Alevi's rights and the freedom of religion in Turkey

ALEVIS’ RIGHTS AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN TURKEY An ignored minority? Written by: Renáta Janka Tóth Since its creation in 1923, the Turkish state counts several religious and ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, Armenians and also religious communities, including Syriac Christians, Maronite Christians, Protestant sects, Jehova’s witnesses, Baha’is and Alevis – although Alevis are not counted officially as minority and are considered a heterodox Muslim sect. These communities face restrictions on their freedoms and rights and they often face discrimination by the state. Complaints are not short from the two biggest communities in Turkey: the Kurds and the Alevis. The European Court of Human Rights also dealt and keeps on dealing with a great number of applications from these groups against Turkey. Turkey has a high profile of complaints and judgements at the European Court of Human Rights. However, the number of the complaints on religious grounds is very small compared to the full number of cases. Between 1959 and 2008, the Court made 1939 judgements out of 14145 complaints involving Turkey and 86% of these judgements identified at least one violation of human rights (Country Statistic, 1 January 20091). The number of judgements involving Turkey increased to 2295 by 2009, still only counting one complaint on religious rights (see 50 Years of Activity: ECHR Facts and Figures 2), and this climbed to 2573 judgements with 3 on religious freedom by 2010. This shows that Turkey has a low number of complaints on religious freedom compared to some other countries (the highest number was produced by Greece: 9, and Russia: 5; see Table of Violations3). Turkey’s human rights profile has been evaluated several times by different Turkish and international policy makers, especially since Turkey started accession talk with the European Union. Although Turkey’s former state minister of human rights, Hikmet Sami Türk noted that Turkey aims at the development of the country’s human rights profile, it still has deficiencies, the reason of which according to Türk can be found in two phenomena: the separatist movement in the South and the rising fundamentalism against secularism: these have to come to an end before Turkey can further promote human rights as laid down in international conventions. He also argued that the Turkish government proved its eagerness to promote human rights and refused the accusation that human rights are systematically breached by the government (Türk, 1999). Mesut Senol also points to the war against 1 available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B21D260B-3559-4FB2-A629- 881C66DC3B2F/0/CountryStatistics01012009.pdf accessed on 01/05/11 2 available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-89D6- 8480AFCC29FD/0/FactsAndFigures_EN.pdf accessed on 01/05/11 3 available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E8F73EC8-AF6A-4205-BAF2- F6043F67F651/0/Tableau_de_violations_2009_ENG.pdf accessed on 01/05/11 2 terrorism, but emphasizes improvement and Turkey’s commitment to human rights and provided in international conventions such as UN treaties (Senol, 1999). Yet development was projected by Türk in 1999, there still seems to be deficiencies when it comes to human rights and freedom of religion. In his article written for Forum18 (www.forum18.org) in 2005, Otmar Oehring pointed out that non-Muslim religious minorities still face restrictions as for freedom of their expression (restricted by the penal code that punishes every manifestation of real or perceived attack on the state and Turkishness) and freedom of association. Worship places cannot be established as religious organisations but only as either foundations or associations. Oehring argues that secularism is no longer practiced as it was meant, for Sunni Islam came to be an unofficial state religion – yet it is justly argued that Sunni Islam was always privileged in Turkey over other minority faiths , thus it is not such a recent development (Oehring, 20054). The US International Religious Freedom Report from 2010 also points out deficiencies in the domain: punishment for “reproaching the government”; restriction on the establishment of religious organisations and worship places; mandatory religious education (with regard to the Alevis); headscarf issue, as main problems5. There are two distinct groups in Turkey whose stance is problematic with regard to religious rights: one group is that of the religious Muslims who complain most about the headscarf issue and the secular dress code, touching mostly girls who want to wear the Islamic veil, and the second group is that of the Alevi community. This paper is to examine the problem of the latter with respect to religious rights and freedoms granted by several conventions. The first section of the present paper discusses the relevant international regulations concerning religious freedom and other relating articles. The second part presents the peculiarities of the Alevi faith, while the third part is to focus on their grievances and the origins of these problems. A final section will concentrate on the minority status which is not, but could be, given to the Alevis and attempts to discover the consequences of such a status granted to this group, and aims at answering why the government is so reluctant to do so. For doing so, the text will aim at emphasizing the differences between Alevism and the other branches of Islam and builds upon their own claims and those of the other religious sects. 