“The Battle of Algiers” – blueprint for revolution/ counterrevolution?
This contribution explores not only The Battle of Algiers extraordinary impact on left wing revolutionary groups since... more This contribution explores not only The Battle of Algiers extraordinary impact on left wing revolutionary groups since the late 1960s as a model for revolution, but also the usage of the film as a training device for anti-guerrilla warfare by different militaries.
Violence as a Theme in Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers and Burn!
This contribution explores the depiction of violence in Gillo Pontecorvo’s neorealist films The Battle of Algiers... more This contribution explores the depiction of violence in Gillo Pontecorvo’s neorealist films The Battle of Algiers (1965) and Burn! (1969) in regard to the ideas expressed by Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth.
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Seen by:La place des réformistes dans le mouvement national algérien
by Malika Rahal
published in 'Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire', 83, 2004.
À travers l’itinéraire de ‘Ali Boumendjel, cet article revisite la place du réformisme dans les idées et les pratiques... more À travers l’itinéraire de ‘Ali Boumendjel, cet article revisite la place du réformisme dans les idées et les pratiques du mouvement national. En revenant sur la fusion de tous les courants dans le FLN, il pointe les autres voies qui étaient alors proposées à l’avenir de l'Algérie et que l’histoire officielle a passé sous silence depuis.
'Filling in the Blanks: Memories of 17 October 1961 in Leïla Sebbar's "La Seine était rouge"'
published in 'Modern & Contemporary France'
Leïla Sebbar's La Seine était rouge (1999) traces the attempts of three characters to uncover the suppression of... more
Leïla Sebbar's La Seine était rouge (1999) traces the attempts of three characters to uncover the suppression of Algerian demonstrators by the Parisian police on 17 October 1961, an event which has hitherto been concealed from two of the three characters by their families. This transmission of silence reflects the wider reluctance to remember the Algerian War on the part of the French state, which only officially acknowledged the war in 1999. Though a wave of commemoration with regard to this past was instigated in the 1990s, this breaking of the silence has not led to a calm levelling of memory, but to a turbulent surge of memories in which opposing representations of the past clash. Sebbar's novel underlines this instability, bringing to light a plurality of memories collected from various actors in the events of 17 October 1961. Through a close textual analysis of how La Seine était rouge constructs a narrative of plurality and incompleteness, this article outlines how Sebbar exposes the intricacies of a past which is characterised by a mix of both remembrance and forgetting. Such an account of history shows itself able to fill in the blanks left by state-sponsored acts of commemoration and the distorted history put forward by colonialism.
La Seine était rouge (1999) de Leïla Sebbar retrace les démarches effectuées par trois protagonistes pour lever le voile sur l'élimination de manifestants algériens par la police parisienne le 17 octobre 1961, un événement qui avait été jusqu'alors dissimulé à deux des trois personnages par leurs familles. Cette loi du silence reflète la réticence plus générale de l'État français à commémorer la guerre d'Algérie, ce dernier n'ayant officiellement reconnu la guerre qu'en 1999. Malgré l'émergence d'une vague mémorielle au cours des années 1990, ce n'est pas à un « calme plat de la mémoire » que cette rupture du silence a mené, mais plutôt à un « flot turbulent » de souvenirs, où s'affrontent diverses représentations contradictoires de l'histoire. Le roman de Sebbar souligne cette instabilité, révélant ainsi une multitude de souvenirs recueillis auprès de différents acteurs des événements du 17 octobre 1961. À travers une analyse textuelle minutieuse des différentes façons dont se construit ce récit de pluralité et d'inachèvements dans La Seine était rouge, cet article expose les ressources (méthodes/stratégies) employées par Sebbar pour livrer les subtilités d'un passé, où se mêlent le souvenir et l'oubli. Un pareil témoignage historique se révèle apte à combler les lacunes, que les actes de commémoration approuvés par l'État, et l'histoire déformée avancée par le colonialisme, ont laissées.
