Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Human Nature

by Constantine Sandis

Edited with M.J. Cain (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 70.

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssuejid=PHS&volumeId=70&seriesId=0&issueId=-1

An understanding of human nature has been central to the work of some of the greatest philosophical thinkers including... more An understanding of human nature has been central to the work of some of the greatest philosophical thinkers including Aristotle, Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, Rousseau, Freud, and Marx. Questions such as ‘what is human nature?’, ‘is there such a thing as an exclusively human nature?’, ‘through what methods might we best discover more about our nature?’, and ‘to what extent are our actions and beliefs constrained by it?’ are of central importance not only to philosophy, but to our general understanding of ourselves as part of the human species. These and other issues are covered in this collection of 12 new essays by scholars working across a multitude of areas including the philosophy of cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, the philosophy of biology, moral philosophy, psychoanalysis, developmental psychology, philosophy of mind and action, and the history of ideas.

Contributors
Richard Samuels, M.J. Cain, Wolfram Hinzen, Stephen J. Boulter, Hans-Johann Glock, Tim J. Crow, P.M.S. Hacker, Rosalind Hursthouse, Sarah Patterson, P.J.E. Kail, John Cottingham, and Beverley Clack.

Lem, Turing, Darwin: Explorations in Computer Literature, Philosophy of Mind, and Cultural Evolution (2013)

by Peter Swirski

TOMASZ LEM: “Professor Swirski’s work is an accessible introduction to the domain Artificial Intelligence and its... more TOMASZ LEM: “Professor Swirski’s work is an accessible introduction to the domain Artificial Intelligence and its impact on the presumed emergence of computer-generated literature—a thought provoking concept”.

Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays

by Declan Smithies

Edited by C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu, Oxford University Press, 2011.

Attention has been studied in cognitive psychology for more than half a century, but until recently it was largely... more Attention has been studied in cognitive psychology for more than half a century, but until recently it was largely neglected in philosophy. Now, however, attention has been recognized by philosophers of mind as having an important role to play in our theories of consciousness and of cognition. At the same time, several recent developments in psychology have led psychologists to foundational questions about the nature of attention and its implementation in the brain. As a result there has been a convergence of interest in fundamental questions about attention. This volume presents the latest thinking from the philosophers and psychologists who are working at the interface between these two disciplines. Its fourteen chapters contain detailed philosophical and scientific arguments about the nature and mechanisms of attention; the relationship between attention and consciousness; the role of attention in explaining reference, rational thought, and the control of action; the fundamental metaphysical status of attention, and the details of its implementation in the brain. These contributions combine ideas from phenomenology, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind to further our understanding of this centrally important mental phenomenon, and to bring to light the foundational questions that any satisfactory theory of attention will need to address.

Through a mind darkly: An empirically-informed philosophical perspective on systematic knowledge acquisition and cognitive limitations

by Helen De Cruz

PhD dissertation in Philosophy, defended October 27, 2011. Advisor: Igor Douven

Given that human cognition is biased and limited, how can we explain the successes in mathematics and the sciences... more Given that human cognition is biased and limited, how can we explain the successes in mathematics and the sciences over the last few centuries? In other words: if we see through a glass darkly, why is it that mathematicians and scientists seem to be able to surmount their cognitive limitations to some extent? This dissertation provides a naturalistic philosophical study of the relationship between evolved human cognitive biases and formal modes of knowledge acquisition. It presents an analysis of key notions from cognitive science that have been the focus of recent debates in empirically-informed epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind including innateness, mental modularity, extended cognition, epistemic action, and evolutionary (debunking) arguments for the reliability of beliefs. One key finding is that a naturalistic picture of formal knowledge acquisition should not only take into account evolved cognitive biases, but also the way humans routinely supplement their internal cognitive resources with external support. Using examples from the domain of arithmetic and the life sciences, the thesis indicates that humans draw on a variety of epistemic tools, including artifacts, symbols, metaphors and other minds. Nevertheless, my second key claim is that evolved cognitive biases play a significant role in mathematical and scientific practice. Case studies from arithmetic, paleoanthropology and evolutionary biology indicate that what people regard as intelligible is influenced by their evolved cognitive architecture. The thesis ends by outlining some normative, epistemic and metaphysical perspectives that a naturalistic philosophy of science can offer.

Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation - Husserl und die analytische Philosophie des Geistes

by Thomas Szanto

(forthcoming 2012): Berlin/New York: de Gruyter

Eine systematische Neubewertung der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls auf der Folie aktueller Diskussionen in... more Eine systematische Neubewertung der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls auf der Folie aktueller Diskussionen in der Philosophy of Mind steht unerachtet einiger neuerer Annäherungsversuche bislang aus.

