Conceptualizing music: Friedrich Theodor Vischer and Hegelian currents in German music criticism, 1848-1871.

Barbara Titus St Anne’s College, Oxford Conceptualizing music Friedrich Theodor Vischer and Hegelian currents in German music criticism, 1848-1887 ii Preface THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (DPHIL) IN MUSICOLOGY AWARDED ON SUPERVISOR: DR BOJAN BUJIĆ EXAMINERS: PROF ROBERT PASCALL PROF REINHARD STROHM 22 OCTOBER 2005 FACULTY OF MUSIC – UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD To my parents Martha Meijer Milan Titus and to the memory of my grandmother Mathilde Erna Elisabeth Titus-Frankenberg Preface During the past five years, my intention to find connections between the aesthetic achievements of Friedrich Theodor Vischer and the discourse of German music criticism raised many an eyebrow amongst scholars. Especially in Germany, it is common knowledge that Vischer – entirely ignorant with regard to music – chose to keep his distance from musical debates. However, a Dutch musicologist wanting to understand the intricacies of Hegelian philosophy while living and working in the ancient halls of Albion is pretty much used to contradictory situations. Nobody was able to understand the ‘dialectics’ of my position better than my supervisor, Dr Bojan Bujić (Magdalen College, Oxford), like my own ancestors a polyglot from Central Europe, who could empathize with my Continental astonishment at Oxford’s delightful peculiarities. He has supported me not only in an intellectual, but also in a moral respect. His continuous encouragement, undiminished when he had just ploughed through pages of my verbose, double-Dutch prose, kept me going. I am also grateful for the useful corrections made by my examiners, Prof Reinhard Strohm (Wadham College, Oxford) and Prof Robert Pascall (University of Wales, Bangor). My interdisciplinary investigation of musical aesthetics around 1850 led to a number of circumstantial insights. The most amusing of those was that I found myself studying my own upbringing. Firstly, in a matter-of-fact kind of way, I was investigating the ideological roots of the historically substantial but somewhat conventional interpretation of my discipline as I had come to know it during my undergraduate years at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Secondly, the better I got to know Vischer, the more I was able to compare him with my own great-grandfather, a German vicar called Wilhelm Frankenberg who, although a couple of decades younger than Vischer, lived and worked in a similar intellectual environment. The many stories that filtered through via my grandmother revealed her father’s ambivalent relationship to God, his immensely broad scholarly interests together with his rather narrow socio-political commitment, and his peculiar sense of humour, all bearing great resemblance to Vischer’s way of life. Both men were representatives of the German Bildungsbürgertum. More revealing and liberating than either of those insights, however, was my gained ability to explain my very own upbringing as a historical artefact, as a loyalty to viewpoints and concepts that had been developed for particular (aesthetic) aims in the early- to midnineteenth century. Without intending to compare my parents to my great-grandfather, I would like to characterize them as true Bildungsbürger, struggling in particular with the dichotomy of social commitment and intellectual elitism that proved to be so decisive in the years around 1850. For as long as I can remember, I have been made aware of the terrible superficiality of present society, the emptiness of present ways of communication, present politics, present architecture, present popular music, and last but not least: present education. All are interconnected in suffering from this emptiness, caused by the corruptive flows of time that swamp the unspoilt, authentic roots of all human expression. The lack of authenticity directly relates to society’s superficiality, because said unspoilt roots are, in fact, the neglected and obscured content behind form and formalities. In present society, there are only ‘empty shells’ of what once was. I soon felt that searching for the lost Beauty or Intellectual Profundity – those two being practically interchangeable – beyond form was a matter of social responsibility. These idealist Bildungsbürger views and convictions, leitmotivs in the period under investigation, formed the basis of my upbringing, drawing subconsciously on Hegel’s Spirit as well as on the absoluteness of his system in which the premise of spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit) never needed to be explained or questioned. This insight is worth mentioning, because this study would not have existed if it were not for my parents. Apart from their emotional support, their interest and commitment, they generously supplemented my funding from Oxford University and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). I know they enjoyed doing this, but I am nevertheless immensely grateful for their unconditional belief in me and my unworldly project. Thus, the dialectics of Vischer versus music, and of England