Biosemiotics

Distributed language: implications for volition

by Stephen J. Cowley

The attached paper is a draft for a Russian volume that explored new perspectives on language. It was translated and appeared in Russian as:
С. Дж. Коули. Понятие распределенности языка и его значение для волеизъявления // А.В.Кравченко (ред.). Наука о языке в изменяющейся парадигме знания (Studia linguistica cognitiva 2). Иркутск: БГУЭП, 2009. С. 192-227.

It can be cited as:
Cowley, S. J. (2009). Distributed language: implications for volition. (In Russian). In A, Kravchenko (ed.) New Perspectives on Language and Cognition, pp. 192-227, Irkutsk: Baikal University Press.

Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of... more Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of volition or, worse, seek explanations in the individual brain. By contrast, when language is recognised as distributed, human cognition is seen to arise as we adapt to life in a collective world. Since language is embodied AND non-local, learning emerges under dual or multiple control –babies learn to talk by participating in “distributed cognitive systems.” In relation to human volition, this opens a gap between tracing actions and feelings to a single brain and privileging the person ‘level’. Although behaviour emerges as people deal with circumstances together, language gives some control over what is not said or done. By focusing on the possible (and what we imagine), we can use the real duration associated with verbal and other thoughts. In short, it is because language is embodied and conventional that we can modulate action/perception: this enables individual organisms to act as living subjects who exert a degree of control over what they – and others – say and do.

A Necessary Condition for Proof of Abiotic Semiosis

by Marc Champagne

To appear in Semiotica.

This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It... more This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a triadic sign — including the interpretant — would have to be abiotic (that is, not dependent on a living organism). Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a natural sign (like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic semiosis. A more rigorous and reserved approach to the topic is called for.

Contextualizing bodies: human infants and distributed cognition

by Stephen J. Cowley

This paper that appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2004). Contextualizing bodies: how human responsiveness constrains distributed cognition. Language Sciences, 26/6, 565-591

By their second birthday caregivers treat infants as ‘using’ words that have grammatical properties. How do... more By their second birthday caregivers treat infants as ‘using’ words that have grammatical properties. How do brain-bodies develop the relevant capacity? In addressing this issue, the paper stresses how babies exploit other people’s understanding. It is argued that joint activity uses ‘shallow thinking’ to gradually develop both caregiver biases and infant predispositions. Using how activity is integrated, the baby's skills are gradually transformed. Taking part in competitive and co-operative activity is sufficient to nudge the infant towards strategic syllable-use. Gradually, a baby’s contextualizing body comes to exploit vocalizing in ways heard as arrangements of arbitrary signs. Far from relying on ‘language acquisition’, telegraphic speech arises from co-ordination, affect and adult interpretation. It emerges in infant agents whose anticipative strategies allow them to distinguish, say, ‘gone dada’ [gondada]’ (e.g. “please get it back, dad”) from ‘dada gone’ [dadagon] (e.g. “father is hiding again”).

Living in the social meshwork: the case of health interaction

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Steffensen, S., Cowley, S.J. and Thibault, P.J. (2010). Living in the social meshwork: the case of health interaction. In Cowley, S.J., Steffensen, S. & J.C. Major, Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health, pp. 201-237. Braga: Portuguese Catholic University Press.

The paper presents a new way of investigating real-time decisions in health interaction. Using a simulation... more
The paper presents a new way of investigating real-time decisions in health interaction. Using a simulation setting, it brings home how much depends on team-work that arises as people concert their movements with speech. In a world of norms, coaction both brings off desired results and, drives problem finding. Using close analysis of a single case, we also identify strengths and weaknesses of using  a simulation setting for training purposes. Its advantage, naturally enough, is that it offers an opportunity to practice situated interpretation drawing on scenarios that, in the real-world, may be challenging. This is surprisingly dependent on external resources, closely timed movements and the sharing and prompting of perspectives. At the same time, close investigation at shows that parties play their roles without losing awareness of their ‘real’ relationships. While of no relevance to the health care investigated, their performance in an emergency simulation is inseparable from enacting a social situation.

К обоснованию идеального проекта лингвистики: интеграция языка, семиотики и биологии

by Alexander Kravchenko

Uncorrected proof. To appear in:
Вестник РГГУ, 2012

A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception Between Auditory Listening and Cognitive Economy

by Mark Reybrouck

Published in Axiomathes (2005) 15:229–266. Springer 2005
DOI 10.1007/s10516-004-6679-4

ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims... more ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural
description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world in its objective qualities, but the world as perceived. In order to make these claims operational we can rely on the ecological concept of coping with the sonic world and the cybernetic concepts of artificial and adaptive devices. Listeners, on this view, are able to change their semantic relations with the sonic world through functional adaptations at the level of sensing, acting and coordinating between action and perception. This allows us to understand music in functional terms of what it affords to us and not merely in terms of its acoustic qualities. There are, however, degrees of freedom and constraints which shape the semiotization of the sonic world. As such we must
consider the role of event perception and cognitive economy: listeners do not perceive the acoustical environment in terms of phenomenological descriptions but as ecological events.