4 read at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=670&pdf=Y accessed on 05/05/11 5 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148991/htm, accessed on 05/05/11 3 Historical background and the Alevi faith Alevis are scattered throughout Turkey, living in almost every province, in rural and urban areas as well, but their origins are mostly in the Central- and Eastern-Anatolian rural areas (Zeidan, 1999, p. 74). The exact number of Alevis is difficult to estimate for several reasons: first, Alevis are impossible to identify according to their appearances – they do not wear traditional clothes, their physical appearance, such as skin colour, is not exceptional and their majority speaks Turkish as their mother tongue – yet approximately 20% of the Alevi population is Kurdish and thus speaks Kurdish, this adds to the ethnic dimension rather than to the religious one. Besides, several Alevis do not admit their religious identity for fear of discrimination. Instead, they practice secrecy about one’s religious convictions in order to avoid discrimination and persecution in a society (a similar concept is known and practiced in mainstream Shi’a Islam under the notion of taqiya) (Zeidan, 1999,p. 75). Alevis themselves estimate their number to be around 20 million, but lower estimates give a number of around 10-12 million, showing a variety of opinions ranging from 10 to 30% of the Turkish population (Zeidan, 1999, p. 74; Shindeldecker, p. 36). As other communities, Alevis also refer to historic tragedies to bring members together and build a common past. Starting from the battle of Kerbala when Husein was killed, they perceive themselves as victims of persecution by other groups. This perception is strengthened by the massacres against Alevis in the 16th century Ottoman Empire, which made them search for refuge in mountainous, remote areas – an aspect that still influences perception of Alevis as “mountain Turks” or the “rural version of the Bektashi order”. The opposition to the leadership was supported by religious ideology that had its roots in these rural, Alevi regions, and it also made them the faithful followers and supporters of Atatürk, who was also named the saviour of Alevis (Vorhoff, 1998, p. 227-230). Added to these historical tragedies is the Sivas massacre which is a main landmark in Alevi identity and political demands7. Atatürk destroyed the former religious institutes, his principles made Alevis equal citizens after the persecution in the Ottoman Empire. This attached the Alevis to Kemalism, in which they became increasingly secular and left-inclined, which led to the abandon of the traditional Alevi religious institutions – this change was accelerated by the migration from 6 available at http://www.alevi.dk/ENGELSK/Turkish_Alevis_Today.pdf, accessed on 01/05/11 7 read more ont he massacre here: http://www.turkeyemergency.com/the-sivas-massacre/ accessed on 05/05/11 4 rural to urban areas, that also created an Alevi middle class (Zeidan, 1999, p. 77). Kemalism however did not finish with discrimination: the biggest massacre against Alevis took place during Atatürk’s rule in 1937 in Dersim8, in which Atatürk was personally involved. After the death of Atatürk, Islam officially regained ground in the Turkish political sphere and the upcoming governments’ Islamic (Sunni) ideology further reinforced social discrimination against Alevis. Re-Islamification took place in Turkey, and the reformed Islam was to be a Sunni interpretation of Islam, which also came to be linked closely to Turkishness – this led to the decline of non-Muslim indigenous population and to an increase of Muslim but not Turk population (Shankland, 2003, p. 15). Such developments lead to the redefinition of the community, as Alevis did after the collapse of the socialist block, when socialism lost its power and Alevis started to redefine itself as Alevis: rather religious than a political direction. This served as a first step towards the reconstructing of the Alevi community in Anatolia, and it was further promoted by the recent Islamic fundamentalism, against which Alevis define themselves as defenders of the Kemalist principles (Camuroglu, 1995, p. 26-27; Erman-Göker, 2000, p. 99), which led to a political and cultural revival of Alevism further encouraged by the liberalisation process and the expansion of the civil society (Zeidan, 1999, p. 75). This revival took place in the 1980s-1990s, but the nature of the revival in the 80s was significantly different from what followed in the next decade. In the 80s, the government used Alevism against the Kurds, in which the main biding force was the class (Erman-Göker, 2000, p. 100). Alevis started to appear in the public sphere and started the revitalisation of certain aspects of Alevism (Vorhoff, 1998, p. 233; Camuroglu, 1997, p. 27) . The 90s, however, witnessed a renewed interest in Alevism and parallel to this, a genuine Alevi awakening and re-organisation of the community: this re-organisation and the communication of the community itself was made possible by a new, young, Western-educated elite via media and new secular organisational forms such as foundations. This period was that of the growth of literature on Alevism, which had as its aim not only the presentation of the faith, but also the reshaping of the cultural heritage to root Alevism in history to legitimate it as a religious and socio-political system (Vorhoff, 1998, p. 233-234; Zeidan, 1999, p. 78). The Alevi Manifesto 8 The massacre evolved as a suppression of a rebellion against government control. The area is inhabited by several Kurdish tribes who adhere to the Alevi faith but make a distinct group with distinct practices that differentiate them from „mainstream” Alevis and especially from the surrounding Sunni Kurdish population. For details, see Martin van Bruinessen, "Genocide in Kurdistan? The suppression of the Dersim rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the chemical war against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)", in: George J. Andreopoulos (ed), Conceptual and historical dimensions of genocide. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pp. 141-170 5 was also published in this period, marking a milestone of the Alevi repoliticization. The Manifesto pointed out Alevis’ grievances and their demands (Erman-Göker, 2000, p. 102). Alevis are usually referred to a homogeneous religious group, yet there are divisions between the ranks of the Alevis as well with regard to political stance, worldview, religiosity and even ethnicity (Turks and Kurds), that also influences one’s political affiliation. Although there are divisions among Alevis, they are generally closed when it comes to the Sunni world, as pointed out in the article of Zeidan (Zeidan, 1999, p. 74). There are many groups within Alevism, some more influential, some more marginal. The most influential group can be labelled as modern and traditional or Kemalist and Republican, which is formed around the Cem Vakfi foundation. It keeps equal distance from the “real Islam” direction as well as from the “secular” way and aims at keeping the authentic features of Alevism (Camuroglu, 1997, p. 29). It contains left-inclined writers and intellectuals who are committed to the Enlightenment, Westernisation, liberalism and the Kemalist ideology. This is the most important Alevi grouping in the political life as they are the ones who voice dissatisfaction and requests towards the government (Erman- Göker, 2000, p. 111-112)9. Beside the divisions, and connected to this, Alevis seem to encounter different identities at the same time, between which they switch according to the needs and situation of the time. The simultaneous existence of multiple reference points allows a group to shift its identity according to its current needs – this is called polytaxis or polytactic potential (see Elwert, 1995). We-group identities also imply the creation of a foe, depending on the current framing of the identity of the group: during the Ottoman Empire, Alevis identified themselves as an offshoot of Shi’a Islam and as a religious minority in the opposition of the Sunni majority Ottoman Empire, whereas in today’s time when Turkey experiences an Islamic resurgence, Alevis tend to associate themselves with Atatürk’s secular state and prefer stressing citizenship rather than participating in a supra-religious community (Shankland, 2003, p. 17). The Alevis are generally defined as a religious community which is officially considered part of Islam, particularly of Shi’a Islam, but in fact the Alevi faith is considerably different from any branch of Islam, while sharing some elements with the mainstream Twelver Shi’a Muslims. Although their main reference is to Muhammad and Ali, their beliefs and practices are different from that of Islam. Ocak claims in his text that the heterodoxy of today’s Alevism is due to the activity of Shah Ismail, who built upon the already existing Turkish 9 It is not int he scope of this paper to further detail different directions within Alevism. For more details, see Erman-Göker, 2000 and Camuroglu, 1997. 6 customs of shamanism and other religious elements and implanted the cult of Ali and a form of Shi’a Islam as adapted to the actual community’s needs and traditions, which resulted in a peculiar mixture of shamanism, Buddhism, a bit of Christianity, a sort of Islam and other ancient religions (see Ocak, 1997). One characteristic of their faith is a fundamental duality between material and immaterial spheres, what is visible and what cannot be seen (Gokalp, 1980, p. 749-750). This emphasises the mystic character of Alevism which is even more deeply visible in their customs and beliefs. Alevis do not practice the five pillars of Islam as other Muslim sects do: ritual Islamic prayer, Ramadan fast, the zakat and the hajj are not part of Alevi practices. They believe that the essential of faith is being a good human being instead of worshipping the Kaaba stone in Mecca. Instead of Ramadan, Alevis’ fast take place during the first 12 days of the month of Muharram, and they generally practice a three-day-long Hizir fast (to honour the supernatural being Hizir who is supposed to help people in distress) in February. Alevis have a modified shahada – confession of faith, to which they add “Ali is the vice-regent of God and Ali is the trustee of God” (Shindeldecker, p. 7-8, 11). Alevis also do not accept shari’a as divine law – instead, they are following a set of norms and the inner aspect of religion rather than its external manifestations. They do not pray in mosques but practice their religion in Alevi worship houses, called cemevis, which are not officially recognized as prayer houses (Bruinessen, 1996, p. 7). These differences are related to the Alevi refusal of the Sunni view of the Judgement Day, which says that humans will be judged upon according to their level of religiosity and the way and punctuality they performed their religious duties. Contrary to this, Alevis believe that humans will be judged upon according to their behaviour toward other human beings, thus being a good person plays a more important role than performing acts of adoration (Shindeldecker, p. 6). Contrary to Sunni Muslim practices and beliefs, Alevis almost deify Ali and believe in a sort of trinity of God, Muhammad and Ali, as they say, “The three makes one and Ali is all the three” – implying that the person of Ali contains that of the prophet Muhammad and God himself (Gokalp, 1980, p. 752). However, this is not seen by themselves as similar to the Christian concept of trinity. A main concept in the view of trinity of the Alevis is the ancient – and definitely not Islamic – concept of incarnation of God in a human being, which leads to the point that Muhammad and Ali are incarnations of God, meaning that they are God himself. Ali and Muhammad are often perceived as one in this trinity, and seen as two sides of one coin (Ocak, 1995, p. 199; Shindeldecker, p. 13-14; Zeidan, 1999, p. 78-79). This saint trinity of Muhammad, Ali and God (Hak – truth) reigns on the