versus Germany, were supplemented with the dialectics of my upbringing. This is why I am dedicating this study to my parents; it is a mirror revealing the historical relativity of their values, but it is also a product of those values. I know they will appreciate it. Apart from my supervisor, my examiners and my parents, a large number of colleagues and friends have contributed to this study. The main proof-reader of this work, Michael Shaw, substantially improved its language by bravely tackling issues that only the German language succeeds in expressing. Dr Grant Olwage (University of Witwatersrand), Dr Robert Gibson (St Catherine’s College, Oxford) and Dr Damien White have assisted me in rephrasing my English at earlier stages of the project. My college adviser, Dr Julian Johnson (St Anne’s College, Oxford) as well as Dr Michael Inwood (Trinity College, Oxford) have given me a number of very helpful suggestions about the position of Hegel in a larger context. Dr Benjamin Earle (University of Birmingham) commented on the Epilogue of this study in his own inimitable and refreshing way. I should also thank Prof Rainer Kleinertz (University of Regensburg) and Prof Richard Sheppard (Magdalen College, Oxford) for their help and abundant bibliographical Hinweise, as well as Dr Nikolaus Bacht (King’s College, Cambridge) for his advice. A number of scholars played an important part in my research during my long and delightful stay at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar, Germany, funded by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD). I should mention in particular the interest and help of Vischer’s successor in Stuttgart, Prof Heinz Schlaffer, and Alexander Reck (University of Stuttgart). The Archive’s Collegienhaus functioned as an informal gathering place for philosophers, literary scholars, art historians, and sociologists from all over Europe. The long and warm September evenings at the terrace watching the Neckar valley made me enjoy the interdisciplinary nature of my research more than ever. Our discussions, ranging from Kant and Hegel to Paul Celan, Theodor Adorno, Ernst Jünger and beyond, often became animated through food and wine, and notably through the Russian lieder we sung. Prof Roberta Ascarelli (University of Siena), Dr Bill Dodd (University of Birmingham), Dr Jean-Luc Evard (Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris X-Nanterre), Prof Axel Gellhaus (University of Aachen), Dr Natascha Romanova (University of St Petersburg), and Dr Elke Schlinsog were all in some way or another involved in these memorable evenings and I am grateful for their advice, inspiration, and sense of humour. I would also like to thank the staff of the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Herr Jürgen Schweier, Frau Anna-Elisabeth Bruckhaus from the University Library in Tübingen, and the staff of the University Library in Utrecht for being extremely helpful and accommodating during my unusual search for Vischer’s musical connections. In my home country, the Netherlands, the inspiring conversations with Dr Sander van Maas (University of Amsterdam) and with Johan Kolsteeg have helped me formulating my Epilogue. A glossary explaining the relevant Hegelian terminology has been provided in Appendix I [157]. For reasons of legibility, the terms in the glossary have not been highlighted in the main text every time they appear; they are, however, marked by an asterisk when they first occur. Translations of the German quotations have been provided in endnotes (marked by Roman numerals) so as to keep them separate from the footnotes (marked by Arabic numerals), which contain remarks relevant to the argument itself. In order to preserve the German quotations in their original form, their spelling has not been harmonized according to modern German spelling rules. The English text has been edited according to The Oxford Spelling Dictionary (1996). Further editorial procedures are addressed in detail in Appendix II [169]. Doorn, June 2005 Table of contents Part I – The hegemony of idealist philosophy Chapter One – Thinking about art Hegelian premises Hegelian revisions Hegelian retreat Chapter Two – Thinking about music Literary premises The year 1848 Intermezzo in Zurich: Vischer and Wagner Hegelian strongholds and Hegelian deceptions 13 13 20 25 29 29 32 36 41 Part II – Music and modernity Chapter Three – Music as the devil Music’s ‘spiritual deficiencies’ as diabolical powers Neutralizing music’s powers through particularization Neutralizing music’s powers through categorization Chapter Four – The end of art Art’s dissolution into philosophy The legitimation of modern art 47 49 54 61 70 70 79 Table of contents Part III – Case studies 9 Chapter Five – Musical forms as ‘spiritualized material’: repositioning Eduard Hanslick 89 Formalism and an ‘aesthetics of content’ 89 The material of music 94 The legitimation of music 98 Chapter Six – Programme music: Franz Liszt’s negotiation of Hegelian aesthetics An aesthetic changeling The autonomous realm of feeling The legitimation of programme music Chapter Seven – Furthering a ‘new form of consciousness’: Franz Brendel’s concept of