Applied Ethics

Gijutsu wa jiyû ni tsûzuru ka — Kasshîrâ ni okeru gendai gijutsu no tetsugakuteki imi to kachi ni tsuite. (“Freiheit durch Technik? — Zur philosophischen Bedeutung und dem Wert moderner Technik bei Ernst Cassirer”), übersetzt ins Japanische von H. Uchida und T. Kurata

by Raji C. Steineck

Published in: Ningen sonzai ron 8 (2002). Kyoto: Kyôto daigaku
daigakuin ningen /kankyô gaku kenkyû ka sôgô ningen gakubu “Ningen sonzai ron” kankôkai, pp. 11-30.

Comparative "Research": A Modest Proposal concerning the Object of Ethics Regulation

by Rena Lederman

You [Still] Can’t Get Married, You're Faggots

by Jacob Held

Draft of a Revised version of my paper "You Can't Get Married You're Faggots," for the upcoming "Ultimate South Park and Philosophy" edited by Robert Arp (Wiley-Blackwell)

This is an update of the chapter published several years ago. It includes updated info on the status of marriage... more This is an update of the chapter published several years ago. It includes updated info on the status of marriage rights in the country, legal trends, and minor alterations making it, I think, better.

Engineering love

by Brian Earp

Savulescu, J. and Sandberg, A. (2012). Love machine: Engineering lifelong romance. New Scientist, 2864, 28-29.

Essay partially adapted from Earp, B. D., Sandberg, A., and Savulescu, J. (2012). Natural selection, childrearing, and the ethics of marriage (and divorce): Building a case for the neuroenhancement of human relationships. Philosophy & Technology, forthcoming [see "profile" box in article].

Available at the New Scientist website: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428646.200-love-machine-engineering-lifelong-romance.html

New Scientist BIG IDEA section, May 2012.

With break-up and divorce a major part of modern life, it looks... more New Scientist BIG IDEA section, May 2012.

With break-up and divorce a major part of modern life, it looks like we may be outliving our inborn capacity to love. But there could be a way to outwit evolution and make love last.

Also available at New Scientist: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21428646.200-love-machine-engineering-lifelong-romance.html.

Against the Common-Sense View of Ethical Careers

by William Crouch

In this paper I defend the idea that a career in professional philanthropy - that is, deliberately pursuing a... more In this paper I defend the idea that a career in professional philanthropy - that is, deliberately pursuing a lucrative career in order to donate a large proportion of one's earnings - is typically ethically preferable to a career within the charity sector.

Review of" Ethics and Humanity: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover

by Eric Rovie

The Ethics of Cognitive Extension

by Joe Dewhurst

First published in Aporia (Issue 9, May 2012: 22-28). Draft version attached. The author can be contacted at 0819473.sms.ed.ac.uk

This paper explores some of the ethical implications of hypothesis of extended cognition. It discusses the possibility... more This paper explores some of the ethical implications of hypothesis of extended cognition. It discusses the possibility of the manipulation of external memory stores qualifying as literally tampering with somebody's memories, as well as the implications of social extension for moral responsibility and agency. It concludes that if the hypothesis of extended cognition gains widespread public acceptance, it will change the shape and texture of moral discourse.

Abortion: Strong’s counterexamples fail

by Ezio Di Nucci

J Med Ethics 2009;35:304–305. doi:10.1136/jme.2008.028233

This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by
Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics tomore This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by
Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to
Marquis’s argument against abortion fail. Strong’s basic
idea is that there are cases—for example, terminally ill
patients—where killing an adult human being is prima
facie seriously morally wrong even though that human
being is not being deprived of a ‘‘valuable future’’. So
Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential
about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is
that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This
paper shows that whichever way the concept of ‘‘valuable
future’’ is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail:
if it is interpreted as ‘‘future like ours’’, the proposed
counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis’s argument.
If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient’s
preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients
in Strong’s scenarios have some valuable future or
admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong.
Finally, if ‘‘valuable future’’ is interpreted as referring to
objective standards, one ends up with implausible and
unpalatable moral claims.

On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate

by Ezio Di Nucci

2009: 'On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate', Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (10): 651-652.

In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s
argument against abortion –... more In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s
argument against abortion – according to which terminating foetuses is wrong
because it deprives them of a valuable future - fail either because they have no
bearing on Marquis’s argument or because they make unacceptable claims about
what constitutes a valuable future. In this paper I respond to Strong’s criticism of my
argument according to which I fail to acknowledge that Marquis uses ‘future like ours’
and ‘valuable future’ interchangeably. I show that my argument does not rely on not
acknowledging that ‘future like ours’ and ‘valuable future’ are interchangeable; and
that, rather, it is exactly by replacing ‘future-like-ours’ with ‘valuable future’ that I
construct my argument against Strong. I conclude with some remarks on how
Marquis’s concept of future-like-ours should be interpreted.

