A Priori Knowledge

Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics

by Katalin Balog

Boghossian's Implicit Definition Template

by Ben Baker

Published in P. Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis, Ontos Verlag. 2012

In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a priori knowledge of basic logical principles as... more In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a priori knowledge of basic logical principles as available by inference from knowledge of their role in determining the meaning of the logical constants by implicit definition together with knowledge of the meanings so-determined that we possess through our privileged access to meaning. Some commentators (e.g. BonJour (1998), Glüer (2003), Jenkins (2008)) have objected that if the thesis of implicit definition on which he relies were true, knowledge of the meaning of the constants would presuppose knowledge of the very logical principles knowledge of which the account purports to explain. A consequence would seem to be that implicit definition is incompatible with privileged access. I argue that whilst it is possible for Boghossian to defend against these objections the form of argument he proposes does exhibit a subtle form of question begging such that it exhibits a transmission of warrant-failure.

Unintended Metaphors

by Barie Fez-Barringten

The 1metametaphor theorem is then idea ism.  John Locke (1632 1704) said that ideas are not innate as Plato maintained; rather, they came from experience, that is, sensation and reflection.  The very things of which man's metaphors are made.  As people are exposed to experiences, they are impressed on the mind.  These experiences are all imprinted on the mind through one or more of the five senses.  Once they are in the mind they can be related in a variety of ways through the use of reflection. 
We can acquire the idea of milk through the sense of taste; perfume through the sense of smell; velvet through the sense of touch; and green through sense of sight.  One can create ideas of green milk or perfumed velvet.  These are all mundane and profane.  Man not relying upon God, but upon his own and very limited life.  Alive with God we are urged to let God's full knowledge of all He has created be accessible to the architect.  With man God can create so much more than man.  As God judges the universe so He provides man the ability to judge, and with judgement the ability to know His will.
1. Meta: used with the discipline of the metaphor to designate a new but related discipline designed to deal critically the original metaphor.  It is more comprehensive and transcends the literary metaphor.
(1.0) Ozman, H.A., and Craver, S.M., "Philosophical foundations of education"
Locke believed that as people have more experience they have more ideas imprinted on the mind and more to relate.  More to exude, reify and translate.  These expressions we perceive and can apply as metaphors.  He believes that the only way we can verify the correctness of our ideas are in the world of experience.  Whereas the word of God gives us His peace, conviction of the holly spirit, and the word as the ultimate test. Does the creation conform to God's word:  is it fruitful, profitable, uplifting, encouraging, strong, safe, compatible and helpful to is context, neighbors and society; and, most importantly does it glorify God
"Information gathering" perceiving and reifying process.  Which solidifies and forms by juxtaposing the conditions, operations, ideals and goals (C.O.I.G.) of a project?  It is the synapse, transformation and interrelationships of these (C.O.I.G.) which creates the composition we call metaphor.  The content of the work of architecture is the experience with these program elements that are brought about by the (4.1) technique of creativity.  "Technique reveals what content itself cannot".  These are the remembered mental schema where a prior experience is accumulated nurtured and encouraged.

Consciously acknowledged or not, by both creators and users, the man- made built environment is a potential symbol... more Consciously acknowledged or not, by both creators and users, the man- made built environment is a potential symbol which creators and users can either ignore or recognize; not only a symbol but a metaphor.

It is the intention of this monograph to validate, and, hopefully, encourage the intentional, controlled, and designed making of metaphors because building metaphors  are actual, real and consequential.  The matter of applying the technology and ideas to make such metaphors are abundant.  What is at question is the will and intention of using these resources. In other words, whether we intentionally make a metaphor or not, the building is a perceived metaphorically as a metaphor.

Even if a builder intentionally aims at not making a metaphor the building is still perceived as a metaphor.
Creators of the environment perceive the created work. In different ways and for different reasons. These differences are in the effort, time and intensity of involvement with the creation and subsequent use of the work.

The result of creator's efforts becomes a symbol and a metaphor, this phenomena is serious, important and with its consequences worthy of validating.  The creator, well-motivated or not, will be at the beginning with an idea and involved in the process of using technology to convert ideas into a reality.  The user, perceiving or not, is involved with the product of this process and for a much longer period of time., perhaps attaching to it  meaning, significance and importance often  different and unexpected by its author.

When by chance, the importance and consequences of the authors concerns are successfully imparted and manifested in the work and perceived by the users we can observe that this phenomena is rooted in the author's own sensitivity and concern about what his context means to him and his family. What importance is the built environment in his own life and how would its improvement, change, or modification affect him. It has been personal, cerebral, and willful. The architect chose to do it and followed his decision by a sustained effort.

Have architects ignored there right, authority and unwritten mandate by being careless about this creative goal.  The goal of making metaphors and symbols, and, if revived what would change? 
 
Would they be more uplifted and would their lives improve? Would the perception of there lives improve?
Unintended Metaphors
It is said that unlike the medical profession, what architects do has no affect on the physical life or death of his client.  He just uses an eraser, etc.
What about the social, psychological and, yes the spiritual life of users.
Metaphors architects make have a significant impact on both the users and the context in which their works are set.
This phenomenon is being exacerbated by computer aided designing and virtual reality. 
Computer aided design miniaturizes and abstracts the bounding and limiting characteristics of environments. Alternatively, it could be a metaphor maker’s tool just as a word processor and internet are to writer.

There was a time when architects could only be religious men vested with a known calling from the creator of all things to carry out his calling to provide buildings symbolizing God's message to man and later his blessings. They were kinds of prophets given a burden by God.  Today, both theists and atheists practice forming the environment.  Works are derived from user's program of requirements; technology; context; and concerns for their health, safety and welfare.
Yet the built environment and its works of architecture are uneven in quality and apparent maintenance and upkeep. 

