19th-century German philosophy

El antirrepresentacionalismo de Hegel y su concepción del conocimiento como praxis intersubjetiva

by Hector Ferreiro

Este artículo aparecerá publicado próximamente en una antología de trabajos sobre la filosofía de Hegel editada por Daniel Brauer en la Editorial Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2012.

La tercera antinomia de la razón pura su crítica y resolución en el Sistema de Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

En: López, Diana María (comp.), Experiencia y límite. Kant Kolloquium (1804-2004), Ediciones de la Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, 2009, pp. 195-207.

El concepto de representacion en la filosofia de Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

En: Escritos de Filosofía, Buenos Aires, 35-36, 1999, págs. 99-130.

El lenguaje como elemento inmanente del pensar y la tesis hegeliana de la muerte del Arte

by Hector Ferreiro

En: Kalíope, São Paulo, a. 7, n. 14 (jul.-dez. 2011), pp. 108-122.

The Relation between Language and Thought according to Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

Slightly re-elaborated english version of the article “La relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento en el Sistema hegeliano”, published in Oliva Mendoza, Carlos (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, Experiencia y Fenomenología, Ediciones de la Facultad deFilosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2010, 21-33. (I read this paper at the "Workshop Kant-Fichte-Hegel", Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University, Belgium, June 24, 2011)

A superação hegeliana do dualismo entre determinismo e liberdade

by Hector Ferreiro

Palestra no Simpósio `Sujeito e liberdade na filosofia moderna alemã´, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Brasil, 26-28 de agosto de 2011

Hegels Theorie der Intelligenz als Grundlegung der Unmöglichkeit des Unvernünftigen

by Hector Ferreiro

Paper read at the Conference “Irrationalität: Schattenseite der Moderne”,
7. Jahrestagung des Internationalen Forschungsnetzwerks Transzendentalphilosophie - Deutscher Idealismus, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany, February 19-21, 2009.

In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein: Toward a Recuperation of Hegel's Metaphysics of Agency

by Ayon Maharaj

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 11.1 (Fall 2006), 225-255.

This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home... more This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home with oneself in one's other." I first briefly isolate the inadequacies of some dominant interpretations of Hegelian freedom and proceed to develop a more adequate theoretical frame by turning to Theodor Adorno. Then I interpret Hegel's notion of the freedom of the will in the Philosophy of Right in terms of his speculative metaphysics. Finally, I briefly examine Hegel's treatment of agency in the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to establish important continuities between the early and late Hegel.

Affectivity, transparency, rapport: Circumscribing the fichtean unconscious= Affectivité, transparence, rapport: comment circonscrire l'inconscient fichtéen

by f. scott scribner

The Aesthetics of Influence: Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right in View of Kant's Third Critique

by f. scott scribner

Published in:  Rights, Bodies and Recognition, Eds., Tom Rockmore and Daniel Breazeale. London: Ashgate Press,... more Published in:  Rights, Bodies and Recognition, Eds., Tom Rockmore and Daniel Breazeale. London: Ashgate Press, 2006, 138-151.

Foreword to "Abelard and Heloise, or: The Writer and the Human by Ludwig Feuerbach". A translation by Eric v.d. Luft

by Angela Moreira

in progress

Kierkegaard’s Influence on Wilhelm Dilthey’s Work. In: Kierkegaard Research. Sources, Reception, and Resources. Section II: Kierkegaard’s Reception, Vol. 11: Kierkegaard’s Influence on Philosophy. Tome I: German and Scandinavian Philosophy. Ed. Stewart, Jon. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 85-104.

by Elisabetta Basso

The History of History: German Philosophy, Judaism and the Spinozist Moment

by Jeffrey Bernstein

Hamlet, Masculinity and the Nineteenth-Century Nationalism

by Magda Romanska

Published in "Ghosts, Stories, Histories: Ghost Stories and Alterative Histories." Ed. Sladja Blazan Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2007).

FROM THE EDITOR:

"Magda Romanska argues that with the rise of nationalism in late nineteenth-century... more FROM THE EDITOR:

"Magda Romanska argues that with the rise of nationalism in late nineteenth-century Europe, the pattern of the patriarchal covenant in Hamlet paralleled the process of nation-building. Hamlet’s filial loyalty toward his Father’s ghost was perceived as a symbol of
patriotic loyalty towards one’s nation/Father-land. Conversely, as a “gift of death” that cements the patriarchal contract, Ophelia became a model of the nineteenth-century feminine ideal."

