Autonomy

Autonomy-minded Anti-perfectionism: novel, intuitive, and sound

by Ben Colburn

Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (2012): 233-241.

John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is... more John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is consistent with anti-perfectionism, viz., that it falsely pretends to be novel, is unacceptably counterintuitive because too restrictive and too permissive, and that it deploys a self-defeating formal apparatus. I argue, in reply, that my argument is more novel than Rudisill gives me credit for; that properly understood my anti-perfectionism implies neither the implausible restrictions nor the unpalatable permissions that Rudisill claims; and that my formal apparatus is innocent of the flaws imputed to it.

Adaptive Preferences and Autonomy

by Ben Colburn

Utilitas 23 (2011): 52-71.

Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have... more Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster’s explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterised by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our autonomy because it undermines the extent to which an agent’s preferences are ones that she has decided upon for herself. This answer fills the lacuna in Elster’s argument. It also allows us to draw a principled distinction between adaptive preference formation and the closely related – but potentially autonomy-enhancing – phenomenon of character planning.

The Concept of Voluntariness

by Ben Colburn

The Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008): 101-111.

In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests the following definition... more In her work on the distinction between freedom and voluntariness, Serena Olsaretti suggests the following definition of voluntary action: an action is voluntary if it is not non-voluntary, and non-voluntary if it is performed because there are no acceptable alternatives, where ‘acceptable’ means conforming to some objective standard (which Olsaretti suggests might be well-being). Olsaretti suggests that ascriptions of responsibility are underwritten by judgments of voluntariness, rather than freedom. Also, Olsaretti notes that a concern for voluntary choice might be grounded in respect for autonomy. So, two important questions in political philosophy – when an agent is responsible for her actions and what we must do if we want agents to live autonomous lives – hang upon whether Olsaretti's account of voluntariness is correct once it has been developed in detail. This article is a contribution to that development. I show that well-informedness about our options is crucial to whether we act voluntarily or not, and I argue that we should restrict the scope of what we consider relevantly unacceptable to include only things which involve serious prudential harm. Inevitably there are some questions left unanswered, but what follows indicates what I take to be the strongest form of Olsaretti's theory, and one which can play the role described for it above.

Forbidden Ways of Life

by Ben Colburn

The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 618-629.

I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and... more I examine an objection against autonomy-minded liberalism sometimes made by philosophers such as John Rawls and William Galston, that it rules out ways of life which do not themselves value freedom or autonomy. This objection is incorrect, because one need not value autonomy in order to live an autonomous life. Hence autonomy-minded liberalism need not rule out such ways of life. I suggest a modified objection which does work, namely that autonomy-minded liberalism must rule out ways of life that could not develop under an autonomy-promoting education. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why autonomy-minded liberals should bite the bullet and accept this.

Anti-Perfectionisms and Autonomy

by Ben Colburn

Analysis 70 (2010): 247-256.

Different types of liberal theory can be distinguished according to their commitments in respect of two claims. One... more Different types of liberal theory can be distinguished according to their commitments in respect of two claims. One the claim that the state ought to promote autonomy; the other is that the state ought not in its action to promote any value. Some liberals are committed to the former (which I call the Autonomy Claim) and reject the latter (generally dubbed 'Anti-Perfectionism'). Others have the converse commitments: they endorse Anti-Perfectionism, and deny that the state ought to promote autonomy.

In this article, I provide support for a liberal political philosophy that endorses both of the claims given above: that is, one that is fully committed to the state promotion of autonomy, and which also counts Anti- Perfectionism amongst its other commitments. I do so by defending it against the serious charge that it is prima facie self contradictory. After all, Anti-Perfectionism appears to demand that the state refrain from promoting any value – it looks as though that must preclude the promotion of autonomy, if the latter is conceived of as a value. I argue that this self-contradiction is a mirage, whose plausibility depends on an equivocation in the statement given above of Anti-Perfectionism. When that is removed, we can see that on its best understanding, Anti-Perfectionism is consistent with the Autonomy Claim.

Why Be Moral? - A Rationalist Defence

by Saurabh Bhattacharya

Autonomy and Desire in Machines and Cognitive Agent Systems

by Kevin Magill

Co-authored with Yasemin J. Erden, published 'Online First' in 'Cognitive Computation', 2012, DOI DOI 10.1007/s12559-012-9140-9. Available through subscribing institutions. Drop me a line if you can't access.
Substantially revised from 2011 paper of same title.

The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key.... more The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key. Indeed, in the quest to develop increasingly autonomous cognitive agent systems, desire has had a significant role. We argue, however, that insufficient attention has been given to analysis and clarification of desire as a complex concept. Accordingly, in this paper, we will draw on some key philosophical accounts of the nature of desire, including what distinguishes it from other mental and motivational states, in order to identify some key characteristics of desire as a complex concept. We will then draw on these in order to investigate the role, definition and adequacy of concepts of desire within applied theoretical models of agency and agent systems.

Flouting the law: Vigilante justice and regional autonomy on the Indonesian border

by Michael Eilenberg

Austrian Journal of South East Asian Studies, 2011, Vol 4(2): 237-253.

