[PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION] Race W. Outhwaite and S. Turner (eds.), Sage Handbook of Political Sociology (forthcoming 2017) Alana Lentin, Western Sydney University Introduction Race is a fiction and a force (Fields and Fields 2012); its fictitiousness, far from abetting its forcefulness, buoys it. In making this claim I do not wish to imply that race is perennial, universal or inevitable. Rather, race is adaptable and as such the ‘western’ societies in which race originates are neither raceless nor postracial. There has been a failure to give race the full consideration it requires if it is to be transcended. This might seem an exaggerated statement with which to begin, given the countless words written on race and racism. However, taking sociology as indicative of the social sciences in general, despite the investment of myriad scholars, activists and educators in deconstructing and historicizing race both conceptually and politically, there is still a tendency to consider the questions these investigations precipitate as marginal rather than central to our discipline. Beyond the historically verifiable investment by western sociology in race as a concept (Hund 2014, Morris 2015), the foregrounding by key bearers of the discipline of a ‘white’ over a ‘black analytics’ (Hesse 2014, Ladner 1973), and its failure by and large to address and redress the role of race and racism in its foundations (Bhambra 2015), sociologists today, it is fair to assume, would largely see the discipline as opposed to racism. ‘Racism’, as Barnor Hesse insightfully remarks, ‘is more objected to than understood in sociology’ (Hesse 2014: 141). When it is only as a result of the objection to it that racism becomes an object of analysis, then it is not racism itself that is being observed but rather the objection which comes to stand in its place. I suggest that one of the reasons for which racism is examined only through this objection is because race has largely been perceived as properly belonging outside the boundaries of sociological interpretation. From around the time of the US civil rights movement in particular, but with precedents stretching back to the inter-war (Hesse 2011) and post-Shoah years (Goldberg 2006, Lentin 2014, Salem and Thompson 2016), race was constructed both as a political aberration and as a scientific one. With the predominance of post-structuralism, race became generally accepted – as W.E.B. Du Bois had already established in the late 19th century – as a social construct. This meant that it became easy to sever the analytical connections between sociology as a discipline, race as a construct, and racist practices. If sociologists did not formally believe in the existence of races, how could they mobilise them in perpetuating their attendant inequalities? Moreover, just as the socially constructed nature of race was first theorized by black scholars such as Du Bois, postcolonial scholars such as Stuart Hall questioned the certainties that resulted from the presumed immutability of racial taxonomies. Hence, the theorization of cultural hybridity and multiple identities gradually instilled a shared understanding of the fact that racial divisions were in fact founded upon less stable grounds than the orthodoxies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would have it. Along with a generalized disinterest among sociologists in the importance of colonialism for modern nation-state formations (Bhambra 2011), it might be considered 1 that the twin knowledges of ‘social construction’ and ‘hybridity’ further enabled race and racism to be objected to rather than studied in sociology. None of this is to blame those who ‘struck back’ at Empire with their scholar-activism grounded in the ‘lived experience’ of colonization, immigration and racist marginalization. Rather, it notes the means through which ‘white sociology’ (Ladner 1973, Hund 2014) has largely succeeded in establishing racism as a problem without, systematically, problematizing it.1 Race, furthermore, has largely been apprehended as something that is rather than, as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun puts it, something that does something (Kyong Chun 2012). Sociologists have learned that race is not anything because it is a representational construct and because its apparent manifestations are hybrid rather than hermetic. This allows the technical dimensions of race to be less prominent, obscuring what Kyong Chun speaks of as the ‘carefully crafted, historically inflected system of tools, mediation, or enframing that builds history and identity?’ that more aptly describes race (ibid.: 7). So, while taking into account, as Clough does, that race ‘as twenty-first-century media’ (Clough forthcoming: 12) might be doing something quite different to race as biopolitics for example (Foucault 1997) – in other words remaining cognizant of race’s adaptive possibilities – I want to privilege a focus on race as doing rather than being. This focus helps us look critically at race as identity while at the same time not losing sight of the power of identities represented by what Du Bois called ‘the badge of colour’ to engender the mobilizations that drive both the understandings of race on which this contribution is based but also in helping transform the unjust conditions it produces (Du Bois 2004[1940]: 43). My aim in the chapter is thus to do three things: trace the trajectory of race as central to nation-state formations (Balibar 1991) and what Anibal Quijano has called the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano 2000); outline the intellectual legacies of race through scientific and cultural routes and show how a combination of these two, purportedly incompatible, modes of interpretation construct race as inherently political; and thirdly, discuss the contemporary political ramifications of race as it adapts to twenty-first century realities while considering the implications of this for both studying racism and challenging it. The contours of race and racism are infinitely wide and thus I will be unable to do justice to explaining them fully. Rather, by focusing on the implications of asking what race does both for a political understanding of race and racism and, crucially here, for an interrogation of the role of sociologists in providing the necessary tools for challenging race, I hope to contribute something useful to those who realize that we treat race as peripheral at our peril. The chapter will be divided into the following sections. • Racial structures, racial logics. • Raced bodies. • Race: science and culture. 1Writing of US-American sociology, Hesse claims Black and White sociology develop along two separate paths due to the active exclusion of Black sociologists, going back to Du Bois, from the discipline (see Morris 2015). In relation to racism, Black sociology refutes mainstream or White sociology’s failure to expose racism. Hesse: ‘sociology’s narration of racism is Black analytically where it interrogates these sociological foreclosures of colonial-racial characterizations of the West and analyses the routine conflation of its modern social formations with the normativity of white domination and non-white subordination’ (Hesse 2014: 143). 