Brain death, philosophical anthropology, and the body-mind problem
Published in: S. Shôji, A. Tamaoka. (ed.): Proceedings of [sic] International Congress on Ethical Issues in Brain Death and Organ Transplantation, Tsukuba, Nov. 1-2, 2003. Tsukuba 2004, pp. 24-36.
In the 'classical' literature in favour of the normative concept of brain death (i.e. brain death as an ethically and... more In the 'classical' literature in favour of the normative concept of brain death (i.e. brain death as an ethically and legally valid criterion for the death of human beings), references to modern philosophical anthropology and body-mind-theory are conspicuously absent. Given the fact, evidenced by this very literature itself, that the normative concept of brain death touches directly on our understanding of what it means to be human, this absence of philosophical theory is peculiar at least. In my presentation, I give an evaluation of the concept of brain death in the light of 20th century discussions on philosophical anthropology and body-mind theory, with a focus on 'rationalist' Continental philosophers like E. Cassirer and H. Plessner. The normative concept of brain death comes in two forms. One assumes that the death of the brain signifies the end of organic life. This notion will be discussed in terms of Plessner's theory of the organism as a positional entity. It will be argued that singling out dysfunction or destruction of the brain is not a correct way of asserting death. A second version of the brain death concept takes brain death to signify the end of personal, and hence, social life. Its analysis requires a theory of the body that differentiates and integrates its biological, personal, and social dimension. Such a theory will be briefly sketched out with reference to Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The notion of brain death as 'death of the person' will be analysed accordingly. It will be shown that, and why, the life of a person is coextensive with the perceptible life of the body.
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Seen by:Nuova laicità vo cercando per non essere laicista
published on "Il Riformista", 1 may 2010
A review of Claudia Mancina's book on bioethics and the role of religion in public life. A review of Claudia Mancina's book on bioethics and the role of religion in public life.
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Seen by:Priority setting of ICU resources in an influenza pandemic: a qualitative study of the Canadian public’s perspectives
Diego S Silva, Jennifer L Gibson, Ann Robertson, Cécile M Bensimon, Sachin Sahni, Laena Maunula and Maxwell J Smith
Silva et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:241
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/241
Background: Pandemic influenza may exacerbate existing scarcity of life-saving medical resources. As a result,... more
Background: Pandemic influenza may exacerbate existing scarcity of life-saving medical resources. As a result, decision-makers may be faced with making tough choices about who will receive care and who will have to wait or go without. Although previous studies have explored ethical issues in priority setting from the perspective of clinicians and policymakers, there has been little investigation into how the public views priority setting during a pandemic influenza, in particular related to intensive care resources.
Methods: To bridge this gap, we conducted three public town hall meetings across Canada to explore Canadian’s perspectives on this ethical challenge. Town hall discussions group discussions were digitally recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using thematic analysis.
Results: Six interrelated themes emerged from the town hall discussions related to: ethical and empirical starting points for deliberation; criteria for setting priorities; pre-crisis planning; in crisis decision-making; the need for public deliberation and input; and participants’ deliberative struggle with the ethical issues.
Conclusions: Our findings underscore the importance of public consultation in pandemic planning for sustaining public trust in a public health emergency. Participants appreciated the empirical and ethical uncertainty of decision-making in an influenza pandemic and demonstrated nuanced ethical reasoning about priority setting of intensive care resources in an influenza pandemic. Policymakers may benefit from a better understanding the public’s empirical and ethical ‘starting points’ in developing effective pandemic plans.
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Seen by:Engineering love
by Brian Earp
Savulescu, J. and Sandberg, A. (2012). Love machine: Engineering lifelong romance. New Scientist, 2864, 28-29.
Essay partially adapted from Earp, B. D., Sandberg, A., and Savulescu, J. (2012). Natural selection, childrearing, and the ethics of marriage (and divorce): Building a case for the neuroenhancement of human relationships. Philosophy & Technology, forthcoming [see "profile" box in article].
Available at the New Scientist website: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428646.200-love-machine-engine
New Scientist BIG IDEA section, May 2012.
With break-up and divorce a major part of modern life, it looks... more
New Scientist BIG IDEA section, May 2012.
With break-up and divorce a major part of modern life, it looks like we may be outliving our inborn capacity to love. But there could be a way to outwit evolution and make love last.