Die Arbeit lotet die Möglichkeiten, aber auch die methodologischen Grenzen eines solchen Brückenschlages aus. In detaillierten Analysen werden dabei gravierende konzeptuelle und metatheoretische Äquivokationen zwischen phänomenologischen und (sprach)analytischen bzw. kognitivistischen Modellen des Mentalen aufgeklärt. Kritisch fokussiert werden insbesondere repräsentationalistische Projekte der Naturalisierung des phänomenalen und intentionalen Bewusstseins, neuere Selbstbewusstseinstheorien sowie Husserls Sonderstellung gegenüber der gegenwärtigen (semantischen und geisttheoretischen) Internalismus/Externalismus- und der Realismus/Anti-Realismus-Debatte.

Die Studie zeigt so das deskriptive und explanatorische Potenzial von Husserls Bewusstseinstheorie auf und präsentiert die Phänomenologie als ernstzunehmenden Diskussionspartner nicht nur der Philosophie des Geistes bzw. der Philosophie der Psychologie und Kognition, sondern auch der analytischen Sprachphilosophie und Erkenntnistheorie.

Common minds, uncommon thoughts : a philosophical anthropological investigation of uniquely human creative behavior, with an emphasis on artistic ability, religious reflection, and scientific study

by Johan De Smedt

PhD dissertation, 2011

The aim of this dissertation is to create a naturalistic philosophical picture of creative capacities that are... more The aim of this dissertation is to create a naturalistic philosophical picture of creative capacities that are specific to our species, focusing on artistic ability, religious reflection, and scientific study. By integrating data from diverse domains (evolutionary and developmental psychology, cognitive anthropology and archeology, neuroscience) within a philosophical anthropological framework, I have presented a cognitive and evolutionary approach to the question of why humans, but not other animals engage in such activities. Through an application of cognitive and evolutionary perspectives to the study of these behaviors, I have sought to provide a more solid footing for philosophical anthropological discussions of uniquely human behavior. In particular, I have argued that art, religion and science, which are usually seen as achievements that are quite remote from ordinary modes of reasoning, are subserved by evolved cognitive processes that serve functions in everyday cognitive tasks, that arise early and spontaneously in cognitive development, that are shared cross-culturally, and that have evolved in response to selective pressures in our ancestral past. These mundane cognitive processes provide a measuring rod with which we can assess a diversity of cultural phenomena; they form a unified explanatory framework to approach human culture. I have argued that we can explain uncommon thoughts (exceptional human achievements, such as art, religion and science) in terms of interactions between common minds (ordinary human minds that share their knowledge through cultural transmission). This dissertation is subdivided into four parts. Part I outlines the problem of human uniqueness, examining theories on how humans conceptualize the world, and what their mental tool box looks like. Part II discusses the evolutionary and cognitive origins of human artistic behavior. Part III focuses on the cognitive science of religion, especially on how it can be applied to the reasoning of theologians and philosophers of religion. Part IV considers the cognitive basis of scientific practice.

Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion

by Greg Smith

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Co-edited with Carl Plantinga.

Carl Plantinga and I asked scholars to apply the insights from cognitive psychology and philosophy to a range of film... more Carl Plantinga and I asked scholars to apply the insights from cognitive psychology and philosophy to a range of film texts. This anthology serves as a good introduction to cognitive film studies of emotion.


Introduction

    Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith


I. Kinds of Films, Kinds of Emotions

Film, Emotion, and Genre

    Noel Carroll


Sentiment in Film Viewing

    Ed S.H. Tan and Nico H. Frijda


The Sublime in Cinema

    Cynthia A. Freeland


The Emotional Basis of Film Comedy

    Dirk Eitzen


II. Film Technique, Film Narrative, and Emotion

Local Emotions, Global Moods, and Film Structure

    Greg M. Smith


Emotions, Cognitions, and Narrative Patterns in Film

    Torben Grodal


Movie Music As Moving Music: Emotion, Cognition, and the Film Score

    Jeff Smith


Time and Timing

    Susan L. Feagin


III. Desire, Identification, and Empathy

Narrative Desire

    Gregory Currie


Identification and Emotion in Narrative Film

    Berys Gaut


Gangsters, Cannibals, Aesthetes, or Apparently Perverse Allegiances

    Murray Smith


The Scene of Empathy and the Human Face on Film

    Carl Plantinga

WHAT MYTHS REVEAL ABOUT HOW HUMANS THINK: A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO MYTH

by K. Mitch Hodge

Master's Thesis Published with UMI Dissertation Services

This thesis has two main goals: (1) to argue that myths are natural products of human cognition; and (2) that... more This thesis has two main goals: (1) to argue that myths are natural products of human cognition; and (2) that structuralism, as introduced by Claude Levi-Strauss, provides an over-arching theory of myth when supplemented and supported by current research in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and cognitive anthropology.  With regard to (1), we argue that myths are naturally produced by the human mind through individuals’ interaction with their natural and social environments.  This interaction is constrained by both the type of body the individual has and the environment in which the individual is situated.  From this interaction, we argue, is produced the human-body metaphor which plays an essential role in forming analogical mental models which humans use to navigate, predict, and think about their environment(s).  With regard to (2), we argue that these analogical mental models are the structures from which myths are created, just as structural anthropology suggests.

Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives

by Lisa Bortolotti

Collection co-edited with Matthew Broome, International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry series, Oxford University Press 2009

Sample chapter available for download!

CONTENTS
Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive... more
Sample chapter available for download!

CONTENTS
Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview (M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti)

Psychiatry as Science
Chapter 1. Is Psychiatric Research Scientific? (R. Cooper)
Chapter 2. A Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. (K.W.M. Fulford and N. Sartorius)
Chapter 3. Delusion as a Natural Kind. (R. Samuels)

The Nature of Mental Illness
Chapter 4. Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth. (H. Pickard)
Chapter 5. Psychiatry and the Concept of Disease as Pathology. (D. Murphy)

Reconciling Paradigms
Chapter 6. On the Interface Problem in Philosophy and Psychiatry. (T. Thornton)
Chapter 7. What does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables. (J. Campbell)
Chapter 8. Mad Scientists or Unreliable Autobiographers? Dopamine Dysregulation and Delusion. (P. Gerrans)

Psychiatry and the Neurosciences
Chapter 9. When Time is Out of Joint: Schizophrenia and Functional Neuroimaging. (D. Lloyd)
Chapter 10. Philosophy and Cognitive-Affective Neurogenetics. (D. Stein)
Chapter 11. An Addictive Lesson: A Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. (L. Stephens and G. Graham)

Phenomenology and Scientific Explanation
Chapter 12. Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology. (M. Ratcliffe)
Chapter 13. Delusional realities. (S. Gallagher)

Delusions and Cognition
Chapter 14. Delusions: a Two-Level Framework. (K. Frankish)
Chapter 15. Explaining Pathologies of Belief. (A.M. Aimola Davies and M. Davies)

Moral Psychology and Psychopathology
Chapter 16. Mental Time Travel, Agency and Responsibility. (J. Kennett and S. Matthews)
Chapter 17. Motivation, Depression and Character. (I. Law)

Conclusion: The Future of Scientific Psychiatry. (L. Bortolotti and M.R. Broome)


One of the best books of 2009 for the Guardian, according to Mary Warnock:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/nov/22/books-of-the-year-2009.

For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/psychiatry

International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems (IJSSS); Volume 1, Issue 1, January-June 2011

by Joao Queiroz

co-edited with Angelo Loula

EDITORIAL PREFACE

Modeling the Emergence and Evolutionary History of Semiotic Systems and Processesmore EDITORIAL PREFACE

Modeling the Emergence and Evolutionary History of Semiotic Systems and Processes

Angelo Loula, State University of Feira de Santana, Brazil
João Queiroz, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil

To read the preface, click on the link below, and then click "Preface."
http://www.igi-global.com/bookstore/titledetails.aspx?titleid=47801

Cognitive Integration

by Richard Menary

This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function... more This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. The integrationist position offers a fresh contribution to the emerging embodied and embedded approach to the study of mind.

What is Cognitive Science?

by Barbara Von Eckardt

Artificial Cognition Systems

by Joao Queiroz

Co-ed. with Loula, A., Gudwin, R.

1.The Goose, The Fly, and the Submarine Navigator
Alexander Riegler (Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary... more 1.The Goose, The Fly, and the Submarine Navigator
Alexander Riegler (Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies, Belgium)
2.An Embodied Logical Model for Cognition in Artificial Cognition Systems
Guilherme Bittencourt (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brazil) Jerusa Marchi (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brazil)
3.Modeling Field Theory of Higher Cognitive Functions
Leonid Perlovsky (Air Force Research Center, USA)
4.Reconstructing Human Intelligence within Computational Sciences
Gerd Doeben-Henisch (University of Applied Sciences Frankfurt am Main, Germany)
5.Stratified Constraint Satissfaction Networks in Synergetic Multi-Agent Simulations of Language Evolution
Alexander Mehler (Bielefeld University, Germany)
6.Language Evolution and Robotics
Paul Vogt (University of Edinburgh, UK and Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
7.Evolutionary Robotics as a Tool to Investigate Spatial Cognition in Artificial and Natural Systems
Michela Ponticorvo (University of Calabria, Italy) Richard Walker (XiWrite s.a.s., Italy) Orazio Miglino (University of Naples "Frederico II", Italy)
8.The Meaningful Body
Willem Haselager (Raboud University, The Netherlands) Maria Gonzalez (UNESP, Brazil)
9.Making Meaning in Computers
Bruce MacLennan (University of Tennessee, USA)
10.Environmental Variability and the Emergence of Meaning
Patrick Grim (State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA)
Trina Kokalis (State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA)
11.Mimetic Minds
Lorenzo Magnani (University of Pavia, Italy)
12. First Steps in Experimental Phenomenology
Roberto Poli (University of Trento, Italy)