mystical field. They are 7 followed by the sacred family and the martyrs, which consist of the twelve imams (Gokalp, 1980, p. 752). The perception of God in Alevism also shows mystic characteristics in views such as that God is everything in universe, God is every person, he is inside the people, God is love and knowledge, or perfect human beings are God (see Shindeldecker, p. 4). Alevis though do believe in the omniscience and omnipotence of God and see him as the ultimate judge and the creator of the universe (Shankland, 2003, p. 118). This leads to the concept of the perfect man, insan-i kamil, which concept is connected to the notion of the four gates and fourty levels. The four gates design the four stations which men has to pass in order to get close to God. Each gate consist of ten levels, which make up altogether fourty levels. The four gates are: shari‟a (religious law, external duties); tariqa (spiritual path, Alevi mode of worship); ma‟arifa (intuitive knowledge of God); haqiqa (spiritual truth, union with God) (Shindeldecker, p. 16; Zeidan, 1999, p. 79). An Alevi enters the first gate with the guidance of a dede (grandfather), and at the end of the road he is supposed to give himself up on the way of God, repudiate his interests and pleasure and work for the others’ good and well being, while being in complete control over his morals and desires (Shindeldecker, p. 16, see also in Zeidan, 1999, p. 79). The already mentioned dedes, along with the babas (fathers) are the spiritual leaders of the community who claim descent from one of the twelve imams and lead ceremonies and act as judges within the community, and exercise a sort of spiritual authority over the members of the community (Vorhoff, 1998, p. 236). Approximately 10% of Alevi population belong to the order of dedes. A dede is usually characterised as such: honest, temperate, hospitable, able to mediate and is fluent in the services and rituals of Alevilik (Shankland, 2003, p. 104-105). In the 70-80s, dedes and babas were practically non-existent in the transformation of the Alevi community, yet their institution and authority was finally re-established in the late 80s and 90s when the Alevi community reconstructed itself in the changed environments. Another key difference of Alevis and Sunnis is their belief concerning the revelations and the Koran in particular. Alevis believe that the Koran was descended by Gabriel as a word of God to Muhammad, but while Sunnis believe in the Koran is unchanged and is still as it was during the Prophet’s time, Alevis refuse this belief saying that the Koran was modified by humans under the caliph Othman and many references to Ali had been removed – this also underlines their strong belief in Ali (Erman and Göker, 2000, p. 112). This relates to their refusal to pray as Sunnis do and fast as Sunnis do and practice their religion in the Sunni way, which is said to be created by Arab elites – this adds to the traditional enmities between 8 Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey and also to the dislike between Turkish Alevis and Arabs in general (Zeidan, 1999, p. 80). Besides the Koran, Alevis believe in other holy scripts as well, which include the books of other monotheistic religions (which for example Sunnis also believe in), traditions and saying of Ali, the life of Muhammad, Ali and Haji Bektash, and the so-called Buyruks, which are collections of the practices of the twelve Imams (Shindeldecker, p. 5; Zeidan, 1999, p. 79). The Buyruk also treats religious hierarchy and the very important notion of müsahiplik as well, and describes the ritual that is to be followed – this is however varying in each region (see Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997, p. 134-135) A key characteristic of the Alevi faith is the concept of müsahiplik, which is a relationship confirmed ritually that, on the one hand, signals the acceptance of the person to the religious communitas, and on the other hand, ties two persons and families together for a lifetime – be it either a married couple or a single man: it depends on the traditions of the community in question. This relationship is considered stronger than blood ties: intermarriage between the next generation of the two families is forbidden, and they are obliged to share their property and their persons with each others’ families: share the property, responsibility, time and care. This is also a factor of organisation of the religious community of Alevis (Zeidan, 1999, p. 80; Gokalp, 1980, p. 753-754; Shindeldecker, p. 10; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997, p. 122-124). Although the institution of the müsahiplik is considered important as a means of integration in the core of the community, and a prerequisite of attendance of religious ceremonies, young Alevis, especially in urban areas, often repudiate this tradition, arguing that by the nature of this relationship – the fact that the partners share everything – would imply that the financial burden for one person is doubled, which is a high responsibility in today’s economic situation which is only possible to take for those in a better financial situation (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1995, p. 131, see details in Shankland, 2003, p. 116-117). Alevis practice different gender-policies than Sunnis: women are accepted to wear modern clothes, veiling is not a common practice in their communities. Added to this, they do not practice gender segregation: women are represented in religious ceremonies and feasts alongside men and they usually worship together, and in households, they are also together with men (see Shankland, 2003, p. 94-98). This principle leads to the equality of members of the community, which Alevis’ are highly proud of, yet women are not in the same status as men: they will not shop alone or appear all alone on the street. In addition, Alevis do not