Early Modern Philosophy

In this paper, we explore a tension in Descartes's writings. The tension is generated by two views: (i) that the total amount of motion in the universe is constant, and (ii) that the soul produces motion in the human body. Has Descartes put forward incompatible positions? There are two prominent solutions to this tension in the literature, each involving a different interpretation of Descartes. The first interpretation is traditionally attributed to Leibniz. On this view, Descartes affirmed that the soul did not add motion to the body but merely redirected the motion that is already present in it. According to another interpretation, recently defended by Daniel Garber, Descartes intended his conservation principle to apply only to inanimate bodies but not to animate ones such as the human body. While both interpretations have some initial appeal, we suggest they are ultimately problematic. We argue, however, that Descartes has the internal resources to offer a different answer. On this solution, prior to creation God has providential knowledge of all the decisions regarding bodily movements that free creatures will make.  God then sets up the laws of nature governing bodies in such a way that the total amount of motion in the universe will remain constant even as bodies begin or cease to move in accord with the intentions of free agents. We show that this proposal is independently motivated by Descartes's own views regarding divine providence and human freedom, and reveals in his thought a trace of the “pre-established harmony” later made famous by Leibniz.

In the early modern period, contempt emerged as a persistent theme in moral philosophy. Most of the moral philosophers of the period shared two basic commitments in their thinking about contempt. First, they argued that we understand the value of others in the morally appropriate way when we understand them from the perspective of the morally relevant community. And second, they argued that we are naturally inclined to judge others as contemptible, and that we must therefore interrupt that natural movement of sense-bestowal in order to value others in the morally appropriate way. In this paper I examine in detail the arguments of Nicolas Malebranche and Immanuel Kant concerning the wrongness of contempt, emphasizing the ways in which they depend on conceptions of community and of the interruption of moral sense-bestowal. After showing how each of these arguments fails to comprehend the nature and the wrongness of contempt, I argue that we can find the resources for a more adequate account in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, and specifically in his reflections on ontology and on the meaning of community.

Convegno "Dissenso ed eterodossia nel pensiero ebraico" all'interno del ciclo di seminari a.a. 2018/2019 "Prismi della modernità. Itinerari di storia della filosofia dal XIV al XVII secolo", Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali, Dipartimento di Studi sull'Asia e sull'Africa Mediterranea, Erc Aristotle in Italian Vernacular, CREMT, 28-29 marzo 2019.

On considère souvent le XVIIe siècle comme le siècle de la raison. Pourtant, les philosophes modernes ont été fascinés par la puissance de l'imagination. Est-elle une puissance négative ou une puissance positive? L'essentiel n'est pas là: l'important est de comprendre comment et pourquoi l'imagination constitue un objet pour la philosophie. Pour Montaigne, Pascal et Malebranche, mais aussi pour Hobbes, Spinoza ou Locke, l'imagination se caractérise par un certain ordre et une cohérence manifeste, elle produit des effets réglés et ne court jamais au hasard. Paradoxalement, c'est en étudiant l'imagination, celle des sages aussi bien que celles des fous, que l'on comprend les hommes tels qu'ils sont.

Francisco de Toledo (Cordoba, 1532–Rome, 1596), one of the most eminent commentators of his day, is among the most important figures in the Society’s early history. He belongs to the first generation of Jesuit theologians who taught philosophy and theology, wrote commentaries and handbooks, and thus began building a distinctively Jesuit orthodox doctrine. Toledo’s academic and political career was filled with success. From the start of his career at Salamanca, where he studied theology and gave his first cursos de artes (courses of philosophy), Toledo’s abilities were recognized by contemporaries such as his professor Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), who described him as “prodigious.” After entering the Society in 1558, he was missioned to teach philosophy (1559–62) and then theology (1563–69) at the prestigious Roman
College. The texts of his lectures were soon adopted as Scholastic
handbooks within Jesuit colleges and became bestsellers once published. In 1569, Toledo began a brilliant diplomatic career as the pope’s ambassador and counselor, during which time he would participate in some of the most important events of his day, such as the reconciliation between King Henry IV of France (r.1589–1610) and the papacy, and the revision of the Latin Vulgate (1592–98), the so-called Sixto-Clementine Vulgate. In recognition of his services, the pope elevated Toledo to cardinal in 1593—the Society’s first. This chapter seeks to explain the reasons for this success and to outline Toledo’s contribution to Jesuit pedagogy. By interrogating his works from a philosophical perspective, the chapter aims to improve our understanding of Toledo’s thought and to link the question of Toledo’s “originality” as a philosopher to the historical context in which he lived and which inevitably informed his work.