2  • Conclusion: Race, post-race. Each section will elaborate on how race as a purported way of making sense of human difference becomes useful, through a series of connections to other ideas and practices, as a primary means of managing that difference. Racial structures, racial logics One of the major problems facing the study of race and racism is the predominance of a chronological account, or what Francisco Bethencourt has called the ‘perspective of linear and cumulative racism’ (Bethencourt 2013: 3). He, like David Goldberg (2015), insists on a ‘relational’ account of racism that examines it against the ‘historical conjunctures’ at which race and racism come into play (Bethencourt 2013: 1). Goldberg also demands that the study of race and racism respect an ‘interactive’ methodology which recognizes that ‘racial ideas and arrangements circulate, cross borders, shore up existing or prompt new ones as they move between established political institutions’ (Goldberg 2015a: 254). So it is shortsighted to examine local racisms as discrete phenomena, while recognizing their unique timbre, and to think of them as encapsulable in what I have called ‘frozen’ examples (Lentin 2016), the ‘Holy Trinity’ of ‘Nazi Germany, Jim Crow and Apartheid South Africa’, noted by Hesse (Burtenshaw 2013). However, while agreeing that we need to think of the ways in which racisms, and thus the meanings inscribed in race, change both over time and in relation to context, this should not mean seeing them as open-ended. Indeed, as Miri Song notes, we have reached the point today that ‘almost any form of racial statement’ is seen as racist (Song 2014, 109), allowing for the ideas of ‘reverse racism’ or ‘anti-white racism’ (Liminana Dembélé 2016) to become acceptable. Song argues that we need to ask ‘what exactly constitutes racism, and who or what can (or cannot) be racist’ (ibid.). So, we need definitions of race and racism that are flexible enough to draw out their interactive, relational, and non-linear dimensions yet which do not universalise it to the point of becoming ahistorical, analytically meaningless and, I would add, politically dangerous. We also need accounts that insist on their systemic nature without at the same time denying individual complicity or, in other words, absolving people of their racist behaviours and beliefs (Wolfe 2016). However, neither do we want to reduce racism to attitudes and individual behaviours, as do many social psychological studies of racism that have gone on to underpin mainstream pedagogies of antiracism. It therefore might be good to think about race as both a series of logics and structures that mutually inform and constitute the other. By elaborating on how these function in relation to the question of ‘what race does’ over the course of the chapter, I hope to explain race and racism as simultaneously many-tentacled and historically grounded. In Stuart Hall’s seminal discussion of the Althusserian idea of articulation as it relates to racism he explains how ‘complex structures’ are always the result of linkages (articulations) between different phenomena (Hall 1980). This explains why, in Hall’s view, it is short sighted to reduce racism to either economically reductive or uniquely sociological explanations. He also denies the utility of any naturalising accounts of race, writing ‘appeals to “human nature” are not explanations; they are an alibi’ (ibid.: 338). In ‘Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance’, Hall states that ‘the structures through which black labour is reproduced […] are not simply “coloured” by race; they work through race’ (ibid.: 340). In other 3 words, at each level of social formation – ‘economic, political ideological’ – race enters to shape the ways in which, in the case of his example the ‘black labouring classes’, are ‘complexly constituted’ (ibid.). Race shapes the ways in which these Black workers are treated in the labour market, the forms of political representation and struggles they can engage in, and the tenor of debates over culture, representation, and it is important to add, gender and sexual relations (Hill Collins 1990). Race is not chosen as the modality through which these conflicts or confluences take shape; Hall turns to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to partially explain the ways in which particular ideological practices are formed. But, more important to my mind, he insists that, although each case is different and demands examination on its own merits, and racial precepts do not underpin all phenomena that later come to be racially imbued – slavery for example – in order to understand why, for example, the black British working class sees its interests ‘working through’ race, it is necessary to closely observe the historical trajectories that led to it being so. Structural racism has been tempered by accounts that privilege racial assemblages (Puar 2007, Weheliye 2014) or patterns (Valayden 2013). To avoid the teleological certainty that structural accounts may encourage, it may be more useful, as Puar proposes following Delanda, to see ‘race and gender [as] situated as attributes only within a study of “the pattern of recurring links, as well as the properties of those links”’ (Puar 2011, Delanda 2006: 56). For Barad (2003), ‘race, gender, sexuality—are considered events, actions, and encounters, between bodies, rather than simply entities and attributes of subjects’ (Puar 2011). This formulation avoids re-reifying race as consigning individuals with fixed identities to pre-determined outcomes. It appears to oppose Hall’s idea that the work of race is to ‘cement’ societies together through the dual processes of inclusion and exclusion (of the racially undesirable or excessive). As Puar remarks, bodies are surveilled ‘not on identity positions alone but through affective tendencies and statistical probabilities’ (Puar 2011). However, she also makes clear that an outright rejection of the idea that one’s subject positioning or identity has no relevance for how one is treated ignores the fact that some people – ‘statistical outliers’ – may never be counted within ‘the fantasy of never-ending inclusion’ and are still subject to ‘discipline and punish…the primary mode of power apparatus’ (ibid.). These discussions point again to race as a doing rather than a being. Etienne Balibar for example insists that ‘racism – a true “total social phenomenon” – inscribes itself in practices’ (Balibar 1991: 17). And Hall refers to the ‘concrete historical “work” which racism accomplishes under specific historical conditions’ (Hall 1980: 338). Paying attention to how, under what conditions and through which precise processes racial ‘practices, discourses, and representations’ (Balibar 1991: 18) become attached to particular collectivities of immutably constituted individuals will lead us to notice both the continuities, and crucially the differences, that are manifest over time and between contexts. Thus, being aware of the structural conditions in which race is operative