John Locke's Political Philosophy

In his early work on Locke, C.B. Macpherson diagnosed “a contradiction in Locke’s account of the state of nature.”  Macpherson later relied on this diagnosis to show that Locke’s arguments against Hobbes fail. This paper reconstructs Macpherson’s analysis of Locke’s argument from sections 135 and 137 of Second Treatise of Civil Government.  The paper then challenges Macpherson’s interpretation of Locke’s arguments from those sections. In particular, the paper argues that Macpherson’s objections to not defeat Locke’s arguments because Macpherson misinterprets the nature of the arguments Locke is offering. Thus, on the one hand, Macpherson ignores the strictly moral nature of Locke’s argument from §135. On the other hand, Macpherson ignores the nature of the prudential arguments Locke offers in §137. The primary source of this latter confusion is that Macpherson ignores the fact that Locke offers not just one, but three, arguments in section §137.  The upshot is that the ambiguity in Locke’s characterization of the state of nature does not do in his arguments against Hobbes; or if it does, it does not do so for the reasons Macpherson suggests.

Cet article est la deuxième partie d'un travail consacré aux Considerations de Locke. L’objet de cette deuxième partie est de restituer le sens global des ‘Considerations’  pour en comprendre la portée politique et morale. On prendra donc appui sur nos premiers résultats concernant sa théorie de l’intérêt, et on cherchera à montrer comment ces ‘Considerations’ ont su mobiliser ces résultats pour parvenir à leur proposition d’action sur la régulation financière. Il s’agira donc de retracer l’argumentation principale de ce texte, on pourrait presque dire : le message que Locke a voulu délivrer.  Et l'on mettra l'accent sur trois points : l'importance de l'épargne financière, l'analyse de la spéculation bancaire et celle de la régulation voulue par Locke. Cet article sera suivi d'un quatrieme consacré à la théorie de la monnaie

I distinguish and reconstruct two distinct branches of Locke’s political legacy as it developed from the time of his death in 1704 through the late 19th century. First, there is the liberal-republican constitutionalism branch, which was concerned with the elaboration and defense of Lockean conceptions of consent, rule of law, and constitutional political power, and which flourished during the 18th century. Second, there is the natural property rights branch. In a remarkable series of texts spanning most of the 19th century, radical social theorists working in both the United Kingdom and the United States developed the Lockean idea of property rights through labor in two quite distinct directions, one libertarian and one egalitarian. Along the way, they influenced Marx and set the stage for 21st century libertarianism both left and right.

Atribuindo a condição de propriedade ao trabalho a teoria de Locke dissimula a desigualdade através da “igualdade de relações” de indivíduos abstratos em um sistema jurídico-político que encerra uma liberdade proporcional ao status dos indivíduos como agentes econômicos, conforme assinala a pesquisa que, dessa forma, defende que, se cabe à sociedade política a delimitação das obrigações da lei natural, o que se impõe ao direito de propriedade individual é a restrição do seu exercício à necessidade, tendo em vista as múltiplas formas que pode assumir como mercadoria nas relações de troca, que implicam a força de trabalho como objeto de troca e consumo em uma formação econômico-social que torna o homem uma simples mercadoria.

Nesta perspectiva, baseado na teoria de Rousseau, que confere à Vontade Geral a condição para o exercício da soberania popular, o trabalho em questão, a partir da concepção dialético-materialista da universalidade, detém-se em seu processo de formação que, inter-relacionando deliberação e decisão, tende à correspondência entre fato e direito, convergindo para assinalar a sua capacidade de atribuir ao sistema de direitos e deveres a necessária conformidade envolvendo a realidade histórico-cultural e econômico-social concreta. Dessa forma, consistindo em um processo ético-jurídico de deliberação coletiva, o que se impõe à manifestação da Vontade Geral é um movimento dinâmico-dialético que demanda uma formação econômico-social baseada no interesse comum, convergindo para uma forma de autodeterminação que guarda possibilidade de promover a superação da alienação das capacidades humanas no contexto das relações socioprodutivas, a saber, a autogestão. Tal experiência social de autodeterminação coletiva envolve tanto a esfera política quanto o âmbito econômico (trabalho) e encerra a noção que implica desde a igualdade substancial (concreta) até a efetiva participação política, sobrepondo-se ao viés mercadológico da organização econômico-social vigente e à estrutura burocrática corporificada pelo Estado no sistema capitalista.