After the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 and the fall of president Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, rural and... more After the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 and the fall of president Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, rural and urban Indonesia experienced a surge in vigilante killings and the rise of non-state forms of authorities working within the twilight of legality and illegality, catering the role of the state. Institutional uncertainty, large-scale decentralisation reforms and the deterioration of formal legal authority in post New Order Indonesia tempted these processes. This apparent lawlessness became especially evident along the fringes of the Indonesian state where state authority has continuously been waxing and waning and contested. This paper argues that by observing these processes of ‘lawlessness’ and vigilantism from the borderlands provides us with an exceptional window in understanding the ambiguous relationship between law and order in post-New Order Indonesia.

Negotiating autonomy at the margins of the state : The dynamics of elite politics in the borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia

by Michael Eilenberg

South East Asia Research [University of London Press, SOAS] 2009, Vol. 17(2): 201-227. 

Recent processes of decentralization have dramatically changed local political configurations and access to resources... more Recent processes of decentralization have dramatically changed local political configurations and access to resources throughout Indonesia. In particular, the resource-rich regions at the margins of the state have, in the name of regional autonomy, experienced new spaces for manoeuvre in their claims for a larger share of forest resources. By stressing the unfolding relationship between local ethnic elites and the state, and their different strategies in negotiating and claiming authority over forests within Indonesia's changing forest regimes, the paper examines how local-level politics has taken on its special configuration in the remote border region of West Kalimantan, Indonesia. The author demonstrates this by focusing on the ongoing struggle over forest resources and by tracking the fate of a political movement for a new district in this resource-rich region. The paper further examines how current local elite strategies and networks can be related back to the period of border militarization in the 1960s and, once again, how these seem to challenge the exclusivity of the Indonesian-Malaysian border. The main argument is that central authority in the borderland has never been absolute, but waxes and wanes, and thus that state rules and laws are always up for local interpretation and negotiation, although the degree of such negotiation changes depending on the strength of the central state.

Liberty, Mill, and Public Health Ethics

by Yashar Saghai

Co-authored with Madison Powers and Ruth Faden

Public Health Ethics, 5 (1): 6-15, 2012
Advance access published February 15, 2012
doi:10.1093/phe/phs002

In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics.... more In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.

The Stress‐Buffering Effects of Control on Task Satisfaction and Perceived Goal Attainment: An Experimental Study of the Moderating Influence of Desire for Control

by Stacey Parker

Uma análise dos reflexos da vulnerabilidade sobre a responsabilidade do consumidor

by Eduardo Augusto Pohlmann

Cold, Cold, Warm: Autonomy, Intimacy and Maturity in Adorno

by Iain Macdonald

Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 37, no. 6 (2011): 669-689.

When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to... more When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to use one’s own understanding independently of dominant heteronomous patterns of thought. This Kantian-sounding claim is essentially an exhortation: maturity demands self-liberation from heteronomy, or more simply: autonomy. The problem, however, is that in spite of Adorno’s general endorsement of Kant’s definition of maturity, he ultimately rejects the corresponding Kantian definition of autonomy, which posits a purely formal sphere of rational interiority in which the self-legislating subject is bound by the moral law. Yet Adorno does not simply set aside the Kantian concept of autonomy. On the contrary, he will try to correct it by returning to it what it lacks, namely, intimacy or ‘live contact with the warmth of things.’ In this gesture, he aims to restore to autonomy its ethical substance or its lived ethical context, not as a mere supplement to the necessary purity of duty, but rather as necessary to the very process of becoming autonomous, i.e., mature and responsible. This paper examines Adorno’s concept of maturity in the context of the dialectical relationship between autonomy and intimacy.

On the role of social interaction in individual agency

by Hanne De Jaegher

Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked... more Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as both a characteristic of individual agents and of social interaction processes. We then propose a number of ways in which interactional autonomy can influence individuals. Then we discuss recent work in modeling on the one hand and psychological investigations on the other that support and illustrate this claim. Finally, we discuss some implications for research on social and individual agency.

Analysis of Autonomous Cooperative Assembly By Force Feedback Using A Control Basis Approach

by Juan Rojas

Business Ethics-A Rethinking

by P Madhu

The meanings of autonomy: Project, self-limitation, democracy and socialism

by Jeff Klooger

Published in Thesis Eleven 108 February 2012

The concept of autonomy as presented in the works of Cornelius Castoriadis offers the possibility of expressing the... more The concept of autonomy as presented in the works of Cornelius Castoriadis offers the possibility of expressing the core aims of a radical politics in a manner divorced from a discredited Marxist or communist past. The concept occasions ongoing debate about its true meaning as well as its implications and consequences. Some people question the value and viability of autonomy as a political aim. This article attempts to elucidate and defend what I see as the central meanings and implications of the concept of autonomy, particularly in its political dimension. The concept of autonomy is considered in its relationship to the ideas of project, self-limitation, and democracy, and the socialist tradition.

Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction and play

by Ezequiel Di Paolo

Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M. and De Jaegher, H., (2010). Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne and E. A. Di Paolo (eds), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 33 - 87.

Overcoming autopoiesis: An enactive detour on the way from life to society

by Ezequiel Di Paolo

Di Paolo, E. A. (2009) Overcoming autopoiesis: a enactive detour on the way from life to society. In Magalhaes, R., and Sanchez, R. (Eds) Autopoiesis in Organizations and Information Systems, Elsevier, pp. 43 - 68.

Extended life

by Ezequiel Di Paolo

Di Paolo, E. A. (2009) Extended life Topoi 28:9-21.

This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity... more This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing 1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, 2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and 3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive.

Keywords: extended mind, enactive approach, autonomy, precariousness, agency, mediation, individuation.