The Monetary Value of Fashion
published June 21, 2011 on Thread for Thought
How film costume auctions have affected "value" of fashion. How film costume auctions have affected "value" of fashion.
Economic Aspects of Intelligent Network Selection: A Game-Theoretic Approach
by Jakub Konka
Presented at the Fifth International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing, Systems, Services and Technologies (UBICOMM), Lisbon, Portugal, Nov. 20-25, 2011.
Awarded best paper award.
The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with... more The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with competition at the call level. It strives to address a tussle between the actors involved in a heterogeneous wireless access network. However, as with any market-like institution, it is vital to analyse the Digital Marketplace from the strategic perspective to ensure that all shortcomings are removed prior to implementation. This paper presents some preliminary results of such an analysis.
Simulation and Pricing Mechanism Analysis of a Solar-Powered Electrical Microgrid
by Shrisha Rao
Co-authored with Indrani Maity. IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 4 (3), September 2010, pp. 275–284 (Special Issue on “Identification and Control of Sustainable Energy Systems,” R. Sacile, ed.). doi:10.1109/JSYST.2010.2059110.
A framework is proposed for an electrical power microgrid, such as for a colony or small township of homes that... more A framework is proposed for an electrical power microgrid, such as for a colony or small township of homes that generate electrical power from solar energy and use it directly when possible, and via stored battery power at other times. The situation is described as a demand and supply problem in a multi-agent system with many consumers and suppliers and no explicit communication or coordination among the agents. Such a demand and supply problem is modeled as a Potluck Problem, a generalization of the Santa Fe Bar Problem. Power produced by PV panels and batteries may be used in the local market, in addition to being consumed locally. The proposed microgrid system model is able to determine the optimum operation of a solar-powered microgrid with respect to load demand, environmental requirements, PV panel and battery capacities. The results indicate the effect of various such parameters on the performance of these micro-grids. This paper also analyzes and proposes, based on auction theory, the most efficient and competing pricing mechanism in the proposed microgrid system model. Two important market bidding techniques, single bidding and discriminatory bidding, are considered. The microgrid is made to participate in the bidding process to serve the consumers at a reduced price and to provide better revenues. The viability of the model proposed is illustrated with analyses using realistic assumptions and published historical data.
Competition for Procurement Shares
by José Alcalde
Co-authored with Matthias Dahm. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881547
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids... more
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are:
(i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive.
(ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued.
(iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
All-Pay Auction Equilibria in Contests
by José Alcalde
Co-authored with Matthias Dahm. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120292
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the... more
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest.
An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent-seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value.