Also available at New Scientist: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428646.200-love-machine-engineering-lifelong-romance.html.
Comparative Melioration and Pathological Pathogenization in Viagra Marketing.
(2011) In: Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten.: The Philosophy of Viagra. Bioethical Responses to the Viagrification of the Modern World. New York, Amsterdam: Rodopi (Value Inquiry Book Series)
The paper investigates how Viagra marketing utilizes the human condition of comparative melioration. Comparative... more The paper investigates how Viagra marketing utilizes the human condition of comparative melioration. Comparative melioration is the drive of humans to improve themselves and their environment by comparing their own condition or status quo with those of others or with potential conditions. In Viagra marketing the utilization of this human condition is linked with the strategy of pathogenization, that is the constant widening and re-definition of the notions and concepts of disease, disorder, and dysfunction. Side effects of the pathologization are that this strategy itself is creating additional medical problems, that means that the pathologization is pathogenic and therefore it is also pathologic. The paper concludes with an enlightenment-appeal according to which one should utilize various available resources of information to improve one's own understanding of medical conditions.
Going Under the Knife: Examining Cosmetic Surgery
by Tyler Carson
forthcoming in Journal of Liberty and Society, 2012
The popularization of cosmetic surgery, particularly on women’s bodies, in Western cultures has initiated an academic... more The popularization of cosmetic surgery, particularly on women’s bodies, in Western cultures has initiated an academic discourse that identifies and critiques the social harms of this recent phenomenon. From this discourse has emerged a debate around whether some or all forms of cosmetic surgeries should be banned in Canada. Using a bioethical framework that observes the fact of reasonable pluralism and recognizes the diverse range of reasonable moral comprehensive doctrines, I posit that a liberal democracy cannot legitimately ban or restrict cosmetic surgery. In this short paper, I provide a brief exegesis of Rawls’ political conception of justice, utilizing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to substantiate my claim that a liberal democracy must refrain from choosing one comprehensive doctrine over another. Instead, the state must respect the fact of reasonable pluralism and therefore must provide a political and legal framework that allows each person’s comprehensive doctrine to be realized. I also address the legitimate concerns raised by feminist and other scholars who argue that societal constructions of femininity coerce women into desiring these surgeries. I ultimately argue that this critique approaches cosmetic surgery, as a bioethical question, from the wrong level of analysis; it evaluates the morality and social reasons for cosmetic surgery. In summary, I assert that a liberal democracy must resist engaging in these so-called debates around “the bioethics of everyday life” and instead focus on providing policies and laws that uphold a political conception of justice that does not impose a moral comprehensive doctrine onto the individual.
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Seen by:Love and Hope for Other Species in the Posthuman Future
by VR Manoj
Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies
I am writing this after having responded to a respected friend, a bioethicist with whom I am connected via Facebook.... more I am writing this after having responded to a respected friend, a bioethicist with whom I am connected via Facebook. In his photo albums, he has a picture of a protected area for dogs in Thailand. This got me thinking.
"Claves éticas para la bioética"
Cuadernos de Bioética, vol. XII, nº. 46, pp. 305-320, 2001. ISSN 1132-1989
"Claves éticas para la bioética"
Cuadernos de Bioética, vol. XII, nº. 46, pp. 305-320, 2001. ISSN 1132-1989
8 views
Seen by: and 1 moreThe Argument from Transfer
Final version published in Bioethics 1996, 10 (1): 27-42.
Utilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is... more
Utilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is wrong, other things being equal, not to procreate when this would have resulted in an additional being with a life worth living. The paper takes this view for granted and examines the common utilitarian claim that overpopulation and destitution in the world mean that, in practice, this obligation to procreate, other things being equal, often turns into a (categorical) obligation not to procreate. A version of this argument is defended - a version called the argument from transfer - according to which, rather than having additional children and care for them in order to make them happy, many people in the West ought to abstain from procreation and take care of destitute children already existing. The reasoning leading up to this conclusion raises some philosophical questions, seldom discussed in connection with bioethics, which indicate that the argument from transfer, although supporting the claim above, cannot neutralise the obligation to create more happy people as easily as assumed by utilitarians. It is argued that the argument from transfer may place many people facing the choice of procreation in a peculiar moral dilemma.
