Kant

Il semble qu'une contradiction surgit quand on passe de la deuxième antinomie dialectique, exposée dans la Critique de la raison pure,  au quatrième théorème dynamique des Premiers principes métaphysiques de la science de la nature,  qui traitent, à des niveaux différents, de la connaissance sur la nature de la constitution de la matière. Ce travail propose une solution à ce problème, à partir de l'analyse des critères établis par la philosophie critique qui permettent de distinguer entre une affirmation scientifique et une affirmation métaphysique.

“Immagini meccanicistiche del mondo” è una storia della filosofia moderna e della scienza moderna che ne mostra i fecondi intrecci. Essa fornisce un approfondimento disciplinare per gli insegnanti, e individua alcuni temi e percorsi su cui il gruppo del "Progetto di storia della filosofia" pubblicato sul mio profilo intende costruire un manuale scolastico, per il quale sta cercando nuovi collaboratori.
Questa terza parte parla degli sviluppi delle diverse scienze nel secolo xviii e dell'avvento della dimensione temporale per la cosmologia e la geologia, unitamente alla trattazione di diversi filosofi contemporanei fino a Hume e Kant.
Nel doc di academia "Introduzione del 2019 e Indice di Immagini meccanicistiche del mondo" si trova l'indice dettagliato di questa e delle altre parti, tutte pubblicate su questo profilo di academia.edu.

Kant conceives of chemical dissolutions as involving the infinite division and subsequent blending of solvent and solute. In the resulting continuous solution, every subvolume contains a uniform proportion of each reactant. Erich Adickes argues that this account stands in tension with other aspects of Kant’s Critical philosophy and his views on infinity. I argue that although careful analysis of Kant’s conception of dissolution addresses Adickes’ objections, the infinite division inherent to the process is beyond our human cognition, for Kant. Nevertheless, such infinite division may be considered as an idea of reason to make comprehensible chemical reactions, revealing reason to play a pivotal role in the foundations of chemistry.

Forthcoming in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
The argument of this paper goes as follows: Beck claims that the only transcendental standpoint consists in a synthetic act whose articulation in judgments merely shows what can be produced and derived from the postulate: ‘represent originally’. My analysis of Beck’s arguments showed how he disregards Kant’s account of the distinctions and the interactions between reason’s faculties, thus misunderstanding the normative aspect of Judgment, regarding its elements (concepts and intuitions) as well as regarding its legislation for experience (the transcendental principles). From Kant’s point of view, the main function of Judgment is that of bringing lawful unity into all synthesis, thus making every kind of experience possible. All of our legitimate cognitive, moral and aesthetical claims result from the application of rules and the determination of laws. And together they arise as a whole in the form of a system. While this topic cannot be developed completely on these pages, my very restricted concern is to suggest that the standpoint of Judgment is the only one we should consider when we demand, as Beck did, to have the last word on Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole. And indeed, the standpoint of Judgment alone allows us to give a general account for the systematical coexistence of all reason’s legislation in the domains of nature and freedom. For pure reason in its critical role is always committed to ground the legitimacy of its claims, and the capacity to judge is reason’s armed wing (or executive power) in the world of human experience.

نبذة عن الكتاب
كان لابن رشد أثر بالغ وعميق في الفكر الأوروبي في أواخر العصور الوسطى وعصر  النهضة، وقد انتشرت الدراسات المتخصصة التي ترصد الحضور الرشدي في أوروبا بين القرنين الثالث عشر والسادس عشر؛ وبات مستقراً لدى الباحثين وجود تيارات رشدية ثلاثة في هذه الفترة: الرشدية اللاتينية والرشدية النهضوية والرشدية اليهودية. وكانت الرشدية بكل تياراتها محل اهتمام السلطات الكنسية التي ظلت تلاحق الرشديين وأفكارهم بالحظر والإدانة طوال أربعة قرون. وفي مقابل هذا الحضور الطاغي للفكر الرشدي في تلك القرون، فإن فلاسفة أوروبا المحدثين، ابتداءً من القرن السابع عشر، كانوا صامتين تماماً إزاء ابن رشد، وكأنه اختفى فجأة من الأفق الفكري الأوروبي. فهل كفت الفلسفة الرشدية عن الحضور والتأثير في أوروبا ابتداءً من القرن السابع عشر؟ تثبت هذه الدراسة أن ابن رشد ظل مؤثراً وبصورة عميقة في فلاسفة أوروبا المحدثين، سواء كان هذا الأثر بالإيجاب عن طريق اتخاذ الأفكار الرشدية صوراً جديدة لدى بعض الفلاسفة، أهمهم سبينوزا وسليمان ميمون وفويرباخ، أو بالسلب عن طريق مقاومة البعض الآخر للأفكار الرشدية وإن على نحو غير صريح يسكت عن ذكر ابن رشد نفسه، كما في حالة ديكارت، أو بمحاولة تجاوز الأفكار الرشدية وإشكالياتها دون التصريح بمصدرها الرشدي كما في حالة كانط. تدخل هذه الدراسة في مقارنات بين ابن رشد من جهة وفلاسفة أوروبا من جهة أخرى، لتوضح أن الفلسفة الأوروبية الحديثة لم تتجاوز أفق الرشدية، بل ظلت تتعامل مع هذا الأفق وإن لم تصرح به.

Este escrito muestra el importante lugar que tiene la felicidad
en el pensamiento de Emmanuel Kant y aclara que la
felicidad y la virtud constituyen el bien supremo, pues todo
hombre busca ser feliz a la vez que moralmente bueno. Por
otro lado, este escrito explica las razones por las cuales la felicidad
no es el fundamento de la moral y sin embargo debe
acompañar toda acción moral, pues lo importante es obrar
con placer, y no por placer.

In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason we find the idea that providing a causal explanation for a certain natural phenomenon is necessarily equivalent with providing a sufficient reason for the occurrence of that phenomenon. In this work, I examine, first, this fundamental equivalence between the principle of causality and the principle of sufficient reason as it is presented in the “Second Analogy of Experience” and second, I explore this equivalence in contrast with other forms of explanations, in the light of the distinction between mechanical causality and teleological causality, as presented in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. I aim to show, contrary to what Béatrice Longuenesse² has argued, that the principle of sufficient reason, in the context of scientific explanation of nature, cannot be either identified with or otherwise reduced to the principle of causality in “Second Analogy of Experience”.

Este artículo muestra los principios precríticos de la belleza en el pensamiento
de Kant para comprender su principal contribución a la teoría de lo bello. Estos
principios no se encuentran en las Observaciones sobre el sentimiento de lo bello
y lo sublime, sino en la primera y segunda críticas, que ubican el sentimiento de
placer y dolor en la facultad de la sensación y no la del Juicio, y en la Historia Natural
y teoría de los cielos que considera la belleza como la perfección del objeto
dado por una inteligencia suprema, y no por una unidad ideal proporcionada por
el juicio reflexivo.

Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.

Este artigo problematiza o uso feito por Kant da noção de força e de alguns termos à ela relacionadas (como, por exemplo, força fundamental, força formadora, força vital) bem como o uso do termo em questão em relação a alguns outros, como faculdade e capacidade. Essa discussão inicia-se com um problema de compreensão do sentido do termo força, em uma abordagem relacionada à vida derivada, amplia-se para uma fusão de campos semânticos que mantém como pano de fundo a questão da possibilidade de uma força fundamental, e encerra-se considerando a impossibilidade de qualificar qual seria essa força fundamental que a razão nos impele a considerar enquanto hipótese.