Autocracies

Asylum Seekers / Patron Seekers: Interpreting Iraqi Kurdish Migration

by Diane E. King

King, Diane E. 2005 Asylum Seekers / Patron Seekers: Interpreting Iraqi Kurdish Migration. Human Organization  64(4):316-326.

This article examines the phenomenon of Iraqi Kurdish out-migration to the West between 1991 and 2003. It argues that... more This article examines the phenomenon of Iraqi Kurdish out-migration to the West between 1991 and 2003. It argues that migrants looked to the West and Westerners as potential patrons and were incited to migrate by their conceptualizations of patronage and clientage roles. Iraqi Kurdish migrants to the West constituted one of the largest flows of asylum-seeking clandestine migrants in the world by the late 1990s. European governments first accepted their asylum claims as “legitimate,” but later accused the migrants of being a “problem” and ceased granting asylum to most applicants. This article demonstrates how participants in the Iraqi Kurdish body politic posture themselves as clients and formulate the ideal roles of patrons in the migration process based on prior experience as clients of the state, tribal leaders, and other figures. Patronage and clientage roles provide both an interpretive frame and a motivator for the act of migrating.

Beyond Divide-and-Rule: Weak Dictators, Natural Resources, and Civil Conflict

by Petros Sekeris

Co-authored with Giacomo De Luca (KULeuven), and Juan Vargas (U. del Rosario)

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over... more We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation's natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group ghting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own prot, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specic heterogeneity.

Military Entrenchment and the Weakening of the Bureaucracy in Pakistan: The 2000 Devolution Reforms

by Muneeb Ansari

An examination of the local government reforms instituted by the Musharraf government in 2000 in Pakistan. It... more An examination of the local government reforms instituted by the Musharraf government in 2000 in Pakistan. It demonstrates how the devolution reforms decreased the political and administrative influence of the bureaucracy by removing their executive administration powers and caused further politicization and decay of the civil service. Non-traditional authorities and local elites were able to capture many of the new elected positions resulting in little improvement in the people’s participation. Patron-client relations between the local elite and civil servants were reversed, further weakening the bureaucracy. The rise in power of the military and its infiltration into all institutions of the state allowed it to systemically weaken the bureaucracy’s elite cadre (the DMG) and marginalize a potential institutional competitor. Local elites became subservient to the military as well, which further decreased the need for a partnership with the bureaucracy. This served to remove a potentially powerful competitor for the military regime and fit the larger trend of the increasing encroachment of the military into the state. The nature of the reforms, though meant to increase democratization and participation, further served to entrench the power of military as the strongest institution in the country.

Bashkortostan: A Case of Regional Authoritarianism

by Jörn Grävingholt

Published in Cameron Ross (ed.), 'Regional politics in Russia', Manchester University Press 2002

Електоральний авторитаризм постсовєтської демократії

by Andreas Umland

Критика. 2007. Т. 11. № 9(119).