Conflicts of Interest: Whose, What, Why and How

by Diana Constantinescu

Opinion piece resulted from the UCL Centre for Law&Ethics Think Tank, 25 April 2012

Nowadays we treat conflicts of interests as insurmountable obstacles, as wars where someone always gets hurt, as... more Nowadays we treat conflicts of interests as insurmountable obstacles, as wars where someone always gets hurt, as disrupting tragedies. We often forget how all-pervading, inescapable, an inherently human they are. As long as we are not Robinson Crusoes and we live in societies, our interests will always clash. Conflicts of interest are a part of our society. And even in Robinson Crusoe’s heart, you’ll find conflicting desires and choices to be made, as this is what distinguishes us as human beings, from instinct-driven animals. What I wish to argue here is that we can treat conflicts of interests less tragically and we can focus instead on finding practical solutions to them, if we clearly define from the beginning about what kind of things they are, and what they are not.

How to object to new technologies on the basis of justice, the impact of uncertainty and time.

by David Hunter

2nd Draft only - presented at Synbio conference

Any new technology faces several significant ethical challenges before we might think it ought to be developed, we... more Any new technology faces several significant ethical challenges before we might think it ought to be developed, we might be concerned about the risks involved in the research, or the risks involved in the widespread availability of the technology. Alternatively we might be concerned by the impact of the technology on the pattern of distribution of resources available, or the opportunities available to people. In other words we might be concerned by the impact of the new technology on distributive justice. This is a recurring objection to the exploration and development of new technologies is the implications that they have in terms of justice. In this paper I will explore this line of objection and how we ought to think about justice in the context of the development and introduction of new technologies. I will argue that justice rarely provides a reason not to investigate, develop and introduce new technologies though it may have significant implications for how they ought to be introduced. In particular I will focus on the time dependency of justice objections and argue that often these function by only looking at the implications of the introduction of the technology at that point rather than the more important impact on patterns of distribution and opportunity in the long run.

Liberty, Mill, and Public Health Ethics

by Yashar Saghai

Co-authored with Madison Powers and Ruth Faden

Public Health Ethics, 5 (1): 6-15, 2012
Advance access published February 15, 2012
doi:10.1093/phe/phs002

In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics.... more In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.

Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles and the Asymmetry Objection: A Response to Strawser

by Jai Galliott

The debate about the ethics of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) is failing to keep pace with the rise of the... more The debate about the ethics of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) is failing to keep pace with the rise of the technology. Therefore, all the key players, including ethicists, lawyers, and roboticists, are keen to offer their views on the use of these drone aircraft. Some are opposed to their use, citing a range of ethical, legal and operational issues, while others argue for their ethically mandated use. B.J. Strawser fits into this latter category. He develops a principle of ‘unnecessary risk’, from which he argues that we have an ethical obligation to employ UAVs if we can do so without incurring a loss of capability. Strawser defends his argument against a number of potential objections, most questionably, the argument that the use of distance weaponry such as drones, against another state without distance weaponry, crosses some moral threshold that makes the combat immoral. Utilising Jeff McMahan's work on the inequality of combatants, Strawser essentially argues that there are no grounds for a ‘fair fight’. However, this paper will argue that it is not so easy to overturn the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants, nor dismiss the problem with asymmetry. It will demonstrate that if the asymmetry reaches a certain level, the justification for resorting to war may be removed and some sort of policing action may remain the only option.

The Concept of Paternalism

by Dominik Düber

Paper presented at the Spring School
"New Perspectives on Medical Paternalism" (Hamburg, March 2012)
http://springschool.y2k.eu/

In this paper, I try to develop a concept of paternalism that does not itself embody a decision regarding the... more In this paper, I try to develop a concept of paternalism that does not itself embody a decision regarding the justification of paternalistic actions and is morally neutral in this sense.

For that purpose, I defend and modify a roughly Dworkinian reading of paternalism as it is developed by Dworkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Such a definition treats three features of an action as necessary and all of them taken together sufficient for rendering an action paternalistic.

The first feature, coercion, should be understood in a broad sense in two ways. First, it should not only include coercion in the narrow sense, i.e. vis compulsiva, but also incorporate vis absoluta. Second, within vis compulsiva, it should allow not only for threats, but for offers as well.

The second feature is the absence of consent, where consent should be understood in a narrow sense as including only actual consent.

The third feature is the benevolence of the paternalizing agent towards the paternalized. Benevolence should make reference to the intentions of the paternalizing agent, not to the factual outcome of the paternalistic action.

I think that a concept of paternalism developed along these lines is able to include those cases that are commonly treated as paternalism and to exclude other cases.

