Hatred by Hated People: Xenophobia in Israel

Hatred by Hated People: Xenophobia in Israel AMI PEDAHZUR Department of Political Science University of Haifa, Israel YAEL YISHAI Department of Political Science University of Haifa, Israel Israel is a state with a large (some 80 percent) Jewish majority. Jews were victims of prejudice and xenophobia for two millennia. They constituted a minority in their countries of residence, and were subject to discrimination and persecution. The founders of Israel pledged, in the state’s Declaration of Independence, to establish a society free from hatred, a society where all citizens enjoyed equal rights. The horrors suffered by the Jewish people during World War II consolidated Israel’s pledge to erase hatred. Yet the country is imbued with hatred towards three distinct groups: Arabs, foreign workers, and Ethiopian Jews. The Arabs are hated in the setting of the ArabIsraeli conflict; foreign workers may be resented on account of economic rivalry; Ethiopian Jews are probably shunned because they are different in skin color and have customs from the majority of Israelis. This article attempts to examine hatred in contemporary Israel, addressing the following questions: (a) What is the scope of hatred? (b) What factors induce hatred? (c) Is there a linkage between a specific set of factors and a specific type of hatred? The article is based on a survey of a Jewish urban population. Although xenophobia is ubiquitous in contemporary societies, its targets vary across countries and nations. In Germany, for example, it is directed mostly at “guest workers” (Adler 1996; Von Trotha 1995). In Belgium hatred is also targeted at foreign laborers, mainly Turks and Greeks; North Africans constitute the major object of hatred in France; in Switzerland hatred is directed at those seeking political asylum; and in Norway at Pakistanis and Vietnamese (Ford 1992). This list, which is not complete, reveals that hatred is widespread even in countries with rich democratic tradition. Israel is a young democracy compared with those listed above, but it is also plagued by hatred. Yet animosity in the Received 4 September 1998; accepted 21 December 1998. Address correspondence to Ami Pedahzur, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel 31905, Israel. 101 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 22:101–117, 1999 Copyright © 1999 Taylor & Francis 1057-610X/99 $12.00 + .00 102 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai Jewish state constitutes a special case meriting scholarly attention. It is a case of hatred by one of the most hated people in human history. With the suspension of Jewish sovereignty in ancient Israel (in 74 A.D.), Jews were dispersed among the nations, often subject to hate, prejudice, and xenophobia. For nearly two millennia the Jewish people have experienced the effect of hate. Jews formed a segregated minority in their countries of residence, distinguished by their appearance, their food, and their customs. The wish to escape anti-Semitism, the modern expression of hatred towards the Jewish people, was one of the motives for the establishment of the Zionist movement a century ago. The horrors of the past were not forgotten with the renewed acquisition of national Jewish sovereignty. The state’s founders pledged, in the Declaration of Independence, to establish a society free from hatred, a society where all citizens and inhabitants enjoyed equal rights regardless of nationality, sex, or cultural affiliation. The horrors suffered by the Jewish people during the Second World War reinforced Israel’s pledge to erase resentment of “others.” Many of the citizens of the new state were survivors of the Nazi concentration camps. They personally had experienced the harshest, cruelest, and most inhuman manifestation of hatred. The memories were fresh; the commitment to obliterate hate was intense. Israelis vowed to erase discrimination against “others.” This commitment has been fulfilled to a large extent in constitutional terms, as the legal code is replete with provisions forbidding any kind of discrimination. Whether or not the anti-hate norm has penetrated society remains, however, an open question. On the surface the answer tends to be negative. Even a cursory glance at the daily press reveals an intense sense of prejudice among the Jews living in Israel. Hatred is not targeted only toward “strangers who come today and remain tomorrow” (Simmel 1987), but against compatriots. As noted by Watts (1997, 272–273), xenophobia is not only rejection of what is strange; the socially weak can be victims as well. There is another Israeli peculiarity. In contrast to other societies, where hatred is targeted at the foreigner, the entire Israeli population consists of “foreigners,” the vast majority of whom immigrated to the country in the past 50 years. Data show that only 61.4 percent of the Jews living in Israel are native born. The proportion of second generation Israelis is 25.4 percent, which is astonishingly low even five decades after the establishment of the state (Statistical Abstracts 1997, 90). Israel may be described as a bubbling melting pot where cultures and traditions clash. Indeed, the process of “melting” was often bitter and painful. Jews from North Africa were treated with suspicion by the old-timers who had immigrated from countries in Eastern and Central Europe; the Jews from Iraq were not welcomed by their brethren from