Analytic Philosophy

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

Abortion: Strong’s counterexamples fail

by Ezio Di Nucci

J Med Ethics 2009;35:304–305. doi:10.1136/jme.2008.028233

This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by
Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics tomore This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by
Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to
Marquis’s argument against abortion fail. Strong’s basic
idea is that there are cases—for example, terminally ill
patients—where killing an adult human being is prima
facie seriously morally wrong even though that human
being is not being deprived of a ‘‘valuable future’’. So
Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential
about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is
that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This
paper shows that whichever way the concept of ‘‘valuable
future’’ is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail:
if it is interpreted as ‘‘future like ours’’, the proposed
counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis’s argument.
If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient’s
preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients
in Strong’s scenarios have some valuable future or
admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong.
Finally, if ‘‘valuable future’’ is interpreted as referring to
objective standards, one ends up with implausible and
unpalatable moral claims.

On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate

by Ezio Di Nucci

2009: 'On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate', Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (10): 651-652.

In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s
argument against abortion –... more In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s
argument against abortion – according to which terminating foetuses is wrong
because it deprives them of a valuable future - fail either because they have no
bearing on Marquis’s argument or because they make unacceptable claims about
what constitutes a valuable future. In this paper I respond to Strong’s criticism of my
argument according to which I fail to acknowledge that Marquis uses ‘future like ours’
and ‘valuable future’ interchangeably. I show that my argument does not rely on not
acknowledging that ‘future like ours’ and ‘valuable future’ are interchangeable; and
that, rather, it is exactly by replacing ‘future-like-ours’ with ‘valuable future’ that I
construct my argument against Strong. I conclude with some remarks on how
Marquis’s concept of future-like-ours should be interpreted.

Rational Constraints and the Simple View

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2010, 70 (3): 481-86

According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to... more According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The idea that intending to ’ is necessary for intentionally ’-ing has been challenged by Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogame player is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannot
hit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. The player knows that she cannot hit both targets, but still she concludes that, given her skills, the best strategy is to have a go at each target at the same time. Suppose she
hits target 1. It seems obvious that she has hit target 1 intentionally. But, Bratman argues, she could not have intended to hit target 1. Since the scenario is perfectly symmetrical, had the player intended to hit target 1, she would have also had to intend to hit target 2. But the player knows that she cannot hit both targets.

Simply, false

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2009, 69 (1): 69-78

According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), ’-ing is... more According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), ’-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to ’. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman’s counter-example – McCann’s (1991), Garcia’s (1990), Sverdlik’s (1996),
Stout’s (2005), and Adams’s (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman’s contention that SV is false still stands...

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

by Ezio Di Nucci

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2010, 13 (2): 207-213

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate... more In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in
the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing
that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

Between Naturalism and Rationalism: A New Realist Landscape

by Fabio Gironi

A review essay of  Bryant, L., Srnicek, N. and Harman, G. 2011. The Speculative Turn: Continental Realism and Materialism. Melbourne: re.press.

Forthcoming in the Journal of Critical Realism

Review of Linda W. Brakel: Unconscious Knowing and Other Essays in Psycho-Philosophical Analysis

by Brian Garvey

Metascience (published online 9 March, 2012)

The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s11016-012-9663-4

Knowing Future Contingents

by Ezio Di Nucci

Logos & Episteme (forthcoming)

This paper argues that we know the future by applying a
recent solution of the problem of future contingents to... more This paper argues that we know the future by applying a
recent solution of the problem of future contingents to knowledge
attributions about the future. MacFarlane has put forward a version of assessment-context relativism that enables us to assign a truth value 'true' (or 'false') to future contingents such as There Will Be A Sea Battle Tomorrow. Here I argue that the same solution can be applied to knowledge attributions about the future by dismissing three disanalogies between the case of future contingents and the case of knowledge attributions about the future. Therefore none of the traditional conditions for knowledge can be utilized to deny that we know the future, as I argue in the last section.