a new German school The features of the present A ‘new form of consciousness’ The herald of truth Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god and the ‘advance’ of musical scholarship Intellectual self-confidence The undermining of idealist philosophy The retreat of the Idea Epilogue The feeble foundations of musicology 104 104 109 112 117 117 121 125 130 130 135 140 145 Appendices Appendix I – Hegelian glossary Appendix II – Editorial procedures a. Reference system b. Editions c. Translations Appendix III – Manuscript sources D-Ma DLA (Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar, Germany) D-Tü UB (Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen University) D-St SA (Stadtarchiv in Stuttgart) 157 169 169 170 173 175 176 178 181 10 Table of contents Appendix IV – Transcriptions and translations of unpublished letters a. Gustav Hotho to Vischer, Berlin 23 April 1845 b. Karl Köstlin to Vischer, Tübingen 2 April 1857 c. Eduard Hanslick to Vischer, Vienna 2 October 1854 d. Correspondence between Vischer and Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein Letters from Vischer: - Zurich, 27 October 1856 - Zurich, 16 November 1856 - Zurich, 23 November 1856 Letter to Vischer [no place, no date (after 1857)], in French Appendix V – Music criticism and the idealist discourse a. The attention devoted to music in Hegelian journals in the 1830s and 1840s b. List of treatises on musical aesthetics during Vischer’s lifetime Appendix VI – References to Vischer in music periodicals and treatises Bibliography Primary sources in print Secondary literature Names index Subject index List of figures Abbreviations Summary Translations 183 184 186 192 199 199 200 202 204 207 207 210 213 224 224 232 239 242 250 251 252 261 Part I The hegemony of idealist philosophy Chapter One Thinking about art Hegelian premises German music criticism in the nineteenth century is generally acknowledged to be intertwined with philosophical issues to such an extent that it is difficult to discuss its history without a serious investigation of its philosophical component. Some of the philosophers determining the intellectual climate in which German music criticism emerged and proliferated have been extensively discussed from a musicological point of view. Others have, for various reasons, remained hidden in remote archives and libraries, whereas a thorough engagement with their thought reveals that their influence on the development of music criticism was decisive. One of these forgotten aesthetic epigones is Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807-1887). On 21 November 1844, Vischer accepted a professorship in German literature and aesthetics at the University of Tübingen, with an inaugural lecture that unleashed an academic earthquake in the distinguished university town. His frank statement that academic success could not be achieved without freedom of speech was shocking enough. However, the most offensive part of his lecture, attended not only by the university’s staff, but also by its pliable students, was that he declared himself to be a pantheist. Tübingen University had been governed by (pietist) clerics for centuries, and, like in most German universities, theology was compulsory for every student, regardless whether one wanted to become a physician, a lawyer or a philosopher. To appoint a self-declared pagan to a prestigious academic position was seriously to undermine the very pillars of nineteenthcentury academic practice. The scandal was closely observed by academics throughout the German-speaking countries, as many universities were confronted with young and rebellious academics such as Vischer.1 Written reactions to Vischer’s lecture emerged in a number of journals, based mainly in the southern German states, but noted also in the north. 2 In Prussia, Vischer’s anthology Kritische Gänge, in which the lecture was eventually published (VISCHER 1844b), was banned immediately after its appearance. A lively polemic developed between the academic establishment and Vischer’s advocates, who felt supported by the hopes and tangible efforts to settle the scores with the aristocratic and clerical authorities once and for all. In 1848, when these efforts finally failed in the suppression of democratic upheavals, the polemic surrounding Vischer’s academic rebellion lost its relevance and died out. For Vischer himself, the consequences of his little coup attempt were multifaceted. The incident had provided him with an immense fame all over Germany, but it was a dubious fame. Despite the sympathy among most German intellectuals, several university authorities made their arrangements. Tübingen University suspended Vischer, and although he could keep his post as Professor of German literature and aesthetics, he was not allowed to teach for two years. During the years of his suspension (1845-1847), he started working on a treatise about aesthetics, structured along the lines of Vischer’s great intellectual model, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). This treatise, which was to encompass nine volumes (Figure 1), took Vischer twelve years to write and confirmed his status as one of the most prominent transmitters of Hegelian aesthetics. Hegel’s attempt to incorporate the aesthetic views of his time in one all-encompassing system subject to logically conceivable processes of development exerted its influence on all German intellectual life in the nineteenth century. The acts of thinking and writing about music were even more closely intertwined with Hegelian thought, as they were still relatively unestablished when Hegelian aesthetics were at their peak of dominating the realm of art criticism. Vischer’s efforts to construct his own Hegelian aesthetics were therefore closely followed. 