A Nietzschean Case for Egalitarianism

by Donovan Miyasaki

2012 Manuscript

This paper draws on Friedrich Nietzsche’s work to defend the (admittedly non-Nietzschean) conclusion that a... more This paper draws on Friedrich Nietzsche’s work to defend the (admittedly non-Nietzschean) conclusion that a non-liberal egalitarian society is superior in two ways: first, as a moral ideal, it does not rest on questionable claims about essential human equality and, second, such a society would provide the optimal psychological and political conditions for individual wellbeing, social stability, and cultural achievement. I first explain Nietzsche’s distinction between forms of egalitarianism: noble and slavish. The slavish form promotes equality, defined negatively as the elimination of privilege. It is non-liberal in its prioritization of equality over the interests of the advantaged. Nietzsche rejects both slavish egalitarianism and liberalism for the same reasons: they questionably assume the equal value of all persons, and they harm cultural achievement, sacrificing the potential of those who are most valuable to cultural development to the interests of the majority. Noble egalitarianism, in contrast, exemplifies Nietzsche’s conception of justice as ‘equality among equals’. It demands that individuals of equal worth or power (such as members of an artistic or political elite) treat each other as what they, in fact, are: equals. It avoids asserting essential equality, demanding instead—against both slavish and liberal forms—respect on the basis of shared superiority. And it escapes the charge of harm to cultural development, commanding respect only where equality already exists. Although Nietzsche quickly assumes that ‘noble egalitarianism’ requires the rejection of all forms of universal egalitarianism, concluding that we should ‘never make equal what is unequal’, in fact it only entails the rejection of slavish methods: equalization through harm to the advantaged. However, non-liberal forms of egalitarianism can be ‘noble’, promoting equality without harm to the advantaged—through, for example, unequal distribution of resources, the equalization of economic opportunities, and economic regulation to prevent the creation of substantial wealth disparities. If egalitarianism can ‘make equal’ without slavish methods, then Nietzsche’s demand for ‘equality for equals’ applies to the newly equal, too.
More importantly, his moral psychology of power—the view that our source of happiness and incentive to self-development is the feeling of power in relation to equal resistance or ‘opponents who are our equals’ —supports the superiority of a nobly-achieved, non-liberal egalitarian society. For achieved, practical equality of wealth and opportunity would optimize conditions for the feeling of power: a balance of equal, oppositional powers serving as mutual limitation and resistance. Such a society is superior in three ways. First, it maximizes social happiness by promoting and maintaining the feeling of power in all. Liberal and aristocratic societies, in contrast, allow radical inequalities that not only diminish the power of the disadvantaged, but diminish the opportunities of the advantaged to encounter equal resistance, thus undermining the happiness of all. Second, it promotes social stability by preserving a balance of powers that prevents domination and exploitation, in contrast to the inevitable class conflicts of aristocratic and liberal societies. Finally, it promotes cultural achievement, since the feeling of power in relation to proportional resistance is the psychological incentive for self-development and cultural achievement.

Nietzsche contra Freud on Bad Conscience

by Donovan Miyasaki

2010, Nietzsche-Studien 39, 434-54.

While much has been made of the similarities between the work of Nietzsche and Freud, insufficient attention has been... more While much has been made of the similarities between the work of Nietzsche and Freud, insufficient attention has been paid to their differences. Even where they have been noted, the degree of these differences, which sometimes approaches direct opposition, has often been underestimated. In the following essay, I will suggest that on the topic of conscience Nietzsche and Freud have radically opposed views, with profoundly different moral consequences. Despite superficial similarities, Nietzsche’s conception of conscience is opposed to that of Freud in almost every conceivable way. For Freud, conscience is primarily associated with bad will, repression, subordination to social prohibition, and the feeling of guilt. For Nietzsche, conscience is primarily related to affirmation, memory, individual sovereignty, and the feelings of pride and power. To be sure, Freudian “bad conscience” has its parallel in Nietzsche’s philosophy—but only as a modality of conscience, not as its foundation. Freudian conscience is, on the contrary, an essentially bad conscience.

