Episodic Future Thinking

This paper will synthesize the existing literature on episodic memory, theory of mind, and temporal representation, in the fields of philosophy of mind, neuroscience, ethology, and human developmental and evolutionary psychology. The conceptual structures and instantiations of the three faculties will be analyzed, showing that they are closely interconnected, and giving empirically supported distinctions between two forms of episodic memory, and two forms of theory of mind. The minimal requirements for the development of each form of both episodic memory and theory of mind will be determined. Delineating the conditions for the development of each form of both episodic memory and theory of mind will show that there is a dependency relationship necessitating a sequential and alternating development of the two forms of each faculty, specifically that prospective episodic memory can develop only following the advent of both retrospective episodic memory, and mind-reading, in that order, and that metacognition can only arise subsequent to prospective episodic memory. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the relationship between episodic memory, metacognition, and temporal representation, showing that temporal representation is fundamentally conditioned by the structure of episodic memory and theory of mind.

Remembering and imagining are intricately related, particularly in imagining the future: episodic future thinking. It is proposed that remembering the recent past and imagining the near future take place in what we term the remembering–imagining system. The remembering–imagining system renders recently formed episodic memories and episodic imagined near-future events highly accessible. We suggest that this serves the purpose of integrating past, current, and future goal-related activities. When the remembering–imagining system is compromised, following brain damage and in psychological illnesses, the future cannot be effectively imagined and episodic future thinking may become dominated by dysfunctional images of the future.

Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability to remember past events and to anticipate or imagine events in the future. MTT globally serves to optimize decision-making processes, improve problem-solving capabilities and prepare for future needs. MTT is also essential in providing our concept of self, which includes knowledge of our personality, our strengths and weaknesses, as well as our preferences and aversions. We will give an overview in which ways the capacity of animals to perform MTT is different from humans. Based on the existing literature, we conclude that MTT might represent a quantitative rather than qualitative entity with a continuum of MTT capacities in both humans and nonhuman animals. Given its high complexity, MTT requires a large processing capacity in order to integrate multimodal stimuli during the reconstruction of past and/or future events. We suggest that these operations depend on a highly specialized working memory subsystem, 'the MTT platform', which might represent a necessary additional component in the multi-component working memory model by Alan Baddeley.

Decisions often involve outcomes that will not materialise until later, and choices between immediate gratification and future consequences are thought to be important for human health and welfare. Combined human and animal research has identified impulsive intertemporal choice as an important factor in drug-taking and pathological gambling. In this paper, we give an overview of recent research into intertemporal choice in non-human animals, and argue that this work could offer insight into human behaviour through the development of animal models. As an example, we discuss the role of future-thinking in intertemporal choice, and review the case for the Western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica) as an animal model of such prospective cognition. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Tribute to Tom Zentall.

Continuity of hippocampal function in mammals has been cited as indicative of continuity in some of the processes underpinning mental time travel. The main evidence presented for this continuity is the activity of rat hippocampal place cells outside of the spatial context to which they correspond. Research into food-caching in corvids has revealed memory and planning abilities that resemble some aspects of human mental time travel. While these abilities appear to have evolved independently of mental time travel in humans, dependence on the hippocampus may have constrained the evolution of both. Central to this claim is the substantial evidence that the hippocampus supports similar spatial cognition in both mammals and birds, and the importance of the hippocampus in food-caching.

Human experience takes place in the line of mental time (MT) created through 'self-projection' of oneself to different time-points in the past or future. Here we manipulated self-projection in MT not only with respect to one's life events but also with respect to one's faces from different past and future time-points. Behavioural and event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging activity showed three independent effects characterized by (i) similarity between past recollection and future imagination, (ii) facilitation of judgements related to the future as compared with the past, and (iii) facilitation of judgements related to time-points distant from the present. These effects were found with respect to faces and events, and also suggest that brain mechanisms of MT are independent of whether actual life episodes have to be re-experienced or pre-experienced, recruiting a common cerebral network including the anteromedial temporal, posterior parietal, inferior frontal, temporo-parietal and insular cortices. These behavioural and neural data suggest that self-projection in time is a fundamental aspect of MT, relying on neural structures encoding memory, mental imagery and self.

Our overriding hypothesis was that future thinking would be linked with goals to a greater extent than memories; conceptualising goals as current concerns (i.e., uncompleted personal goals; Klinger, 1975). We also hypothesised that current concern-related events would differ from non-current concern-related events on a set of phenomenological characteristics. We report novel data from a study examining involuntary and voluntary mental time travel using an adapted laboratory paradigm. Specifically, after autobiographical memories or future thoughts were elicited (between participants) in an involuntary and voluntary retrieval mode (within participants), participants self-generated five current concerns and decided whether each event was relevant or not to their current concerns. Consistent with our hypothesis, compared with memories, a larger percentage of involuntary and voluntary future thoughts reflected current concerns. Furthermore, events related to current concerns differed from non-concern-related events on a range of cognitive, representational and affective phenomenological measures. These effects were consistent across temporal direction. In general, our results agree with the proposition that involuntary and voluntary future thinking is important for goal-directed cognition and behaviour.

Published in the Springer Journal Neuroethics
Available here: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-015-9243-6?wt_mc=internal.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst

Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel--episodic memory and episodic foresight.  Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons.  In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy’s view.  Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, indeed appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them.  I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument.  I use an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.

Decisions often involve outcomes that will not materialise until later, and choices between immediate gratification and future consequences are thought to be important for human health and welfare. Combined human and animal research has identified impulsive intertemporal choice as an important factor in drug-taking and pathological gambling. In this paper, we give an overview of recent research into intertemporal choice in non-human animals, and argue that this work could offer insight into human behaviour through the development of animal models. As an example, we discuss the role of future-thinking in intertemporal choice, and review the case for the Western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica) as an animal model of such prospective cognition.