Causation

Cause and Effect

by Shannon Nason

Rough draft of a paper to appear in Kierkegaard's Concepts, ed. Jon Stewart (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, forthcoming)

I offer an analysis of the concept of cause and effect in Kierkegaard's thought. Particular attention is given to... more I offer an analysis of the concept of cause and effect in Kierkegaard's thought. Particular attention is given to Kierkegaard's metaphysical views about efficient and final causation

Causation without influence

by Tomasz Bigaj

published in 'Erkenntnis' 2012, Vol. 76, pp. 1-22

David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events.... more David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation.

Causes, conditions and counterfactuals

by Tomasz Bigaj

published in 'Axiomathes' 2005, Vol. 15, pp. 599-619.

The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely... more The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely the context-sensitivity problem or, as I prefer to call it, the background condition problem. It appears that Lewis’ counterfactual definition of causality cannot distinguish between proper causes and mere causal conditions – i.e. factors necessary for the effect to occur, but commonly not seen as causally efficacious. The proposal is put forward to amend the Lewis definition with a condition, based on the notion of cotenability, which would eliminate the problem. It is shown that the corrected definition of causality leads to the transitivity of the causal relation. Possible objections to the proposed solution, involving the assumption of indeterminism and the preemption cases, are given a thorough consideration.

The Rationale of Variation In Methodological and Evidential Pluralism

by Federica Russo

Why theories of causality need production: an information-transmission account

by Phyllis Illari

Philosophy and Technology 2011, 24(2) 95-114
DOI: 10.1007/s13347-010-0006-3

In this paper, I examine the comparatively neglected intuition of production regarding causality. I begin by examining... more In this paper, I examine the comparatively neglected intuition of production regarding causality. I begin by examining the weaknesses of current production accounts of causality. I then distinguish between giving a good production account of causality, and a good account of production. I argue that an account of production is needed to make sense of vital practices in causal inference. Finally, I offer an information-transmission account of production based on John Collier's work, that solves the primary weaknesses of current production accounts: applicability and absences.

Mechanistic evidence: Disambiguating the Russo-Williamson Thesis

by Phyllis Illari

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 25(2), (2011): 139–57.
DOI:10.1080/02698595.2011.574856

Russo and Williamson claim that establishing causal claims requires mechanistic and difference-making evidence. In this... more Russo and Williamson claim that establishing causal claims requires mechanistic and difference-making evidence. In this paper, I will argue that Russo and Williamson’s formulation of their thesis is multiply ambiguous. I will make three distinctions: mechanistic evidence as type vs object of evidence; what mechanism or mechanisms we want evidence of; and how much evidence of a mechanism we require. I will feed these more precise meanings back into the Russo-Williamson Thesis and argue that it is both true and false: two weaker versions of the thesis are worth supporting, while the stronger versions are not. Further, my distinctions are of wider concern because they allow us to make more precise claims about what kinds of evidence are required in particular cases.

Why look at Causality In the Sciences: A manifesto

by Phyllis Illari

With Federica Russo and Jon Williamson
Causality in the sciences, edited by P. McKay Illari, F. Russo, and J. Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2011)

This chapter is the introduction to the volume. The volume editors begin by setting out a manifesto that puts forward... more This chapter is the introduction to the volume. The volume editors begin by setting out a manifesto that puts forward two theses: first, that the sciences are the best place to turn in order to understand causality; second, that scientifically-informed philosophical investigation can bring something to the sciences too. Next, the chapter goes through the various parts of the volume, drawing out relevant background to and themes of the chapters in those parts. Finally, the chapter discusses the progeny of the papers and identify some next steps for research into causality in the sciences.

What is a mechanism?: Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences

by Phyllis Illari

With Jon Williamson. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 2(1) (2012) 119-135
DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0038-2

After a decade of intense debate about mechanisms, there is still no consensus characterization. In this paper we... more After a decade of intense debate about mechanisms, there is still no consensus characterization. In this paper we argue for a characterization that applies widely to mechanisms across the sciences. We examine and defend our disagreements with the major current contenders for characterizations of mechanisms. Ultimately, we indicate that the major contenders can all sign up to our characterization.

The Supervenience Argument: Kim's Challenge to Nonreductive Physicalism

by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

Co-authored with Ausonio Marras. Published in F. Orilia and S. Gozzano, eds., Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, pp. 101-132.