On Our Alleged a Priori Knowledge That Water Exists

by Sanford Goldberg

The structure of logical consequence: proof-theoretic conceptions

by Ole Hjortland

PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2009

The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple... more The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.

We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.

Does the A Priori Belong to Science and Technology?

by Neb Kujundzic

Intuition et finitude dans la lecture heideggérienne de Kant

by Maria Hotes

Référence complète :
Maria Hotes (2012). « Intuition et finitude dans la lecture heideggérienne de Kant », in Revue Phares, vol. 12, Hiver 2012, pp. 77-101.

La version finale est disponible sur le site de la revue : [http://www.ulaval.ca/phares/vol12-hiver12/texte05.html].

A Priori Infallibilism: Reply to Hoffmann

by Ted Parent

draft only

The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my (2007) infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is... more The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my (2007) infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view is compatible with (i) strictly a priori justification, and (ii) the Quinean revisability of any belief, in light of new evidence.

Infallibilism about self-knowledge

by Ted Parent

Philosophical Studies 133; Apr 2007. pp. 411-424.

Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first... more Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contemporary defense of this claim, given by Burge (1988), and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense, appealing to a minimal version of the language of thought hypothesis. The argument here has the virtue of refraining from any semantic premises; thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists about semantics. The argument also illuminates how a subject may have an a priori and privileged access to her own thoughts.

What the Externalist Cannot Know A Priori

by Ted Parent

draft only

Several authors have argued that, assuming we have a priori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic... more Several authors have argued that, assuming we have a priori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know a priori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know a priori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian’s Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such a priori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth experiment, however, since it would imply that externalism is true of empty concepts as well as non-empty concepts. Yet in this paper I respond by defending empty-concept externalism, from criticisms suggested by Boghossian and also by Jessica Brown. Specifically, I argue that the view does not preclude an empty concept from having the appropriate form or structure—nor would it reveal a priori that a linguistic community is necessary for an empty concept to have a content.

A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (I) Mathematics, Method and Pure Intuition

by Stephen Palmquist

The Review of Metaphysics 41:1 (September 1987), pp.3-22.

This article is mainly a critique of Philip Kitcher's book, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Four weaknesses in... more This article is mainly a critique of Philip Kitcher's book, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Four weaknesses in Kitcher's objection to Kant arise out of Kitcher's failure to recognize the perspectival nature of Kant's position. A proper understanding of Kant's theory of mathematics requires awareness of the perspectival nuances implicit in Kant's theory of pure intuition. (Apologies that the pdf of this article was prepared with every other page upside down. Take it as an opportunity to practice changing one's perspective!)

A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori’

by Stephen Palmquist

The Review of Metaphysics 41:2 (December 1987), pp.255-282.

This is the second in a two part series of articles that attempt to clarify the nature and enduring relevance of... more This is the second in a two part series of articles that attempt to clarify the nature and enduring relevance of Kant's concept of a priori knowledge. (For Part I, see below.) In this article I focus mainly on Saul Kripke's critique of Kant, in Naming and Necessity. I argue that Kripke draws attention to a genuine defect in Kant's epistemological framework, but that he used definitions of certain key terms that were quite different from Kant's definitions. When Kripke's definitions are replaced by Kant's definitions, Kripke's account of the status of naming turns out to be a defense of analytic aposteriority as a significant classification of knowledge that Kant neglected. I also introduce here a new way of understanding such epistemological labels, as defining the perspective adopted by the knowing subject in a given situation, rather than an objective characteristic of certain propositions as such.

The Importance and Relevance of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature

by Sebastian Rand

Published in Review of Metaphysics, 2007.

Apriority from the Grundlage to the System of Ethics

by Sebastian Rand

Published in Philosophy Today.

Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant's Theory of Matter

by Sebastian Rand

Forthcoming in Kantian Review. Please cite published version when available.

Como são possíveis os juízos sintéticos a priori?

by Caius Brandão

Neste trabalho, temos a missão de falar sobre uma questão epistemológica
considerada central por Kant: Como são... more Neste trabalho, temos a missão de falar sobre uma questão epistemológica
considerada central por Kant: Como são possíveis os juízos sintéticos a priori?
(KANT, 2001, p. 49) Em virtude do caráter introdutório do nosso estudo sobre a
Crítica da razão pura1, vamos primeiro nos limitar à exposição de como o filósofo
formulou o problema na carta2 que escreveu a Marcus Herz, em 1772, portanto, antes
de publicar a Crítica em 17813. Em seguida, e de forma breve, tentaremos reconstruir
parte do quadro conceitual e argumentativo utilizado por Kant na reformulação da
questão central na Introdução da Crítica.

Reasoning and Regress

by Markos Valaris

Draft Only

Regress arguments seem to have convinced most philosophers that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows... more Regress arguments seem to have convinced most philosophers that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning — most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive role in reasoning.

Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition

by Markos Valaris

A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship

by Tuomas Tahko

Metaphysica, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2011

The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion,... more The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that a priori and a posteriori resources are in fact used in parallel. We will define this relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge as the bootstrapping relationship. As we will see, this relationship gives us reasons to seek for an altogether novel definition of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Specifically, we will have to analyse the relationship between a priori knowledge and a priori reasoning, and it will be
suggested that the latter serves as a more promising starting point for the analysis of aprioricity. We will also analyse a number of examples from the natural sciences and consider the role of a priori reasoning in these examples. The focus of this paper is the analysis of the concepts of a priori and a posteriori knowledge rather than the epistemic domain of a posteriori and a priori justification.

Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as

by Annalisa Coliva

Synthese 2011, on-line first DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9982-9