Conservative Meinongianism
by Ted Parent
draft only
This paper defends the Meinongian thesis that “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,”... more This paper defends the Meinongian thesis that “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,” re: fictitious and illusory objects. I first collect 23 different data-points from natural language, and discuss why an anti-Meinongian is hard pressed to explain them. The Meinongian, in contrast, easily and uniformly explains the same data, by allowing the existence Pegasus, pink elephants, and the like. But unlike other Meinongians, who hold that Pegasus and the rest are mind-independent, I hold that such things are mind-dependent, precisely because they are imaginary or hallucinated. (Yet unlike Quine’s McX, I distinguish Pegasus from the idea of Pegasus, even though the Pegasus-idea is mind-dependent as well.) Such a Meinongian view is “conservative” in that it merely acknowledges the sense in which there are mind-dependent objects, imaginary and illusory objects being prime examples. (The “ideology” is conservative as well, in that I paraphrase away the Meinongian’s jargon of “nuclear” or “encoded” properties.) I end by arguing that it is presumptive to use Occham’s razor against Meinongian objects, since this would assume we can achieve empirical adequacy without them. Yet this assumption is now seen as contentious, provided the contrast between the Meinongian and the anti-Meinongian explanations.
Modal Meinongianism and fiction: the best of three worlds
We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and... more We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories.
Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects
Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal... more Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the claim that naïve Meinongianism allows one to prove that anything exists. In §3, we have impossible worlds enter the stage and provide independent justification for their use. In §4, we introduce our revised comprehension principle: our CP has no restriction on the (sets of) properties that can characterize objects, but parameterizes them to worlds, therefore having modality explicitly built into it. In §5, we propose an application of the MMM apparatus to fictional objects and defend the naturalness of our treatment against alternative approaches. Finally, in §6, we consider David Lewis’ notorious objection to impossibilia, and provide a reply to it by resorting to an ersatz account of worlds.
Meinong on Magnitudes and Measurement
published in *Meinong Studies* 1, 2005
The paper comprises a presentation of Meinong’s
discussion on magnitudes and measurement found in his Über die... more
The paper comprises a presentation of Meinong’s
discussion on magnitudes and measurement found in his Über die Bedeutung des Weber’schen Gesetzes. The first part of the presentation examines Meinong’s analysis of magnitudes. According to Meinong, we must distinguish between divisible magnitudes and indivisible ones. He argues that relations of distance, or dissimilarity, are indivisible magnitudes that coincide with divisible magnitudes called stretches. The second part of the presentation is concerned with Meinong’s account of measurement as a comparison of parts. Meinong holds that measuring is comparing parts and, thus, only divisible magnitudes are directly measurable. When indivisible magnitudes like distances are indirectly measured, they are measured by means of divisible magnitudes like stretches.
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Download (.pdf) Relations in the early works of Meinong and Husserl
by Carlo Ierna
in Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien III, 2009, pp. 7-36.
Both Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl wrote about relations in their early works, in periods in which they were... more Both Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl wrote about relations in their early works, in periods in which they were still influenced by Franz Brentano. However, besides the split between Brentano and Meinong, the latter also accused Husserl of plagiarism with respect to the theory of relations. Examining Meinong’s and Husserl’s early works and the Brentanist framework they were written in, we will try to assess their similarities and differences. As they shared other sources besides Brentano, we will consider very carefully whether we should speak at all of influence or plagiarism. Despite Meinong’s accusations it seems that both he and Husserl took over some elements from Brentano and, partially through him, from John Stuart Mill, who appears to be the most probable source on relations.