Action Theory

The specificity of action in the analysis of movements

by Audrey van der Meer

Justicia como virtud artificial en David Hume. Elementos para una teoría psico-social de la acción

by Ana Marta González

Pensamiento, pp. 97-127, 2008. ISSN 0031-4749

LA DISTINCTION ENTRE LES ACTIONS ET LES ÉVÉNEMENTS

by Giuseppina D'Oro

French translation of "The Action/Event distinction", forthcoming in Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage 29: L’Explication de l’action: perspectives contemporaines, Vrin (publisher) ed. Rémi Clot-Goudard.

Rational Constraints and the Simple View

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2010, 70 (3): 481-86

According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to... more According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The idea that intending to ’ is necessary for intentionally ’-ing has been challenged by Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogame player is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannot
hit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. The player knows that she cannot hit both targets, but still she concludes that, given her skills, the best strategy is to have a go at each target at the same time. Suppose she
hits target 1. It seems obvious that she has hit target 1 intentionally. But, Bratman argues, she could not have intended to hit target 1. Since the scenario is perfectly symmetrical, had the player intended to hit target 1, she would have also had to intend to hit target 2. But the player knows that she cannot hit both targets.

Simply, false

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2009, 69 (1): 69-78

According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), ’-ing is... more According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), ’-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to ’. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman’s counter-example – McCann’s (1991), Garcia’s (1990), Sverdlik’s (1996),
Stout’s (2005), and Adams’s (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman’s contention that SV is false still stands...

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

by Ezio Di Nucci

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2010, 13 (2): 207-213

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate... more In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in
the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing
that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

Lost in translation – A methodological critique of constructivist norm research

by Matthias Hofferberth

Paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention 2012, 1-4 April, in San Diego, co-Authored with Christian Weber. Please do not quote without the permission of the authors – Comments are most welcome!

Under the headline of “explaining change”, scholars in the 1990s rediscovered the importance of “non-material factors”... more Under the headline of “explaining change”, scholars in the 1990s rediscovered the importance of “non-material factors” in International Relations. Questions about the creation, the evolution, and the impact of norms obtained a prominent place in constructivist theorizing. Norm research seemed to offer the most promising alternative to the rationalist mainstream. We argue, however, that constructivist norm research entailed major conceptual and methodological problems which have not yet been spelled out comprehensively. Although norms were introduced as the product of social interaction, empirical studies defined them as expressions of a “given identity” with specifiable “regulative effects”. The insight that norms are potentially contested and thus constantly renegotiated through creative action has been lost in translation. Most authors adopted a structuralist framework explaining how norms caused a certain “behavior”, putting norm research at odds with the epistemological assumptions of previous constructivist works. By reconstructing the conceptual and methodological decisions of constructivist norm research, we show how the metatheoretical challenge to rationalism has been narrowed down to a neo-positivist research agenda. We propose to re-conceptualize the connection between norms and action from a relationalist perspective and outline an interpretive methodology that allows to deliver on the ambitious promise to explain processes of normative change in international politics.

Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the 'New Natural Law Theory'

by Matthew O'Brien

Co-authored with Robert C. Koons, forthcoming in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Fall 2012) Vol. 86, Issue 4.

The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a... more The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a distinctive account of intentional action, which underlies a moral theory that aims to justify many aspects of traditional morality and Catholic doctrine.

In fact, we show that the NNL is committed to premises that entail the permissibility of many actions that are irreconcilable with traditional morality and Catholic doctrine, such as elective abortions. These consequences follow principally from two aspects of the NNL. The first aspect is its distinctive version of the planning theory of intention, in which adopting the 'first-person perspective' of an agent is a sufficient, and not merely necessary, condition for determining the nature of his intentional action; this planning theory rests upon an implicitly Cartesian conception of human behavior, in which behavior chosen by an agent has no intrinsic “intentionalness” apart from what he confers upon it as part of his plan. The second aspect is the NNL's distinctive account of basic human goods' incommensurability, according to which there is no common factor shared by basic human goods that allows them to be comparatively ranked in any way that directs practical deliberation.

The entailments of these two aspects of the NNL, we argue, amount to a reductio ad absurdum. Pace the proponents of the NNL account, we sketch an alternative hylomorphic conception of intentional action that avoids untoward moral implications by grounding human agency in the exercise of basic powers that are either (a) essential constituents of human nature or (b) acquired through participation in social practices. This conception of intentional action provides a stronger foundation for natural law theory.

Creativity and folk art: A study of creative action in traditional craft

by Vlad Glaveanu

Forthcoming in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts

The present article aims to explore creativity in craftwork using the case of Easter egg decoration, a folk art chosen... more The present article aims to explore creativity in craftwork using the case of Easter egg decoration, a folk art chosen for its traditional roots and diversity of artistic outcomes. The research presented here contributes to the literature at: a) a theoretical level, by conceptualising a pragmatist-inspired framework of creative activity, b) a methodological level, by using, beside observation and interview, subjective cameras to record activity, and c) at an empirical level, considering the fact that creativity in folk art has often been a neglected topic. The two studies included in the article employed the participation of 20 different egg decorators of various ages from the village of Ciocӑneşti in northern Romania. The first research was concerned with general stages of traditional egg decoration and their characteristics, while the second investigation took a closer look at variations associated with the activity path, the generalities and specificities of work and how they could be accounted for, particularly in terms of expert - novice differences. These studies revealed the many ways in which creativity is intrinsic to Easter egg decoration and the final discussion of the article summarises them with reference to processes of combination and change, copying and translation, personal style and creative identity. In the end, an understanding of “micro” moments of creativity in craft is achieved, one that can help us rethink the relation between tradition and creativity, between folk and fine art.

