Aristotelianism

“Wordsworth Amongst the Aristotelians.”

by Essaka Joshua

Journal of the History of Ideas 67 (2006): 513–24.

Critics have ignored scholastic Aristotelianism as a possible source for Wordsworth’s philosophical outlook on the... more Critics have ignored scholastic Aristotelianism as a possible source for Wordsworth’s philosophical outlook on the related areas of metaphysics and cognitive theory. Without denying fundamental orientations towards both empiricism and Platonism on these issues, I argue that Wordsworth also has much in common with the Aristotelians who debated with Locke. Wordsworth accepts, as these thinkers do, the passivity not just of sensation but of knowledge of objects external to the mind, and, in common with the Aristotelian rejection of Platonism, he accepts that the essences of things are somehow intrinsic to or immanent in the things themselves.

Giacomo da Pistoia (Iacobus de Pistorio)

by Alessandro Ottaviani

in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 54 (2000)

Girelli, Girolamo

by Alessandro Ottaviani

in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 56 (2001)

Uno strumento per il predicatore: il compendio di filosofia aristotelica di Girolamo Savonarola, in L’antichità classica nel pensiero medievale. Atti del XIX Convegno internazionale di studi della SISPM (Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale) Trento, 27-29 settembre 2010, ed. Alessandro Palazzo, Porto, FIDEM, 2011, pp. 441-469

by Lorenza Tromboni

Giacomo Veneto (da Venezia)

by Alessandro Ottaviani

in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 54 (2000)

The practice of making and sustaining family life: a school of the virtues

by Kim Redgrave

Draft only, do not cite or circulate

In this paper I will develop the idea that the making and sustaining of family is an example of what Alasdair... more In this paper I will develop the idea that the making and sustaining of family is an example of what Alasdair MacIntyre calls a practice, which is any well-ordered and rational form of socially established cooperative human activity. MacIntyre includes the making and sustaining of family life in his list of practices in After Virtue but does not develop the point further. In his later work, Dependent Rational Animals MacIntyre argues that the end of family life is to initiate children into adult activities through various institutions outside of the family. Thus the family does not have its own specific internal good; rather the good of family life is realised through the pursuit of goods internal to the practices of the milieu of associations and institutions in which families participate. This paper will draw on MacIntyre’s theory whilst offering a critical response to his understanding of the internal goods of family life, suggesting that his argument ignores another important aspect of family life: the care of dependent adults.  Recognition of this is crucial to any theory of the family because it has a huge impact not only on family members but also on the wider society in which a family is located. This paper will therefore develop MacIntyre’s Aristotelian approach to identify the internal goods of family life and will examine whether the Western model of the institution of the family sustains or corrupts this end.

The Ethics of Care, Virtue Ethics and the Flourishing Family

by Kim Redgrave

Draft only, do not cite or circulate

Carol Gilligan’s psychological moral theory popularised the idea of a feminist ethics of care during the 1980s, around... more Carol Gilligan’s psychological moral theory popularised the idea of a feminist ethics of care during the 1980s, around the same time that a renewed interest in Aristotelian virtue ethics was sparked by Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. Both care ethics and virtue ethics have been fiercely critical of contemporary liberal thinking, such as rights-based theory and the abstract universalism of Kantianism, and, in particular, the focus on the individual at the expense of relationships and community. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the family by mainstream liberal theory, with the exception of David Archard’s The Family: A Liberal Defence and to some extent John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. The key theoretical concern of this paper is how we can conceptualise a flourishing family life. This paper will argue that it is only by drawing on virtue ethics rather than contemporary liberal theory, as many care ethicists currently do, that we can properly give an account of flourishing family life. I will firstly discuss the importance of care ethics for discussion of the family. In doing so I will explore some of the tensions within care ethics on what is meant by care or care-giving and what the relevant values of care ethics are to thinking about the family. The paper will then go on to discuss how some virtue ethics can improve on the insights of care ethics to provide a philosophical account of the flourishing family.