Morocco. Particularly notable is the plight of the Jewish immigrants from Ethiopia who presumably are subject to much hate and discrimination. The fact that they are so different from the Jews from other countries in skin color, culture, social tradition, and religious practices made them particularly vulnerable to negative sentiments and exclusion (Schwarzwald and Tur-Kaspa 1997). Hatred was targeted also at the Arab (“non-Jewish” in the official statistical Xenophobia in Israel 103 terminology) population living in the country. The Jewish state was established in a conflict-ridden area where two nations are involved in a protracted bloody conflict for the possession of the same land. The Israeli Arabs constitute a minority characterized by strong nationalist orientations. Their growing sympathy with the Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territories has intensified their nationalist sentiment. A survey conducted by Smooha (1989, 87) among the Arab community in Israel revealed that nationality ranks first, reported by over 40 percent of the respondents, as the most important identity. The animosity of Jewish Israelis toward their Arab counterparts has been widely documented (Smooha 1987, 1989, 1992, 1993; Ghanem 1998a). Foreign workers constitute the third focus of possible hatred. During its fifty years of existence Israel has experienced a dramatic economic surge. It is currently situated in the highest rank of middle-income states as graded by the World Bank, with a GNP of $17,000 per capita—higher than that of several European countries. Rapid economic growth was made possible by the import of financial aid, by the inflow of immigrants, some of whom (such as the recent immigrants from the former states of the Soviet Union) are highly educated and economically qualified (Ben-Porath 1986), and by the incorporation of a cheap labor force from the Occupied Territories. The upscaling of terrorist activities during the 1980s was followed by a policy of closure, limiting the entry of Palestinian workers to Israel. The void, causing much turmoil among Israeli employers, particularly in construction and agriculture, was filled by foreign workers, who swamped the country. Foreign labor became a national political issue in the mid-1990s, when state authorities revealed the scope of the problem. Foreign workers established their own neighborhoods in the big cities (particularly Tel Aviv), creating their own communities on the fringe of society. Generally speaking, no acute violence has been waged against foreign workers but there are mounting signs of resentment against their presence. To sum up, xenophobia in Israel could be traced, or at least expected, along three distinct lines: national—toward the Arabs residing in Israel; racial—toward the Ethiopian Jews, and economic—toward the foreign workers. Research on hatred in Israel is mostly confined to the Arab-Jewish conflict. Extensive literature describes the relationship between the two peoples on both the national and on a group level (Lustick 1980; Smooha 1992; Rekhes 1993; Landau 1993; Ghanem 1998b). Very little is known, however, about other forms of xenophobia. The underlying question guiding this article is how far other forms of hatred are present in Israeli society. What are the factors inducing people, who through time have been subject to uncompromising and bitter hostility, to hate fellow human beings? This article reports an attempt to provide tentative answers based on an empirical study. It seeks to measure the scope of hatred, its causes, and characteristics. More specifically, it is directed by the following questions: (a) What are the targets of hatred? Is it directed only at Arabs, as predicted by the literature or also at other minority groups? (b) What factors determine hatred? Are they economic? Cultural? Other causes? (c) Is there any linkage between the determinants of hate 104 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai and its target? Is hating Arabs, for example, motivated by factors different from hating black Jews from Ethiopia or foreign workers from Romania? The answers to these questions, derived from our survey, are expected to yield two contributions. On a contextual level, the study touches upon fundamental characteristics of contemporary Israeli society and strikes very sensitive cords. It exposes the extent to which hate is exercised in Israel, the land of the hated people. On a theoretical level, little has been done to link motives for hatred to its specific objects. By probing this particular aspect, this article hopefully contributes to a better understanding of hatred and its causes. Causes of Hate Three theoretical approaches account for the rise and diffusion of hatred. The first relates mainly to the socioeconomic status of individuals; the second pertains basically to their cultural identity; the third focuses on the general attributes of society (phenomenology theory). In writing about strife between ethnic groups in New York City during the 1960s, Glazer and Moynihan (1970) stated that much of the conflict could best be understood in terms of a competition for scarce resources. In more recent years this notion has expanded into the “power theory.” This paradigm views the relationships between groups “as a function of their competitive positions,” suggesting that a threat of one particular group to another is a source of hate (Giles and Hertz 1994, 317). Although