Semiotics and Intelligent Systems Development

by Joao Queiroz

Co-edited with Ricardo Gudwin

In this book, our goal is to present the most representative research projects in computational semiotics at the... more In this book, our goal is to present the most representative research projects in computational semiotics at the present time. Considering the relevance of the semiotic approach for
future developments in artificial intelligence, we suggest—and certainly hope—that the collection will be a major contribution to the field. Within the book, we have contributions from philosophers, cognitive scientists, computer scientists, and engineers, all focused on the singular agenda of inquiring how semiotics works with intelligent system techniques in order to create newer and more robust types of intelligent systems. One of the main criticisms of which intelligent systems developers are accused is being naïve in their approaches to the question, “What is intelligence?” Therefore, it is as important to take into
account the philosophy of the mind and to be aware of the issues of that field within current philosophic speculations as it is to develop a practical methodology of the technologies of semiotic intelligent systems.

The book is divided into four parts. Section I: Theoretical Issues includes chapters with a more philosophical tone. Section II: Discussions on Semiotic Intelligent Systems includes chapters that still have a philosophical flavor but move beyond philosophical speculations toward some kind of implementation of intelligent systems. Section III: Semiotics in the Development of Intelligent Systems includes chapters that use semiotics in some sense for the development of an intelligent system. Finally, the fourth part, Semiotic Systems Implementations, includes chapters whose authors claim to be using semiotic concepts in intelligent systems implementation.

The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems

by Mike Nair-Collins

Ph.D. Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, 2009

I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints.  Briefly, we begin by... more I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints.  Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents.  Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney.  I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection.

To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both “point to” or “refer” to something, as well as “say” something regarding whatever it is they are about.  To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the ‘f’ simply connotes ‘fundamental’, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts).

Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem.  Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I’ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined.  These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows.  F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation.  F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system.  Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems.

This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts.  After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske’s, Fodor’s, and Millikan’s theories in chapters 2-4.  Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6.  In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems.  In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory.

Psychology's Territories: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives from Different Disciplines

by Thomas Sturm

Co-edited with Mitchell G. Ash. Mahwah, NJ & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers, 2007.

This is an interdisciplinary collection of new essays by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and historians... more This is an interdisciplinary collection of new essays by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and historians on the question: What has determined and what should determine the territory or the boundaries of the discipline named "psychology"? Both the contents - in terms of concepts - and the methods - in terms of instruments - are analyzed. Among the contributors are Mitch Ash, Paul Baltes, Jochen Brandtstädter, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Heidelberger, and Gerhard Roth.

I contributed two chapters: One that shows how talk of the "self" is often understood differently by philosophers and psychologists. I argue that fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration is more to be expected on specific issues, such as self-control, self-knowledge or - my example here - self-deception. The second contribution (with the psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer) deals with the history of research instruments that became - somewhat oddly - metaphors for the very subject matter of cognitive psychology, namely statistics and the digital computer. This isn't merely of historical interest, because one needs to ask under what conditions metaphors can and should be interpreted realistically.

From some book reviews:

„It the ‚territories’ of psychology straddle the boundaries of the discipline, guideposts are needed for the exploration of these borderlands. The thematic clusters visible in this volume are certainly helpful in pointing to directions of inquiry that are currently active and promising.“ Kurt Danziger, Isis, 100 (2009)

„... a ‚must have’ for anyone interested in the history of psychology... The sparks generated by the friction between the representatives of different disciplines really do illuminate the issues considered... There is not a weak chapter in the bunch.“ John G. Benjafield, PsychCritiques: Contemporary Psychology APA Review of Books, 52 (2008)

„...an array of exciting, multidisciplinary perspectives on psychology’s past, present, and near future... representing the state of the art in the history and theory of psychology... Specialists in the history and theory of psychology will find stimulating ideas that ought both to inform their teaching and inspire future research“ Michael Petit (York University), Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 45 (2009).

(...sure there are criticisms in these and other reviews too.)