Emmanuel Kant

Il semble qu'une contradiction surgit quand on passe de la deuxième antinomie dialectique, exposée dans la Critique de la raison pure,  au quatrième théorème dynamique des Premiers principes métaphysiques de la science de la nature,  qui traitent, à des niveaux différents, de la connaissance sur la nature de la constitution de la matière. Ce travail propose une solution à ce problème, à partir de l'analyse des critères établis par la philosophie critique qui permettent de distinguer entre une affirmation scientifique et une affirmation métaphysique.

Forthcoming in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
The argument of this paper goes as follows: Beck claims that the only transcendental standpoint consists in a synthetic act whose articulation in judgments merely shows what can be produced and derived from the postulate: ‘represent originally’. My analysis of Beck’s arguments showed how he disregards Kant’s account of the distinctions and the interactions between reason’s faculties, thus misunderstanding the normative aspect of Judgment, regarding its elements (concepts and intuitions) as well as regarding its legislation for experience (the transcendental principles). From Kant’s point of view, the main function of Judgment is that of bringing lawful unity into all synthesis, thus making every kind of experience possible. All of our legitimate cognitive, moral and aesthetical claims result from the application of rules and the determination of laws. And together they arise as a whole in the form of a system. While this topic cannot be developed completely on these pages, my very restricted concern is to suggest that the standpoint of Judgment is the only one we should consider when we demand, as Beck did, to have the last word on Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole. And indeed, the standpoint of Judgment alone allows us to give a general account for the systematical coexistence of all reason’s legislation in the domains of nature and freedom. For pure reason in its critical role is always committed to ground the legitimacy of its claims, and the capacity to judge is reason’s armed wing (or executive power) in the world of human experience.

A widespread view sees a great affinity between Kant's theory of matter in his 1756 Monadologia physica and Boscovich's dynamics. To claim that Boscovich influenced Kant's account, however, requires a European diffusion of Boscovich's 1745-1755 writings, and the label "the Kant-Boschovich shell atom theory" is justified on the basis of a common assumption of simple unextended  parts of compound bodies as centres of attractive and repulsive forces. The aim of this paper is to provide detailed evidence and analysis against both claims.

L'articolo intende fornire argomenti ed evidenze testuali contro l'opinione diffusa che vi sia molta affinità tra la concezione della materia nella Monadologia fisica (1756) di Kant e la dinamica di Boscovich. L’ipotesi di un’influenza delle tesi di Boscovich su Kant richiede una circolazione europea degli scritti boscovichiani del 1745-1755, mentre l’etichetta di una 'teoria Kant-Boscovich' viene giustificata sulla base di una comune assunzione di parti semplici inestese di corpi composti come centri di forze attrattive e repulsive. L'analisi mostra la rispettiva infondatezza e genericità di questi due aspetti.

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كان لابن رشد أثر بالغ وعميق في الفكر الأوروبي في أواخر العصور الوسطى وعصر  النهضة، وقد انتشرت الدراسات المتخصصة التي ترصد الحضور الرشدي في أوروبا بين القرنين الثالث عشر والسادس عشر؛ وبات مستقراً لدى الباحثين وجود تيارات رشدية ثلاثة في هذه الفترة: الرشدية اللاتينية والرشدية النهضوية والرشدية اليهودية. وكانت الرشدية بكل تياراتها محل اهتمام السلطات الكنسية التي ظلت تلاحق الرشديين وأفكارهم بالحظر والإدانة طوال أربعة قرون. وفي مقابل هذا الحضور الطاغي للفكر الرشدي في تلك القرون، فإن فلاسفة أوروبا المحدثين، ابتداءً من القرن السابع عشر، كانوا صامتين تماماً إزاء ابن رشد، وكأنه اختفى فجأة من الأفق الفكري الأوروبي. فهل كفت الفلسفة الرشدية عن الحضور والتأثير في أوروبا ابتداءً من القرن السابع عشر؟ تثبت هذه الدراسة أن ابن رشد ظل مؤثراً وبصورة عميقة في فلاسفة أوروبا المحدثين، سواء كان هذا الأثر بالإيجاب عن طريق اتخاذ الأفكار الرشدية صوراً جديدة لدى بعض الفلاسفة، أهمهم سبينوزا وسليمان ميمون وفويرباخ، أو بالسلب عن طريق مقاومة البعض الآخر للأفكار الرشدية وإن على نحو غير صريح يسكت عن ذكر ابن رشد نفسه، كما في حالة ديكارت، أو بمحاولة تجاوز الأفكار الرشدية وإشكالياتها دون التصريح بمصدرها الرشدي كما في حالة كانط. تدخل هذه الدراسة في مقارنات بين ابن رشد من جهة وفلاسفة أوروبا من جهة أخرى، لتوضح أن الفلسفة الأوروبية الحديثة لم تتجاوز أفق الرشدية، بل ظلت تتعامل مع هذا الأفق وإن لم تصرح به.

