Understanding McTaggart's Paradox
Published in Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age Vol. II, Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 1999.
The paper is a shorter conference version of the original article ’McTaggart and the Unreality of Time’ published in... more The paper is a shorter conference version of the original article ’McTaggart and the Unreality of Time’ published in Axiomathes 9(3): 287–306, 1998 (also available for download on my academia webpage).
Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change
Published in Sats–Nordic Journal of Philosophy 2(2): 60-79, 2001.
I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through... more I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is made explicit, the arguments turn out to be either circular, they presuppose what they profess to prove, or mere demonstrations of the fact that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation. Furthermore, I discuss the metaphysical consequences of accepting the temporal parity thesis, arguing that it deprives us of the means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena.
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Seen by:Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time?
Published in Sats–Nordic Journal of Philosophy 10(1): 79-99, 2009.
It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps... more It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have incompatible properties at those different times, and thereby change. In effect I argue that they do not resolve the charge that the tenseless view of time is incomatible with endurantism because the tenseless view does not allow anything to change temporal location and thereby come to be ‘wholly present’ at various times.
McTaggart and the Unreality of Time
Published in Axiomathes 9(3): 287-306, 1998.
McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time is generally believed to be a self-contained argument independent of... more McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time is generally believed to be a self-contained argument independent of McTaggart's idealist ontology. I argue that this is mistaken. It is really a demonstration of a contradiction in the appearance of time, on the basis of certain a priori ontological axioms, in particular the thesis that all times exist in parity. When understood in this way, the argument is neither obscure or unfounded, but arguably does not address those versions of the A-theory that deny that all times exist in parity.
