An Analysis of "The Hobbes Game"
Teach Phil, 18(3), 257-268, S95
John Immerwahr's 1976 classroom simulation is introduced to a new generation of teachers with practical suggestions on... more John Immerwahr's 1976 classroom simulation is introduced to a new generation of teachers with practical suggestions on conducting the game and philosophical discussion on its game-theoretic implications. The game is designed as a analog of Hobbes' model of the mutual transfer of rights in the formation of a social contract. From an analysis of the outcomes of fifteen games with the help of game theory, Immerwahr's simulation is seen to be an effective pedagogical tool for understanding ethical conflicts.
Laxenburg TECT: Reflections on a literature that GIScientists and Historians do not know
Report for the DynCoopNet Project, TECT (The Evolution of Cooperation and Trading), EUROCORES Scheme, European Science Foundation
Report on the TECT Conference at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria,... more Report on the TECT Conference at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, 15-18 September 2009. Conference title: “Evolution of Cooperation: Models and Theories”; prepared especially for the nineteen core researchers of the TECT project “Dynamic complexity of self-organizing, cooperation-based commercial networks in the first global age”, who were excluded from participation by the collapse of TECT networking funds. The DynCoopNet Project within TECT focuses on cooperation within the networks linking the global domains of Iberian Monarchies during the First Global Age, 1400-1800.
Strategic Behavior Modeling of Multi-service Overlay Multicast Networks Based on Auction Mechanism Design
M. H. Rezvani and M. Analoui, Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, Vol. 71, No. 8, pp. 1125-1141, Elsevier (2011) (ISI Journal)
Since the users of overlay multicast networks belong to different administrative domains, they are selfish in nature;... more Since the users of overlay multicast networks belong to different administrative domains, they are selfish in nature; resulting in degradation of performance. That is why strategic behavior modeling is a hot topic in the area of the overlay multicast networks. Mechanism design is the most versatile tool for strategic behavior modeling in microeconomics. In this paper, we model the strategic behavior of the selfish peers by leveraging the rich theory of mechanism design using the concept of economic auctions. By considering the bandwidth of services as the commodity, we design a revenue- aximizing auction mechanism. The sellers are either the origin servers or the peers who forward the digital multimedia content to their downstream peers. For each seller, the corresponding downstream peers play the role of buyers who are referred to as bidders. Each bidder submits a sealed bid to the corresponding seller. The highest bidder wins and pays its bid for the service. Also, we derive analytical closed-form expressions for upper bounds relevant to the performance metrics. The experimental validation proves the scalability and the efficiency of the proposed mechanism.
The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games
co-authored with · AziLev-On and AlexChavez; Synthese (2010) 176:125–147
Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of... more
Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions.
Most importantly, we find that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.
The effects of consequential thinking on trust game behavior
Co-authored with Tamar Kugler and Terry Connolly, published in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2009
Contrary to rational Expected Monetary Value (EMV) predictions that no money will be transferred in Trust Games, in... more Contrary to rational Expected Monetary Value (EMV) predictions that no money will be transferred in Trust Games, in experiments players make positive transfers. Theorists have proposed modifying the Sender’s utility function while retaining utility- maximization assumptions to account for this behavior. Such accounts assume that Senders can grasp the possible outcomes of their choices, their probabilities, and utilities. In reality, however, Senders’ choices are unexpectedly complex, and the assumption that they approximate expected utility maximization is highly implausible. Instead, we suggest that Senders are guided by general propensities to trust others. Two experiments examine the effect of inducing consequential thought on Sender behavior. One induced consequential thought directly; the other did so indirectly. The amount sent was significantly reduced following either manipulation. This suggests that models of Sender behavior in Complex Trust Games should not assume that participants routinely engage in consequential thinking (CT) of the depth that would be required for utility maximization.
An Information Economy for Single-Service Application Layer Multicast Networks
Mohammad Hossein Rezvani and Morteza Analoui, 15th IEEE International Workshop on Computer-Aided Modeling Analysis and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD2010), pp. 111 - 115, Miami, USA, December 3-4, 2010.
Since the peers in application layer multicast network belong to different administrative domains, they are selfish.... more Since the peers in application layer multicast network belong to different administrative domains, they are selfish. One of the main challenges in this area is designing self-organizing protocols capable to exploit this inherent selfishness in such a way that leads to maximization of the aggregate throughput of the network. In this paper, we have modeled the behaviors of the peers by leveraging the rich theory of strategic mechanism design of microeconomics. We consider the bandwidth of the service as the offered good in the auction. In our mapping, each service provider is thought of as the auctioneer. Also, the downstream peers are the buyers of the economy who submit their bidding values for the good at the auctioneer.