Tomando como eje vertebrador El meridiano de Paul Celan (Discurso pronunciado con motivo de la recepción del premio Georg Büchner), en el presente artículo se analiza la explícita incomodidad que muestra el poema “hoy” ante su alejamiento de la verdad y la vida (i.e. ante su condición de mera representación), atendiendo a la particular apuesta celaniana. Para ello se pone en diálogo la propuesta de Celan con el poema griego –concretamente de Píndaro– a la luz de la teoría hölderliniana de los géneros poéticos, así como con el filosofema kantiano de la figura bella tal como aparece en la Crítica del juicio. El dialogo abre la puerta a utilizar el concepto de figura bella kantiana como útil para una hermenéutica literaria, atendiendo a la concreta singularidad de cada poema –del mismo modo en que Píndaro atendía a la concreta singularidad de cada gesta–; y ello, no para recuperar para el poema o la figura bella en general su condición de ente –condición que tuvo en Grecia–, pero sí para encontrar en cada singular una concreta interpretación de lo devenido. Finalmente se vincula este carácter singular al que aspira el poema “hoy” con el eterno retorno nietzscheano.

In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason we find the idea that providing a causal explanation for a certain natural phenomenon is necessarily equivalent with providing a sufficient reason for the occurrence of that phenomenon. In this work, I examine, first, this fundamental equivalence between the principle of causality and the principle of sufficient reason as it is presented in the “Second Analogy of Experience” and second, I explore this equivalence in contrast with other forms of explanations, in the light of the distinction between mechanical causality and teleological causality, as presented in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. I aim to show, contrary to what Béatrice Longuenesse² has argued, that the principle of sufficient reason, in the context of scientific explanation of nature, cannot be either identified with or otherwise reduced to the principle of causality in “Second Analogy of Experience”.

Blind to the antepredicational notion of Being in the German Idealism, the recent debate over Hegel’s philosophy is carried out along the lines of the Kantian-epistemological vs. metaphysical interpretations of his position. Those belonging to the first camp understand Hegel as the figure who brought the Kantian epistemological turn in philosophy to its completion, leaving behind the questions of traditional metaphysics regarding the ultimate structure of reality that underlies the mere appearance and true nature of God, soul, and the world. The general line taken by these commentators is that although Hegel does not stop short of using the terminology of traditional metaphysics (such as God, infinite, absolute, etc.), the philosophically significant core of his position is independent of these archaic elements, which therefore can be lifted out of his overall corpus without sustaining any philosophically significant loss. Though not always explicitly acknowledged, these Hegel scholars stand in the long tradition of trying to rescue what is alive in Hegel from what is dead and ought to be left behind.

Hegel's Transcendental Ontology argues that Hegel presents the kernel of his metaphysics, in the Doctrine of the Concept, the final part of his Science of Logic. The Concept has three moments: universality (a process through which conceptual content of empirical determinations is formed), particularity (a holistic system of inferentially interrelated determinations comprising the totality of conceptual content), and individuality (the totality of objects conditioned by the shared system of empirical determinations that comprise the particular moment). The book details these three moments as well as the specific schema of their relation to one another. One of its aims is to offer a resolution to the recent debate between Kantian and traditional metaphysics-based readings of Hegel that has been dominating Hegel scholarship. The author claims that Hegel walked a narrow path between Scylla, of offering just another version of the traditional kind of metaphysics and Charybdis of abstaining from making any substantive claims about the nature of reality and focusing exclusively on the analysis of the faculty of understanding. Hegel left behind traditional approaches to the problems of metaphysics and, through a radical reformulation of the relationship between thought and being, proposed a new kind of metaphysics that is Kantian through and through.

The essential kernel of Hegel’s system worth rescuing, according to these commentators, is the Kantian transcendental project brought to its completion.

The central figure among the commentators who consider the completion of Kantian transcendental epistemology central to Hegel’s legacy is Robert Pippin, whose groundbreaking Hegel’s Idealism, published in 1989, set a new stage in Hegel scholarship. In the book, Pippin aims to demonstrate that the issues most important to Hegel’s project can be traced back to Kantian critical epistemology. Uncovering the Kantian origins of Hegel’s philosophy, according to Pippin and his followers, allows us to interpret Hegel as a post- Kantian epistemologist whose doctrine can be set free of any substantive ontological commitments. This approach invites us to read Hegel’s two central works, Logic and Phenomenology, as investigations within the normative authority of the pure concepts of understanding as the means by which reality can be cognized, and to do so without ascribing to Hegel any substantive commitments regarding the nature of this reality.