Fitness

by Timo Maran

Published in: A More Developed Sign. Interpreting the Work of Jesper Hoffmeyer (Tartu Semiotics Library 10), Favareau, Donald; Cobley, Paul; Kull, Kalevi (eds.), Tartu: Tartu University Press 2012, 147-149.

Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on The Symbolic Species

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2002). Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on “The Symbolic Species”. Language Sciences, 24: 73-95.

Deacon's co-evolutionary theory provides a new basis for how we think about language and brains. Instead of ascribing... more Deacon's co-evolutionary theory provides a new basis for how we think about language and brains. Instead of ascribing language to either nature or nurture, it is intrinsic to both: biological principles ensure that the brain can only function by attuning to itsbody's worlds. For humans, this means both that our brains are biosocial organs permeated by history and that human bodies can tightly constrain the nature of our languages.

While endorsing the thought that language is insinuated into brains, I also identify what I take to be the theory's Achilles heel. Deacon pictures the brain as able to process words qua 'symbolic' tokens. Unlike morphosyntactic patterns, these belong to a private domain where referential interpretation detaches from experience. Opposing this split between symbolic (and nonverbal aspects of language,I claim that it is not only unnecessary but also implausible and damaging to co-evolutionary theory.

Towards a cyber-semiotic foundation of a scientifically adequate Functional Discourse Grammar

by Ole Nedergaard Thomsen

Abstract proposal for a paper within our project on Cybersemiotics and Functional Linguistics (esp., Functional Discourse Grammar and Distributed Language Theory).
Co-authored with Søren Brier, Dec. 2011.
Comments welcome

In this paper we shall try to give a foundation for a scientifically adequate Functional Discourse Grammar. By the... more In this paper we shall try to give a foundation for a scientifically adequate Functional Discourse Grammar. By the term ’scientific adequacy’ Functional Grammar’s original types of adequacy, inherited by Functional Discourse Grammar, have been generalized: typological, psychological, and pragmatic, for we believe that a lot more has to be involved in scientific model building. Firstly, scientific adequacy will involve observational and descriptive adequacy, in addition to Functional Discourse Grammar’s adequacies. The former, observational adequacy, will deal with the problem of observing natural language and language use (e.g., ’the observer’s paradox’ of how to obtain samples of natural, vernacular speech, not distorted by observation), but in the first place we have to determine what counts as a linguistic observation (what is observed?). Then, how many and what kinds of observations do we need, for them to be representative of the whole population? Descriptive adequacy will have to define types of scientific model building – e.g., will a symbolic-diagrammatic description be adequate (e.g., Functional Discourse Grammar’s formulae and flow diagrams)? or should we use a connectionist, neural network model? – clearly the answers depend on (the type or aspect of) the observandum we are interested in, and on which aspects of it we abstract away, or on which level of granularity is needed (e.g., minute real-time factors in some topics of psycholinguistics).

With respect to explanatory (typological, psychological, and pragmatic) adequacy, we propose that Functional Discourse Grammar’s model of verbal language must be given a cyber-semiotic foundation (Brier 2008), and by this we mean, on the one hand, a cognitive (’second-order cybernetics’) and, on the other, a semiotic foundation. Cyber-semiotics implies that linguistic communication, the Natural Language User, and language (observandum) be investigated (trans- and inter-disciplinarily) in four irreducible dimensions (the ‘cybersemiotic star model’), viz., 1. as part of the physical world (perceptibe signs), 2. as part of the biological world (neurological-physiological embodiment), 3. as part of the psychological world (cognitive and phenomenological substrate), and 4. as part of the social world (socio-cultural situatedness). The four explanatory dimensions are not disparate, but complementary and united by a conception of ’absolute naturalism’, that is, that they all are integrated aspects of the natural world.