The Impasse of Political Transition in Algeria
by Abed Ayyad
This paper was written by Abdel Nasser Jaby for the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
This paper takes as its starting point the Arab Spring which began in 2011. It goes on to describe the spread of... more This paper takes as its starting point the Arab Spring which began in 2011. It goes on to describe the spread of youth-driven political uprisings throughout the Arab region, and examines why these did not spread to Algeria, despite the success of the Tunisian revolution.
Comment faire l'histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine?
by Malika Rahal
La Vie des Idées, 13 mars 2012.
Dans l’Algérie contemporaine, il semble qu’il ne puisse y avoir d’histoire que de la guerre d’indépendance. Une fois... more Dans l’Algérie contemporaine, il semble qu’il ne puisse y avoir d’histoire que de la guerre d’indépendance. Une fois franchi le seuil de 1962, l’histoire devient difficile à écrire, à cause de la propagande d’État, de la destruction des documents, des hésitations des témoins. Étude sur la texture du temps en Algérie.
Fused Together and Torn Apart: Stories and Violence in Contemporary Algeria
by Malika Rahal
History & Memory, vol. 24, 1, Spring/Summer 2012, pp. 118-151
Abstract
This article explores the constraints of contemporary history writing about Algeria. It analyzes... more
Abstract
This article explores the constraints of contemporary history writing about Algeria. It analyzes the historiographical blocks and blind spots to show the centrality of the question of unity/plurality within Algerianness. Borrowing from anthropologist Françoise Héritier, it uses the notion of entre-soi to elaborate a new chronological framework, a continual sequence of war between 1945 and 2002. It also examines the impact of the rapid succession of these episodes of political violence on individual memories, and how moments of paroxysmal violence are reactivated during interviews, and considers the emotional cost for historians when they become the last recipient of narratives of forms of violence intended to terrorize.
Algeria bans soccer matches during parliamentary elections
By James M. Dorsey
Fears that anti-government protests in Algerian soccer stadiums and provincial towns... more
By James M. Dorsey
Fears that anti-government protests in Algerian soccer stadiums and provincial towns could again spill into the streets of the capital Algiers have prompted the government to ban matches in early May when Algerians go to the polls.
The ban follows failed efforts by the government to persuade soccer officials to speed up this season’s premier league so that it would end no later than May 10, the day of the parliamentary election, rather than on May 22, the scheduled end of the soccer season. Efforts to rush teams through the season’s schedule in a bid to end this year’s league early were in part thwarted by the cancellation of several matches as a result of unusually heavy snowfall this year.
"We're doing our best to accommodate for the obligations of league and clubs. We believe that it is impossible to end the season before May 10th, the date set for holding the election. We've agreed with the public authorities not to schedule any activities during the week of election, provided that the league and clubs are allowed to resume their activities after the election," Professional Football League (LFP) president Mahfoud Kerbadj told the Maghrebia news web site.
The suspension of matches during election week, a period in which rallies and assemblies are banned by law, is designed to free security forces from having to police stadiums where football fans regularly take on President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the military ever since anti-government protests fizzled out in early 2011.
The suspension reinforces a fragile, tacit understanding between soccer fans and security forces that allows the fans to raise their grievances as long as it is contained to the stadiums. The government fears that militant soccer fan groups or ultras associated with a host of teams, including MC Algiers, Mouloudia Club D'Oran and Jeunnesse Kabyle, while less organized than their Egyptian counterparts, could emerge as a force if the protests again spill into the streets of Algerian cities.
The understanding between the security forces and the fans was made in part possible by the fact that Algeria has been among the most advanced in the Middle East and North Africa in encouraging the emergence of soccer as a professional sport rather than a policy tool for the government.
