Analyticity

Boghossian's Implicit Definition Template

by Ben Baker

Published in P. Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis, Ontos Verlag. 2012

In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a priori knowledge of basic logical principles as... more In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a priori knowledge of basic logical principles as available by inference from knowledge of their role in determining the meaning of the logical constants by implicit definition together with knowledge of the meanings so-determined that we possess through our privileged access to meaning. Some commentators (e.g. BonJour (1998), Glüer (2003), Jenkins (2008)) have objected that if the thesis of implicit definition on which he relies were true, knowledge of the meaning of the constants would presuppose knowledge of the very logical principles knowledge of which the account purports to explain. A consequence would seem to be that implicit definition is incompatible with privileged access. I argue that whilst it is possible for Boghossian to defend against these objections the form of argument he proposes does exhibit a subtle form of question begging such that it exhibits a transmission of warrant-failure.

Meaning and justification: The case of modus ponens

by David Enoch

Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment

by Ian Proops

Published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2005, vol. 70, no. 3, 588–612.

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of... more In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of “containment,” a second time in terms of “identity,” a third time in terms of the explicative–ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of “cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction.” The paper asks: Which of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—best captures Kant’s conception of analyticity in the first Critique? It suggests: “the second.” It argues, further, that Kant’s distinction is intended to apply only to judgments of subject–predicate form, and that the fourth alleged characterization is not properly speaking a characterization at all. These theses are defended in the course of a more general investigation of the distinction’s meaning, its epistemology, and its tenability.

The Analytic, the Synthetic and the A Priori: a Matter of Form. The Debate between Husserlian Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism

by Davide Bordini

Published in Rivista di storia della Filosofia (peer reviewed journal), LXVI(2011), 2, pp. 205-230.

This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction between phenomenology... more This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction between phenomenology and logical empiricism, which took place in the early part of the twentieth century. On the one side, the author reconstructs the debate itself from an historical angle; on the other, he gives a theoretical account of the different positions and arguments. In particular, he has three main aims: a) to clarify how, according to Husserl, the analyticsynthetic opposition is to be understood as the form-matter opposition; b) to show how this position has been misunderstood by neo-empiricist philosophers, in particular by Schlick in his paper against the theory of the factual a priori; c) to point out that Husserlian theory anticipates some relevant features in the matter of analyticity (i.e. the distinction between logical analytic and extra-logical analytic truths) which will be made fully explicit only by Carnap and Quine, philosophers of the following generation.