The image of Hegel that emerges as a result of this account is that of a transcendental epistemologist who replaces the Kantian formal account of the pure concepts of the understanding with a more robust exposition of the conceptual schemata as the medium of making sense of the world while putting aside questions of metaphysical nature.

In turn, the ultimate goal of this book is to present a detailed account of the key element of Hegel’s transcendental ontology. As I will argue, it is in the Doctrine of the Concept, and in its Syllogism section, where Hegel presents the most fundamental account of his conception of actuality.

Therefore, a close analysis of these parts of the Logic will be the central task undertaken in the book. As is, we shall see that the detailed presentation of the basic underpinnings of Hegel’s ontology will serve as the most conclusive confirmation of the above two points as well. It is only after a comprehensive account of Hegel’s vision of actuality is brought to light that we can fully appreciate both its indebtedness to Kant and the extent to which it departs from traditional metaphysical theories.

Contents:
List of Abbreviations vii
Introduction ix
1 Hegel’s Critique of Alternative Positions 1
2 Determinations of Reflection and Generation of Conceptual Content 31
3 Hegel’s Theory of the Concept and Its Kantian Origins 53
4 The Moments of the Concept 73
5 Failed Forms of Syllogistic Mediation 97
6 The Syllogism of Necessity 119
Bibliography 139
Index 145
About the Author 151

Kant's philosophy through three moments.

Kant'ın üç moment üzerinden felsefesi.

Bu çalışmada Kant’ın eleştirel felsefesinin üç uğrağı, başka deyişle Saf Aklın Eleştirisi (1781), Pratik Aklın Eleştirisi (1788) ve Yargıgücünün Eleştirisi (1790) adlı eserleri bağlamında ele alınmaya çalışılacaktır. 
Kant, 1770-1 kışı sırasında, Duyulur ve Anlaşılır Dünyanın Biçim ve İlkeleri adlı başlangıç söylemini kaleme aldıktan sonra, bu eseri bir kenara bırakmaya ve yeni bir çalışmaya girme düşüncesini geliştirir. Haziran 1771’de Öğrencisi Marcus Herz’e gönderdiği bir mektupta Duyarlığın ve Aklın Sınırları başlıklı yeni bir kitap üzerinde çalışmaya başladığını yazar. Söz konusu çalışmada duyulur dünyanın deneyiminden önce belirlenmiş olarak alınan temel ilke ve yasaların, beğeni teorisinde, metafizikte ve ahlâkta kapsanan konularla ilişkilerini ele almayı öneriyordu.  Kant, bu niyetinin sonucunda yaklaşık on yıllık bir sessizlikten sonra Saf Aklın Eleştirisi’ni ve diğer eleştirilerini kamuya sunar. Saf Akıl uğrağındaki eleştiriye geçebilmek için önce, Kant’ın bu çalışmanın içeriğini ve niyetini aktardığı Önsöz(ler)e  değinelim.

Este artigo problematiza o uso feito por Kant da noção de força e de alguns termos à ela relacionadas (como, por exemplo, força fundamental, força formadora, força vital) bem como o uso do termo em questão em relação a alguns outros, como faculdade e capacidade. Essa discussão inicia-se com um problema de compreensão do sentido do termo força, em uma abordagem relacionada à vida derivada, amplia-se para uma fusão de campos semânticos que mantém como pano de fundo a questão da possibilidade de uma força fundamental, e encerra-se considerando a impossibilidade de qualificar qual seria essa força fundamental que a razão nos impele a considerar enquanto hipótese.

In this paper I intend to show that it’s a serious mistake to construe the role of sensible representation in Kant’s work as a nonconceptual content (on the contemporary and technical sense of “content”) which, like a mental indexical, would refer to what appears in space and time in the so-called de re form. The interpretation I advance and further sup- port is this: without possessing a representational content, sensible representation must be understood as the basic epistemic relation between the subject and the physical entities in space and time she is acquainted with. Immediate reference of sensible intuition to their respective objects is to be understood as a form of knowledge by acquaintance <kennen>. I call my own interpretation relacionalism.