An Ontological Interpretation of Nietzsche's Will to Power

by Donovan Miyasaki

2010 Manuscript

In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche’s published works contain a substantial, although implicit, argument for the... more In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche’s published works contain a substantial, although implicit, argument for the will to power as ontology—a critical and descriptive, rather than positive and explanatory, theory of reality. Further, I suggest this ontology is entirely consistent with a naturalist methodology. The will to power ontology follows directly from Nietzsche’s naturalist rejection of three metaphysical presuppositions: substance, efficient causality, and final causality. I show that a number of interpretations, including those of Clark, Schacht, Reginster, and Richardson, are inconsistent with Nietzsche’s naturalism, because they presuppose efficient or final causality. In contrast, I argue that the will to power is not an explanatory theory, but a description of the basic, necessary character of reality, designed to critically reveal and minimize metaphysical presuppositions—to reject false explanations of reality and human behavior. It avoids substance-metaphysics by describing reality as will, a causal process without discrete efficient causes or agents. It eliminates efficient causality by describing events as maximal manifestations of power, rather than as agent-actualized potentialities. Finally, it opposes teleology by describing life as tending toward the activity of resistance as such, rather than toward explanatory end-states, such as the accumulation of power or overcoming of resistances.

Nietzsche and the Morality of Liberal Euegenics

by Donovan Miyasaki

2011 Manuscript

Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and its supposed... more Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and its supposed harm to autonomy, an emphasis that leads into irresolvable disputes about human nature, free will, and identity. In this paper I draw on Nietzsche’s work to critique eugenics’ ends rather than its means, as harm to abilities, rather than to autonomy. I first critique subjective eugenics, the selection of extrinsically valuable traits, using Nietzsche’s notion of ‘slavish’ forms of evaluation: values reducible to the negation of another’s good. Subjective eugenics slavishly evaluates traits in comparison to a negatively evaluated norm, disguising an intention to diminish the norm – for example, increasing one child’s intelligence by relatively decreasing everyone else’s. Even seemingly non-comparative selection of traits like eye color depend on negative comparison. Valued either for rarity or group identity, they devalue norm in its commonness or difference. Next, I argue there is no objective form of eugenics on the Nietzschean grounds that abilities are not valuable intrinsically, but only given the power to exercise them. Abilities frustrated by conflict with other abilities or one’s environment are harmful, while disabilities that empower one’s other abilities are beneficial. Consequently, all supposedly objective forms of eugenics are subject to the previous ethical critique of subjective eugenics. Because, like evolutionary fitness, the complementary fit of traits and environment that produces power is accidental and unpredictable, human wellbeing is maximized through the conservation of a diversity of types, rather than through active improvement.

Nietzsche's Naturalist Morality of Breeding: A Critique of Eugenics as Taming

by Donovan Miyasaki

2010, forthcoming in Nietzsche and the Becoming of Life, ed. Vanessa Lemm, Fordham University Press.

In this paper, I directly oppose Nietzsche’s endorsement of a morality of breeding to all forms of comparative,... more In this paper, I directly oppose Nietzsche’s endorsement of a morality of breeding to all forms of comparative, positive eugenics: the use of genetic selection to introduce positive improvement in individuals or the species, based on negatively or comparatively defined traits. I begin by explaining Nietzsche’s contrast between two broad categories of morality: breeding and taming. I argue that the ethical dangers of positive eugenics are grounded in their status as forms of taming, which preserves positively evaluated character traits and types through the active de-selection of negatively evaluated ones. The morality of taming is not a form of selection, but de-selection: the production of counter or anti-traits and types. Consequently, in its attempt to improve humanity, it tends necessarily toward violence as the elimination of de-selected forms of human life. In contrast, Nietzsche’s morality of breeding selects traits and types by protecting them from de-selection—specifically, by attacking moral ideas, values, and practices designed to eliminate them. It tends not towards the destruction but preservation of types; its negativity targets not life but the ideas that disable, disempower, and eradicate forms of life. I argue, further, that the fundamental ethical difference between breeding and taming, and so between Nietzschean morality and eugenics, is found in their attitudes toward the natural world. The violence of eugenics as taming is grounded in its status as anti-natural, while Nietzsche’s morality of breeding resists violence through its foundational affirmation of the conditions and limitations of the natural world: its resolute moral naturalism. Finally, I apply my interpretation of breeding and taming to two cases of comparative, positive eugenics: the historical case of racial eugenics and the so-called “designer baby” case in contemporary liberal eugenics. Nietzsche must condemn both as forms of the anti-natural morality of taming, to which the morality of breeding is diametrically opposed.

Ist die Identität des Selbstbewußtseins in Fichtes System unerreichbar? Hegels methodologische Kritik in der Differenzschrift

by Patrick Grüneberg

In: Hegel-Jahrbuch 2007, Zweiter Teil, S. 121-125.