A Conceptual Analysis of the Potentiality Argument
by Pavol Labuda
co-authored with Ján Baňas;
published in Internationl Journal of Philosophy, July 2009, p. 49-64.
The aim of this paper is a logical and conceptual analysis of argumentation based on the potentiality principle (PP)... more The aim of this paper is a logical and conceptual analysis of argumentation based on the potentiality principle (PP) and a designation of conditions of validity and soundness of the PP based argument that is in favor of human embryo's right to life. The first chapter will present the PP and the universal form of the bioethical argument based on it. The Second chapter will realize conceptual analysis of argument’s concepts with special emphasis on the central concept - potentiality. The third and final chapter will offer conditions for validity and soundness of the bioethical argument developed in favor of human embryo’s right to life via clear explication of the type of potentiality in the PP based argument and via the explication of the species-specific properties as dispositions.
Razionalità, identità, controllo: le condizioni soggettive della responsabilità (Rationality, Identity, Control: the Subjective Conditions of Responsibility, in Italian)
in 'Rivista di Filosofia', 1/2006, pp. 33-58.
Ever since the 1970s the elaboration of a philosophical theory of the subjective basis of criminal liability has been... more
Ever since the 1970s the elaboration of a philosophical theory of the subjective basis of criminal liability has been attempted in the Anglo-American world, often in the context of the discussions on the problem of the responsibility of the mentally ill offender. Michael S. Moore’s (and others’) theory of capacity for rational choice seemed to prevail in the debate. A brief history of the birth and the development of this theory is proposed in this paper, together with an attempt to weight its pros and contras. The basic claim is, despite its great intuitiveness and its good applicability to many moral and legal cases, the theory of capacity for rational choice is not likely to play the role of general theory of personal responsibility its proponents sometimes attribute to it. As it is displayed by the results of many present debates on some particular cases, rational capacity theory is in fact not likely to offer interesting
solutions to many significant cases.
Carattere, merito e responsabilità (Character, Desert, and Responsibility, in Italian)
in 'Rivista di Filosofia', 2/2007, pp. 193-214.
Many moral and legal theorists have recently endorsed a Humean view of responsibility, according to which attributions... more Many moral and legal theorists have recently endorsed a Humean view of responsibility, according to which attributions of responsibility depends on character assessment. In the first part of this paper, the major contemporary developments of this view are presented, and some historical and theoretical reasons of its appeal are briefly discussed. In the second and third part, character-based theories of responsibility are shown to be untenable on both theoretical and ethical grounds. They seem to reflect a too simple view of the conceptual connection between character, personal and moral identity, and action. Moreover, they lead to very counterintuitive results in concrete cases such as those of an intentional wrong action “out of character”. In the final part, some additional reasons against character-based theories of responsibility deriving from some general reflections on the nature of responsibility are given.
Introduzione. I problemi della responsabilità (Introduction. The Problems of Responsibility, in Italian)
in F. Santoni de Sio (editor), Responsabilità e diritto, Milano, 2008, pp. 1-24.
Il concetto di causa e i problemi del diritto (The Concept of Cause and the Problems of Law, in Italian)
revised version published in 'Cassazione penale', 7-8/2009, pp. 3221-3237
Molti giuristi e filosofi concordano sulla definizione di causa come conditio sine qua non. Questa posizione presenta... more Molti giuristi e filosofi concordano sulla definizione di causa come conditio sine qua non. Questa posizione presenta alcuni seri problemi. In primo luogo, essa si affida alla discutibile idea di una definizione riduttiva del concetto di causa; inoltre, essa incontra importanti difficoltà teoriche nei casi di sovradeterminazione causale; terzo, l’idea di condizione necessaria può indurre a guardare, inopportunamente, a un modello di certezza mutuato dalla logica della scoperta scientifica, confondendo gli usi del concetto di causa tipici dei contesti predittivi con quelli propri dei contesti di spiegazione retrospettiva, tipici dell’ambito giudiziario; quarto, la teoria del sine qua non, ponendo sullo stesso piano tutte le condizioni necessarie, oscura la fondamentale distinzione fra cause e condizioni; infine, essa non riconosce lo speciale ruolo dell’intervento degli agenti umani nelle spiegazioni causali.