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument purports to show that epiphenomenalism about the mental follows from premises... more Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument purports to show that epiphenomenalism about the mental follows from premises that any nonreductive physicalist should find acceptable. Kim regards his argument as a reductio ad absurdum of nonreductive physicalism. We reconstruct and evaluate the latest version of Kim’s argument. We argue that the premises of Kim’s argument are much less innocent than they may appear. In particular, we single out for criticism an unstated assumption about the identity conditions of events, and we argue that this assumption could be seen as all by itself implying that nonreductive physicalism is false, thus begging the question against that position. It is also dubious, we argue, whether Kim’s unstated assumption is even consistent with one of the stated assumptions of his argument, “the principle of causal exclusion”, given a standard understanding of causal overdetermination.

Causal and Explanatory Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List

by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

Co-authored with Ausonio Marras. Published in Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, eds., Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

The chapter argues that Menzies and List's defence of the claim that higher‐level properties have causal powers... more The chapter argues that Menzies and List's defence of the claim that higher‐level properties have causal powers independent of those of their physical realizers conflates questions about the causal powers of properties with questions about their explanatory roles. Menzies and List's argument shows only that explanations in terms of higher‐level properties are sometimes more appropriate than explanations in terms of physical properties, but no conclusions about the causal powers of properties can be drawn from this without assuming a questionable version of the interventionist theory of causation.

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by Damir Ibrisimovic

New Physics - draft 1.0

Ethics and Loss of Chance in Medical Causation

by Jack Clayton Thompson

A brief introduction to the issues arising out of Gregg v. Scott and so-called 'Loss of Chance' case in Clinical... more A brief introduction to the issues arising out of Gregg v. Scott and so-called 'Loss of Chance' case in Clinical Negligence.Written as part of the Globalising European Bioethics Education (GLEUBE) project.

Do I have more free will than you do?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Do I have more free will than you do? An unexpected asymmetry in intuitions about personal freedom. New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 21, 34-40.

The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human... more The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.

Top-down causation regarding the chemistry-physics interface

by Eric Scerri

Lagunas y otras omisiones

by Hernán Miguel

COLOQUIO SADAF DE FILOSOFÍA 2005
Miguel, H.: “Lagunas y otras omisiones”
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Buenos Aires, 9 y 10 de Septiembre, 2005.

The Futures of Causality

by Christopher Groves

Final version published in Causality and Motivation, ed. Roberto Poli, Ontos Verlag. ISBN 978-3-86838-068-2

To understand novelty, we arguably require a concept of the future which does not define it as fully determined by the... more To understand novelty, we arguably require a concept of the future which does not define it as fully determined by the past. To flesh out what such a concept might require, I examine Hans Jonas' concept of immanent teleology and Gilles Deleuze's concept of the virtual. While Jonas' concept is shown to be useful for understanding adaptive behavioural novelty at the level of the individual organism, Deleuze's is interpreted as having a broader analytic scope, applying to the creation of novelty across any number of different kinds of non-equilibrium systems. In both cases, the meaning of causation is widened in ways which evoke Aristotle's ambiguous notion of aition.

35. Afterword to THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, Signet/Penguin.

by Susanne Bobzien

New afterword to THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, ed. Bambrough, Signet/Penguin, new edition, January 4th, 2011, 291-510. (Final Draft)

ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading... more ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).

'Epistemology, Semantics, Ontology, and David Hume' (2000)

by Galen Strawson

'Realism and Causation' (1987)

by Galen Strawson

Philosophical Quarterly 37: 253–77 and in Real Materialism and Other Essays (2008)

Causality - Encyclopedia Article

by David Frost

more http://www.unc.edu/~dfrost/docs/FrostCausalityIEP.pdf


1. The Nature of Causality
a. Causation versus Correlation
b. Causation versus Causal Explanation
i. Theories of Scientific Explanation
c. Causation, Possibility and Necessity
2. Causation in the History of Philosophy
a. Aristotle’s Four Kinds of Causation
b. Hume
c. Kant

3. Causal Analyses
a. Regularity Theories
b. Mackie’s INUS Conditions
c. Counterfactual Theories
d. Probabilistic Causation
e. Process Theories
f. Manipulationist Accounts

4. Special Issues in Causation
a. Mental Causation
b. Free Will and Causal Determinism