and I today, are not only manipulated, but that manipulation is sought out, required and pre-programmed. This is a book about how we are all being intentionally hyper-manipulated without our knowledge, by whom and to what end.

To “anti-social engineer” is to counter this phenomenon of modernity through critical consciousness, dubbed “assignee's prerogative.” This self direction is aimed toward eudaemonia, which is an Aristotelian idea roughly meaning “happiness and promotion,” and it is further suggested that virtue is found in the mean between excess and deficiency, in these concerns. This sounds rather simple in such a paragraph form, rest assured, chasing the meanings and relationships of these ideas to any philosophical depth requires a maze of rabbit holes and someone to guide you through them. Taylor is nothing if not thorough in this regard.

Entertaining, personal, conversational, exact and profound, this book has a strange undercurrent, almost a charge running through it. Most clearly defined in it's most opinionated moments, there is a subtext, not a call to arms but to a social contract. Taylor says, throughout the book, that it is specifically battling social engineering, the command, hidden or not, “think this about that.” Yet, he too wants us to think a certain way, a centrist “golden mean,” a path of no extremes. Making an argument against his ideas is difficult, regardless of the talking points he uses. (These vary from possible moral objections we may hold for prostitution or murder, to social norms such as supporting the troops or the war on terror.) In his most controversial moments, when objectivity is at its thinnest, the author's existentialism shines through and he suggests it's better to not claim to know something than to suspect something incorrectly. The exception to this rule is when the social engineering is secret, malicious, degenerative or merely in error.

There are things that we can do anti-social engineer our hyper-manipulated selves and Taylor spells these tasks out clearly. Firstly, social engineering, be it delivered by a television commercial, ideology, civility, social construct, etc. is to be expected and recognized. Then Taylor presents us his Philosophy Generator which is described as “a dismantling of paradigm” and a way to determine if any particular social engineering is more persuasive or manipulative. If we are able to first know what it is we are deciding, then do our best possible thinking on the matter, which is what working through the Generator is for, we should be able to be confident in our decision, whatever it may be. Furthermore, given the standardization of awareness, contemplation and centrist philosophy, it should be expected that the same benefit experienced by individuals would transfer to societies.

The book ends with a chapter called “God wears a yellow hat.” It is concluded with a list of 24 interesting intentions, (23 actually, one of them is missing,) this list is not meant to be a complete index of the topics discussed, but rather an indication of the book's scope. The war on terror, the war on drugs, food transportation, consumerism, capitalism, communism, false flags, dehumanization via technology, God, 2012, patriotism, culture, globalization, human rights and religion. There is an entire chapter devoted to a reasonable discussion between the two sides divided over the conspiracies associated with September 11, 2001. This book discusses conspiracy as it dismantles thought, which is a strange dichotomy. Taylor seems to want to convince us that he is a reasonable man, with a reasonable method and if such a man can find a reasonable conspiracy, we can take the suggestion from the fringe to the mainstream. He may be right. However, this is not a conspiracy book, this is a book about thinking.

One comes away from the experience of reading this book enticed to do more and this is the goal. Anti-Social Engineering the Hyper-Manipulated Self is about taking responsibility and looking ahead, prudently. It doesn't want to take anything away from you, you're entitled to have your beliefs as the author has his. We need our beliefs and we even need social engineering, these things are part of a natural, healthy species. The dangers of our beliefs are represented by the lack of awareness of them and the inability to think critically about them. Taylor argues that, if in fact we are not thinking well about the things we believe, we are not living up to the reasonable purpose we have as human beings. This appreciation of hyper-reality and our place in it defines our authenticity and is the promise expressed by the 21st Century Enlightenment.

Intencionalidade: Mecanismo e Interacção

by Porfírio Silva

Intencionalidade: Mecanismo e Interacção, Principia - An International Journal of Epistemology, 14(2), pp. 255–278 (2010)

The non-mysterious flesh - embodied intersubjectivity at work

by Liz Disley

Working one‘s fingers to the bone, having one‘s nose to the grindstone, Knochenarbeit… the metaphors we use for hard... more Working one‘s fingers to the bone, having one‘s nose to the grindstone, Knochenarbeit… the metaphors we use for hard physical work are often applied equally to serious intellectual feats or exhaustive non-physical investigation or processing. In the phenomenological experience of work, what is the qualitative difference between physical and non-physical work? Hegel was the first to suggest a strong connection between work and sense of self-as-subject as among other selves, and his account in the master/slave dialectic and subsequent influential interpretations such as that of Kojève are focused on the physical process of ‗negating‘ objects. Recent work on joint interests and joint attention focuses on goal-directed action that is paradigmatically non-physical, or where the physical aspect is incidental. In this paper, I investigate the role played by physical work in self-perception and in intersubjective relationships, specifically in a model of empathetic relationships. I also investigate the question of whether embodiment or shared goals and intentions are more important to a full account of intersubjectivity and empathy. As well as contributing to current debates about models of empathy, this discussion is also relevant to conceptions of solidarity and theories of the self in general, particularly as regards self-world relations.

Avatars of the Collective: A Realist Theory of Collective Subjectivities*

by Frederic Vandenberghe

Money as an Institution Sanctioned by Political Authority

by Georgios Papadopoulos

The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative to the commodity theory of money, based on the state theory of... more The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative to the commodity theory of money, based on the state theory of money and original institutional economics. These theoretical traditions have a lot in common and this paper is a further attempt to clarify the connections and the benefits of their relations. Recent developments in social ontology and particularly on the ontology of institutions have provided new models and new of arguments in support of an institutionalist account of money. An institutionalist account of the state theory of money is consistent with the anthropological and historical findings about money and its emergence at the same time as it can provide a frmaework for the analysis of the evolution of money. At the same time the proposed institutionalist state theory of money is avoids the logical inconsistencies of the commodity theory of money, and enjoys sounder ontological foundations.

The social and moral cognition of group agents (2010)

by Bertram Malle

Malle, B. F. (2010). The social and moral cognition of group agents.  Journal of Law and Policy, 20, 95-136.