Abortion

Get Your Laws off my Body! by Elise Edwards

by Feminism and Religion

Originally published on the Feminism and Religion project.

After considering Virginia’s Transvaginal Utrasound Bill in light of the womanist critique, I wonder if... more After considering Virginia’s Transvaginal Utrasound Bill in light of the womanist critique, I wonder if religiously-motivated lawmakers considered that they alone do not have access to God’s intentions, but that the divine spirit is operative in a pregnant woman as well, would they be so willing to negate her moral agency?

On Tuesday, the senate in Virginia approved a law that would require women to get an external ultrasound before an abortion.  This is a scaled-back version of an original bill that mandated transvaginal ultrasounds prior to abortions. According to this Washington Post article, opponents like Sen. Janet D. Howell describe the measure as “state rape,” since it is the state, not the woman and her doctor who decides that she must undergo this procedure  requiring the insertion of a probe into the vagina.  Although proponents of the bill say that it is designed to give women more information about a fetus’ gestational age and development, most would agree that it is ultimately intended to discourage the women from having an abortion.

Mapping Moral Landscapes: Cartographies of Ascent and Descent in the Narratives of Pro-Life Activists

by Field Notes: A Journal of Collegiate Anthropology

By Tegan J. Gaetano

Published in Field Notes: A Journal of Collegiate Anthropology 4(1): 74-86. (May 2012)
Copyright ©2012 by Field Notes: A Journal of Collegiate Anthropology

The Supreme Court ruling of Roe v. Wade in 1973 brought to the fore of public consciousness in the United States two... more The Supreme Court ruling of Roe v. Wade in 1973 brought to the fore of public consciousness in the United States two dominant stances on the issue of abortion (i.e. pro-life and pro-choice), each organized around a rhetoric of moral vilification. As the sites of abortion practice, abortion clinics have since become theatres of contention, where conflicting imaginings of agency, reproduction, and personhood take shape and are experienced. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between morality, place, and imaginative practice in the narratives of pro-life activists working at the doors of Affiliated Medical Services, a women’s health clinic providing abortions in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Discourse about abortion experiences and activisms is treated reflexively as landscape talk – talk of how places are culturally recruited to stake out the values, histories, and identities of the individuals who occupy them. This paper argues that to better understand this process, there is a need to investigate how talk temporally and spatially located in the lived landscape is rooted in the imaginative landscape. How is abortion imaginatively rendered in talk? An answer to this question is approached by adopting Randall Lake’s (1984) heuristic model of an ascent-descent structure of moral discourse.

The Argument from Transfer

by Christian Munthe

Final version published in Bioethics 1996, 10 (1): 27-42.

Utilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is... more Utilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is wrong, other things being equal, not to procreate when this would have resulted in an additional being with a life worth living. The paper takes this view for granted and examines the common utilitarian claim that overpopulation and destitution in the world mean that, in practice, this obligation to procreate, other things being equal, often turns into a (categorical) obligation not to procreate. A version of this argument is defended - a version called the argument from transfer - according to which, rather than having additional children and care for them in order to make them happy, many people in the West ought to abstain from procreation and take care of destitute children already existing. The reasoning leading up to this conclusion raises some philosophical questions, seldom discussed in connection with bioethics, which indicate that the argument from transfer, although supporting the claim above, cannot neutralise the obligation to create more happy people as easily as assumed by utilitarians. It is argued that the argument from transfer may place many people facing the choice of procreation in a peculiar moral dilemma.

Abortion: Strong’s counterexamples fail

by Ezio Di Nucci

J Med Ethics 2009;35:304–305. doi:10.1136/jme.2008.028233

This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by
Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics tomore This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by
Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to
Marquis’s argument against abortion fail. Strong’s basic
idea is that there are cases—for example, terminally ill
patients—where killing an adult human being is prima
facie seriously morally wrong even though that human
being is not being deprived of a ‘‘valuable future’’. So
Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential
about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is
that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This
paper shows that whichever way the concept of ‘‘valuable
future’’ is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail:
if it is interpreted as ‘‘future like ours’’, the proposed
counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis’s argument.
If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient’s
preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients
in Strong’s scenarios have some valuable future or
admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong.
Finally, if ‘‘valuable future’’ is interpreted as referring to
objective standards, one ends up with implausible and
unpalatable moral claims.

On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate

by Ezio Di Nucci

2009: 'On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate', Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (10): 651-652.