“In a context of political closure, a lack of serious political debates and projects for society and of a weakened political society, football stadia become one of the few occasions for the youth to gather, to feel a sense of belonging (for 90 minutes at least), to express their frustrations over their socio-economic condition, to mock the symbol of the state’s authority and to transgress the boundary of (imposed) political order and institutionalized language, or the narrative of the state’s political and moral legitimacy,” cautions Mahfoud Amar in a recently published book, ‘Sport, Politics and Society in the Arab World.’
With discontent over lack of water, housing, electricity and salaries pervading the country and erupting almost daily in protests inside and outside of stadiums suspension of soccer matches has become a fixture of Algerian life. The government early last year suspended the league for weeks after protests erupted in Algiers and other cities in the wake of the toppling of Tunisian President Zine el Abedine Ben Ali.
A quarter of the Algerian population lives under the poverty line and unemployment is rampant. Recent protests in Laghouat and other oil and gas cities are symbolic of simmering discontent and have gone viral in social media. The government again suspended soccer matches last year after riots erupted in the Algiers neighbourhood of Bab el-Oued.
“Bouteflika is in love with his throne, he wants another term," is a popular anti-government chant in stadiums, referring to allegations that 74-year old Mr. Bouteflika is behind a spate of recent bombings in a bid to enhance his position in advance of a presidential election in 2014 by raising the spectre of a threat by Al Qaeda’s North African affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Mr. Bouteflika, whose health is failing, has lost several of his closest associates over the past year as a result of a military-inspired corruption investigation. His efforts at political and economic reform designed to attract foreign investment and diversify the economy have been thwarted by the military’s desire to retain its privileges by reinforcing the state's role in the economy.
The military has further signalled in advance of the May election that it will adopt a hard line towards domestic unrest as well as AQIM. It recently recalled from retirement Gen. Bachir Tartag to head the Directorate for Internal Security (DSI). Gen. Tartag made a name for himself during the civil war against the Islamists in the 1990s as one of Algeria’s most notorious hardliners and a brutal military commander.
The appointment positions him as a potential successor to aging Algerian spy chief Gen. Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Mediene, widely viewed as the number two within the Algerian regime. It comes at a time that there are no clear successors to Algeria’s ageing but opaque military leadership. Gen. Tartag succeeds Gen. Abdelkader Kherfi who was criticized for having failed to prevent the kidnapping of three European aid workers in October of last year and for his handling of the protests in the first quarter of 2011.
Algeria has recently adopted a number of laws that emphasize security rather than reform and impose restrictions on the media, associations and political parties, which according to Amnesty International violate international conventions signed by Algeria.
While signalling that it will take a hard line against anti-government protesters, the government and the military are banking on the assumption that allowing protests in stadiums as a release valve coupled with last year's lifting of the state of emergency, increased subsidies of basic goods and public sector wage and memories of the massive bloodletting in a decade-long war between the military and Islamist forces will stymie activists’ desire to confront the regime head on. That assumption is reinforced by the fact that the experience of popular uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Yemen has so far produced mixed results and the spectre of protests descending into pro-longed bloodshed and chaos as it has in Syria.
With discontent nonetheless continuously manifesting itself, the government and the military are walking a tightrope. The seeming return to the very policies that brought protesters on to the streets of Algerian cities early last year could at any moment again tip the balance.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
Examining the Underlying Conditions Presdisposing Societies to Terrorism
Thesis written for the requirements of the Global Security Studies M.A. Program at Johns Hopkins University.
The document examines theories of underlying conditions which predispose societies to the use of terrorism stemming from cultural, socio-economic and political, and individual psychological factors.
Chapter Summaries- pg. 17
Chapter 1- Case study of Northern Ireland, pg. 20
Chapter 2- Case study of Algeria, pg. 43
Chapter 3- Case study of Chechnya, pg. 79
Conclusion- pg. 103
Abstract
This paper attempts to examine the underlying conditions which predispose societies to... more
Abstract
This paper attempts to examine the underlying conditions which predispose societies to terrorism. The paper will specifically focus within three different regions to provide balance to the discussion. These areas are Western Europe in Northern Ireland, Northern Africa and the Middle East in Algeria and Eastern Europe in the North Caucus within the territory designated as Chechnya.