En este trabajo analizaremos el tratamiento del problema del continuo y del infinito en el pensamiento de juventud de Leibniz. Mostraremos que, en su abordaje, el filósofo de Leipzig entremezcla problemas físicos, metafísicos y matemáticos. El trabajo se divide en cuatro capítulos. En el primero, examinaremos el contexto en el que Leibniz formuló una de sus tesis más peculiares sobre el problema del continuo, a saber, que hay infinitas partes en acto, así como también algunas consecuencias que se siguen de esta visión. Veremos que en este período, en el que hubo una gran evolución interna, Leibniz planteó algunas nociones muy importantes, como por ejemplo las de lo indivisible y lo infinitamente pequeño. En el segundo capítulo, seguiremos como hilo conductor la distinción planteada por Leibniz al final del período parisino entre ‘tres grados de infinito’, a saber, el infinito en el grado ínfimo, lo máximo en su género y Dios. Se destacan, entre muchas otras cosas, la distinción entre infinito terminado e interminado, y el abordaje de los atributos o formas simples como lo que da razón de las cosas en los diversos géneros y de la unidad de cada género. En el tercer capítulo, examinaremos la concepción del cuerpo de Leibniz del final del período parisino. Veremos, entre otras cosas, que sostuvo un fenomenalismo que no es radical, pues, si diversas mentes son capaces de sentir las mismas cosas, debe haber una causa extramental. Asimismo, examinaremos el problema de explicar que los cuerpos, en los que hay infinitas criaturas, poseen una unidad interna. Finalmente, en el cuarto capítulo, buscaremos establecer continuidades y rupturas entre las concepciones leibnizianas de juventud y las de su primer sistema de madurez.

Some questions in philosophy never grow old, and one of these questions is the nature of the human person and the relationship between body and soul. While most contemporary debate occurs between some form of Cartesian Dualism or some form of materialism, in this paper I compare the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas and Renes Descartes on the unity of the human person. I begin by giving an overview of Descartes' position, and answering criticisms from his contemporaries. I also show that the typical "ghost in a machine" characterization is a misrepresentation of Descartes' view. After this, I provide a explanation of St. Thomas' teaching which argues that the ultimate principle of intrinsic human unity is ​ esse​ or the act of existence, which is consistent with the Existentialist school of Thomism and is rarely given attention. My explanation allows St. Thomas to avoid the criticisms usually leveled against Descartes. In the end, I demonstrate that Descartes' position leads to a violation of the law of non-contradiction and is therefore rendered absurd, thus showing St. Thomas' doctrine to be the superior account of the unity of the human person.

A moral obligation is binding upon us insofar as it has obligatory force. But where does obligatory force come from? Within the early modern theistic framework where Malebranche’s ethics is situated, there are two accounts of the source of obligatory force: rationalism and theological voluntarism. For rationalism, an obligation is binding because it is dictated by Reason, whereas for theological voluntarism, an obligation is binding because it is decreed by divine volition. Most commentators are inclined to read Malebranche as a rationalist, but in this paper I argue that Malebranche is a theological voluntarist. In spite of Malebranche’s commitment to God’s role in morality, I demonstrate that the moral arbitrariness of theological voluntarism, as indicated by the Euthyphro Dilemma, motivates Malebranche to constrain divine volition. Moreover, I show that Malebranche’s strategy of constraining divine volition rests upon a division – whereas obligatory force is grounded in divine volition, the content of obligation is grounded in Reason – so divine volition cannot arbitrarily decree what one is obliged to do. To summarize my reading, Malebranche is a theological voluntarist who tries to solve the Euthyphro Dilemma through a division between obligatory force and the content of obligation that ultimately constrains God’s legislative will.