Action

Rational Constraints and the Simple View

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2010, 70 (3): 481-86

According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to... more According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The idea that intending to ’ is necessary for intentionally ’-ing has been challenged by Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogame player is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannot
hit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. The player knows that she cannot hit both targets, but still she concludes that, given her skills, the best strategy is to have a go at each target at the same time. Suppose she
hits target 1. It seems obvious that she has hit target 1 intentionally. But, Bratman argues, she could not have intended to hit target 1. Since the scenario is perfectly symmetrical, had the player intended to hit target 1, she would have also had to intend to hit target 2. But the player knows that she cannot hit both targets.

Towards a dynamic theory of intentions

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a dynamic theory of intentions. In S. Pockett, W.P. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds) Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 145-167.

La dynamique des intentions

by Elisabeth Pacherie

Pacherie, E. (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue, XLII, 3: 447-480.

Synthesis and fragmentation in social theory: a progressive solution

by John Holmwood

Postmodern claims for the lack of general coherence in social life and therefore in social research are merely a... more Postmodern claims for the lack of general coherence in social life and therefore in social research are merely a version of recurrent attempts to accept incoherence as adequate in explanations. Incoherence, however, is less sharply distinguishedfrom the synthetic and generalizing theories that it is held to have replaced than its proponents and critics suppose. Generalizing approaches, in fact, were built around contradictions
that contributed to their instability and facilitated postmodern fragmentation. In this paper we demonstrate the central contradictions in social theory, showing their common occurrence in apparently opposed positions. Both postmodernism and what it seeks to replace are features of a conservative and unproductive social science. We trace the
contradictory continuities through major modern schools of social theory in order to clear the ground for a progressive social science which accepts contradictions as problems that must be solved creatively in the practice of social research.

" Éléments pour une sociologie du deuil": une analyse compréhensive de l'action normative, du point de vue des individus endeuillés

by Karine Roudaut

2003, Thèse de doctorat de sociologie sous la direction de F. Chazel, Université Paris-4-Sorbonne, 549 p.

Cette thèse contribue à l'étude du deuil dans notre société (objet principal) du point de vue des endeuillés. Elle... more Cette thèse contribue à l'étude du deuil dans notre société (objet principal) du point de vue des endeuillés. Elle comporte un objet secondaire : une réflexion plus large sur la sociologie du deuil et les possibilités de cette sociologie.

Words as tools and the problem of abstract words meanings

by Anna Borghi

Becoming a social agent: Developmental foundations of an embodied social psychology

by Moritz Daum

Controlling reaching movements with predictable and unpredictable target motion in 10-year-old children and adults

by Moritz Daum

Meaning and motor actions: Artificial life and behavioral evidence

by Anna Borghi

Instrumental Rationality

by Markos Valaris

Forthcoming in 'European Journal of Philosophy'

Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends?  Intuitively, it seems clear that it does.  And... more Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends?  Intuitively, it seems clear that it does.  And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one’s taking the means necessary to bring that end about.  In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem.  On the view I develop, the instrumental requirement is normative not because agents have reasons to comply with it, but because it is a normative standard intrinsic to intentional action — i.e., it is a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one’s agency well.

Categorization and action: What about object consistence?

by Anna Borghi

Limits of the Conscious Control of Action

by Michael Schmitz

Action and agency in dialogue

by François Cooren

Olhar testemunhal e representação da ação na fotografia

by Benjamim Picado

In: e-compós. 3 (2005)

dans ce texte, nous proposons une analyse des aspects de
codage du geste, dans ses relations avec l’arrêt des... more dans ce texte, nous proposons une analyse des aspects de
codage du geste, dans ses relations avec l’arrêt des actions de la part de la photographie : en partant du cas de l’arrêt de l’action dans le photojournalisme contemporain, nous examinons les manières dans lesquelles les principes picturaux de la représentation peuvent servir comme une structure du discours visuel dans la photographie. En
partant aussi des idées de Gombrich sur les principes de la
représentation picturale des actions humaines, nous identifions l’arrêt du geste dans la photographie comme étant divisé entre deux traits principaux de son codage : d’une coté, nous identifions cette normalisation du geste avec les procès de ritualisation de l’attitude humaine ; d’autre part, le geste est identifié avec les aspects plus expressives de la représentation (donc avec la génération d’un pathos, que se trouve traduit dans sa forme iconique), i.e., pour la production d’une sympathie sensorielle de l’image avec les aspects de l’expérience des personnages de la scène capturé.

Visual illusions: pointing the finger at the Judd illusion

by Andrew Dunn

Dunn, A. & Thompson, P. (2005). In: Bernice E. Rogowitz, Thrasyvoulos N. Pappas, Scott J. Daly (Eds). Proceedings of SPIE: Human Vision and Electronic Imaging X , 5666, 402-415 doi:10.1117/12.610852

Attempts to demonstrate dual route processing of vision for action and vision for perception, have yielded mixed... more Attempts to demonstrate dual route processing of vision for action and vision for perception, have yielded mixed results44. Early work suggested that motor actions were, unlike perceptual responses, unaffected by visual illusions. However, it has been argued that these experiments were methodologically flawed and that the evidence actually supports a unitary representation account. We have examined perception of and pointing at the Judd illusion. In Experiment 1 we compared immediate object orientated pointing with perceptual line-matching at the ends and unmarked midpoints of the left and right facing Judd illusion. In Experiment 2 we compared immediate and delayed (4s) pointing and line-matching performance using the right facing Judd. We found that although pointing and matching were affected by the illusion, the pattern and magnitude of the errors were different across modality. Immediate pointing performance was generally less accurate (bigger errors) than line-matching performance; delayed pointing accuracy improved (errors were reduced) while line-matching accuracy remained unchanged. We argue that these data do not fit either the unitary or the standard dual route account, and are best understood in the context of a two-stage dual route model. We suggest that looking for differences in the pattern of results might serve a more useful approach than focussing on null effects in the motor task.