the power explanation covers many aspects of intergroup competition, including the political and the social, strong emphasis has been put on the economic aspect. In Germany, for example, the economic component of the power model was especially important. Jobs and cheap housing have been especially scarce in the enduring economic crisis characterizing Europe since the early 1970s. From the perspective of the old-timers, migrants compete for residential space and particularly for working opportunities (Castles 1987; Olzak 1993). The theoretical core of this argument is often a model of rational decision making. When people feel insecure in the face of threat, they portray resentment and hate. The intensity of hate, however, need not necessarily depend on real competition on the job market but on the perception of threat, which is sufficient to induce animosity (Wimmer 1997, 21). The growing threat of economic competition, enhanced by the unification of Germany, has been identified as a source of hatred (Hoskin 1991). It is the economic insecurity of those afflicted by the crisis of the modern welfare state that induces prejudice and hatred. The power theory has also been validated in the United States. For example, in discussing the candidacy for the governorship of Louisiana, Giles and Buckner (1993) found that the greater the concentration of blacks in parishes, the higher the support for a racist candidate. Another study by the same two authors (Giles and Buckner 1996) showed a strong relationship between the percentage of blacks and the defection of whites from the Democratic party. The cultural-symbolic theory of racism is presented in contrast to the power theory. This approach holds that animosity towards the other is not a conse- Xenophobia in Israel 105 quence of economic competition between rival groups, but a product of “early political and value socialization” (McConahay 1982, 692). Fear for jobs appears to play a more modest role than general fears of loss of social status and cultural identity. Accordingly, self-interest predicated in the rational choice theory is not necessarily involved (Kinder 1986; Wood 1994). Cultural differences among people could be responsible for conflicts and hatred (Wimmer 1997, 22). Racism, independent of economic rivalry, has been found to be important as an explanatory variable in predicting white attitudes toward busing to achieve racial desegregation in Louisville (McConahay 1982) and in Los Angeles (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979). Various measures of racism predicted opposition to busing much better than having a child in the public schools (self-interest). Legge (1996) argues that the symbolic explanations, particularly in the form of racism and chauvinism, are primary sources of anti-foreign sentiment, not economic competition. Immigrants from Third World countries, for instance, have been portrayed as incapable of assimilating into mainstream culture because of their social background. Low educational and occupational qualifications create “cultural incompatibility,” leading to prejudice. The inability of certain minorities to integrate into the structure and culture of society leads the majority population to xenophobic rejection. One simply prefers to be surrounded by one’s own kind rather than to be exposed to the unlike. Defining a group of people as “unbelonging” to the national “we” deprives them of the right to belong (Wimmer 1997, 23). The third approach, termed phenomenology, attributes xenophobia not to economic strains or to cultural divergencies but to general attributes of society. When society experiences deep-gripping crises, which occur intermittently, anomic tensions encroach upon social postures. This leads to a crisis of collective identity “so that the calm self-certainty which might enable unproblematic relations with the minorities gets lost” (Wimmer 1997, 27). When this is the case society turns to historic myths promising to solve the crisis of identity; on the other hand, this very search for origins breeds exclusion of “others” (Imhof 1993, quoted in Wimmer 1997). According to this approach, xenophobia is interpreted as a way of reassuring the national self and its boundaries, as an attempt at making sense of the world in times of a national crisis. Causes of Hatred: The Israeli Context At face value, all three approaches explaining hatred are relevant to Israel. Power theory is relevant because, despite the remarkable progress Israel has achieved in its five decades of independence, the country faces the economic crises engulfing modern societies. To begin with, structural changes in the labor market are occurring, with the shift of the economy from branches relying on a cheap and untrained labor force, such as the textile industry, to sophisticated high-tech industry. The need to curb inflation, which for years has been higher than in other industrial societies, contributed to a strict monetary policy, causing, in turn, unemployment at an unprecedented level (approximately 8 percent of the labor force). As a result, during 1997, angry workers who lost their jobs staged violent 106 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai demonstrations at various locations throughout the country. The policy of privatization and liberalization has worsened the condition of the unskilled labor force. Economic competition may thus be considered a source of hatred towards “others.” The cultural