Emotions

When assessing pediatric dysphonia, there are different approaches that can be taken in gathering a subjective view of the impact voice difficulties have on a child. Most valid questionnaires require parent-proxy reporting, although it has become increasingly important to gather the views of children themselves. This study reports a pilot study of an adaptation to the Pediatric Voice-Related Quality of Life Questionnaire (PVRQoL). A total of 24 parent and child dyads were recruited from a tertiary pediatric voice clinic. Children were aged between 3 years and 8 months and 15 years and 3 months. Parents completed the existing PVRQoL questionnaire, whereas their children were given a child-adapted version. Follow-up completion of the child questionnaire was conducted after a 2-week period. There was a good correlation between the two time periods when children completed the adapted PVRQoL and also between parent and child responses. Of particular interest, however, was the different ratings on individual items by parents and their children with parents tending to overestimate the extent to which their children may be emotionally affected by their voice disorder. This study shows that children have much to tell about their own voice-related quality of life, so our conclusion is that they should also be self-assessed. The PVRQoL when adapted for use with children offers an additional insight that can be gathered in a relatively short timeframe and be considered with other assessments of vocal function.

With increasing knowledge of chronic pain, clinicians have attempted to assess chronic pain patients with lengthy assessment tools. To describe the functional and emotional status of patients presenting to a tertiary care pain clinic; to assess the reliability and validity of a diagnostic classification system for chronic pain patients modelled after the Multidimensional Pain Inventory; to provide psychometric data on a modified Comprehensive Pain Evaluation Questionnaire (CPEQ); and to evaluate the relationship between the modified CPEQ construct scores and clusters with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition - Text Revision Pain Disorder diagnoses. Data on 300 new patients over the course of nine months were collected using standardized assessment procedures plus a modified CPEQ at the Comprehensive Pain Program, Toronto Western Hospital, Toronto, Ontario. Cluster analysis of the modified CPEQ revealed three patient profiles, labelled Adaptive Copers, Dysfunctional, and...

In Nafs, IV, 4 Avicenna maintains that fear, sadness, grief, and the like are accidents belonging primarily to the soul (in particular to the branches of the desiderative faculty, i.e. the irascible and the concupiscible faculty) insofar as it is in the body, and only derivatively to the body, on which they can act by changing its temperament. However, their cause is to be searched for in the perceptive faculties and in their participation in the activities of the branches of the desiderative faculty. Moreover, at the end of Nafs, IV, 4 by referring to his medical books Avicenna adds that different bodily temperaments dispose individuals towards these different accidents. By medical books Avicenna refers primarily to his Maqāla fī l-adwiya al-qalbiyya, where the psychological account of these accidents is supplemented by physiological explanations (see Alpina 2017): they are received in the cardiac pneuma in accordance with the appropriate bodily temperament, and the cause of individual dispositions towards them are the qualities (thickness, fluidity, opacity, clarity) of the cardiac pneuma, which in turn can be modified by external factors.
If having the perceptive faculties and the heart (and the cardiac pneuma inhering in it) is a sufficient condition for sharing in these accidents, they have to be shared by all animals, not only by human beings. However, in Nafs as well as in the Adwiya Qalbiyya Avicenna seems to be hesitant to attribute these accidents to all animals. The aim of this paper is shedding more light on Avicenna’s position concerning the possibility that animals feel emotions by including in the aforementioned dossier of texts Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, XIII, 3 (on the anatomy of the heart), and VIII, 1-4 (on animals’ characters and activities).

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore.

This article seeks to shed light on the literary agenda of Odo of Deuil, author of the most detailed Latin account of the Levantine branch of the Second Crusade. It calls for scholars to reinstate Odo’s vilification of the Byzantines as a primary, rather than secondary, objective and proposes a new explanation for his stringent anti-Greek tone. It first extends our knowledge of Odo’s engagement with the historiographical tradition of the First Crusade, before drawing attention to a hitherto unappreciated layer in his vilification of the Byzantines: his use of emotional language.