Cyber-semiotics is an evolutionary theory. Thus, we focus on language and linguistic communication as evolutionary phenomena. This may be self-evident but implies that a model of (a) language and of the Natural Language User (linguistic cyborg) should always ultimately be seen in this perspective, which again means that the model views (verbal) language as an integrated part of ’total integrated evolutionary multimodal communication’, involving, i.a., co-produced gesture.
The evolutionary perspective has the ramification that a Functional Discourse Grammar should be seen (at least) in the temporal perspective of: 1. the evolution of (human) language in the species, 2. the history of the speech tradition of a given speech community, and 3. the development of the language(s) of the individual Natural Language User (i.a. first-language acquisition, second-language acquisition, language loss, language impairment), as well as 4. the on-line incremental development of a given communication.


Keywords: Cybersemiotics, Functional Discourse Grammar, Functional Grammar, Natural Language User, linguistic cyborg, scientific adequacy: observational adequacy, descriptive adequacy, explanatory adequacy: psychological adequacy, pragmatic adequacy, typological adequacy, transdisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, the cybersemiotic star model: physical dimension, biological dimension, psychological dimension, sociological dimension; total integrated evolutionary multimodal communication

Language and biosemiosis: Towards unity?

by Stephen J. Cowley

This is a draft of a paper that appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2006). Language and biosemiosis: towards unity? Semiotica, 162(1/4), 417-444.

Although many pay lip-service to the view that signs are common to culture and biology, it remains unclear how such a... more Although many pay lip-service to the view that signs are common to culture and biology, it remains unclear how such a unity could emerge. Indeed, while those working with culture usually ignore biology, biologists rarely consider how their observations bear on issues of meaning. So, when sign-making is studied, its outcomes are usually interpreted either against a cultural surround or models of how semiosis is represented in the brain. Often it is implied that the only alternative is a biolinguistic view where syntactic computations are used to claim that (internal) language has its basis in molecular biology (Jenkins, 2000). In what follows, I challenge the view that verbal language are, on any such view, entirely separable from persons, neural processes and the sensorium. Building on Eerdmans, Prevignano and Thibault’s (2003) overview of what Gumperz’s opus offers to the ‘theory and practice of communication analysis’ (2003: vii), I consider how to naturalize contextualization cues. I argue that, since much contextualizing is independent of ‘meaning potential’, we can turn to how indexical sense-making is grounded in biosemiosis. Sketching such a model, I link Barbieri’s (2002) approach to semantic coding with Damasio’s (1999) view of core consciousness to show how human judgements can use the feeling-of-what-happens. During talk sensitivity to the feel of biosemiosis prompts us both to adjust to each other in real-time and to make verbal judgements about how they sound and act.

Advertising and the Predation Loop: A Biosemiotic Model

by James Carney

Published in Biosemiotics, 2008 Published in Biosemiotics, 2008

Active motion, communicative aggregations, and the spatial closure of Umwelt

by Kalevi Kull

Kull, Kalevi 2000. Active motion, communicative aggregations, and the spatial closure of Umwelt. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 901: 272–279.

On the basis of a simple model of movable organisms that are supplied by semiotic force of attraction or repulsion,... more On the basis of a simple model of movable organisms that are supplied by semiotic force of attraction or repulsion, several general features of spatial behavior are demonstrated: (1) the stochastic spatial distribution of actively moving organisms is unstable; (2) simple or complex aggregations of organisms appear as a result of active motion; and (3) the ability for active motion ties the organisms with place. These results show that models that apply an internalist approach can considerably simplify the theory of spatial behavior of organic systems. Explanations based on the effects of Darwinian fitness may not be necessary for understanding the origin of biological aggregations.

Taking a language stance

by Stephen J. Cowley

These proofs appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2011.) Taking a language stance. Ecological Psychology, 23/3: 185-209.

Linguists tend to view language in terms of forms and their use. For historical reasons, speaking and listening have... more Linguists tend to view language in terms of forms and their use. For historical reasons, speaking and listening have often often ascribed to knowledge of a language system. Language behavior is thus seen as the production and processing of forms. Others contrast language to man-made codes (see Kravchenko, 2007; Love, 2004). Instead of focusing on forms, language can be conceived of as action and, as such, both dynamic and symbolic (Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2009). History places us in a meshwork where public resources of language, among other things, contribute to games, mashing beans, and watching television. Speaking-while-hearing draws on cultural products (e.g., axes, social roles, pictures, and wordings). As we collaborate, we orient to wordings or repeated (and systematized) aspects of vocalizations that, within our community, carry historically derived information. Pursuing this view, it is argued that hearing “words” is like seeing “things” in pictures. This is described as taking a language stance. To defend the position, it is argued that, first, we learn to hear wordings and, later, to use “what we hear” as ways of constraining our actions. Far from depending on individual knowledge, orienting to wordings makes language irreducibly collective.

Peirce’s ten classes of signs: modeling biosemiotic processes and systems

by Joao Queiroz

(in prep.)