practice polygamy (Shindeldecker, p. 20); they are not only monogamous but also 9 endogamous, meaning that they marry within the community, which ensures the continuity and reproduction of faith within the community (Zeidan, 1999, p. 76). A key distinguishing feature that differentiates Anatolian Alevism from any other branch of Islam and the Syrian Alawites is the importance associated to the person of Haji Bektash Veli: he is presented as a patron saint of the Turkish Alevi community, which is not part of any other variant of Islam (Vorhoff, 1998, p. 237). Alevis are also often associated with the Bektashi order, although the two are somewhat different. Even though their ideology is basically the same, they have differences on the level of organisation of the community. Membership in the Bektashi order is an individual choice, while that of the Alevis depends first and foremost of descent: being born into an Alevi family means an already born Alevi identity of the child, whereas inclusion into the core of the religious life of the community only takes place by engagement in a müsahiplik. Relevant international and European regulations Religious rights are regulated in several conventions and agreements on the European and international level as well. UN conventions treat the issue of human rights and more precisely the freedom of religion and belief. A major document on this issue is the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed in 194810. Article 18 of this document relates to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, saying: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”. This article includes those rights that are also guaranteed by the ECHR which seems to be inspired by the UN document with regard to the human rights and religious freedom. Article 18 provides the reader with a few examples of what is meant by freedom of practice and manifestation of religion in public: it mentions teaching, practice, worship and observance, which excludes the possibility of banning a religion – except for the reasons stated in the ECHR, such as the protection of public health and security. Some other articles of the UN treaty can also be related to certain religious issues: Article 19 refers to the freedom of expression and holding an opinion without interference, and 10 Read full text here: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18 10 Article 20 refers to the freedom of gathering and assembly. Article 26 refers to the crucial question of right to education and states that: „1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.”. The second paragraph of this Article is especially important concerning the Alevi claims about mandatory religious education being Sunni and ignoring other religious beliefs, which is not seen by the Alevis as promoting understanding and tolerance between the two respective sects: it angers Alevis against Sunnis and it does not provide Sunni children with a relative insight into the Alevi faith. An important addition to these Articles in the convention is Article 30, the final article of the document, which states that: „Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein”. This article places a barrier to the state to engage in activities which are in contradiction with any of these freedoms and rights and equality in the government and workplaces and the ban on discrimination, as implied by the Convention itself. In the Alevi issue it relates most to the question of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs which is, in the Alevi view, filled up with Sunnis and Alevis are not fairly represented in the Diyanet – basically not at all represented. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed in 1950, enacted in 1953, is one of the most relevant international regulations that apply to Turkey as well, especially since one of the major goals of Turkish foreign policy is the accession to the EU, which puts a high emphasis on human rights and the freedom of religion and conscience. The ECHR states in Article 9 that: 11  “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, and to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The Article consists of two parts. The first describes the rights’ details and the second provides details about possible restrictions. One important point to underline in this Article is the right to manifest religion publicly and in private as well, which includes the practice of religion in worship places and also relates to the control of the holy sites of a certain religion. The article may seem clear, however, as the guide to the implementation of Article 9 (Murdoch, 200711) points out, the application of Article 9 requires care to determine whether an issue in question really falls into the scope of this particular article, meaning that several issues that may be considered as part of religious rights might just as well fall under other articles of the Convention, such as Article 10 or 14, and Article 2 of Protocol 1 and Protocol 12 may also be involved. It reflects the complexity of these issues and the overlapping of several categories. Article 10 of the Convention regulates the freedom of expression, thought, conscience and belief: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.” This Article contains the same second element about restrictions as Article 9: interference with rights is permissible in case of pressing social need and in protection of public health and morals, as long as it is necessary in a democratic society and justification is provided. Article 14 on the other hand provides protection against discrimination on the basis of religion or belief: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 11 available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/88B98643-09C1-4D80-ACD8- EBBB51851747/0/DG2ENHRHAND092007.pdf 12  religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. More