Keywords: folk art, Easter egg decoration, creative activity, pragmatism, subjective cameras

Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition

by Shannon Spaulding

forthcoming in Mind & Language

Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very... more Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.

Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose

by Danny Frederick

Forthcoming, Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept... more Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error.

The Actions of Mahabharat (an Indian Epic): An Analysis from Action Science Perspective

by madhu ranjan kumar

The Actions of Mahabharat (an Indian Epic): An Analysis from Action Science Perspective

by madhu ranjan kumar

Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists!

by Florian Cova

Co-authored with Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Bruno Dubois. To appear in Consciousness & Cognition. (This is a draft version. Ask for the final version.)

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists... more Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data.

Responsibility, blame, and respect

by Carla Bagnoli

Free will, responsibility, and punishment (Workshop I)
Università degli studi di Roma III, 21/2/12

Strawson’s argument has been extraordinarily influential in recent debates on free will and moral responsibility.... more Strawson’s argument has been extraordinarily influential in recent debates on free will and moral responsibility. However, current treatments of responsibility have departed from Strawson in two major respects. First, they have significantly narrowed down the category of reactive attitudes to deontic attitudes, that is, attitudes that are associated with moral obligations and moral norms rather than with personal moral relations. In all such accounts, blame is elected as the key reactive attitude to measure moral responsibility. Secondly, the emotional aspects of reactive attitudes are discounted or denied. For instance, Jay Wallace develops an account of moral responsibility apparently inspired by Strawson where reactive attitudes are taken to be violations of normative expectations or ‘demands’—that is, to violations of ‘practical requirement[s] or prohibition[s] in a particular situation of action’.  In a similar vein, T.M. Scanlon focuses on the normative dimension of blame in personal relations, arguing that it is not a moral emotion.
I argue that this debate leads us astray. By contrast, I attempt to recast moral responsibility in terms of recognition respect,  a concept that governs the attribution or recognition of the status of practical subjects.

Learning to Negotiate Reality: A theory of action approach to intercultural competence

by Ariane Berthoin Antal

co-authored with Victor Friedman, published in Management Learning, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2005:69-86

In an increasingly global business environment, managers must interact effectively with culturally complex people in... more In an increasingly global business environment, managers must interact effectively with culturally complex people in culturally complex situations. The dominant stream of thought in international management literature frames this situation as a problem of conflict and offers generalized models of cultural difference as guides to “adaptation” for avoiding conflict. This paper offers an alternative approach to intercultural competence, “negotiating reality”, that engages cultural conflict as a resource for learning. Negotiating reality draws on concepts from action science and identity-based conflict to take a new look at the meaning of competence in intercultural interactions. This paper analyzes and critiques the approach to culture implicit in the dominant international management literature and the adaptation model. It then describes negotiating reality and the kinds of thinking and behavior that must be adopted in order to put this approach to intercultural competence into practice.

"Thomistic Hylomorphism, Self-Determination, Neuroplasticity, and Grace: The Case of Addiction"

by Daniel D. De Haan

A version of this paper was presented at the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO, October 28-30, 2011. For a citable version see the forthcoming, “Thomistic Hylomorphism, Self-Determination, Neuroplasticity, and Grace: The Case of Addiction” in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Science, Reason, and Religion, Vol. 85,
(2012).

This paper presents a Thomistic analysis of addiction that incorporates scientific, philosophical and theological... more This paper presents a Thomistic analysis of addiction that incorporates scientific, philosophical and theological features of addiction. I will argue first, that a Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides a cogent explanation of the causal interactions between human action and neuroplasticity. I employ Karol Wojtyła’s account of self-determination to further clarify the kind of neuroplasticity involved in addiction. Next, I will elucidate how a Thomistic anthropology can accommodate, without reductionism, both the neurophysiological and psychological elements of addiction, and finally, I will make clear how Thomism can provide an ethics and theology of grace that can be integrated with these ontological and scientific considerations into a holistic theory of addiction.

Epistemic Freedom

by J. David Velleman

Originally published in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1989). Reprinted in The Possibility of Practical Reason, online in the SPO Monograph Series

We are not metaphysically free to do just anything that is within our power, but we are epistemically free to believe... more We are not metaphysically free to do just anything that is within our power, but we are epistemically free to believe that we will do just anything that is within our power.

The Guise of the Good

by J. David Velleman

Published in Nous (1992)

Argues that action does not aim at the good. Argues that action does not aim at the good.

What Happens When Someone Acts?

by J. David Velleman

Published in Mind (1992)

A theory of supervenient agent-causation A theory of supervenient agent-causation