does not mean that those conditions are always the same or that they are pessimistically destined to reproduce themselves ad infinitum (Kyriakides 2012). At the same time, completely throwing the baby out with the structural bathwater may lead to a failure to observe the imprint of certain legacies, colonialism and slavery most prominently, on current racial formations,2 such as the 2One example is the similarity between asylum detention centres, especially those run by Australia in the Pacific, and historical concentration camps in Namibia, South Africa or Europe during the Second World War. 4 continuities between the racialization of the prison industrial complex and Jim Crow laws (Alexander 2010). Structures then are constantly made and remade through the racialising processes that are attached to them (e.g. the labour market in Hall’s example), leading to them being unseen or even denied. This in turn leads to the avoidance of race in many mainstream accounts of power. What we may call racial logics underpin both the circuitous and malleable features of the operations of race and their apparent invisibility to many scholars who symbolically re-enact racist violence through the denial of its significance (Lentin 2014). The task therefore is to lay bare these logics and to demonstrate the role they play in making situations racial. For example, there was nothing pre-determined about the fact that the European colonisation of much of the world came to be organised and legitimated on racial grounds. Rather, through a complex coupling of ideas originating in the first theorisations of immutable racial difference in the 1500s, the challenges to monogenism which reconfigured the boundaries of the human, and the development of Enlightenment methodologies of categorisation and differentiation, the colonial could be imbued with the racial, and in turn gain dominance. Dispossession, genocide, displacement, enslavement, and foreign rule could eventually be rationalised by that which, by the nineteenth century, had become cemented as the bioracial explanation of human differences (Fields and Fields 2012). In other words, race does not pre-exist the contexts of its making as a preformed idea; rather it is created in these contexts, as it continues to be. As Goldberg notes, a form of anti-racism already existed from at least the sixteenth century. However, the form of that contestation did not result in less racism, rather in racism of a different tenor. The two registers of race that Goldberg identifies in his 2002 book, The Racial State, can be described as racial logics, both of which have infused understandings of race since the Valladolid debate between De Las Casas and Sepúlveda. As Goldberg explains, ‘racial ideas have always been diverse, shifting over time, even throughout slavery’ (Goldberg 2015b: 9). Although slavery was the lens through which ideas about race were formed from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, according to Goldberg, the Valladolid debate injected a question over what race meant for conceptualising the human which was at the heart of ongoing challenges to the legitimacy of slavery, both before and after formal ‘emancipation’. In short, while De Las Casas argued for the humanity of the ‘Indians’ whom Spain had conquered and enslaved in the Americas, Sepúlveda argued for their natural predisposition to slavery based on their irrational, and thus less-than-human, practices such as idolatry and cannibalism. This gave way to what Goldberg has characterised as two modalities of race – naturalism and historicism. While under naturalism, non-Europeans are condemned to an irretrievable state of inherent inferiority, racial historicism contains the redemptive promise of inclusion within the boundaries of humanity for ‘natives’ under the tutelage of superior Europeans (Goldberg 2002). Although naturalism precedes historicism, the advent of the latter does not entirely replace the former logic. Indeed, while historicist ideas underpinned the abolitionist movement that contributed to seeing slavery officially wound down in the early 1800s, naturalist notions were recompounded in the development of ‘racial science’, Social Darwinism and eugenicism, which reached their apex in the early 20th century and rationalised the Nazi genocide. As Goldberg explains, under historicism, although non- 5 Europeans were ranked as ‘less historically mature’ than ‘Euro-provincials’, ‘nothing inherently prevents any non-European from advancing (through education and self-striving) to maturity’ (Goldberg 2015b: 13). By holding the possibility of humanisation out to non-Europeans, historicism is processually progressive, denying ‘immediate existing equality’ (ibid. 14). It is the primacy placed on European/white leadership and guidance towards that promise of equality that recompounds the, albeit apparently more flexible, idea of racial hierarchy, and makes historicism the more enduring of these two racial logics. From our vantage point, naturalism is the unacceptable face of race – racism as open discrimination based on a totalising division between legitimate and illegitimate claimants for inclusion within the definition of the human. Historicism, by allowing room for inclusion yet never establishing an end to its inherent trajectory by fixing the terms of full equality, remains racism’s acceptable face; we can see the logic at work in discourses of international development for example (Wilson 2012). Aldon Morris, in his account of the sociological life of the great African-American scholar, W.E.B. Du Bois, demonstrates how this historicist dynamic was at play in early twentieth century attitudes towards ‘Negro education’. Du Bois’s famous conflict with the black leader Booker T. Washington presages the questions of self-determination that were at the heart of the struggle against the paternalism of historicist ideas. While Du Bois believed that his scholarship, and that of the black (and white female) students he mentored over his career ‘could be used as a weapon for racial liberation’ (Morris 2015: 15), Washington was more palatable to the white establishment when he advocated for a historicist vision according to which giving black people a liberal arts education was wasteful because ‘it is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top’ (Washington [1895]1974: 584). The realisation of the impact of such logics on the affirmation of racial domination was at the heart of anticolonial thought and struggle. The relationship between racism and universalism in particular was at the heart of ambivalence towards Western thought in postcolonial, decolonial and Black thinking (cf. Gordon 2008). According to Balibar, universalist ideas are bound up with the aim of establishing a ‘general idea of man (sic)’ (Balibar 1994: 356) and in order to define the boundaries of the human, exemplary humanity was held up against its constitutive other, the non- or less than-human, which in the political context of European global domination within which European universalist philosophies were worked out, meant native peoples, slaves, and colonized peoples. Hence, questioning