importantly, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 also has a point of intersection with Article 9, as it provides right to education without discrimination, and it also states that parents’ convictions shall be taken into consideration to ensure that the education is in conformity with their beliefs (Murdoch, 2007, p. 49). This is something that seriously touches the Alevi community of Turkey: many of their complaints emanate from their problems in schools due to mandatory religious classes at state schools, that feed the perception of the state as a Sunni Islamic state that oppresses non-Sunni communities and forces them to follow their beliefs. Protocol No. 12 provides citizens with further protection against discrimination. Another UN document issued in 1981 bears the name Declaration of Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief12 which is another document banning discrimination and stating similar principles to the ones mentioned above. Besides the above mentioned international conventions on human rights related issues, the Turkish Constitution13 itself provides the rights also mentioned in the ECHR regarding the freedom of religion and conscience, as developed in Article 24 along with the mandatory religious education which is described as such: “Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual‟s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.” All the freedoms stated in the constitution leads to the barrier of respecting the unity of the state which is a reason for curtailing these freedoms according to the national constitution. Alevis’ grievances and the origins of these problems Alevis perceive themselves as oppressed by the Turkish state and considered as second-class citizens. They face several problems in the society linked to religious freedoms, right to education and to a certain extent, to the freedom of expression. Their problems are being dealt 12 Read the full text here: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/religion.htm, accessed on 27/04/11 13 Read the full constitution here: http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKE Y.pdf, accessed on 27/04/11 13 with by the state, but the initiative was considered a failure and was viewed negatively by the majority of the Alevi community. One of the main concerns of the Alevi community in Turkey is the question of mandatory religious education in state schools14. Although the Turkish state argues that the classes are only for social and moral education, Alevis see it as focused on Sunni Islam, teaching children how to be a good Sunni Muslim, but ignoring other religions, as also argued by an Alevi father in one article by Sarah Rainer for BBC15. Resentments are further deepened due to the fact that Christian and Jewish citizens of Turkey are genuinely allowed to not take the mandatory religious classes. This refers back to the Lausanne Treaty16 that regulated the post-World War 1 situation with Turkey in 1922 as well as some basic minority rights. The Lausanne Treaty declared that religious minorities cannot be submitted to religious education, which applies well for Christians, Jews and other non-Muslim sects, but not for Alevis, as they are officially considered a Muslim sect and thus are not given a religious minority status. Religious education raises concerns in the majority of the Alevi population in Turkey, however, they represent different views on how to solve the problem. Some Alevis push for the complete abolishment of religious education in state schools while others would accept a pluralistic religious education that focuses less on Sunni Islam and puts a greater emphasis on other religions, such as Christianity, Judaism, Shi’ism and Alevism, and even atheism17. Another main concern of the Alevi community of Turkey is the problem of the worship houses, called cemevi. These worship places are officially not recognised as such, and are thus excluded of government help of financial support, whereas the state finances the building of new mosques and their funding as well. This does not only imply that the functioning of the Alevi cemevis are harder to maintain, being funded only by private donors, but also that building cemevis as worship houses is considered illegal. This is presented by a recent case of closure of a company established in 2004 to fund cemevi-building, that was described as places of worship for Alevi people in the constitution of the company in question. This phrase 14 See the case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey, 2008: http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights- project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/2602 accessed on 30/04/11 15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7303536.stm accessed on 30/04/11 16 http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/ accessed on 30/04/11 17 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=alevis8217-demands-to-remain-in-next-year8217s-texts-2010-12-13 accessed on 30/04/11 14 led to controversies and finally a close procedure against the company because it was unwilling to rephrase its constitution to define cemevis as cultural institutions18. Connected to this problem is the question of state-sponsored mosque-building in Alevi villages and neighbourhoods, a main demand of the protesters in Izmir on March 6, 2011. Along with the claimed Sunni-domination as for the Directorate of Religious Affairs and mandatory religious classes, it gave way to declarations by Alevi leaders such as the one quoted in one article of Hürriyet Daily News: “[Turkey is] moving toward a one-man rule flavored by religious sauce,” Balkız said. “[Erdoğan] played with the judiciary after the referendum and in the aftermath of the [June 12] general elections, he will move toward a presidential regime. I‟m afraid an [Adolf] 19 Hitler, or [Benito] Mussolini is coming. We