1 Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, for instance, were dismissed from their jobs at the University of Göttingen in 1837 for protesting against the abolishment of the so-called ‘Hanover Constitution’. 2 Vischer’s colleague in Tübingen, the philosopher and archaeologist Albert Schwegler (1819-1857), founded his progressive Hegelian Jahrbücher der Gegenwart in 1843. He instantly took Vischer’s side (NO AUTHOR = SCHWEGLER 1845a & 1845b). Vischer’s friend David Friedrich Strauß defended Vischer in the Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche (STRAUSS 1845). Attacks on Vischer came from the conservative camp in Tübingen University. Heinrich Merz wrote a combative pamphlet Die Jahrbücher der Gegenwart und ihre Helden: Wider die Herren Schwegler, Vischer und Zeller (MERZ 1845), which was teasingly dismissed by Vischer and his companions with their ‘hiking guide’ for Dr Merz (VISCHER/ZELLER/SCHWEGLER 1845). Gustav Hotho, in an unpublished letter (Tü UB Md 787-453, shown in Appendix IVa [184] and annotated in Appendix III [178]), also backed up Vischer in his statements, which reveals that they were much discussed and closely followed among the most prominent intellectuals of his time. Figure 1. The compilation of volumes of Vischer’s Aesthetics in the first and the second edition (see also Appendix IIb [170]) Volumes (title pages) in first edition Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Erster Theil: Die Metaphysik des Schönen Reutlingen/Leipzig: Carl Mäcken 1846 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Zweiter Theil: Das Schöne in einseitiger Existenz 1. Abtheilung: Die Lehre vom Naturschönen Reutlingen/Leipzig: Carl Mäcken 1847 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Zweiter Theil: Das Schönen in einseitiger Existenz 2. Abtheilung: Die Lehre von der Phantasie Reutlingen/Leipzig: Carl Mäcken 1848 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Theil: Die Kunstlehre 1.Abschnitt: Die Kunst überhaupt Reutlingen/Leipzig: Carl Mäcken 1851 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Theil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 1. Heft: Die Baukunst Stuttgart: Carl Mäcken 1852 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Theil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 2. Heft: Die Bildnerkunst Stuttgart: Carl Mäcken 1853 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Teil: Die Kunstlehre 1. Abschnitt: Die Kunst überhaupt München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1922 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Teil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 1. Heft: Die Baukunst München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1922 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Teil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 2. und 3. Heft: Bildnerkunst/Malerei München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1923 Volumes (title pages) in second edition Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Erster Teil: Die Metaphysik des Schönen München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1922 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Zweiter Teil: Das Schöne in einseitiger Existenz München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1922 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Theil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 3. Heft: Die Malerei Stuttgart: Carl Mäcken 1854 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Theil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 4. Heft: Die Musik Stuttgart: Carl Mäcken 1857 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Theil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 5. Heft: Die Dichtkunst (Schluß des ganzen Werkes) Stuttgart: Carl Mäcken 1857 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Vollständige Inhaltsverzeichnis Namen- und Sachregister Stuttgart: Carl Mäcken 1858 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Teil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 4. Heft: Die Musik München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1923 Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen Dritter Teil: Die Kunstlehre 2. Abschnitt: Die Künste 5. Heft: Die Dichtkunst Register München: Meyer und Jessen Verlag 1923 Vischer had been brought up at the infamous Blaubeuren abbey school from the age of 14, which prepared its pupils for a pietist theology course at the Seminary in Tübingen (Tübinger Stift). Vischer repeatedly admitted that the suffocating and reactionary