Justice as a Self-Alienated Other
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Abstract
Justice as a Self-Alienated Other Transfixed by the "innocent boredom" of a young boy "carefully throwing his cap on the floor and then carefully picking it up, and then again, over and over", Franz Kafka denigrates his own lecture of Heinrich von Kleist"s Michael Kohlhaas by critiquing that he "Read wildly and badly and carelessly and unintelligibly" . Kafka"s self-flagellation is consistent with his more profound frustrations on his (and perhaps everyone"s) inability to effectively communicate ideas, but the motivation for choosing Kleist"s novella is less obscure. Michael Kohlhaas was, in fact, "one of Kafka"s favourite pieces of prose" (Brod, 1948), which in combination with its clear, candid, and exciting plot provides him with a vehicle to relate his own epistemic issues.
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