Reassessing Feminist Care Ethics from the standpoint of Contemporary Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

by Kim Redgrave

draft only

Over the past couple of decades feminist care ethics has put forward a substantial critique of the liberal paradigm of... more Over the past couple of decades feminist care ethics has put forward a substantial critique of the liberal paradigm of the self-interested economic man. Care ethicists such as Eva Feder Kittay (2002) and Virginia Held (1995) have proposed that this paradigm be replaced with that of the relationship between mother and child which is essentially other-directed. In this paper I will identify the problems with the mother-child moral paradigm and suggest instead we look to Aristotle’s conception of philia or friendship for an alternative paradigm, of which the mother-child relationship is a particular example. If we look at the mother-child relationship in terms of character friendship, the best kind of philia, we lose the connotation that maternal care is based on irrational feelings of love. Care ethicists have drawn attention to the facts of dependency and the need for care in social relations, not just in the private sphere. However, they continue to debate how care fits with justice and which should take priority (Bubeck, 2002). Another related concern within this field is how we define care. Is it a labour, a feeling, a virtue or all of the above? I will argue that care should not be narrowly defined as labour, as it is by Bubeck, but more broadly conceived as a disposition or virtue which one employs when a particular other is in need. Finally I will argue, along with MacIntyre, that in order to respond to dependency we need a combination of the virtues of justice, generosity and the disposition of affectionate regard which we can only cultivate through practices and intimate social relations. According to MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism, it is through the pursuit of the good life, not an abstract sense of justice or care, that we train our desires and impulses to act for the good of others.

Aristotle, validity, and action research

by Olav Eikeland

pp.29-44 in Boog, Ben; Preece, Julia; Slagter, Meindert; and Zeelen, Jacques (eds.): Towards Quality Improvement of Action Research, Rotterdam / Taipei, Sense Publishers

Aristotle, validity, and action research

by Olav Eikeland

pp.29-44 in Boog, Ben; Preece, Julia; Slagter, Meindert; and Zeelen, Jacques (eds.): Towards Quality Improvement of Action Research, Rotterdam / Taipei, Sense Publishers

LLOBERA, I., “Aristotelian Social Justice” [Review of NUSSBAUM, M.C., Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach]

by Ignasi Llobera Trias

The ways of Aristotle: Aristotelian phrónêsis, Aristotelian philosophy of dialogue, and action research