In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s
argument against abortion –... more In a previous paper, I had argued that Strong’s counterexamples to Marquis’s
argument against abortion – according to which terminating foetuses is wrong
because it deprives them of a valuable future - fail either because they have no
bearing on Marquis’s argument or because they make unacceptable claims about
what constitutes a valuable future. In this paper I respond to Strong’s criticism of my
argument according to which I fail to acknowledge that Marquis uses ‘future like ours’
and ‘valuable future’ interchangeably. I show that my argument does not rely on not
acknowledging that ‘future like ours’ and ‘valuable future’ are interchangeable; and
that, rather, it is exactly by replacing ‘future-like-ours’ with ‘valuable future’ that I
construct my argument against Strong. I conclude with some remarks on how
Marquis’s concept of future-like-ours should be interpreted.

Is Baptism a Male Birthing Ritual? By Michele Stopera Freyhauf

by Michele Stopera Freyhauf

Originally published on the Feminism and Religion Project.

Quite a number of years ago I had a conversation with one of my professors, a feminist theologian, who posed the... more Quite a number of years ago I had a conversation with one of my professors, a feminist theologian, who posed the question “Why do I need a man to purify my baby with the waters of baptism?  Is there something wrong or impure about the blood and water from a mother’s womb – my womb?”  Before you jump and shout the words Sacrament or removal of original sin, this question bears merit in exploring, especially in today’s world where women are taking a serious beating religiously, politically, and socially.  In today’s world, violations and rants are causing women to stand up and say STOP!  This is MY Body.  This outcry was provoked by chants of ethical slurs against women– Slut! Prostitute! Whore!  The cry got even louder when the issue of religion and government was raised in the fight of healthcare coverage of contraception. The cry got even louder with the enactment of the laws in Virginia and Texas (and many other states to follow suit) that forces women to undergo transvaginal ultrasounds in early stage abortions.  The mandatory insertion of a wand into a woman’s vagina (mandated by the government, mind you), is a violation and has women crying RAPE!

Abortion and the Argument from Potential. What We Owe to the Ones Who Might Exist

by ALBERTO GIUBILINI

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, (2012) 37 (1): 49-59.doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhr053

I challenge the idea that the argument from potential (AFP) represents a valid moral objection to abortion. I consider... more I challenge the idea that the argument from potential (AFP) represents a valid moral objection to abortion. I consider the form of AFP that was defended by Hare, which holds that abortion is against the interests of the potential person who is prevented from existing. My reply is that AFP, though not unsound by itself, does not apply to the issue of abortion. The reason is that AFP only works in the cases of so-called same number and same people choices, but it falsely presupposes that abortion is such a kind of choice. This refutation of AFP implies that (1) abortion is not only morally permissible but sometimes even morally mandatory and (2) abortion is morally permissible even when the potential person’s life is foreseen to be worth living.

After-birth Abortion. Why Should the Baby Live?

by ALBERTO GIUBILINI

co-authored with Francesca Minerva (equal contribution), Journal of Medical Ethics, Published Online First: 23 February 2012 doi:10.1136/medethics-2011-1004

Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not
have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By... more Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not
have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing
that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the
same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that
both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3)
adoption is not always in the best interest of actual
people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth
abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all
the cases where abortion is, including cases where the
newborn is not disabled.

THE ONE AND ONLY (Susanne Bier, 1999), the kitchen in all its states

by Rene Hirsch

2 or 3 things I know about Susanne Bier (1)

This romantic comedy is about two couples with fertility problems. At the beginning, the 2 couples go through the same... more This romantic comedy is about two couples with fertility problems. At the beginning, the 2 couples go through the same sequence of events, but these parallel lives will eventually merge into one.
To protect her body from the marks of pregnancy, Sus gives false indications to her husband Sonny as to when her fertile periods are. On the other hand, Lizzie and Niller want to adopt a child, because they can’t have one of their own, the sperm of Niller being worthless...

Adoption is not Abortion-Lite

by Lindsey Porter

Journal of Applied Philosophy (2012), 29: 63–78. 

It is standardly taken for granted in the literature on the morality of abortion that adoption is almost always an... more It is standardly taken for granted in the literature on the morality of abortion that adoption is almost always an available and morally preferable alternative to abortion — one that does the same thing so far as parenthood is concerned. This assumption pushes proponents of a woman's right to choose into giving arguments that are based almost exclusively around the physicality of pregnancy and childbirth. On the other side of the debate, the assumption that adoption is a real alternative seems to strengthen the contention that a woman who wishes to abort is morally deficient, whatever the status of the foetus: that she is selfish or short-sighted in her refusal to bear the temporary physical burden of pregnancy.