racial logics and the knowledges in which they are situated goes hand in hand with challenging racist structures. And far from being contained solely in the naturalist precepts of nineteenth century ‘scientific’ bioracism, such logics exist within the contradictions of universalist thought, and in no small part are afforded by them. As the history of the Haitian revolution shows, for example, although the revolutionary leader Toussaint l’Ouverture used the rallying cries of liberty and equality to proclaim freedom from slavery and Haitian independence, ‘the slave trade and slavery were the economic basis for the French Revolution’ (James 1989: 47). Hence, although slavery and colonisation were used as examples by the French revolutionaries, in practice despite the significance of abolitionist feeling, they could not alienate their bourgeois financiers for whom the end of slavery meant the loss of property, and thus wealth (Sternfeld 2007). All this is lost in the official recounting of the French revolution and the place of Haiti within it. As Sternfeld argues, the role played by the ‘Black Jacobins’ in fighting on behalf of the French against the Spanish following the abolition of 6 slavery by revolutionary France means that it is arguably Haiti, and not France that defines universalism. However, ‘universalist criticism [is] always predicated on the assumption that universalism’s perspective goes from the hegemonic centre to the fringes’ (ibid.). What I have aimed to establish here is that, due to the dual logics that Goldberg proposes underpin the development of racial thought and racial rule – naturalism and historicism – we are left with the allied problem that the roots and routes of race are obscured. Because, as we shall see, racism has been successfully tethered exclusively to a bioracial account, and that its economic and geopolitical dimensions have been obscured by the very discourses of universalism that deflected from the inequalities they contained, the historicist dimension of race has been obscured. The effect of this is to see western logics of progress as determining the ability of all peoples to accede to full humanity while simultaneously veiling the fact that the very idea of historicism determines the fact that ‘progress’ is defined as a linear trajectory from primitive nativehood/blackness to civilized European/whiteness. In sum, racial structures are bound by racial logics that have specific historical origins in European invasion, slavery and colonisation. That is to say, structures are made racial by being imbued with discourses about, for example, the inherency of non-European inferiority, or the possibility of progressive inclusion. And these logics, as we shall see in the later sections of the chapter, are added to (if not replaced by others) to apply to changing conditions, for example under multiculturalism or ‘postracialism’. Raced bodies Bethencourt’s criticism of linear accounts of racism also alerts us to the problem of thinking about race as either purely ideological, exclusively economic, or only ‘scientific’. In this and the next section, I hope to show how these various registers are concurrent and codependent, the multiple methods through which racial logics flow and are given meaning within racialised structures. The most unavoidable dimension of race is its attachment to particular bodies. However, as the emphasis on history should announce, these are not arbitrary bodies: the reason Black and non-white (brown) bodies are coded as racially inferior has everything to do with the fact that Black and Brown people were to be found in the territories invaded by Europe from which slaves were also taken. And, as the history of immigration to the ‘West’ reveals, this initial linking of ‘colour, hair and bone’ (Du Bois [1897]2007: 180) to relative power status endures: Black and brown migrants continue to be those either locked out of the world’s wealthy countries or occupying positions of relative domination and exploitation within them. The story is of course tempered by the fact that race is elastic and that racial inclusion has been, and continues to be, extended to those previously coded as Other, Jews, Southern Europeans, and the Irish (Ignatiev 2008) most prominently in settler colonies such as the US, Canada and Australia, whose very existence is predicated on the elimination of the rights of ownership of native people and, in the case of the US, on the enslavement of Black Africans at the core of global economic supremacy. Bearing the idea of elasticity in mind as a way of analogising race’s adaptability to context and contingency, we should not at the same time lose sight of the undeniable fact that racial inclusion does not extend to encompass everyone equally. We are not (yet) postracial (Goldberg 2015b). A focus on the way in which 7 race continues to stick to Black bodies and to define the experiences and possibilities of Black people outside of Africa allows us to see just how much this is so. What we are dealing with here is an enduring association between the signifier of blackness (Hall 1997) and the legacies of racial logics and structures. Blackness and black thought allow us to map the boundaries of race, stretch the elastic to its maximum capacity, and from that vantage point explain what race means in practical terms in the experiences of Black people (Du Bois 1903, [1940]2007; Fanon 1967). As Alexander Weheliye shows, the failure of European theorists of modern violence, such as Foucault or Agamben, to begin with the Middle Passage instead of the Holocaust means an avoidance of how integral the degradation and exploitation of Black people was to the establishment of western dominance (Weheliye 2014). What looking at the relationality between ‘the concentration camp, the colonial outpost, and slave plantation’ (ibid. 37) brings to light is their non-exceptional nature; contra post-Shoah orthodoxy, none trump the other, but all coexist to demonstrate the unavoidable centrality of human violation to modernity (ibid. 36). Indeed, looking at slavery zooms in on exactly this non-exceptionality. Again Weheliye considers the existence of slavery within ‘the normal juridico-political order’ (ibid.37) where the aim was not to exterminate slaves, as in the case of the Nazi Holocaust, but neither to preserve life. Following Spillers (2003), Weheliye alerts us to the ‘enfleshment’ of enslaved Black people: ‘If the body represents the legal personhood qua self-possession, then the flesh designates those dimensions of human life cleaved by the working together of depravation and deprivation. In order for this cruel ruse to succeed, however, subjects must be transformed into flesh before being granted the illusion of possessing a body’ (ibid.: 39). I take this to mean that because race was initially theorised in relation to individuals conceived of – in naturalist terms – as wholely incommensurable with white, Europeans then, unlike in the case of previously assimilated Jews exterminated in the concentration camps, they remain in many ways irredeemable to humanity and thus expendable. For many complicated reasons beyond the