approach might also be deemed as a valid explanation for hatred. Israel is a country of immigrants. Data published in the annual Statistical Abstracts show that Israelis currently living in the state of Israel originated from 22 countries (apart from “others” not listed in detail). As noted, the majority of the Israelis are not native-born, but have had to undergo a process of acculturation. But this process took place during a prolonged social and economic crisis. The new immigrants were not absorbed into a culture molded by generations of old-timers but had to blend into a culture-in-the-making. The tensions involved in the dual process—of forming culture on the one hand and socializing the newcomers into the culture-in-the-making on the other—produced cultural consciousness. The implication of this enhanced consciousness was a deep yearning to guard the emerging myths against intruders; to establish a symbolic framework that excludes outsiders and provides its members with a sense of belonging. Xenophobia would presumably be targeted at those who disrupted the desired cultural harmony. The third approach is also relevant to the Israeli context. The identity of Jewish Israelis has been subject to wide elaboration (Kimmerling 1985, 1993; Shapira 1997). Contemporary Israeli society provides a good example of a polity whose citizens are engaged in a long-term struggle over their identity. The identity of the Israelis is shaped by cross-cutting cleavages (Moore and Kimmerling 1995). There is a marked Jewish component and a national component, both immersed in collective values. From its very inception, Israeli society has evinced a strong Jewish identity, connoting the religio-national traditions of the Jewish faith. There is general agreement, even among the secular Jews (comprising some 70 percent of the Jewish population), that Israel should be a “Jewish state.” This sense of Jewishness has since manifested in a series of laws and social practices embodying many aspects of society. Besides adhering to their Jewish origin Israelis tend to rally around the national flag. Israelis’ dedication to the national cause was substantiated by a worldwide poll (conducted in 32 countries) questioning citizens’ readiness to defend their country.1 Israel took first place, with 92 percent ready and willing to do so (Yishai 1991, 318). Both identities are cloaked in collectivism, pertaining to the role of the collective in one’s life. The collectivist dimension dictates precedence of the national interests over individual interests. As noted by Moore and Kimmerling (1995, 389), all members of a collectivist society are expected to join the collective effort and contribute to the attainment of its goals. Individual prosperity, personal consumption, and attainment of material resources such as wealth and property are accorded a lower value than the well-being of the collectivity as a whole. These values are to be gained through winning collective goals rather than through individual action. In the name of collectivism, individuals are called upon to sacrifice their private interests and place themselves at the disposal of a group that claims to serve Xenophobia in Israel 107 collective goals (Lissak 1969; Horowitz and Lissak 1978). Considering the triple attributes of the Israeli identity, its Jewish, national, and collective components, it is highly likely that outsiders not fitting into this configuration would be excluded outright. Methodology Sample The data for this study were gathered in a survey conducted in March 1998. The sample (n = 505) consisted of adult (18+) urban Jews. By demographic characteristics the sample represented the Israeli population at large. It was divided roughly equally between men and women (50.5 percent and 49.5 percent, respectively); age distribution was similar to that of the population at large. The proportions of education, ethnic origin, and geographic location categories in the sample corresponded to those of the entire population in 1997 as reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Data were collected through telephone interviews based on close-ended questionnaires. Variables The dependent variable in this study was hatred (used interchangeably with xenophobia, exclusion, resentment, and prejudice). It referred to non-willingness to interact with the “other” at work, at home, and in the family. It also referred to opinions about state’s obligations toward the “other.” Hatred was measured separately regarding the three groups under consideration: Arabs, Ethiopian Jews, and foreign workers. Respondents were asked five questions measuring their disposition toward the members of these three groups. The scale was constructed on the basis of a continuum from distant, “objective” parameters of opinion to the personal and intimate. Hate was measured on the basis of the accumulated answers and on the basis of the separate answer for each group under discussion. The questions were: (1) Are you willing to invite (an Arab, an Ethiopian, a foreign worker) to a social event at your home? (2) Are you willing to accept (an Arab, an Ethiopian, a foreign worker) as your boss? (3) Would you approve a member of your family becoming romantically involved with (an Arab, an Ethiopian, a foreign worker)? (4) Would you agree to live in the same building as (an Arab, an Ethiopian, a foreign worker)? (5a) Are you willing to equalize the social rights of Arabs, for example, in the housing domain, to those of the Jews? (5b) Are you willing to continue the expanded economic assistance granted by the state to the Ethiopian Jews? (5c) Are you willing to grant foreign workers who have resided more than five years in the country social rights such as health insurance, national insurance, etc.? All fifteen questions were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (highly agree) to 10 (highly oppose). To measure general hatred each respondent was placed on a continuum starting from 15 (no hate) to 150 (strong hatred). To measure specific hatred respondents were placed on a continuum from 5 to 50 on the basis of the questions relevant to the target of the hatred. 