En este artículo, analizo los conceptos de analogía y símbolo en la Kritik der Urteilskraft, y el procedimiento analógico-simbólico que opera en la articulación entre naturaleza y libertad. Asimismo, analizo las implicaciones del símbolo como elemento sensibilizador de las ideas. En este sentido, el parágrafo 59 resulta decisivo para comprender los alcances del procedimiento analógico y su formulación bajo la figura de la belleza como símbolo de la moralidad. Para ello procedo de la siguiente manera: en primer lugar, analizo el concepto de analogía y su desarrollo en el período crítico de la filosofía de Kant; en segundo lugar, describo la noción de ejemplo que desarrolla en la “Analítica de lo bello”. Por último, me ocupo de la noción de símbolo, a partir de sus diferencias respecto al ejemplo, para reflexionar sobre la función de la analogía como símbolo de la moralidad.

"O que é racional é real e o que é real é racional." [Hegel]

Se o sentido e a finalidade da razão como instrumento de conhecimento convergem para a possibilidade de discernimento envolvendo o verdadeiro e o falso, o que se impõe ao seu exercício não é senão um método que consiste na aplicação de determinados preceitos destinados tanto ao entendimento como à vontade, cuja contradição caracteriza, segundo Descartes, o fundamento metafísico do erro. Descartes, conforme assinala o Capítulo 1, recorre a uma dúvida que, na investigação dos fundamentos absolutos, encerra uma radicalidade que tende a se deter nas fronteiras do próprio ato de duvidar, o que implica na experiência do Cogito e traz a prova ontológica da existência de Deus como única condição capaz de assegurar a realidade do mundo.
Sobrepondo uma concepção crítica envolvendo os fundamentos do saber às ontologias dogmáticas que se impõem ao trabalho que implica a apreensão das questões filosóficas, o projeto kantiano propõe o fim da filosofia como construção metafísica e a necessidade de se lhe atribuir uma tarefa teórica de caráter essencialmente genealógico e crítico, no sentido que encerra a legitimação do conhecimento racional através da análise das faculdades que se lhe estão atreladas, conforme assinala o Capítulo 2, que se detém nos direitos da razão cuja legitimidade a lógica da verdade reconhece e cuja ilegitimidade a lógica da aparência denuncia, convergindo para as fronteiras que encerram a possibilidade da construção do conhecimento científico, à medida que, tornando o entendimento o legislador universal da natureza e circunscrevendo a utilização das categorias aos limites da experiência possível, propõe as condições necessárias para fundá-lo sobre os juízos sintéticos a priori.
Assinalando o modo pelo qual a lógica acena com a emergência do Absoluto, o Capítulo 3 se detém na leitura hegeliana que, baseada no postulado que encerra uma equivalência entre o racional e o real, sublinha o movimento dialético que converge para a autoprodução da Razão, cujo processo traz o Estado como a sua realização através do Espírito objetivo, que implica uma relação antitética que envolve o Espírito subjetivo do homem e culmina na sua transposição em uma unidade substancial, a saber, o Espírito “em si” e “para si”, o Absoluto como Espírito, puro saber de si da Ideia, perfazendo uma perspectiva que caracteriza a História como a encarnação do Espírito e atribui à liberdade uma condição que transcende o indivíduo e sua vida privada.

Categoria: Epistemologia; Metafísica.

Características:

Author: Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa
Paperback: 220 páginas
Editora: Politikón Zôon Publicações
Idioma: Portuguese
ISBN-10: 8568078079
ISBN-13: 978-8568078075
Dimensões do produto: 14 x 1,3 x 21,6 cm

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Immanuel Kant's moral theory explains human relationships as a balance between respect and love. The former a repulsive force; friends respect each other's boundaries. The latter an attractive force; loving friends actively improve each other's lives. Thomas Hill Jr. advocates appreciation as a third attitude necessary in relationships. In "Ideas of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect", Hill explains this concept. His paper focuses on attitudes toward and relationships with persons with disabilities. Here I will take a general approach, expanding Hill's ideas to include a reciprocal attitude to appreciation: wariness. I will argue that these two attitudes are subcategories of understanding, having accurate ideas about an object. That is, the more accurate your ideas about a thing then the more you may appreciate it or be wary of it. Appreciation is the positive aspect of understanding; one appreciates a person's virtues or good qualities. Hill gives examples of appreciation, and a lack thereof, with a hypothetical family. The Distant Dad respects his son's wishes and wants for his happiness. The father helps the son when needed, such as if the son needs money. But the father does not take an interest in the details of his son's life. He does not learn about his dislikes, his interests, or activities. Hill says the Distant Dad does not appreciate his son. In contrast, the son's Curious Sister, who also helps and wants for the son's happiness, takes an active interest. She listens, enquires about his interests, and learns about him. Hills says that the Curious Sister does appreciate her brother. Throughout the paper, Hill's language implies a connection between appreciation and understanding. He says appreciation is openness to acknowledge things about a person, to see the good in them, to find out things about them. This is contrasted with beneficence as being caring