scope of this chapter, Jews’ suffering in the Holocaust becomes emblematic of the ‘crime against humanity’, but the humanness of that suffering, according to Weheliye and Spillers, is not extended in the case of Black people who after all were interned in German concentration camps, on for example Shark Island in Namibia, well before the Nazis modelled the ‘final solution’ on these precedents. Thus, Spillers, by distinguishing the flesh from the body, proffers an explanation for why Black people continue to bear the brunt of racialised violence and inequality today: what she calls ‘“hieroglyphics of the flesh”… is transmitted to the succeeding generations of black subjects who have been “liberated” and granted body in the aftermath of de jure enslavement’ (ibid.). Gender and status property Gender and sexuality are key for explaining the ‘anchoring of racial difference in physiology and the banning of black subjects from the domain of the human’ (ibid. 42). The way in which Black people are made to appear as either ‘hyperfeminine’/’hypermasculine’ or, conversely as desexualised’ (ibid. 41) is fundamental to their placement beyond the realm of humanity. In particular, black feminist scholars have 8 argued that shedding light on the experience of Black women, often overlooked, under racial regimes and as the bearers of racial progeny alerts us to the fact that race exists as part of what Patricia Hill Collins calls a ‘matrix of domination’ including gender, sexuality and class (Collins 1990). Because racism elicits anxieties about racial purity, Black and Indigenous women are the transgressors of racial boundaries. The violence that they endured, and in many places continue to endure – note for example the cases of rape of asylum seekers in Australian offshore detention camps3 – is, from the point of view of racial preservation not read as violence, but as the violation of the borders between purity and impurity. While in the past, under US slavery for example, women who were raped by white slave owners and bore ‘mixed-race’ children were deemed responsible for miscegenation, and thus the loss of racial purity, today women who have been sexually abused in Australia’s detention centres are portrayed by politicians as ‘using’ their (doubted) experiences to seek entry to Australia, thus violating its borders. As Weinbaum shows, ‘race and reproduction are bound together’ (Weinbaum 2004: 6) and ‘notions of national belonging [depend] on the idea that race is something that can be reproduced’ (ibid. 17). Despite the fact that what she calls ‘the white subject’s ontological certitude conceals nothing less than the pervasive history of race mixing in the United States’ (ibid.), and thus reveals the basic lie about ‘purity’ upon which race is based, women of colour as the purported transmitters of the ‘one drop of black blood’ are disproportionately punished for the transgression of the lines of purity/impurity. Black and otherwise racialised women are portrayed variably as oversexualised, overly submissive or unjustifiably angry. These ways of delegitimising their existence to either justify their suppression or their paternalist (or maternalist) ‘protection’ – Spivak’s (1988) ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ – avert attention from the role played by racial reproduction in the maintenance of white property. For Weinbaum, following Harris, whiteness comes to be associated with property; they are both based on ‘the right to exclude’ (Weinbaum 2004: 21, Harris 1994). After the end of the Civil War in the United States and the formal end of slavery, Blacks remained unequal because they did not own property, unlike whites for whom the ‘ownership of property in the form of land, animals, and slaves’ differentiated them from Blacks and entitled them to the rights of citizenship (ibid.). ‘Status property’, as Weinbaum explains, ‘came to reside in the body in the form of whiteness’. Hence the maternal body assumes importance as that which transmits ‘racial property over time’ (ibid.). As Weinbaum asserts, ‘status property relies upon the consolidation of a reproductive logic in which this form of property is understood to be bequeathed not by deed but by one’s mother’ (ibid.). Read the other way round, and echoing Collins’s idea of domination as a matrix, Mitropoulos reminds us that ‘there is, very simply, no way to think about sexual economics without speaking, also, of the organisation of race’. They are ‘both crucial to the inscriptions of genealogy, the transmission of property through name’ (Mitropoulos 2012: 100). By speaking about the embeddedness of race in the body, and specifically the sexual, reproductive body, we can see how the racial logics which, I argued in the first section, flow through and link structures that come to be imbued racially (property, the labour market, prisons, etc.) are a vital focus. What Weinbaum calls the ‘race/reproduction bind’ is a central racialising logic that is too often ignored, despite 3McKenzie-Murray, ‘Nauru rapes: “There is a war on women”’, The Saturday Paper, August 22 2015. https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/immigration/2015/08/22/nauru-rapes-there-war- women/14401656002263. Accessed May 31 2016. 9 understandings of the centrality of reproducibility to the nation, for example (Yuval-Davis 1997). Perhaps it is the dominant reticence to see race and nation or, to follow Balibar, racism and nationalism, as existing in a relationship of ‘reciprocal determination’ that obscures this from view (Balibar 1991). However, drawing attention to this sheds light on the conundrum at the heart of race that, if bodies are to be exploitable, as in the case of slavery, or as present-day migrants and asylum seekers (Mitropoulos and Kiem 2016), then they are also reproducible as reproductive beings with which something then has to be done. If placed alongside Weheliye and Spillers’ arguments about the Black body as enfleshed – and thus outside humanity - then this draws attention to the contemporariness of this particular logic. In all matters sexual and reproductive, Black women and Black queer and trans women and men are disciplined to greater degrees. Sterilisation of Black and Native American and Canadian and Australian Aboriginal women is an ongoing feature of the ways in which they are disciplined within racial states, compounded by, but less visible within, the neoliberal prison industrial complex (Haritaworn et al. 2014). If this can be read as having the ultimate aim of maintaining white property, it also endeavours to purify society in other ways by putting an end to its purportedly undesirable elements. When it comes to the ‘race nation’, it is not sufficient to fortify the fitness of its members, but to eliminate the sources of its potential decline, the source of which, for the most part, were and are Black and Indigenous mothers. Race: science and culture Trajectories of race and racism have often been traced as initially biological and later as cultural (Stolcke 1995). ‘Racism without race’ is said to characterise a late twentieth century move within racism, in post- immigration societies understood