have to prevent this.” This also arouses several complaints in the Alevi community20 as they are struggling to get recognition for the cemevis as worship houses (it complements the demand of equal status with Sunni Muslims) and the ending of mosque-building in Alevi villages. Alevis also call for the abolishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs – although moderates voice a more conciliatory approach, namely the higher representation of Alevis within the Directorate instead of its abolishment – the same division also exists in relation to the religious education. The Directorate is viewed as Sunni-controlled, which is in turn perceived to be contrary to the principle of equality and also to the principle of secularisation for a link between state and church is made in a way which promotes one religious faction over the others. It is also argued that the Directorate only services Sunnis, meaning that state- sponsored religious services are provided for the Sunni Muslims whereas Alevis do not enjoy the same benefits. Some changes occurred in the past years, as the state accepted to put Alevi dedes on government payroll and to pay the utility bills of the cemevis21. Added to this comes the question of the Madimak Hotel in Sivas, the place of the massacre where more than 30 Alevis were killed by Sunnis the 2 July 1993. Alevis demand that the hotel be transformed to a museum and dedicated to the memory of those who lost their lives there; yet, the state hesitates to cede to the demand. Connected to this in a way is the question of the control over the religious and holy sites of Alevis that are currently 18 Read about the case in the following articles: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=closure-case-against-alevi- association-kicks-off-2011-02-10 and www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=cemevi-building-association-faces-closure-for- cemevibuilding-2010-12-24 19 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=thousands-demand-equal-rights-for-the-alevi-faith-2011-03-06, accessed on 30/04/11 20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7303536.stm accessed on 30/04/11 21 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=162671 accessed on 30/04/11 15 controlled by the Sunni-dominated Directorate of Religious Affairs. Alevis are still striving to get control over their own holy sites, but as long as they are considered part of the overall Muslim community of Turkey, it is less possible that they get recognition for this claim. Alevis were also pushing for media representation of their views and their culture, which was finally provided to them by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) in 2008, preceding the Muslim holy month of Muharram, when the TRT offered to broadcast emissions for and about the Alevis22. This is a step forward widened freedom of press and expression, regarded that Alevis were for long deprived of media representation. These claims are often echoed by Alevi leaders and common people as well, and indicates the failure of the state-initiated „Alevi initiative‟ that had as its aim the achievement of better understanding between the Sunni and the Alevi, and the decrease of Alevis’ grievances. In the framework of this initiative, the government organised several workshops to promote mutual understanding and embarked on projects to alleviate the problems that the Alevi community has to face – however, this initiative is more seen as a way to assimilation and making Sunnis out of Alevis23. These workshops ended with an Alevi report made by the state: contrary to general expectations, this report only further angered the Alevis and turned them against the system, arguing that their faith is being defined by persons outside the community and that the Alevi issue is being used in politics and geared towards the elections with the aim to sooth the international opinion24. On the other hand, the report does not promote real solutions to the Alevis’ demands and excuses are being made on the basis of some Republican reforms, for example with regard to the legal status of the cemevis25. The majority of Alevis’ grievances goes back to the question of minority status: the rights of religious minorities as provided by the Lausanne Treaty could solve most of the problems that Alevis face today, yet it would have other implications to the politics of the country. Minority Status 22 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=162671 accessed on 30/04/11 23 www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=alevi-opening-futile-aims-at-eradicating-our-belief-saysalevi- congress-2011-01-16 accessed on 30/04/11 24 www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=8216alevi-opening8217-has-not-reached-its-aim-sayalevi- associations-2011-04-05 accessed on 30/04/11 25 www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=alevis-not-satisfied-with-government8217s-alevireport- 2011-04-01 accessed on 30/04/11 16 The fundaments of the minority status that is applicable in Turkey was laid down by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty26 that regulated the situation in the region after the first World War. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire left the new Turkey with several religious and ethnic minorities whose status was not clearly defined. The Treaty states that: „All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.”