Humans are endowed with a natural sense of fairness that permeates social perceptions and interactions. This moral stance is so ubiquitous that we may not notice it as a fundamental component of daily decision making and in the workings of many legal, political, and social systems. Emotion plays a pivotal role in moral experience by assigning human values to events, objects, and actions. Although the brain correlates of basic emotions have been explored, the neural organization of "moral emotions" in the human brain remains poorly understood. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a passive visual task, we show that both basic and moral emotions activate the amygdala, thalamus, and upper midbrain. The orbital and medial prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus are also recruited by viewing scenes evocative of moral emotions. Our results indicate that the orbital and medial sectors of the prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus region, which ar...

Cognitive models predict that vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is due to a bias to blame oneself for failure in a global way resulting in excessive self-blaming emotions, decreased self-worth, hopelessness and depressed mood. Clinical studies comparing the consistency and coherence of these symptoms in order to probe the predictions of the model are lacking. 132 patients with remitted MDD and no relevant lifetime co-morbid axis-I disorders were assessed using a phenomenological psychopathology-based interview (AMDP) including novel items to assess moral emotions (n=94 patients) and the structured clinical interview-I for DSM-IV-TR. Cluster analysis was employed to identify symptom coherence for the most severe episode. Feelings of inadequacy, depressed mood, and hopelessness emerged as the most closely co-occurring and consistent symptoms (≥90% of patients). Self-blaming emotions occurred in most patients (>80%) with self-disgust/contempt being more frequent than guilt, followed by shame. Anger or disgust towards others was experienced by only 26% of patients. 85% of patients reported feelings of inadequacy and self-blaming emotions as the most bothering symptoms compared with 10% being more distressed by negative emotions towards others. Symptom assessment was retrospective, but this is unlikely to have biased patients towards particular emotions relative to others. As predicted, feelings of inadequacy and hopelessness were part of the core depressive syndrome, closely co-occurring with depressed mood. Self-blaming emotions were highly frequent and bothering but not restricted to guilt. This calls for a refined assessment of self-blaming emotions to improve the diagnosis and stratification of MDD.

The importance of differentiating between social concepts when appraising actions (e.g., understanding behavior as critical vs. fault-finding) and its contribution to vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is unknown. We predicted poor integration of differentiated conceptual knowledge when people with MDD appraise their social actions, contributing to their tendency to grossly overgeneralize self-blame (e.g., "I am unlikable rather than critical"). To test this hypothesis, we used a neuropsychological test measuring social conceptual differentiation and its relationship with emotional biases in a remitted MDD and a control group. During fMRI, guilt- and indignation-evoking sentences were presented. As predicted, conceptual overgeneralization was associated with increased emotional intensity when appraising social actions. Interdependence of conceptual overgeneralization and negative emotional biases was stronger in MDD (reproducible in the subgroup without medication) and was associated with overgeneralized self-blame. This high conceptual-emotional interdependence was associated with functional disconnection between the right superior anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) as well as a septal region across groups when experiencing guilt (SPM8). Strong coupling of conceptual information (ATL) with information about the context of actions and emotions (frontal-subcortical regions) is thus associated with appraisal being less dependent on conceptual overgeneralization, thereby protecting against excessive self-blame.

Modern neuroscience is beginning to substantiate Darwin's notion that the roots of human morality lie in social instincts, present in several species. The role of primitive motivational-emotional systems in human morality still remains under-recognized, however. Based on recent experimental evidence and classic neuroanatomical data, we here portray a view of how "ancient" limbic-neurohumoral systems of social attachment and aversion are crucially involved in human moral behaviors, including altruism, empathic concern and aggression. Rather than being a mere evolutionary remnant of our ancestors, such limbic-neurohumoral systems are tightly integrated with cortical mechanisms to enable complex moral sentiments and values, which powerfully influence our choices in socio-cultural settings. Exploring the underlying mechanisms of human social attachment and aversion will provide new insights and foster novel experimental paradigms for the study of moral cognition and behavior.