climate at Blaubeuren and the Stift had deformed his very character. However, despite the traditionalist approach of both institutions, Vischer’s generation was to some extent exposed to contemporary philosophy (Hegel, for instance). Charismatic teachers, such as the theologian Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860), who is, even to date, highly regarded for his pioneering work on the history and philosophy of Christianity, allowed considerable room for excursions from theology into philosophical and historical research. Thus, orientation towards contemporary philosophy was an acceptable escape route for most students at the Stift. The institution raised generations of influential idealist thinkers. Hegel, Friedrich Schelling and Vischer’s classmate David Friedrich Strauß were among them, as well as a number of distinguished poets, such as Friedrich Hölderlin and Eduard Mörike, the latter being another of Vischer’s friends and classmates. After finishing his degree in 1830, Vischer was employed as a vicar and an assistant lecturer at the Stift. He took his doctorate in theology at Tübingen University in 1832, and his Habilitation in aesthetics and German literature in 1836 with a dissertation on the Comic and the Sublime as conditions for the appearance of Beauty (VISCHER 1837), an early effort to adapt the concept of Beauty* to his own allegedly ‘unbeautiful’ time. Because he was such a successful product of the traditional educational system, Vischer’s 1844 attack on the Church’s power in academia was ever so shocking for the establishment. His rebellion was, however, by no means unique. In the years leading to the political upheavals in 1848, known in German as the Vormärz* period, many middle-class intellectuals all over Europe expressed their intention to participate in political decision-making, an intention that was further enhanced in German-speaking countries by hopes for political unification. The various dukes and kings that reigned over their own small states were considered to be an immense obstruction to this unification, as none of them would want to give up his sovereignty. People were expecting a radical upheaval to solve the problem in its entirety. As soon as the aristocracy gave in, what could obstruct the realization of a unified Germany under democratic rule? To prepare for this, a shadow parliament was established in 1848, named after the place in which it resided: St Paul’s Church in Frankfurt am Main. The so-called Frankfurt Parliament consisted mainly of middle-class, welleducated citizens wanting to expand their often economically powerful positions with political authority. 3 Not surprisingly, Vischer’s reputation easily enabled him to join one of the moderate left-wing parties. From his diary notes covering his period in Frankfurt (Ma DLA: Vischer 42472), it appears that Vischer was far too staunch and incorruptible to be a good politician. 4 His speeches were too difficult and too academic to bring about immediate action, and his uncompromising character did not help find practical solutions to social and political problems. Vischer’s position illustrated the situation of the Parliament as a whole. It could not take a stand against the politically experienced aristocracy; internal struggles and opposing interests made it powerless. In 1849, it was muzzled and Vischer had to keep his head down in order to avoid prosecution by the now increasingly powerful aristocratic rulers. Like many of his obstinate fellow Germans, he decided to move to Switzerland, where he became Professor of literary history at the Polytechnikum in Zurich in 1855. Since he had recently divorced his wife after a short and disastrous marriage, he was happy to move.5 During these years, the early 1850s, Vischer distanced himself increasingly from 3 When the members of the Parliament talked about democracy, they considered ‘the people’ to be the middleclass: well-educated individuals with experience in dealing with responsibility. Other reasonably well-known figures in the Parliament were the radical left-winger Arnold Ruge (1802-1880), Jacob Grimm (1785-1863), and the poet Ludwig Uhland (1787-1862). 4 Some of the notes have been published by Gottlob Egelhaaf (VISCHER 1907b & VISCHER 1909/1910). Hegel, who had, up to then, been an example for him in everything he wrote and taught. This shift, also found by many of his contemporaries, was caused first and foremost by the changed political situation, the lost hope for an imminent liberation of mankind. The issue of freedom was an aspect of Hegel’s philosophy that exerted an immense influence on his followers. Hegel had built his philosophical theory on the assumption that mankind as a whole develops through stages of increasing self-knowledge and selfconsciousness* towards the ultimate goal of freedom and total self-determination (Selbstbestimmung). He implied that this goal may indeed be sheerly theoretical and the development towards it everlasting, but the history of mankind was still entirely determined by this teleological dimension. Thus, as one of the first philosophers of his time, Hegel acknowledged that it was impossible to