Brain Science

In this paper I unfold the implications of Warburg’s notion of »cerebral protuberance« (German: »Gehirnhirnausstülpung«) for a historical epistemology of intellectual work and material imagination. Attention to the penultimate character of conceptual language, I argue, allows for an analysis of unconscious aspects in the process of knowledge formation. Revisiting Gaston Bachelard’s conception of historical epistemology in the age of neuroplasticity, I suggest to attend to the reverberations between history of science and intellectual history in order to arrive at a better understanding of the exteriority of intellectual activity and the importance of affect in scientific and scholarly production.

For a long time, one of my dreams was to describe the nature of uncertainty axiomatically, and it looks like I've finally done it in my co∼eventum mechanics! Now it remains for me to explain to everyone the co∼eventum mechanics in the most approachable way. This is what I'm trying to do in this work. The co∼eventum mechanics is another name for the co∼event theory, i.e., for the theory of experience and chance which I axiomatized in 2016 [1, 2]. In my opinion, this name best reflects the co∼event-based idea of the new dual theory of uncertainty, which combines the probability theory as a theory of chance, with its dual half, the believability theory as a theory of experience. In addition, I like this new name indicates a direct connection between the co∼event theory and quantum mechanics, which is intended for the physical explanation and description of the conict between quantum observers and quantum observations [4]. Since my theory of uncertainty satises the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory, to explain this co∼eventum mechanics I will use a way analogous to the already tested one, which explains the theory of probability as a theory of chance describing the results of a random experiment. The simplest example of a random experiment in probability theory is the " tossing a coin ". Therefore, I decided to use this the simplest random experiment itself, as well as the two its analogies: the " "flipping a coin " and the " spinning a coin " to explain the co∼eventum mechanics, which describes the results of a combined experienced random experiment. I would like to resort to the usual for the probability theory " coin-based " analogy to explain (and first of all for myself) the logic of the co∼eventum mechanics as a logic of experience and chance. Of course, this analogy one may seem strange if not crazy. But I did not come up with a better way of tying the explanations of the logic of the co∼eventum mechanics to the coin-based explanations that are commonly used in probability theory to explain at least for myself the logic of the chance through a simple visual " coin-based " model that clarifies what occurs as a result of a combined experienced random experiment in which the experience of observer faces the chance of observation. I hope this analogy can be useful not only for me in understanding the co∼eventum mechanics.

Brain science has made remarkable advances in the 20th century and several kinds of brain functions have been elucidated. On the other hand, not only neurobiological research approaches or theoretical approaches but also systematically combined research approaches are needed to understand higher-level brain mechanisms such as language and learning, ie intelligence. Based on this idea, our research approach with a robot has two main aspects. One is to provide a test bed for the validation of hypotheses related to brain ...

The idea that consciousness has an integrative function has a long history. The late Francisco Varela and colleagues called it the" brainweb"(2002). Global Workspace theory suggests a fleeting memory capacity that enables access between brain functions that are otherwise separate.

Neuro-philosophy and the Healthy Mind (2016) is an intriguing book. The neuroscientist, psychiatrist, and philosopher Georg Northoff offers a careful and alluring investigation of brain-environment relations via treating those brains of his clinical patients with psychiatric disorders, developing a framework for neurophilosophical inquiry, notably raising the question of “ontology of the brain” as the core issue of neurophilosophy.

What is the neural-level basis of human morality? Various empirical studies, such as fMRI investigations, have been conducted to answer this question. However, because the majority of the previous studies have focused on human moral functioning in a specific domain, such as moral decision making or moral affection, they have not been able to examine the common neural substrate of human morality across diverse psychological functional domains. To address this limitation, the present study conducted a meta-analysis based on the previous fMRI investigations focused on diverse moral functions. In addition, philosophical and psychological implications of the result were discussed.