In this article, I will argue that adoption is not a genuine alternative to abortion. It does not ‘do the same thing’, even setting aside the physicality of pregnancy. I will show that on the most successful model of parental obligation — a causal account that formalises the distinction between parent: progenitor, and parent: carer — birth mothers and fathers remain obliged, life-long, to their birth children even when the child is adopted out.

[on a relational account of the moral significance of birth--title omitted]

by Lindsey Porter

Currently under review
Key words Moral status, marginal persons, contextualism, abortion, infanticide.
Draft available on request.

According to Mary Anne Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth—that is, whether and how birth can change... more According to Mary Anne Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth—that is, whether and how birth can change the moral status of the foetus/neonate—being a party to social relationships makes one morally considerable. On this picture, social community membership confers full moral community membership on minimally sentient beings. I argue that social community membership cannot so alter moral status, but that social facts are relevant to determining the moral quality of a particular act. An explicitly contextualist account of the moral quality of acts can better explain our intuitions about the moral difference between abortion and infanticide.

[on abortion and infanticide--title omitted]

by Lindsey Porter

currently under review. draft available on request.

In ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted... more In ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted for the same reasons abortion is. In particular, they argue that infanticide should be permitted even for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be best interests) of the newborn. They claim that abortion is permissible for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be interests) of the foetus because foetuses lack a right to life. They argue that newborns also lack a right to life, and they conclude that therefore, the same reasons that justify abortion can justify infanticide. This conclusion does not follow. The lack of a right to life is not decisive. Furthermore, the justificatory power of a given reason is a function of moral context. Generalisations about reasons across dissimilar moral contexts are invalid. However, a similar conclusion does follow—that foetus-killing and newborn-killing are morally identical in identical moral contexts—but this conclusion is trivial, since foetuses and newborns are never in identical moral contexts.

Ritual and Reciprocity within the work of Joscelyn Gardner (2012)

by Janice Cheddie

Exhibition Catalogue for Joscelyn Gardner Exhibition 'Bleeding and Breeding', Station Gallery, Whitby, Ontario, Canada, January 14-February 12 2012. Publisher Station Gallery, Ontario, CANADA ISBN: 978-0-9867171-4-7

An examination of the work of the Barbadian/Canadian artist Joscelyn Gardner through the concepts of ritual and... more An examination of the work of the Barbadian/Canadian artist Joscelyn Gardner through the concepts of ritual and reciprocity. The essay draws upon Elaine Scarry's 'On Beauty and Being Just'(1999) as a means to explore Gardner's work through Scarry's assertion of the relationship between beauty and justice. In a dialogue with Gardner's 'Creole Portraits' series, the essay navigates how Scarry's text provides us with a means to enter into a meditation between the relationship between beauty and justice. Thus locating Gardner's work within recently re-emerged critical discussions on the role of beauty and contemporary visual practices.
Key Words
Elaine Scarry 'On Beauty and Being Just' (1999), Barbadian Artists, Post Colonial Theory, Portraiture, Peacock Flower, Contemporary VIsual Culture, Print-making, Contemporary Art, Menstrual Blood, Trans-Atlantic Slavery, Creolisation, Caribbean Artists, Barbados, Braiding, Abortion, Slave Resistance, Joscelyn Gardner, Caribbean Diaspora

Very limited role of psychiatry in late termination [Letter]

by Christopher Ryan

Ryan, C. J., and T. Shaw. 2008. Very limited role of psychiatry in late termination [Letter]. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 42 (2): 173-174.

At the conclusion of an excellent review of the role of psychiatry in late termination, Morris and Orr suggest that... more At the conclusion of an excellent review of the role of psychiatry in late termination, Morris and Orr suggest that ‘it is timely for psychiatrists to consider their position on the discipline’s involvement in the process’ [1]. They are right. If psychiatrists do not determine their position it is possible that legislators will do it for them. Without clear guidance from the profession, future law makers may mandate psychiatric review for any woman seeking a late termination of pregnancy. We believe that psychiatrists should have no routine role in the procedure.

Psychiatrists and abortion: clinical, legal and ethical aspects

by Christopher Ryan

Morris, Kristy, Kristin Savell, and Christopher James Ryan. 2012. Psychiatrists and abortion: clinical, legal and ethical aspects. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 46 (1): 18-27.