as multicultural whereby there is no need to have recourse to the discredited idea of ‘scientific’ race to enact racist oppression (Balibar 1991). However, in reality, there is no sense in which the biological and the cultural are separable inasmuch as they have both been used contiguously to make arguments about the necessity for human differentiation and population management of various kinds on the basis of this differentiation. Ann Stoler for example insists, ‘We’ve assumed that early racisms, the real racism, the hard racism is biological racism and now we’ve moved to a new racism, which is a cultural racism. This is a totally erroneous notion of how race has developed as a category. From the very get go […] it has always been about […] the cultural competencies that were displayed or not displayed’ (Stoler and Lambert 2014). Hence, I want to look at the biological and the cultural together in terms of the role they played concomitantly in cementing the idea of race in modernity. Race assumes immutability but, precisely because it is such an unstable concept – unprovable on any scientific measure that is not already underpinned by racialised assumptions – it needs a range of theories to explain why racial boundaries should not be transgressed. Nation-building Europe was at various stages confronted with a range of ‘unruly’ populations both externally and internally. These included the white working or underclasses that were conceived of in racial terms as feckless and uncontrollable (Balibar 1991, MacMaster 2001) but which were, for reasons of expedience, at various points folded into the white race in Europe and the US, thus already signalling the openness or adaptability of racial categorisation, and hence its lack of scientific 10 bearing. Indeed, on close examination of the discourses undergirding the creation of racialised groups, their presumed genetic inferiority was always supplemented by a discourse of incompatibility that relied on culture as much as it did on biology. The biological, phenotypical or genetic features of groups of human beings were intermeshed with their ethnic, cultural or spiritual traits and reduced to the ‘natural’. In other words, the supposed biological basis for race is inseparable from what are proposed to be its cultural effects. If racial scientists explained that the cultural capabilities of a so-called racial group were the result of its predestined ‘fitness’, they could not do so without referring to the very cultural characteristics that were said to be evidence of their position within the racial schema. Hence, culture was already subsumed under race by the proponents of nineteenth century scientific racism, meaning that the more recent idea that it is possible to separate the cultural from the biological does not take into account the actual way that race developed as an all-encompassing theory from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Science and culture may appear as distinct ways of racialising, but in fact they are ‘relationally connected’ (Hall 1980, Weheliye 2014) in the way they feed into racial structures. They form the knowledge bank out of which racialised arguments, laws, policies, etc. are created. It matters little that bioracial ‘facts’ appear to contradict themselves because culturalist reasoning (religion, ethnicity, lifestyle, etc.) can be used to supplement them in ideology and law. Fields and Fields note how this is still in play in today’s genetic research, which harks back to the ‘bio-racism’ of the nineteenth century by invoking ‘a system of classifying people steeped in folk thought’ (Fields and Fields 2012: 6). They are alarmed that, despite the advance in ‘probabilistic methods and molecular-biological’ knowledge (ibid.), the folkish has not gone away. Despite the fact that, as Du Bois already noted in 1897, building on none other than Darwin, ‘so far as purely physical characteristics are concerned, the differences between men do not explain all the great differences of their history’, there is still a tendency in some quarters to map their data onto discredited racial categories that ‘make sense’ for no other reason than they have made sense before (Du Bois [1897]2007: 180). As Fields and Fields neatly demonstrate for the medical field, sickle cell anaemia is still considered a ‘black disease’ despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. They show that this is because the power of folk precepts makes ‘racial’ and ‘genetic’ analogous, thus extrapolating from the individual to the purportedly homogenous group. This becomes even more obvious when a further extrapolation is made to ‘blood’ as in the statement, ‘even if Obama identifies as an African American he cannot deny blood’ (Fields and Fields 2012: 48). The extent to which notions derived from some idea of the biological and have become enmeshed with the cultural/folk is clear precisely when thinking about blood. Fields and Fields remark on the incongruous fact that the ‘one drop of black blood’ does not register with most Americans as metaphorical despite it appearing ‘ghoulish’ to many outsiders (ibid. 58). This points to the fact that the peculiarity of race is its ability to produce certainties out of the most unstable foundations. Arguably, it is able to do so because it enmeshes a number of registers – which I am summarising here as biological and cultural – in ways that are not always easy to follow, what Weheliye and others call ‘racialising assemblages’. The endurance of the race project after emancipation and despite its development alongside universalism, humanism, democracy and socialism was the opportunity to give it a scientific imprimatur, from the first ideas of figures such as 11 Blumenbach to the ‘racial hygiene’ of Galton or the eugenicism of Huxley or the Fabians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, well into the twentieth century. But the reason why race and racism do not wither away with the demise of racial science and eugenics after the end of the Second World War is because it is the naturalising power of the race concept that is central, and which endures despite official refutation. It is the idea that race hits some kind of nail on the head, by summarising the complexities of human behaviour in one explanation reduced to predestination that remains irresistible. However, and this is key, the actual evidence that racial scientists sought to proffer by experimenting, measuring and counting does not need to hold water for race to make sense. By mapping racial factoids, based on precepts already steeped in racialising assumptions and, crucially, the institutional arrangements that elicited the appearance of a natural human hierarchy, both in the colony and the multicultural metropole, the ‘evidence’ could always be provided. As Fields and Fields show, by relating to the nuts and bolts of race-think – blood, fitness, etc. – as folk thinking, that evidence could come from a variety of sources, ancient and modern, and always interwove narratives of culture, custom and lifestyle with those of stock, breed, and pedigree, thus mapping the complexity of the human world onto the