108 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai The three independent variables, looking into the causes of hatred, were demography, culture, and identity. Demographic variables were measured by ethnic origin, education, family’s income, place of residence, age, political affiliation, and religiosity. The affluent respondent was born in Israel to parents of European or American origin, was young, secular, with a high family income, higher educational attainments, and a left-wing political orientation. His or her counterpart was born to parents of AsianAfrican origin, was older, religious, with a low family income, low educational attainments, and politically oriented to the right. The first hypothesis regarding the causes of hate was: H1: The less affluent will be more inclined to hate. Cultural variables were measured by two questions asked separately for each target of possible hate. The questions were: (1) There is no chance that I will find a common language with (an Arab, an Ethiopian, a foreign worker) on account of cultural differences. (2) The customs of (the Arabs, the Ethiopians, the foreign workers) can tarnish Israeli culture. Both questions were measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. Maximum cultural distinctiveness required 60 points. The second hypothesis regarding the causes of hate was: H2: Individuals with high cultural distinctiveness will manifest a high level of hatred. Identity was measured on the basis of opinions regarding three major issues: the Jewishness of the state, the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, and patriotism. Responses to the following statements reflected attitudes to these issues: (1) Israel should be a Jewish state. (2) Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria should be reinforced. (3) For the sake of Israel’s existence I am willing to make a personal sacrifice. Here too, opinions were measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Respondents highest on identity, namely endorsement of the Jewish attributes of Israel, support of settlement in the West Bank, and willingness to sacrifice for the state, received the full 30 points. On the basis of the above the third hypothesis was: H3: Individuals with a high collective identity will be placed high on the scale of hatred. The study also looked at the specific relationship between motive (identity vs. status) and target of hatred. The rationale for the linkage does not derive from professional literature as no such question, to the best of our knowledge, has been raised yet by students of hatred. From pure logical inference it appears that hatred towards foreign workers is prompted by power considerations associated with status as they constitute competitors in the labor market, especially by those situated in the lower echelons of the socioeconomic scale. Hatred towards the Ethiopians is motivated by fear of the unknown, namely by cultural exclusion. Hatred towards the Arabs is expected to be motivated by broader questions of identity, as it focuses on the fundamental questions on Israel’s agenda. Admittedly, Arabs may be considered both Xenophobia in Israel 109 cultural strangers and economic competitors, particularly among the lower income strata. Yet, the tendency to exclude them is expected to be based primarily on the Israeli-Jewish collective identity. Findings The Extent of Hate The distribution of hatred towards the three groups under consideration is presented in Table 1. The first finding regards the scale of hate. The alpha Cronbach test reveals that the questions presented to the respondents describe a syndrome of hate (alpha = 0.892) and not dispersed attitudes.2 Second, data reveal that resentment was most intense in regard to personal relations. Jews opposed romantic relations with “others.” The long tradition of marital exclusion seems well entrenched among contemporary Israelis. Provision of social rights appears to be the least objectionable item. Here Israelis showed relatively benevolent attitudes towards Table 1 Distribution of hate among Israeli Jews (means and s.d.) Question Hospitality Arabs Hospitality Ethiopians Hospitality foreigners Mean total Romantic relations Arabs Romantic rel. Ethiopians Romantic rel. foreigners Mean total Boss an Arab Boss an Ethiopian Boss a foreigner Mean total Co-residence Arabs Co-residence Ethiopians Co-residence foreigners Mean total Social rights Arabs Social rights Ethiopians Social rights foreigners Mean Total Cumulative total Mean 5.717 3.034 5.771 4.840 8.100 4.368 7.606 6.691 6.459 2.620 6.113 5.064 6.210 2.411 6.148 4.923 5.920 3.012 5.228 4.720 5.247 s.d. 3.674 2.821 3.568 3.006 3.354 3.167 3.599 2.555 3.434 3.644 2.441 3.521 3.500 2.543 3.518 Source: Survey conducted for this study. 