Was heißt: den Paternalismus angemessen begrenzen

by Dominik Düber

Preliminary version
To be published in an edited volume on 'Paternalism and Consequentialism'

Comment on Thomas Gutmann's paper "Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus"

more Comment on Thomas Gutmann's paper "Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus"

http://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/kfg-normenbegruendung/intern/publikationen/gutmann/17_gutmann_-_paternalismus_und_konsequentialismus.pdf

Afterthoughts on ethics and action research

by Olav Eikeland

pp.29-53 in Lehtonen,J. & Kalliola, S. (ed.) (2008), Dialogue in Working Life Research and Development in Finland, Frankfurt a.M., Peter Lang Publishers

This book opens a view into the dialogical methods used in national policy programmes and in local action research... more This book opens a view into the dialogical methods used in national policy programmes and in local action research projects in Finland. On the basis of versatile academic and facilitator experience the authors shed light on the theoretical-philosophical backgrounds of the methods and analyze the prerequisites and the challenges of dialogue in case studies in different work environments - from day care to new technology. Dialogue is seen both as episodic situations and as continuous processes that may promote the quality of working life and the effectiveness of organizations. The creation of permanent development structures by using dialogue as a driver of learning, action and change is proposed to be one of the most challenging aims of the research-assisted development activities.

Contents: Satu Kalliola: Foreword - Jarmo Lehtonen: Introduction - Olav Eikeland: Afterthoughts on ethics and action research - Pekka Kuusela: Dialogue and change in organizations - Jukka Sädevirta: The emergence and development of institutional dialogue - Maarit Lahtonen/Nuppu Rouhiainen: The role of dialogue in a national workplace development programme - Satu Kalliola/Risto Nakari: Dialogues with an impact on development - Robert Arnkil: Remembering the future: future dialogue and the future of dialogising - Arja Ala-Laurinaho: Dialogue in a knowledge production process - practitioners and experts designing a technological environment - Sirpa Syvänen: Development structures and dialogic processes in research-assisted development of services for the elderly - Taina Tuomi: Dialogue through group learning - Helena Rajakaltio: Finnish School - The PISA star and dialogical paradox - Jarmo Lehtonen/Teijo Räsänen: Dialogue as a method of learning and constructing development structures - Jarmo Lehtonen/Risto Nakari: From episodes to dialogue driven change and action.

Ethical dilemmas in social work practice with disabled people: the use of physical restraint

by David Wilkins

Due to be published in the Journal of Intellectual Disabilities in June 2012

This article discusses the use of restraint with disabled adults and children and uses a case study of one particular... more This article discusses the use of restraint with disabled adults and children and uses a case study of one particular child to explore issues related to the use of restraint, including the consent of the person subjected to restrain, their human rights and the balancing of these rights with the need to reduce the risk of harm. The case study involves young women who requested to be restrained in a particular way and the challenges this posed to the staff caring for her. The article concludes that in many complex situations, there is no clearly right approach to take and each situation involving restraint must be considered on an individual case-by-case basis.

Aging and Wisdom: Culture Matters

by Igor Grossmann

Co-authored with Karasawa, M., Izumi, S., Na, J., Varnum, M. E. W., Kitayama, S., & Nisbett, R. E., published in 'Psychological Science', in press

Research indicates that cultures differ in the ways they approach social conflicts, with Japanese being more motivated... more Research indicates that cultures differ in the ways they approach social conflicts, with Japanese being more motivated to maintain interpersonal harmony and avoid conflicts than Americans. Such cultural differences have developmental consequences for reasoning about social conflict. We interviewed random samples of Americans from the Midwest in the U.S. and Japanese from the larger Tokyo area about the future developments of intergroup and interpersonal conflicts. Responses showed increased wisdom (e.g. recognition of multiple perspectives, compromise, and the limits of knowledge) with increasing age among Americans, but older age was not associated with wiser responses among Japanese. Younger and middle-aged Japanese showed greater use of wise reasoning strategies than younger and middle-aged Americans. This cultural difference was weaker for older participants for interpersonal conflicts and was actually reversed for intergroup conflicts. Implications of this research for the study of aging, cultural psychology, and wisdom are discussed.

Virtudes cardeais no afresco de Rafael – Arte, Ética e Jusfilosofia

by Paulo Ferreira da Cunha

in "Vdetur", n.º 15, 2002, pp. 5-24

Este artigo procura arqueologias filosóficas para uma simbolização da Justiça. Tudo indica que Rafael não conhecia (ou... more Este artigo procura arqueologias filosóficas para uma simbolização da Justiça. Tudo indica que Rafael não conhecia (ou não aderiu) à perspectiva de autonomização do jurídico, cara a Aristóteles, nem ao desejo de laicização do Direito, protagonizado por Tomás de Aquino. Entre este último e o seu tempo interpusera-se, evidentemente, muita água nominalista e muita escolástica tardia sob as pontes da História. Porém, se a Prudência não é a virtude das virtudes em Rafael, tal se deve certamente ao facto de não estar a fazer teologia moral, mas representação da Justiça. E, mesmo assim, a Prudência surge no centro das virtudes e num plano superior. Aliás, o próprio Tomás de Aquino, na linha de Aristóteles, embora moderando o Filósofo, dá a maior relevância à Justiça, como suprema das virtudes morais, dependendo porém, na ordem do ser e da verdade, da Prudência.

Speak No Evil: Scientists, Responsibility, and the Public Understanding of Science

by Nicholas Evans