Few semioticians have approached Peirce’s extended typologies of signs (10 and 66 classes of signs), developed from... more Few semioticians have approached Peirce’s extended typologies of signs (10 and 66 classes of signs), developed from 1903, which still seems obscure, structurally intrincate and hard to apply to empirical phenomena. To make things worse, it remains the tendency to think that the extended typologies are extravagant and unproductive conceptual-tools. My argument here suggests something different. Such classifications should be considered as an important advancement with respect to the task of empirically modeling the morphological variety of signs, and constitute one of the most important topics of Peirce’s mature semiotic. My main assumption is very simple: the morphological space of semiotic events and processes into which biosemiotic systems are embedded always include intermediary and mixed classes of signs (e.g., proto-symbols). If correct, any Peircean based tentative of classifying biosemiotic processes should consider the extended typologies of signs, according to which several aspects of sign-object-interpretant (S-O-I) relation are described.

Distributed language and dynamics

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J. (2009). Distributed language and dynamics. Pragmatics & Cognition, 17/3: 495-507.

Language is co-ordination. Pursuing this view, the Special Issue presents papers that challenge two orthodoxies.... more Language is co-ordination. Pursuing this view, the Special Issue presents papers that challenge two orthodoxies. First, they deny that language is essentially ‘symbolic’ and, second, that verbal patterns are represented inside minds (or brains). Rather, language is, at once, social, individual and constitutive of the feeling of thinking. It is distributed between us. By way of illustration, the papers report empirically-based work on the anticipatory dynamics of reading, its cognitive consequences, Shakespearean theatre, what images evoke, solving insight problems, and the basis of semiotic cognition. Having given reason to consider this challenge to linguistic autonomy, the collection concludes with theoretical papers. First, a central function of language lies in realizing values. Second, like all biologically based activity, we depend on how cultural and biological symbols co-function in regulating human dynamics.

Cognitive Dynamics and the Language Sciences

by Stephen J. Cowley

The paper, jointly written with Alexander Kravchenko, marks the birth of the Distributed Language Group at the opening meeting in September 2005 at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.

A Russian version was published in Voprosy Vazykoznanija as:
Коули С.Дж., Кравченко А.В. (2006). Динамика когнитивных процессов и науки о языке//Вопросы языкознания. 133-141.

Grounding signs of culture: Primary intersubjectivity in social semiosis

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S.J., Moodley, S. & Fiori-Cowley, A. (2004) Grounding signs of culture: primary intersubjectivity in cultural semiosis. Mind, Culture and Activity, 11/2: 109-132.

The article examines how infants are first permeated by culture. Building on Thibault (2000), semiogenesis is traced... more The article examines how infants are first permeated by culture. Building on Thibault (2000), semiogenesis is traced to the joint activity of primary intersubjectivity. Using an African example, analysis shows how – at 14 weeks – an infant already uses culturally specific indicators of “what a caregiver wants.” Human predispositions and the mother’s enactment of cultural processes enable the child to imbue joint activity with a specific “sense”. Developmentally, the child prods the caregiver to shaping his or her actions around social norms that transform the infant’s world. The nascent lopsided relation is probably necessary for learning to talk. Acting with its mother, the baby’s full-bodied activity is already semiotic.

Language flow: Opening the subject

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as
Cowley, S.J. (2009) Language flow: opening the subject. Cognitive Semiotics, 4: 63-91.

Analysis of linguistic forms does not clarify experience of language. Pursuing this, the paper turns to dynamics and,... more Analysis of linguistic forms does not clarify experience of language. Pursuing this, the paper turns to dynamics and, using examples, introduces language flow. It is suggested that sensory perception uses movement that can be independently described (from different perspectives). Next, using Barbieri’s model of protein synthesis, attention is given to how experience is possible. It is suggested that, in principle, the operations of organic coding may have interactional counterparts. By analogy, prosodic ‘contextualization’ becomes felt reaction that influences real-time response. This parallels how anticipatory gaze is used to generate reading aloud. Finally, using neuroscientific work on intersubjectivity, it is suggested that norms and rewards may reconfigure neural processes that use experience of perception-actiion in sensing what is meant. On this view, language identifies how we use collective practices to integrate verbal patterns, action, and lived experience. Wordings thus constrain both the flow of langauge and, inseparably, the feeling of thinking that enriches how we act and perceive as we live the lives of human subjects.

Language and Emotional Knowledge: A Case Study on Ability and Disability in Williams Syndrome

by Christine James

Published in Biosemiotics, August 2009.

Биосемиотика: на пути к объединенной науке

by Alexander Kravchenko