110 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai the targets of hate. As long as no personal commitments were involved people were willing to accept others. Note, however, that hospitality was graded very close to providing social rights. Israelis were willing to host members of marginal groups, although this willingness was short-term. The guest leaves the home and negative feelings may persist towards them. In the absence of comparative or temporal data it is difficult to ascertain whether hate in Israel is more intensive than in other western countries or whether it has diminished or increased across time. On the basis of the findings it may be argued, however, that an average total of 5.247 (out of ten points) reveals a medium degree of hate. Differential Hate The second question pertained to differential hatred. Is there a variation in the extent of hate towards the three groups under consideration? Data presented in Table 2 confirm that variation is discernible. A comparison among the three groups clearly demonstrates the hierarchy of Table 2 Hate, by target. Attitudes towards Arabs, Ethiopians, and foreign workers (means and s.d.) Question Arabs Hospitality Romantic relations Boss Co-residence Social rights Mean total Ethiopians Hospitality Romantic rel. Boss Co-residence Social rights Mean total Foreign workers Hospitality Romantic rel. Boss Co-residence Social rights Mean total Mean s.d. 5.717 8.100 6.459 6.210 5.920 6.482 3.034 4.368 2.620 2.411 3.012 3.089 5.771 7.606 6.113 6.148 5.228 6.173 3.674 3.006 3.599 3.644 3.500 2.821 3.354 2.555 2.441 2.543 3.568 3.167 3.434 3.521 3.518 Source: Survey conducted for this study. Xenophobia in Israel 111 hate. The Arabs were most hated on all measures (mean of 6.48); the foreign workers came next (mean of 6.17), and the Ethiopians were the least hated (mean of 3.08). An overwhelming majority of the Israelis (77.2 percent) opposed any romantic relations with an Arab; over half of the respondents had negative feelings (placed on points 6–10 in the ten-point scale) towards Arabs on the remaining four indicators. Interestingly, 56.5 percent of the respondents opposed granting Arabs social rights equal to those enjoyed by Jews. This attitude manifests the deep resentment toward the Arabs who, as noted, do enjoy equal rights before the law. Attitudes towards foreign workers were somewhat more favorable. Over half the respondents tended to support the idea of giving social rights to foreign workers who had resided in Israel five years or more. Over half the respondents, however, rejected the idea of living with a foreign worker in the same building or having a foreign worker as a supervisor at work (52.8 percent and 55.1 percent, respectively). Some three quarters of the respondents rejected the idea of having romantic relations with foreign workers; over a half (55.3 percent) were not ready to host a foreign worker in their home. Analysis of hate towards the Ethiopians presents a different picture. With regard to their brethren from the African continent Jewish Israelis tended to show the least hate. Contrary to our assumption the findings of the study reveal that the Ethiopian Jews are not subject to much hate and that they are accepted as equal members in Israeli society. The figures are clear-cut: three out of four respondents supported giving extended financial and social support to Ethiopian Jews, despite the burden on the state’s budget; an overwhelming majority were willing to live in the same building with an Ethiopian Jew and are willing to work under an Ethiopian boss (85.5 percent and 80.8 percent, respectively). A large proportion (78.2 percent) were willing to host an Ethiopian. Favorable attitudes diminished somewhat regarding romantic relations. Still, a substantial majority (62.5 percent) would approve of a family member engaging in an intimate relationship with an Ethiopian Jew. The answer to the question posed at the outset of this paper is therefore affirmative. A differential hatred was found in members of Israeli society. The Arabs constituted a very popular target of hate; hate toward the Ethiopian Jews was low; foreign workers were situated between these two extremes. Causes of Hate General Hate. What are the determinants of hate? As recalled it was postulated (a) that hate towards foreign workers would be explained by the power theory, namely economic competition for scarce labor resources; (b) that hate towards the Ethiopians could be explained by the cultural theory, namely fear of the unknown; (c) that hate towards the Arabs could be explained by the phenomenological theory, focusing on problems of identity. To test these hypotheses, a regression analysis was performed on general hatred and its specific ramifications. The first step was to turn the hatred questions (1–15) into dependent variables. This was done in the following ways. First, 112 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai a hate scale was created based upon the accumulation of the scores each respondent received. Second, three other scales were created, one for each group. The results of the regression analysis regarding general hate are presented in Table 3. The variables under discussion were successful in predicting over a third of the dependent variable (R 2 = 0.344). Three variables stand out as significantly contributing to the explanation: the strongest is cultural fear (beta = 0.315). The more one was