Musings on Hume's Treatise

by Kile Jones

Caveat, Metaphors!

by Drazen Pehar

Synthesis Philosophica, 11, 11/1991, pp. 159-178, Zagreb

The author refutes the two main hypotheses of the standard analytic model of ascribing of metaphorical content, the... more The author refutes the two main hypotheses of the standard analytic model of ascribing of metaphorical content, the hypothesis of patent falsity as metaphorical warrant and the hypothesis of some deeper secondary meaning of metaphor. Moreover, he attempts to prove that paraphrasing is a legitimate procedure that can offer a complete content of metaphorical expression. This part includes a discussion with Black's and Davidson's opinions. At the end the author concludes. 1) the word “metaphor” is a constructive formula for ad hoc definition of metaphor; 2) the definition of metaphor is unnecessary; 3) the concept of metaphor is relative and depends on the flexible and movable boundaries of discourse.

A critique of Habermas

by Drazen Pehar

Section 3, Chapter 8 of the book Diplomatic ambiguity: Language, power, law (LAP Lambert Academic 2011) (a revised version of PhD thesis, pol./int'l relations, SPIRE (Keele University UK, 2006)

Review of Reshaping Reason: Toward a New Philosophy John McCumber Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005, xvi+ 263 pp., $24.95

by Cherilyn Keall

Published in Dialogue, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 618-620

« Recension de Vernon (Richard) – Cosmopolitan Regard. Political Membership and Global Justice. – New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 222 p. Bibliogr. Index», Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, n°61, Vol.4, août 2011, p. 785-786.

by Martin Deleixhe

Comentario: Ivan Domingues: O continente ea ilha: duas vias da filosofia contemporânea.

by Pedro Karczmarczyk

Kriterion. Revista de filosofia, UFMG, Brasil, vol 51, n° 121, Julho 2010, pp. 313-316.

Incompletezza normativa, inconsistenza normativa e responsabilità dell'agente nell'etica religiosa

by Daniele Bertini

Lo Sguardo, VIII(1), 2012, pp. 112-134

My paper addresses the notion of moral responsibility in religious ethics. I begin with the outline of the doctrine of... more My paper addresses the notion of moral responsibility in religious ethics. I begin with the outline of the doctrine of moral heteronomy. The scripture stories of the Tables of the Laws and the Holy Covenant provide the general pattern for heteronomic ethics. My claim is that heteronomic ethics transfers the responsibility for the action A an agent x is performing from x to the normative system commanding x to perform A. I then picture the architecture of the normative system of the Decalogue (System D) and I work out criteria for the completeness and consistency of the system. In the next section I make the case for the actual incompleteness and inconsistency of D. As a consequence, an agent subject to the authority of D can not rule his moral conduct by the norms in D. Therefore, the acceptance of D transfers the moral responsibility for the actions by x from x to D, but D does not provide a complete and consistent system of norms to rule x's conduct. In the final section of the paper I briefly present the way religious ethics deals with this problem, by offering an alternative approach to the notion of moral responsibility.

Is Perception a Source of Reasons?

by Santiago Echeverri

forthcoming in 'Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy'

It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is... more It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this paper I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. I exploit these results to formulate a series of constraints that a satisfactory account of the epistemic role of perception should fulfill. I also make a positive suggestion: coherentists are right when they claim that only beliefs can be reasons for other beliefs. Nevertheless, I depart from traditional coherentism, for I do not buy its conception of perception as bare sensation, nor explicate the justificatory status of beliefs in terms of coherence. My point is rather that, when one invokes experience to justify a belief, the justifying state must have structural features of beliefs.

Analytic Philosophy

by Guy Longworth

Hilary Putnam: Agyak a tartályban

by Ferenc Ruzsa

A Hungarian translation of Putnam's "Brains in a vat" paper.

J O'Shea - 'American Philosophy in the 20th Century' 2008 pre-publication version (corrected version in Dermot Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 2008)

by James O'Shea

final version in: Dermot Moran, ed., 'The Routledge Companion to 20th Century Philosophy': http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415299367/

Contents:

- Lasting themes in American philosophy from Charles Sanders Peirce
- William James, John... more Contents:

- Lasting themes in American philosophy from Charles Sanders Peirce
- William James, John Dewey, and other classical American pragmatists
- Varieties of realism, naturalism, and positivism from 1900 to 1950:
The New Realism
Critical Realism
The revolution in logic and the conceptual pragmatism of C. I. Lewis
Logical Positivism
- Mid-century developments: from positivism to ordinary-language
philosophy
- One case study in philosophical continuity and change across two
generations [i.e., father & son: Roy Wood Sellars and Wilfrid Sellars]
- Analytic philosophy in the naturalistic American style comes of age
- Neo-pragmatism and other recent developments