Each chapter of this thesis presents a different case study of the history of a terrorist group and its country of origin. After setting historical foundations, the chapters then analyze these accounts in relation to modern theories of terrorism.
The thesis tests theories of terrorism which are based on the arguments derived from five working groups on the topic at the March 2005, Madrid Summit. The groups included the top experts from around the world who are knowledgeable on the categories of terrorism resulting from cultural, economic, political, psychological and religious (or ideological) factors. The case study used the working groups to test the arguments that have been developed by theorists within these categories in order to help bring further understanding to the topic of terrorism.
This thesis also tested the hypothesis that claims that multiple combinations of underlying conditions within society blend together to predispose societies to the use of terrorism. In spite of the fact that the combinations of factors varied in importance from case to case, the thesis found that all of the potential underlying conditions which predispose some societies to terrorism mentioned at the Madrid Summit are confirmed in the case studies presented.
The thesis shows that the most comprehensive explanations for predisposition of terrorism come from a combination of multiple underlying conditions with varying degrees depending on which society is targeted.
Thesis Advisors: Dr. Ken Masugi, Dr. Mark Stout, Dr. Ariel Roth
The Veil of Nationalism: Frantz Fanon's "Algeria Unveiled" and Gillo Pontecorvo's The Battle of Algiers
Kunapipi: Journal of Post-Colonial Writing, 25 (2). pp. 56-73. ISSN 0106-5734
Von der hispanidad zum Panarabismus: Globale Verflechtungen in Argentiniens Nationalismen
in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 37 (2011), pp. 523-558.
The article explores the connections of various forms of nationalism in Argentina with Arab countries and pan-Arabism,... more The article explores the connections of various forms of nationalism in Argentina with Arab countries and pan-Arabism, focusing on the 1960s. Contrary to much of the existing scholarship on Argentine nationalism, it maintains that nationalist ideas and movements were not necessarily undermined, but frequently fed by transnational exchange. Analyzing how cultural analogies between Argentina and Arab countries were construed on the basis of pre-existing notions of Argentina as a Hispanic country, the article eventually arrives at broader theoretical considerations about the advantages and predicaments of transnational history.
The wounds of Algeria in Pied-Noir autobiography
by Amy Hubbell
Dalhousie French Studies 81 (Winter 2007): 59-68.
Protest proves beneficial to North African soccer performance
By James M. Dorsey
Protest is good for soccer. It enhances performance despite the hardship of civil strife... more
By James M. Dorsey
Protest is good for soccer. It enhances performance despite the hardship of civil strife according to an analysis of the performance of six North African national soccer teams before and after pro-longed mass protests that demanded regime change in their countries.
Matthew Barrett, a sports sponsorship professional, concluded in an analysis published on FootballSpeak.com that Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Morocco and Algeria, five nations that experienced political upheaval in 2011, had performed significantly better in terms of average points per match following the protests or in Sudan’s case, the cessation of South Sudan, compared to 2010, the year before the unrest. Egypt, , which won the African Cup three times in row, but failed to qualify for the 2012 finals was the exception that confirmed the rule.
The six national teams, Mr. Barrett, calculated, played 53 matches since the series of Arab uprisings erupted in Tunisia a year ago, in which they scored 87 goals with an average of 1.64 goals per match and won 45% of all games played. By comparison, the same teams played 60 matches in the year before the revolts in which they scored 79 points with an average of 1.32 per game and won 33% of the games played.
The teams performed better even though professional soccer was suspended for months in several countries, including Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria during the protests in a bid to prevent the soccer pitch from becoming an opposition rallying point. The enhanced performance occurred further against the backdrop of a rift in various countries between fans, who played key roles in the protests, and a majority of players who opted to either remain aloof, and not take sides or in some cases to come out in support of the embattled autocrat.