proposed simplicity of the animal one. It is no accident, given this, that Aboriginal people in Australia were classified as ‘flora and fauna’ until a change to the constitution as late as 1967. As Moreton-Robinson has shown, when James Cook invaded Australia in 1788, he saw the people he encountered as living in a state of nature based on his observation that they had no interest in material possession. The fact that the concept of ownership did not exist in Aboriginal cultures allowed the British to declare what became Australia a people-less land and for myth to recount the country to have been taken ownership of, rather than wrested from its custodians against their will. It was this Aboriginal lack of attachment to property that allowed Cook to ‘make them appear will- less’ and thus to deny their sovereignty over the land (Moreton-Robinson 2009: 32). The naturalisation of this perceived absence of will was based on a political imperative to take the land. The racialization of Aboriginal people took the form of their exclusion from humanity altogether, as to be will-less was to lack humanity, even of a lower order. Hence, the central – cultural - ordering principles of Aboriginal relationships to land were reconfigured as proof of their naturalised emplacement outside or beneath the racial order of things. But, far from the official recognition of Aboriginal people as members of the nation leading to the rupturing of the link between the racial and the cultural in their regard, it may have set in motion the means for further cementing it. According to Elizabeth Povinelli, the passage of the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act, followed up by further Native Title legislation in the 1990s had more of an impact than the 1967 Referendum because it allowed Aboriginal people to make claims to vacant land. In other words, it meant a form of legal and economic redress for colonisation, genocide, assimilation and the ‘Stolen Generations’.4 Povinelli shows how the terms of this legislation reifies Aboriginal culture by forcing claimants to demonstrate their ‘degree of attachment’ to ancient lands and traditions and to prove that they continue to practice Aboriginal 4The Stolen Generations refers to the history of Aboriginal children taken forcibly from their parents between the 1890s and the 1970s. Many people have dubbed the present day practices of ‘Child Protection’ a new stolen generation (Grandmothers Against Removals. http://stopstolengenerations.com.au/. Accessed 6 June 2016). 12 customs. However, this insistence on providing proof of uninterrupted authentic traditional practice is almost impossible in a country ravaged by ‘cultural genocide’ (Behrendt 2011). Povinelli argues that while the Australian public wishes to celebrate Aboriginal culture and law, which they respect for being the most ancient in the world, there is a failure to equate this with actual Aboriginal people who are seen as imperfectly embodying these traditions. The meaning of this, which is pertinent also to the broader discussion of the relationship between racism and multiculturalism (Lentin and Titley 2011), is that the culture of Aboriginal people, contrary to that of Europeans, remains fixed and inflexible in the dominant view. Consequently, the very culture which was originally used as evidence of their inhumanity is now used, within contemporary ‘prescriptive multiculturalism’ (Goldberg 1993), to police their access to sovereign rights. This returns us to the focus of race, which remains the management of human groups in need of disciplining: the unruly populations standing in the way of conquest, or the exploitable in the aim of enrichment. The naturalizing logic at the core of race thinking uses all the tools at its disposal, most often interchangeably – and indeed it is here that it has greatest effect, making the cultural appear natural, insurmountable, the source both of destiny and constant adjudication. Conclusion: Race, post-race The ‘end of race’ was already embedded in the disentanglement of race from culture that became dominant in the wake of the first UNESCO Statement on Race and Racial Prejudice (1950). The ‘UNESCO Tradition’ (Barker 1983), fuelled as it was by the labours of antiracist scientists and anthropologists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, provide central legitimation for what became the dominant position: race is fictional but culture is real, and while race denotes hierarchy, and hence discrimination, cultures are relative and thus equal (Lentin 2008). By theorizing a ‘new’ cultural racism, proponents of this idea were attempting to shed light on the impossibility of the neutrality of culture as a way of denoting human difference. However, as previously argued, by focusing on the newness and, moreover in the emphasis of some (cf. Taguieff 1995), on the responsibility of anticolonialist antiracism for endowing the far right with the ‘dangerous’ language of cultural relativism, the much older roots of culturalism were obscured. It was always obvious to those on the receiving end of racism that whether biology or culture was invoked did not make a difference to the outcome when violence and discrimination were concerned. Although, as briefly glimpsed, multiculturalism did not supplant racism, rather displacing it officially into the realm of culture - as integration, but also the consumption of ‘otherness’ (Hage 1998) – the postracial is the death knell of the multicultural, ‘as both social arrangement and normative value’ (Goldberg 2015b: 27). Under its terms, race has been officially declared null and void. Subverting arguments for the inadequacies of racial theory, advocates of the postracial use the ‘end of race’ against those who have been forced to wear a ‘badge of colour’ due to having ‘suffered a long disaster and hav[ing] one long memory’ (Du Bois 2004[1940]: 43). In other words, having been subject to oppression undergirded by racialising arguments for five or so centuries, Black and other racialised people are no longer permitted, in a postracial era, either to identify racially and, more crucially, to mobilise, collectivise, or seek redress on the basis of race. 13 While several authors have sought to recuperate postracialism for antiracism, most prominently Paul Gilroy (1998), it remains difficult to separate the aims of racial eliminativism from the political trajectory taken by the postracial, particularly, though not exclusively, since the election of Barack Obama in 2008 (St Louis 2015). For Barnor Hesse, this is because the postracial has always been written into a dominant liberal and Eurocentric vision of racism which identifies it as at odds with European values and thus always extraneous to democracy. Such a view, which proceeds as though colonialism and its crimes had no effect on defining Europe, allows for the end of race to be written into a view of racism which confines it to internal European dynamics, most prominently the Shoah: the European aberration (Hesse 2011, Goldberg 2006, Lentin 2014). The ‘postracial horizon’ was incipiently in view in European theorisations of racism, according to Hesse (ibid.). Indeed, following Goldberg, ‘the postracial… is, one could say, the implication if not effect of racial historicism, its predictable outcome’ (Goldberg 2015b: 24). The end of the line for historicism is, by this reading, the end of race. But given that historicism was a racist logic, the only possible end is arguably the denial of the very significance of race to the shaping of the possibilities of progress proffered by historicists. Denial and ‘debatability’ (Titley 2016) are the mainstays of postracialism. Goldberg uses the term ‘racial dismissal’ which contains elements of both (Goldberg 2015b: 29). Dismissal charges ‘the historically dispossessed as the now principal perpetrators of racism’ and ‘reduces responsibility for degradation and disprivilege to individuated experience’ (ibid.). The former is evident in the widespread and growing acceptability of the idea of ‘reverse’ or ‘anti-white’ racism. By encapsulating ‘real’ racism in frozen events from the past, postracial racism allows for an unleashing of a concomitant ‘motile’ racism which morphs itself into a panoply of circumstances in a universalizing move that detaches itself from the much broader history of race, particularly under colonialism (Lentin 2016). Having been written out of the official annals of racism, colonial subjugation and its aftereffects, then and now, are not seen as grounds for racial subjugation. Rather, the descendants of the colonized, particularly those still thought of as ‘immigrants’ in European countries are conceived of, racially, as ‘ingrates’ who repay their hosts (note the historicism therein) with criminality, fecklessness, and today, Muslim extremism. Their ‘insolence’ is named ‘anti-white’ racism, a new social demon that equally feeds into anti-migrant sentiment in the context of the refugee crisis of the late 2010s. The events of New Years Eve in Cologne, when sexual assault and petty crime were pinned on gangs of marauding refugees, despite little evidence, is an example of the feedback loop between these two groups: the racialised citizen and the refugee. The construction of both as ‘anti-white’ is fuelled by demographic fears of a coming ‘Eurabia’ (Bat Yeor 2005), or the end of white dominance in the USA, powering support for 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump’s plans to stop Mexican immigration by building a wall along its border. What characterizes the postracial era as different, if not new, is the sheer amount of ‘noise’ generated about race, as Gavan Titley notes (Titley 2016). He argues that racism is denied not only through silencing, but also through the creation of noise by which he means the cacophony of opinions about just what racism is. This ‘debatability’ makes everyone an ‘expert’, and all equally endowed with the capacity to deliberate on what racism means (ibid.). The result is the drowning out of the voices of those for whom racism continues to be a reality who, still subsumed under white supremacy, despite postracial invocations 14 to the contrary, are less listened to when it comes to ‘what counts as racism and who gets to define it’ (ibid.). This message was brought home in a widely shared article on ‘white fragility’ which began with the words, ‘everything I’m going to say has already been said, better and with frequency by people of color. But it seems like when it comes to racism (just like men re: feminism) white people need to hear it from other white people’ (Shroyer 2016). The second aspect of racial dismissal is the individuation of racism postrace. By declaring race over, the persistent structural effects of race as it adapts under postracial conditions are obscured. Racism can no longer be held responsible for its ill effects because of its official declaration as past. Hence, responsibility for the effects of racism is individuated; it becomes, qua the dominant neoliberal mantra, one’s personal responsibility (Goldberg 2008). This works in two ways, those who experience discrimination cannot seek redress by appealing to structuring conditions. As Goldberg notes, ‘the postracial is the racial condition in denial of the structural’ (Goldberg 2015b: 34). This explains the rise of the antiracialist principle of colourblindness as the predominant argument against the need to recognise and correct for structural injustice. Non-racial ‘neutrality’ proposes meritocracy as the panacea to discrimination, failing to acknowledge its impossibility due to the very racialised conditions it tactically ignores. The ascendancy of this position is responsible for the decline of affirmative action and ethnic studies programmes in the United States and their failure often to get off the ground elsewhere. The second sense in which racism is individuated relates to the theme of debatability. Not only is the meaning of racism constantly subjected to dehistoricised reinvention, but the individual’s experience of racism itself is subject to debate. Racial experience is ‘affected by less visible structural conditions’ (ibid. 30). However, when these are unrecognised under postracialism, they become interpretable otherwise. Postracial racism, particularly in an age of fast-flowing digital communications, is marked by a constant subjection of experience to denial. While an individual’s experience may be recognised as racism – albeit often interpreted as an isolated event – it is not in turn connected either to the experiences of similar others or to the wider matrices of domination (Hill Collins 1990) in which they play out. Racism then literally becomes a matter of subjective opinion and individuals are increasingly judged on their perceived ability to ‘bounce back’ from racism. In particular, any attempt to connect contemporary experience to historical patterns of domination are met with calls to ‘get over it’, the intimation being that, under postracialism, any invocation of the past is a mere excuse not to take ‘personal responsibility’ in the present. We are currently witnessing a time in which postracial dismissal, denial and debatability weigh heavily on the capacity to agitate against racism. The levels of repression, pulled violently into the spotlight by the deaths of Trayvon Martin, Mike Brown, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland or Mya Hall to name but a handful of the Black people killed by the state in the US and that unleashed the #BlackLivesMatter movement sit awkwardly with the postracial consensus. Events in the USA, always echoing globally in matters racial, are matched by the rise of European extremisms and border closures in the face of a refugee ‘crisis’ whose roots in historicist ‘democratisation’ interventions are barely acknowledged. Race is more necessary analytically than ever before, and never more absent save as a grab bag containing almost everything but 15 the tools needed to dissect the reasons for its persistence. My hope is that the work of race critical scholarship intersects more deeply with that of political sociology in general to lay bare its imbrication in so many of the social processes of interest to the discipline today. 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