One widespread view holds that vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is linked to overall increases in negative emotionality. In contrast, cognitive attribution theories emphasize the importance of blaming oneself rather than others for negative events. Thus far, the contrasting predictions of these models have not been directly compared. Following the attributional perspective, we tested the hypothesis that people with remitted MDD show no overall bias towards negative emotions, but a selective bias towards self-blaming emotions relative to those emotions associated with blaming others. We compared a remitted MDD and a control group on a novel experimental test that allowed us to directly compare proneness to specific emotions associated with different types of self-blame (guilt, shame, self-contempt/disgust) and blame of others (other-indignation/anger, other-contempt/disgust) whilst controlling for negative valence and medication status, and excluding comorbidity. In agreement with our hypothesis, individuals with remitted MDD exhibited an increased self-contempt bias (difference between contempt/disgust towards self and others) but no increased proneness to any other negative emotion or overall increases in perceived negative valence of stimuli. Moreover, the remitted MDD group exhibited reduced contempt/disgust towards others. Our results corroborate the prediction that vulnerability to MDD is associated with an imbalance of specific self- and other-blaming emotions rather than a general increase in negative emotions. Based on the composition of our sample, we speculate that self-contempt bias may be particularly characteristic of melancholic MDD subtypes and could be useful for stratification of depression in the future.

Morality has been at the center of informal talks and metaphysical discussions since the beginning of history. Recently, converging lines of evidence from evolutionary biology, neuroscience and experimental psychology have shown that morality is grounded in the brain. This article reviews the main lines of investigation indicating that moral behavior is a product of evolutionary pressures that shaped the neurobehavioral processes related to the selective perception of social cues, the experience of moral emotions and the adaptation of behavioral responses to the social milieu. These processes draw upon specific cortical-subcortical loops that organize social cognition, emotion and motivation into uniquely human forms of experience and behavior. We put forth a model of brain-behavior relationships underlying moral reasoning and emotion that accommodates the impairments of moral behavior observed in neuropsychiatric disorders. This model provides a framework for empirical testing with current methods of neurobehavioral analysis.

One widespread view holds that vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is linked to overall increases in negative emotionality. In contrast, cognitive attribution theories emphasize the importance of blaming oneself rather than others for negative events. Thus far, the contrasting predictions of these models have not been directly compared. Following the attributional perspective, we tested the hypothesis that people with remitted MDD show no overall bias towards negative emotions, but a selective bias towards self-blaming emotions relative to those emotions associated with blaming others. We compared a remitted MDD and a control group on a novel experimental test that allowed us to directly compare proneness to specific emotions associated with different types of self-blame (guilt, shame, self-contempt/disgust) and blame of others (other-indignation/anger, other-contempt/disgust) whilst controlling for negative valence and medication status, and excluding comorbidity. In agreement with our hypothesis, individuals with remitted MDD exhibited an increased self-contempt bias (difference between contempt/disgust towards self and others) but no increased proneness to any other negative emotion or overall increases in perceived negative valence of stimuli. Moreover, the remitted MDD group exhibited reduced contempt/disgust towards others. Our results corroborate the prediction that vulnerability to MDD is associated with an imbalance of specific self- and other-blaming emotions rather than a general increase in negative emotions. Based on the composition of our sample, we speculate that self-contempt bias may be particularly characteristic of melancholic MDD subtypes and could be useful for stratification of depression in the future.

OBJECTIVE: To study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. METHOD: Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either "right" or "wrong". Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content…

Clinical psychopathology has largely ignored the developments in the field of social neuroscience. The so-called moral emotions are a group of affective experiences thought to promote cooperation, group cohesion, and reorganization. In this review, we: (i) briefly describe a provisional taxonomy of a limited set of moral emotions and their neural underpinnings; and (ii) discuss how disgust, guilt, anger/indignation, and shame/embarrassment can be conceptualized as key affective experiences in different neuropsychiatric disorders. Based on a concise review of the literature linking moral emotions, psychopathology, and neuropsychiatry, we have devised a simple and preliminary scheme where we conjecture how specific moral emotions can be implicated in some categories of DSM-5 diagnoses, potentially helping to bridge psychopathology and neurobiologically plausible variables, in line with the Research Domain Criteria initiative. We hope this stimulates new empirical work exploring how mo...