Se Hobbes elabora um hipotético estado de natureza que, encerrando uma situação na qual “o homem é um lobo para o outro homem” (homo homini lupus) em um contexto que envolve “a guerra de todos contra todos” (bellum omnium contra omnes), converge para a necessidade acerca do estabelecimento da paz como condição sine qua non para a conservação da vida, o que impõe a fundação do Estado e da sociedade civil por intermédio do contrato que demanda a renúncia dos direitos ilimitados dos indivíduos e instaura a autoridade política, o poder absoluto e a soberania estatal, Locke atribui ao estado de natureza a condição de uma realidade histórica concreta caracterizada pela perfeita igualdade e absoluta liberdade em uma construção que, baseada na lei natural, implica a transição para o estado civil através do contrato que funda a sociedade política como um processo que tende a assegurar os direitos naturais dos indivíduos, à medida que traz como fundamento da instituição do poder a propriedade, ou seja, a vida, a liberdade e os bens dos cidadãos, característica do individualismo moderno e do liberalismo político. Dessa forma, se o contrato burguês não encerra qualquer tipo de “alienação” propriamente dita, caracterizando-se, em suma, pela abdicação de um direito infinito que, contudo, não se impõe senão como teórico, convergindo para assegurar, em compensação, direitos “reais”, à medida que é para si mesmo, para o próprio lucro, que se contrata, o contrato de Rousseau, que se contrapõe à referida perspectiva, consiste em uma troca que implica não menos do que o homem, sobrepondo-se o cidadão ao indivíduo no processo de constituição do social que determina o pacto que, convergindo para a antinomia da relação envolvendo liberdade e autoridade, requer a “alienação verdadeira” dos indivíduos em face da soberania popular e resulta na constituição do povo soberano, única fonte legítima do poder e seu único detentor, e na instituição da Vontade Geral como condição para o seu exercício.

L’article que l’on va lire fait partie d’un dossier de 5 articles concernant la pensée politique et économique de Locke, et qui vise à répondre au débat actuel concernant sa théorie de la propriété. Ce débat est un authentique débat de déconstruction. Il se caractérise par une extrême dispersion des interprétations, mais qui toutes – quelque soit leur intérêt - sont en contradiction manifeste avec le texte de Locke.
Cela ne veut pas dire que ce débat soit illégitime. Il est effectif qu’il y a un problème de compréhension de cette théorie. Il n’est pas vrai notamment que Locke ait voulu y fonder un droit institutionnel à la propriété. Et la question de Kendall est toujours pendante : what Locke really said ?

L’article que l’on va lire fait partie d’un dossier de 5 articles concernant la pensée politique et économique de Locke, et qui vise à répondre au débat actuel concernant sa théorie de la propriété. Ce débat est un authentique débat de déconstruction. Il se caractérise par une extrême dispersion des interprétations, mais qui toutes – quelque soit leur intérêt - sont en contradiction manifeste avec le texte de Locke.
Cela ne veut pas dire que ce débat soit illégitime. Il est effectif qu’il y a un problème de compréhension de cette théorie. Il n’est pas vrai notamment que Locke ait voulu y fonder un droit institutionnel à la propriété. Et la question de Kendall est toujours pendante : what Locke really said ?

In the following, I outline important developments in the history of dominium as it culminated, in conjunction with the rise of modern sovereignty, in the 17th century conception of property. This account involves a separation of ius (right) from dominium, which recaptures the spatial dimensions of rule inherent in the latter, and provides a novel perspective from which to revisit the most important property-based defense of English colonialism, namely John Locke’s Two Treatise of Government. We find that Locke’s critique of and subsequent justification for private property constituted more than a radicalization of the theories of his 17th century Protestant contemporaries, Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, or his 16th century Catholic predecessors, such as Francisco de Vitoria, supplementing their occupatio justification of appropriation with a theory of agrarian improvement. It was also a catalyst for the globalization of an absolutist proprietary dominium, which masked the spatiality of its rule while simultaneously justifying private wars to protect its sovereign title. Locke’s support for colonialism was grounded in an ingeniously subtle negation of Amerindian political and proprietary dominium, which opened up the “vacant places of America” to European rule. The result, both in
Locke’s theory and in colonial practice, was the most explicit division of territorial sovereignty to date, moving well beyond that found in Hugo Grotius’ influential De jure belli ac pacis (1625), and pregnant with revolutionary implications.