Objective: To provide practical guidance for psychiatrists asked to conduct an assessment of a woman requesting a... more Objective: To provide practical guidance for psychiatrists asked to conduct an assessment of a woman requesting a termination of pregnancy.

Method: The law relevant to termination of pregnancy in each of the Australian states and territories and in New Zealand was synthesised and reviewed, as was the available literature around the key roles for the psychiatrist in these settings.

Results: Little is known about the rates of and reasons for termination in Australasia. The “lawfulness” of termination varies between jurisdictions and might require a consideration of the woman’s mental health. When psychiatrists are asked to assist, their roles can be divided into: assessment and management of the woman’s mental health, assessment of the woman’s capacity to consent to the termination, assessment of the impact of having a termination or not having a termination upon the woman’s mental health, assistance in determining the lawfulness of the proposed termination and finally, support of the obstetric team providing terminations.

Conclusions: The psychiatric assessment of a woman requesting a termination of pregnancy requires an understanding of the ethical issues, the relevant law and a clinical framework within which the psychiatrist can delineate his or her various roles.

Doch dann ist es zu spät. Zweifelhafte Gründe für einen restriktiveren Zugang zu Spätabtreibung

by Dominik Düber

Published in 'prager frühling. Magazin für Freiheit und Sozialismus'
Nr. 4, 2009, 42-43.

After birth abortion: why should the baby not live?

by Michele Loi

Quasi-final draft, please do not quote. Submitted to Journal of Medical Ethics, 4/3/2012. Little corrections on 22/03/2012

A recent paper has argued that “after-birth abortion” (early infanticide) is permissible in all the cases where... more A recent paper has argued that “after-birth abortion” (early infanticide) is permissible in all the cases where abortion is. I will not consider the cases in which the newborn is expected to have life not worth living, but only cases in which the newborn is a potential happy person and is adoptable. For the sake of the argument, I grant the author's view of the moral personality of newborns, but I argue that infanticide is never justified. The specific set of circumstances that have to be satisfied for infanticide be justifiable have probably never occurred and will never occur unless human nature undergoes a radical transformation. The conclusion reached by the authors concerns a mere logical possibility with no significant chance of realization and is, for that reason, of little relevance to ethics. More precisely, I shall argue that the social and psychological circumstances in which after-birth abortion is going to damage the mothers' interest more than adoption are, if not impossible, extremely unlikely to occur. I rely on an account of human psychology and sociability that fits with common-sense and makes sense in the light of natural evolution. I conclude that, at least in this specific circumstances, the prohibition of infanticide is almost always in the best interests of the parents and is still justified even when exceptionally it is not in best interest of the parents.

Embriões e células-tronco embrionárias têm direito à vida?

by Marco Antonio Azevedo

Ethic@, 4, 3, 2005: 301-308.

Na polêmica em torno da permissão ou proibição da pesquisa com células-tronco embrionárias freqüentemente são... more Na polêmica em torno da permissão ou proibição da pesquisa com células-tronco embrionárias freqüentemente são empregados argumentos que apelam a considerações sobre direitos. Porém, faz sentido dizer que embriões têm direitos? Há argumentos fortemente plausíveis em favor da tese de que embriões de laboratório não são seres candidatos a terem direitos. Da alegação, por exemplo, de que se tratam de pessoas em potencial não se segue que pré-embriões possuam quaisquer direitos, já que ninguém tem direitos equivalentes aos de outrem pelo fato de o ser em potência. Além disso, é discutível se pré-embriões são seres individualizáveis ou apenas células totipotentes das quais podem vir a surgir nenhum, um ou mais indivíduos. Contudo, o direito à pesquisa é um direito inquestionável. Ora, para que se proíba a pesquisa científica é preciso uma razão imponente. Pesquisadores, por exemplo, não podem violar direitos humanos. Porém, não há consenso de que embriões tenham algum tipo de direito, quanto mais direitos humanos como o direito à vida. Logo, não é razoável proibir de forma absoluta a pesquisa com embriões de laboratório, violando com isso o direito incontroverso à liberdade de pesquisa, sob o argumento de que se está protegendo o direito, todavia controverso, de um ser cujo estatuto biológico e moral é patentemente indeterminado e dificilmente inteligível.

Abortion and Virtue Ethics

by Mathew Lu

Aborto En Debate: Dilemas Y Desafíos Del Uruguay Democrático: Proceso Político Y Social, 2001-2004

by Alejandra López Gómez