culturally xenophobic, the higher was the likelihood of general hate. Religion also contributed to hate (beta = 0.237). Religious Jews in Israel tended to be hateful towards others, even though Judaism preaches compassion towards “outsiders.” Surprisingly, however, the variable patriotism had a differential effect on hate. Willingness to sacrifice for the sake of Israel’s survival reduced the prospects for hate (beta = –0.168). The rationalization for this somewhat bizarre finding is twofold. First, it appears that nationalism alone need not necessarily lead to hate. It is only the combination of nationalism with religious beliefs that induces resentment towards others. Second, the question probing willingness to eschew personal assets in favor of the state may indicate a sense of civility. Identification with the state, rather than with a specific community in it, enables one to accept others.3 All other variables, particularly those describing a person’s demographic attributes, including ethnic origin, education, income, and the like, were insignificant in explaining hate. Those identified as haters were not distinguished by social class or origin, gender or age. Even political affiliation (voting for Shimon Peres or for Benjamin Netanyahu in the last elections) did not make a difference. Individuals who hate others could be found all over the economic and the political spectrum. Table 3 Regression analysis of general hatred Variable Culture Religion Ethnic origin Voting Education Income Israel as a Jewish state Support of the greater Israel idea Patriotism R square Adjusted R square F 0.344 0.322 15.570** Beta 0.315 0.237 0.062 0.083 0.000 –0.019 0.118 0.040 –0.168 T 5.796** 3.975** 1.162 1.273 0.006 –0.339 2.118 0.594 –3.236** **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Source: Survey conducted for this study. Xenophobia in Israel 113 Specific Hate. A regression analysis regarding hatred of specific targets of hate is presented in Table 4. Very few variables accounted for hatred of Ethiopians, the least-hated group. The regression model was able to explain only 16.4 percent of the dependent variable. Only two independent variables proved to be statistically significant in the analysis. Culture was found to contribute to hatred (beta = 0.280), but patriotism reduced the inclination to hate (beta = –0.196). Hatred towards foreign workers was explained by one additional variable. Here the model was successful in explaining some quarter of the dependent variable (R 2 = 0.244). Two variables were found significant. Culture stood out as a predictor of hate towards foreign workers. The fact that most of them were from less developed European countries, such as Romania, or from Asia and Africa, contributed to the saliency of the cultural components. Foreign workers indeed remain foreign and do not integrate into society, which is bound by strong cultural and ethno-religious norms. Religion was also found to be significant in explaining hatred. Orthodox Jews were unwilling to accept non-Jews (i.e., foreign workers) as equals. Here too, willingness to sacrifice for the sake of Israel’s survival contributed negatively to the prospects of hate. Finally, the reasons for hatred towards Arabs were scrutinized. The model Table 4 Regression analysis of hatred toward Ethiopian Jews, Foreign workers, and Israeli Arabs Ethiopian Jews Variable Culture Religion Ethnic origin Voting Education Income Israel as a Jewish state Support of the greater Israel idea Patriotism R square Adjusted R square 6.490** 0.164 0.139 10.151** Beta 0.280 0.057 0.000 0.112 0.091 –0.041 0.028 T Foreign Workers Beta T 4.121** 4.448** 1.250 0.038 –0.970 0.500 1.637 Israeli Arabs Beta 0.207 0.228 0.072 0.165 0.052 –0.001 0.142 T 4.164** 4.206** 1.444 2.701** –1.014 –0.012 2.767** 4.828** 0.236 0.911 0.278 –0.003 0.071 1.601 –0.003 1.524 –0.056 –0.688 0.029 0.460 0.095 –0.009 –0.196 –0.121 0.028 –3.552** –0.114 0.244 0.220 20.633** 0.403 –2.122* 0.113 –0.145 1.816 –3.024** 0.386 0.367 F **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Source: Survey conducted for this study. 114 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai regarding hatred towards Arabs offers the most persuasive explanation, with R 2 = 0.386. Five variables were found significant. First was religion (beta = 0.228), which in Israel is politically connected with nationalism. This linkage is clearly manifested in the makeup of the present coalition government and has been affirmed by empirical data (Shamir and Arian 1997; Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 1998). Likewise, cultural attitudes played a significant role in contributing their share to hate (beta = 0.207). Israeli Arabs maintain their distinct cultural attributes. They speak their own language and preserve separate life styles. NonJews play their own music, and promote their own theater and literature. Voting also was prominent, with those voting for right-wing parties associated with more hatred than their left-leaning counterparts (beta = 0.165). The view that Israel should become more Jewish also contributed to resentment of Arabs (beta = 0.142). It is hardly surprising that those wishing to emphasize the Jewish character of the state of Israel were unfavorable towards its Arab population. The survey reveals that the more religious a Jew was the more he or she was inclined to hate Arabs. Religiosity had its own statistical merit, regardless of other personal