This paper revisits the admixture theory, one major legal philosophical argument for private property. It discusses its original version in John Locke's Second Treatise and contemporary restatements by Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard.
The admixture theory postulates legitimate ownership of one’s labour and, accordingly, legitimate ownership of objects with which one has mixed it. Rooted in the natural rights tradition, it defends the institution of private property, a set of very extensive property rights for land owners.
This paper reveals substantialistic, idealistic and teleological foundations of the admixture theory and discusses their problems. A categorical mistake at the heart of the argument concerning the difference of the substances of labour and land is analyzed. Historical queries with the Lockean proviso that „enough and as good” must be left in common for others in the process of appropriation, and contemporary contributions in this field by Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard are discussed.
Altogether, internal frictions of the admixture theory and problems with the historical breach of its constraints on appropriation are quite substantial. In conclusion, the admixture theory fails to justify the institution of private property in land.

The modern Western philosophical concept of toleration is not always easily translated into other philosophical traditions, but this book opens a dialogue between various traditions of thought to explore precisely the ways in which overlap and distinctions exist. What emerges is the existence of a family of resemblances in approaches to religious and cultural diversity from a program of pragmatic noninterference in the Ottoman Empire to deeper notions of acceptance and inclusiveness amongst the Newar People in the Kathmandu Valley. The development of an Islamic ethic of tolerance, the Daoist idea of allinclusiveness, and Confucian ideas of broad-mindedness, respect, and coexistence to the idea of ‘the one in the many’ in Hindu thought are examined along with sources for intolerance, tolerance, and toleration in Pali Buddhism, early modern Japan, and contemporary India.

Several passages in John Locke’s Letters for Toleration suggest he was favourable to an enforcement of the moral code by magistrates. According to John Marshall, Locke was not sympathetic towards moral coercion when he wrote An Essay concerning Toleration (1667), given his insistence on the limits of civil power ; his views in this regard changed in the nineties, because of his adhesion to the ideals of the Movement for the Reformation of Manners. However, there is no clear evidence that Locke was contrary to an enforcement of morality by magistrates before he wrote the Letters ; more importantly, some manuscript notes which he penned in 1681 reveal that, already in those years, his ideas on morality had undergone an important change which legitimated magisterial action against immorality. The private, super-political nature conferred on the concern for virtue and vice in An Essay concerning Toleration had begun to be obscured in Locke’s writings by his identifying virtue with social decorum, a public concern.

The “grandfather” of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”), Gustave Moynier, was not a utopian idealist. Instead, Moynier recognized the demand of realpolitiki during the Geneva International Conference of 1863, and, as a result, introduced the first international humanitarian framework for a permanent international tribunal. However, due to foregone philosophic guidance in favor of politics and “State sovereignty,” the proposal was rejected and was ultimately not revived again until the ad hoc tribunals following World War I and World War II. Unfortunately, now that the International Criminal Court has been formed, history appears to be repeating itself as politics and “State sovereignty” concerns in the form of “personal jurisdiction” and “territorial jurisdiction” limitations have undermined the Court’s ultimate Lockean philosophical goal – “all men [must] be held back from invading the rights of others and harming one another [ ] so that . . . the peace and preservation of all mankind may be obeyed. Specifically, the greatest jurisdictional threat to this guiding philosophy is the Court’s recognition of the Doctrine of Complementarity Jurisdiction (“Doctrine”). In practice, the “Doctrine,” in conjunction with other jurisdictional exceptions, permits State-level criminal justice systems (deemed “willing and able”) to investigate and/or prosecute a case in place of the ICC. Thus, instead of a single body adjudicating violations of international humanitarian law, the Rome Statute of the ICC allows for 196 possible adjudicating authorities. While this provision retains the Hobbesian tradition of absolute “State sovereignty,” the “Doctrine” violates the Lockean principle requiring “a common judge” (one authority) for all adjudications. As a result of the Court’s deviation from its Lockean foundations, the ICC (fully adjudicating only eight defendants since 2002) is a hostage to its own, weak statutory foundation. Thus, the court is at a functional and philosophical cross-roads, in which it may follow one of two paths: (1) the Court may continue its divesture of power and authority, thereby supporting a return to a post-Moynier ad hoc tribunal system; or (2) the Court may embrace the argument that “a common judge” (authority) is necessary to prevent a return to a “state of war” at the expense of “State sovereignty” based upon Locke’s overriding principle “when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred.”