by Olav Eikeland

Table of Contents / Pagination is incorrect:
THE WAYS OF ARISTOTLE – ARISTOTELIAN PHRÓNÊSIS, ARISTOTELIAN... more Table of Contents / Pagination is incorrect:
THE WAYS OF ARISTOTLE – ARISTOTELIAN PHRÓNÊSIS, ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE, AND ACTION RESEARCH
Olav Eikeland
Preface 1
PART 1 – ARISTOTLE, SOCIAL RESEARCH, AND ACTION RESEARCH 3
1. Introduction – The Challenge of Phrónêsis 3
1.1 Three Kinds of General Theory 10
1.2 Aristotle and Critical Action Research 17
2. Action Research Approaching Phrónêsis 20
2.1 A Philosopher Defending Action Research 21
2.2 Making Social Science Matter 23
2.3 Abandoning Techniques 25
PART 2 – READING ARISTOTLE – LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PHRÓNÊSIS 27
3. Virtues – Intellectual and Ethical 29
3.1 Particulars of Ethical Virtues 34
4. Phrónêsis and the Other Intellectual Virtues 38
4.1 Theoretical Knowledge, and Knowledge about Things We Influence 40
4.1.1 Overlaps and Intermeshes 45
4.2 Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue 48
4.2.1 Excursus: Knowledge Forms and Ways of Knowing in Aristotle 49
4.2.1.1 Praxis, Poíêsis, Khrêsis, Páthos – And the Various Forms of the Epistêmai 50
4.2.1.2 Theoretical and Practical Truth 61
4.2 (Continued) Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue 64
4.3 Phrónêsis and Rhetoric, Phrónêsis and Practical Syllogisms 70
4.3.1 The relationship to rhetoric 70
4.3.2 The relationship to practical syllogisms 75
5. Phrónêsis on Means and Ends, Phrónêsis and General Knowledge 76
5.1 Means and Ends, and Kinds of Causes 76
5.1.1 Poíêsis Makes Things, Praxis Makes Perfect 81
5.1.2 “Professional” Deliberations and Deductions 89
5.2 Knowledge, General and Particular 94
5.2.1 General Knowledge, Appropriate Knowledge, Knowledge in Action 94
5.2.2 Héxis (Habitus), and Empeiría (Experience) 103
5.2.3 Knowing Particulars 109
5.2.3.1 By What? 110
5.2.3.2 How? 111
5.2.3.3 Preconditions for a Universally Flexible Consideration 115
6. Developing and Defining Virtue 126
6.1 Developing Virtue 127
6.1.1 Epistêmê and Virtue through the Formation of Habit, Once More 130
6.1.2 What “Means” Means 136
6.1.3 Practical Development with a Hinge to It, the Question of Standards Again 138
6.2 Defining Virtue 145
6.2.1 Nóêsis as Dialogue, or, the Reason Why Aristotle Insists on Letting Phrónêsis Deliberate about Means Only 150
6.2.1.1 The Unfolded Know-How of Nous 152
6.2.1.2 The Topica and the Enfolded Habitus of Dialectics 154
6.2.1.3 The Philosopher, the Dialectician, and Experience 160
6.2.1.3.1 Dialogical Peculiarities 165
6.2.1.3.2 Dialogue and Experience 170
6.2.1.3.3 Basic Principle, Beginning, Medium, and End 182
6.2.1.4 Ways of Learning 185
6.2.1.5 Self-Evident First Principles? 191
6.2.1.6 Praxis1, and Praxis2 194
6.2.2 The Ethical Works do not Deliberate about Means, They Develop and Define Ends 198
6.2.3 Epistêmê, Virtue, and Phrónêsis Defined 205
6.3 Who Develops and Defines? The Art and Practice of Architectonics 214
7. Eudaimonía and Wisdom as “The Highest Practical Good”; Aristotelian Phron-Ethics, Theor-Ethics, and the Way of the Intellectual Commons 219
7.1 Kinds of Theory, Kinds of Practice 220
7.2 Ethics and Politics as Methodological Guidelines for Autonomous Practitioners 230
7.2.1 The Laws of Virtue 233
7.2.2 Tékhnê and Phrónêsis – At the Parting of the Ways 239
7.3 The Wisdom of the Commons – Common Wisdom 242
7.3.1 Tà Koiná – The Commons 247
7.3.2 The Common Skholê 252
7.4 Theor-Ethics and Primary Friendship 254
7.4.1 The Noetic “I” and the Psychological “Me” 259
7.4.2 Theorethical Interventions? 268
7.5 The Way of Theor-Ethics 269
7.5.1 Ethical Excellence – Settling with the Best “for Us”, i.e. for the Second Best “Absolutely” 277
7.6 The Ways of Politics – Continuous Learning in Common 288
7.6.1 Community: What Are the Things Common? 289
7.6.2 Oikos, Pólis, and Constitutions 294
7.6.3 Developing Concord – The Ethico-Political Role of Dialogical Gatherings 299
7.6.4 Different Concepts of Politics 310
7.6.5 Unity and Diversity in the Pólis 318
7.6.6 The Koinópolis as Panarchy – Aristocracy Suspended and Transcended 328
7.6.7 Religious Politics? 338
PART 3 – ARISTOTELIAN ACTION RESEARCH – WISDOM AND EUDAIMONÍA TRANSPOSED, SOCIAL RESEARCH TRANSFORMED 344
8. Neo-Epistemic, Dialogical Action Research 344
9. From Oikos to Pólis, and Beyond 349
10. Aristotle, Marx, and Modern Work Life 359
11. Aristotle Suspended 370
12. Epilogue 376
REFERENCES 381
Appendix 394