(Section III, Article 38), which contains the same rights and same restraints as mentioned in later documents. Yet it is interesting to point out that the text talks about inhabitants of Turkey and not of its citizens: „Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.” (Section III, Article 39), having today reference not only to religious rights but also to the right of fair trial as included in Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. „Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.” (Section III, Article 40). This article clearly states minorities’ rights to establish their own religious institutions although does not guarantee state support for them. „In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes” (Section III, Article 41). These articles provide the most important minority rights. However, in the case of Turkish Alevis, a significant problem emerges: they are officially not considered as minority, but as 26 read full text at http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/ , accedded on 30/04/11 17 part of the Muslim community, and particularly as an offshoot of Shi’a Islam. This means that the minority rights laid down already in the Lausanne Treaty are not applicable on them. Yet, several members of the Alevi and Sunni communities argue that Alevis are not really part of Islam, they are so different: their ideology differs as well as the basis of their faith and their social organisational structure. What most alienated Alevis from Islam is the practical deification of Ali, the belief in a sort of trinity and the argument that the Coran has been modified by the enemies of Ali (yet this phrase is also present in Shi’a Islam). Alevis themselves are struggling for recognition as equal to, but different from, Sunni Islam. They usually refuse to be labelled as Muslims on their identity cards and often leave the space blank – although the notion of Muslim brings social advantages. Yet, the government refuses to recognise Alevis as a distinct religious group: religious minorities only include the several Christian sects and Jews. The origin of this is the founding principle of the Turkish Republic, claiming that public acknowledgement of any cultural and religious group should not be permitted, other than Turkish and Muslim – which are two notions intertwined in the concept of Turkishness (Shankland, 2003, p. 159). This is in turn connected to the concept of secularism, which is however perceived by Alevis as violated, because of the importance of Islam and the existence of the Diyanet as such. As long as Alevis are being officially considered as part of the majority Muslim community, there is not much chance for them to get all the freedoms and rights they want: they are provided with all what the government provides to other Muslim sects: religious education, state-sponsored mosque-building and payment of imams from the government budget, and even a Sunni-dominated Diyanet. But this is not what Alevis want. Alevis do not pray in mosques and do not have imams – they have instead cemevis and dedes who are not paid nor supported by the state, and are not even recognized as worship houses. They complain about the mandatory religious education and also about Sunni-domination. Conclusion The paper presented the main characteristics of Alevism, the main aspects of its historical background, the relevant conventions that regulate religious freedom and connected rights, and the grievances of the Alevis. Struggling for recognition, there are several possible solutions, according to what is being recognized. One preferable solution from the state’s point of view is the recognition of 18 Alevism as a movement and thus give them social and political rights but still deprive them of the religious rights they are fighting for, which angers Alevis. A second possible solution is to recognize Alevism as it is based on Bektashi and other brotherhoods, which would also imply the recognition of dozens of tarikats, which is unacceptable for the administration. The third solution is the one favoured by Alevis but still refused by the state: the recognition of Alevism as a distinct faith (Shankland, 2003, p. 160). Sunnis already find their faith heretical and they are advocating Alevis’ return to real Islam, repudiate their non-Islamic views and take up Islamic elements, such as going to mosques, praying and giving zakat. As it was pointed out in the article, Alevi faith has the basis of being recognised as a religion distinct from Islam due to its particularities and syncretistic nature. Being given the minority status, the Lausanne Treaty could be immediately applicable on them, providing them with the foundations of the rights they desire. This could serve as a starting point to the expansion of religious freedoms onto the Alevi community, and as a continuation of this process, the more recent international conventions and agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the several UN treaties protecting freedom of religion could be also applicable on the Alevi community, giving them all the rights and freedoms they are struggling for. Alevis perceive their treatment by the government as oppression and forced “Sunnification” going against their own wishes. However, the state’s behaviour can be explained by the concept of Turkishness, which involves those who are Turkish and Muslim. Other groups, be it Muslim but not Turkish, or Turkish but not Muslim, are considered lower- class citizens and not real Turks. This view would lead to a highly problematic situation in the case of the Alevis’ recognition for two reasons: on the one hand, 20% of the Alevis are Kurds who thus face a double burden: they are already ethnically excluded, and in case of recognition as a religion, they would also face religious exclusion, which would deprive them from this one remaining point of reference to the Turkish state which serves as a tool of identification with the state itself. The other and more important thing is that as soon as Alevism is acknowledged as a faith distinct from Islam, it means that they lose their Muslimness and become excluded from the ranks of real Turks. This would be dangerous regarded that the number of Alevis is around 15-25 million people in Turkey, which makes up approximately ¼ of the overall population. 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