The “grandfather” of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”), Gustave Moynier, was not a utopian idealist. Instead, Moynier recognized the demand of realpolitiki during the Geneva International Conference of 1863, and, as a result, introduced the first international humanitarian framework for a permanent international tribunal. However, due to foregone philosophic guidance in favor of politics and “State sovereignty,” the proposal was rejected and was ultimately not revived again until the ad hoc tribunals following World War I and World War II.

Unfortunately, now that the International Criminal Court has been formed, history appears to be repeating itself as politics and “State sovereignty” concerns in the form of “personal jurisdiction” and “territorial jurisdiction” limitations have undermined the Court’s ultimate Lockean philosophical goal – “all men [must] be held back from invading the rights of others and harming one another [ ] so that . . . the peace and preservation of all mankind may be obeyed. Specifically, the greatest jurisdictional threat to this guiding philosophy is the Court’s recognition of the Doctrine of Complementarity Jurisdiction (“Doctrine”).

In practice, the “Doctrine,” in conjunction with other jurisdictional exceptions, permits State-level criminal justice systems (deemed “willing and able”) to investigate and/or prosecute a case in place of the ICC. Thus, instead of a single body adjudicating violations of international humanitarian law, the Rome Statute of the ICC allows for 196 possible adjudicating authorities. While this provision retains the Hobbesian tradition of absolute “State sovereignty,” the “Doctrine” violates the Lockean principle requiring “a common judge” (one authority) for all adjudications.

As a result of the Court’s deviation from its Lockean foundations, the ICC (fully adjudicating only eight defendants since 2002) is a hostage to its own, weak statutory foundation. Thus, the court is at a functional and philosophical cross-roads, in which it may follow one of two paths: (1) the Court may continue its divesture of power and authority, thereby supporting a return to a post-Moynier ad hoc tribunal system; or (2) the Court may embrace the argument that “a common
judge” (authority) is necessary to prevent a return to a “state of war” at the expense of “State sovereignty” based upon Locke’s overriding principle “when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred.”

In Locke’s Second Treatise of  Government: Book II (1690) and Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), both philosophers argued that humans are naturally free and equal; however, while Locke argued that human nature is brutal and must be bound by the law of nature, Rousseau stated that human nature is inherently good.

This paper aims to trace the origins of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the European integration process. It is a transcontinental journey that connects the French and the American revolution under the achievements and the principles of the Enlightenment. It is the history of contemporary Europe, from the French Revolution to the tragedy of World War II. In the process of European integration the institutions overlap, and find in the Council of Europe, an institution larger than the European Union, the moment in which these rights are codified. These principles, which are the basis of European values, have been embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights, one of the most advanced instruments on the protection of fundamental human rights.

Public debates in our societies are marked by appeals to tradition, religion and even manipulative uses of ‘post-truth’. This book argues that the antidote to such tendencies can only be public reasoning. We can find the resources to build what I call the public perspective if we make two commitments: to respect people as free autonomous agents and to endorse a shared ethics of beliefs. An ethics of belief is a set of epistemic and moral rules that inform the beliefs that we bring to the public forum and make possible discussion and confrontation on a terrain that is adequately public. The epistemological aspects cannot be severed from the political commitments that motivate public justification in the first place. An ethics of belief shields us against two temptations: on the one hand, to abandon reason and claim that all sorts of beliefs and opinion should weigh into public reasoning; or, on the other, to appeal to objective reasons only, independently of whether people recognise them as such or not.