R. Chiaradonna, "Energeia et kinêsis chez Plotin et Aristote (Enn. VI, 1, [42], 16. 4-19) ", In Dunamis : autour de la puissance chez Aristote, éd. M. Crubellier, Annick Jaulin et alii, Louvain-La-Neuve, Peeters, 2008, p. 471-491

by Riccardo Chiaradonna

Aristotle My Beloved: Poetry, Diagnosis, and the Dreams of Julius Caesar Scaliger*

by Kristine Haugen

Renaissance Quarterly 60,3 (2007): 819-47

Notoriously Aristotelian in his poetic theory, linguistics, and natural philosophy, Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558)... more Notoriously Aristotelian in his poetic theory, linguistics, and natural philosophy, Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) also reimagined the lost love poetry that Aristotle himself was said to have written. Scaliger's 'New Epigrams' of 1533 combine a distinctively humanist view of Aristotle as an elegant polymath with a sustained experiment in refashioning the Petrarchan love lyric. Most visibly in poems about dreams and dreaming, Scaliger educes his speaker's erotic despair from philosophical problems in contemporary Aristotelian accounts of the soul, knowledge, and personal identity. The strange but compelling texts that result form a crossroads for Scaliger's own identities as physician, philosopher, and poet.

The Birth of Tragedy in the Cinquecento: Humanism and Literary History

by Kristine Haugen

Journal of the History of Ideas 72,3 (2011): 351-70

As literary history stages a comeback as a method in contemporary literary study, it makes sense to ask about its... more As literary history stages a comeback as a method in contemporary literary study, it makes sense to ask about its antecedents. In the Renaissance, as it turns out, literary history was widely pursued alongside interpretive commentary and textual criticism. Perhaps the thorniest question Renaissance scholars faced in this field, as well as the most resonant for 21st-century readers, centered on the birth of tragedy in ancient Greece. What had been the tragedy's original form, and in particular, had it included music in any way? To attempt to answer was to engage with Aristotle's 'Poetics' in a very unfamiliar way, and moreover to compare Greek with Roman sources imaginatively and boldly. Angelo Poliziano, Francesco Robortello, Pier Vettori, and Francesco Patrizi da Cherso are discussed.

Sulla relazione di Enrico Berti “Saggezza o filosofia pratica?”

by Giovanni Catapano

«Etica & Politica», VII/2 (2005) (http://www.units.it/etica/2005_2/CATAPANO.htm), ISSN 1825-5167. 8 pp.

Discussione della relazione «Saggezza o filosofia pratica?» tenuta da Enrico Berti (1935-) all'Università di Cassino... more Discussione della relazione «Saggezza o filosofia pratica?» tenuta da Enrico Berti (1935-) all'Università di Cassino nell'ottobre 2004 e pubblicata nella rivista elettronica «Etica & Politica», VII/2 (2005).

“La Quaestio de felicitate di Giacomo da Pistoia: un tentativo di interpretazione alla luce di una nuova lettura critica del testo”, in Le felicità nel Medioevo, a cura di M. Bettettini e F. Paparella, Louvain-la-Neuve: Fidem, 2005, pp. 355-409.

by Irene Zavattero

L’attenzione onomastica nelle Poetiche 500esche: il caso della novellistica

by Leonardo Terrusi

To be published in "Nomina. Studi di onomastica in onore di Maria Giovanna Arcamone", a cura di D. Bremer, D. De Camilli, B. Porcelli

Three Different Ways of Interpreting Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium: Pietro Pomponazzi, Niccolò Leonico Tomeo and Agostino Nifo

by Stefano Perfetti

in C. Steel, P. Beullens, G. Guldentops (eds.), Aristotle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance («Mediaevalia Lovaniensia», XXVII), Leuven University Press, Leuven 1999, pp. 289-308.

Metamorfosi di una traduzione. Agostino Nifo revisore dei De animalibus gaziani

by Stefano Perfetti

«Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale», 22 (1996), pp. 259-301