The improvement in performance constitutes an apparent triumph of national identity over internalized neo-patriarchism, which characterizes Arab autocracies and means that players and managers more often than not identified with the autocratic leader as a father figure. It also highlights the debilitating effect that politically motivated autocratic interference in the game had on performance.
Libyan goalkeeper Samir Aboud suggested that enhanced performance was the result of post-revolt national teams having a sense of truly playing for their country rather than their ruler when he said after a draw against Zambia that allowed Libya to progress towards the 2012 African Cup finals that “this is for all Libyans, for our revolution.” Libya’s Brazilian coach, Marcos Paqueta, added that his squad was "not only playing for football success but for a new government and a new country”.
Nabil Maalouf, coach of Esperance Sportive de Tunis, which this year won the African Champions League, noted that “the events at home really stimulated our team and we believe that the players felt greatly liberated after what happened." Defender Khalil Chammam concluded that “one positive thing from the revolution was that, although we suffered a lot, those changes and the suffering made us stronger -mentally and physically."
The triumph of national identity over neo-patriarchism symbolized by the post-Qaddafi Libyan team flying the pre-Qaddafi Libyan flag and singing a new national anthem enabled Libya to remain undefeated in competitive matches since the country’s autocratic leader, Moammar Qaddafi, was toppled earlier this year. That is no mean fete for a team that was dominated for years by Al Saadi al Qaddafi, the Libyan leader’s cruel and mercurial son with soccer ambitions of his own, who equated its success with that of his father’s regime and its failures as unacceptable poor reflections on the regime.
Interpol has issued an international arrest warrant for Saadi on charges of misappropriation of soccer funds and armed intimidation of players and officials who has sought refuge in neighboring Niger. In a separate case, Saadi is under investigation by Libyan authorities for the 2005 murder of an anti-Qaddafi player.
The impact of neo-patriarchism that turned players into celebrated figures who went victorious were showered with expensive gifts meant that the Libyan team meant was during the revolt increasingly split between supporters of Mr. Qaddafi and players who lost close ones among the NATO-backed rebel forces in the war against Qaddafi loyalists. The team’s captain denounced the rebels as dogs and rats, language used by Mr. Qaddafi to describe his opponents, while the goalkeeper and three other players defected together with 14 club players to the rebels four months into the rebellion.
The Libyan team’s rising star contrasts starkly with the fact that like Sudan it had barely ever registered on the radar of African soccer prior to the wave of protests that have swept the Middle East and North Africa in the past year and led to the overthrow of not only Mr. Qaddafi but also the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, far-reaching political reform in Morocco, continued unrest in Algeria and the carving out of an independent state of South Sudan.
The Algerian national squad, with anti-government protests moving this year from the streets back into the stadiums after having forced the government to lift the 19-year old state of emergency, won three of its five matches to emerge at the top of its group, according to Mr. Barrett, who calculated that it had scored 1.75 points per game as opposed to 1.25 last year. For its part, Sudan qualified as a runner-up in its group, achieving a 53 percent win ratio with 1.79 points per game as opposed to a 25 percent win ratio and 1.13 points per match a year earlier.
Egypt is the exception to the rule that autocratic interference diminishes and protest enhances performance. In the days of ousted President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s national team coached by the legendary Mubarak loyalist Hassan Shehahta won the African Cup three times in a row but this year failed for the first time in 29 years to qualify for the tournament’s finals.
There is no immediate explanation for why Egypt’s performance has been markedly weaker. Granted, Egypt’s transition from autocracy to a more open political system has been messy and bloody with soccer fans remaining engaged in bitter battles to force the country’s military rulers to relinquish power. Transition has however been messy in most countries with the exception of Tunisia, yet all have displayed performances beyond expectation.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
Slipping home in Marie Cardinal's Ecoutez la mer
by Amy Hubbell
In Gender and Displacement: "Home" in Contemporary Francophone Women's Autobiography. Ed. Natalie Edwards and Christopher Hogarth. Newcastle, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 34-45.