characteristics. The mere fact that a Jew observed religious commandments made him or her a potential hater. Finally, patriotism added its share (beta = –0.196). Here too, willingness to sacrifice for one’s country, interpreted here as a form of civility, reduced hate. Conclusions The foregoing analysis focused on hate among Jews, historically one of the most hated people on earth. The questions guiding the study pertained to the scope of hate, its general causes, and its differential causes. The answer to the first question is qualified. On the face of it, the extent of hatred in Israeli society is not alarming in comparison with other Western societies. This tentative statement is not based on comparative data (as these are not available), but on general information alone. A closer look, however, reveals that hate does exist, but it is targeted differentially at distinct social groups: Ethiopian Jews were least hated, despite their skin color; foreign workers were moderately hated despite their being economic rivals; Arabs were most hated, despite the fact they are native-born and have lived side by side with Jewish Israelis for many decades. The study shed light on the varied factors that induce hate. Among the independent variables that were examined, some were more influential than others. Fear among Israelis of foreign influences on their culture was an important variable in explaining hatred towards all the populations, including the Ethiopian Jews. The fact that power considerations, namely fear of economic rivalry or low standing on the socioeconomic ladder, played no role in inducing hate is very significant. The more people adhere to their cultural myths, the more they appear to play a critical role in shaping their attitudes towards others compared to sheer materialistic factors. Another important explanation for hatred is the degree of religiosity. This explanation may be true for Israel only, because of the unique Xenophobia in Israel 115 linkage between religion and ethnic culture. Being an orthodox Jew, in this respect, does not imply only adherence to divine commandments but evident seclusion and rejection of others. A variable found influential in all cases is the person’s degree of what was defined here as patriotism. Apparently, one’s readiness to sacrifice for the state does not increase hate. On the contrary, identification with the state contributes to the reduction of hate. As for the linkage between a specific set of factors and a specific type of hatred, the only variable that explained xenophobia towards Ethiopian Jews is the fear of cultural divergence. Foreign workers were hated due to both the cultural and the religious threat they presented. As already noted, education and income, two very important variables in the “power theory,” were found insignificant in explaining xenophobic attitudes towards foreign workers as well as towards other populations. This finding is incongruent with reasons for hatred most common in Europe. The hatred of Arabs can be explained by the widest set of factors. These factors support the “phenomenological” argument, stating that a society experiencing anomic tensions will try to define its own identity by excluding others. Culture, religion, and political attitudes and preferences appear to fashion deep resentment of Arabs in the Jewish state. All these issues are linked not with the economy or with specific cultural aspects, but with fundamental questions of identity. At fifty, Israeli society is still unsure about what it is. One of the ways of settling this matter is by defining who is part of the community and who is not. On the basis of the present study it may be concluded that religion is a strong determinant of boundaries. Though Israelis do not want the Ethiopian culture to influence their own, they are willing to accept Ethiopians and even greet them warmly. This is not true for the foreign workers and the Arabs, both of whom are excluded. At present, only a minority of Israelis have daily contacts with foreign workers. The combination of the increasing number of workers and growing unemployment may make the “power theory” more relevant to the Israeli scene. Israeli Arabs constitute the most hated population. The long-lasting and deep Arab-Israeli conflict makes the Jewish population very hostile towards Arabs. This situation reflects religious, cultural, and political gaps between different ethnic populations sharing the same land. Even today, after the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and the establishment of the Palestinian autonomy, the internal dimension of the conflict is still unresolved and its end is not in sight. To conclude, the grim past of the Jewish people has not checked hate. On the contrary, past suffering may have contributed to the diffusion of xenophobic attitudes. The Jews, who encountered so much suffering in the recent past, seek isolation and distance themselves from others A vast majority of Israelis would like to close the state’s gates and leave “others” outside its borders. In more general terms, our study showed, first, that hate as an aggregate concept should be compartmentalized rather than used as a general concept. Second, theories explaining hate should be applied with discretion, relating not to a specific country, but to a specific group who are the victims of xenophobia. 116 A. Pedahzur and Y. Yishai Notes 1. 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