understand man, or his ways of expression, without the study of his past development. Mankind is gradually developing into what it was to begin with. It develops into itself, as it were, just like a child develops into an adult, already having the most basic inner and outer features in its genes when it is born. Only when mankind is reconciled with its own ‘absolute’ self does it stop depending on anything outside itself; it is free (HEGEL 1995a, 30). By formulating this reconciliation as an absolute one, Hegel stressed that any reconciliation with the self that cannot be described as absolute does not lead to freedom as there is no total independence from anything else. The absoluteness or totality of the reconciliation safeguarded the teleological dimension of it. Hegel described the twofold impetus of mankind’s development in similar terms, by distinguishing between the Spirit* and the Idea* as two sides of the same Absoluteness. The importance attributed to the Absolute* as Idea provided an entire German philosophical movement with its name: idealism*. Idealist philosophy further explored the Platonist view that reality has a metaphysical counterpart that cannot be readily observed or described, but needs a form of imagination* or logical deduction to be accessed. Hegel’s interpretation of the Absolute as Idea includes a concept* of something (which required imagination) together with the reality of that concept (which could be observed sensorily) (INWOOD 1993, xiii-xxi). Whilst the Idea still possesses some kind of determinable content, albeit a metaphysical one, the Absolute as Spirit does not have content. It is nothing more and nothing less than a driving force, an instigator of mankind’s development into its absolute self. Hegel claimed that the Spirit manifests itself in the history of the world, the history of humankind as a whole (HEGEL 1995a, 75). The developments instigated by the Spirit are therefore, in Hegel’s eyes, necessities, inevitable outcomes of mankind’s urge to develop into itself. Thus, they are essentially unilinear. However, in order to describe the actions of the Spirit as dynamic processes, Hegel had to specify how one development could necessarily grow out of another. He did this by means of his dialectics*. Hegel’s dialectics are often summarized as opposing developments or situations, creating a new development or situation by means of their opposition. It should be kept in mind, however, that Hegel was primarily concerned with establishing identity, since selfconsciousness can only be attained by focussing both on oneself and on other things. By dialectically opposing oneself to other things, one is able to establish one’s identity. Thus, Hegel was not primarily interested in situations opposing each other, but rather in the process of sublation* (Aufhebung) between the two, which would lead to a new situation or premise. Sublation in Hegel’s thought therefore means dissolution as well as elevation. The opposing situations, developments or premises that precede the process of sublation are merely the dynamics triggering the process; their opposition is transitory, while functional and subservient to the concept of development. Hegel often described the dynamics of development as outer and inner, or objective and subjective aspects of the same thing. Creating a work of art, for instance, could easily be described in dialectical terms as an interaction between the objective outer world of nature and the subjective inner world of man (Figure 2). An artist observes an object (material*) in nature that he would like to use as a model or means for a work of art. He interiorizes this material, as it were, by means of his imagination. Observation in idealist aesthetics is always an imaginative act, in which adaptation of the natural object is unavoidable. The outer manifestation of this object as well as its interiorized subjective counterpart are two dialectical preconditions for the concept of the work of art that now emerges in the mind of the artist. His conception of the work of art is a sublation of the two previous stages. Subsequently, the concept of the work of art needs to be executed in order to become apparent in objective reality. Until it has been embodied as a tangible, objective manifestation it is in fact non-existent, as the Spirit seeks tangible objects in which to appear and will keep imposing its force until it has found one. The concept of the work of art on the one hand, and the tangible actions of the artist to execute his work of art on the other objectify the work of art’s subjective state of being. It is the force of the Spirit that is eventually responsible for the dynamics of this movement, the dialectical oppositions are just temporary stages in the process. The series of dialectical movements will lead to a reconciliation with the absolute self, in which mankind’s Spirit has found itself, and mankind depends on nothing else but itself: Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen. Es ist von dem Absoluten zu sagen, daß es wesentlich Resultat, daß es erst am Ende das ist, was es in Wahrheit ist; und hierin besteht seine Natur, Wirkliches, Subjekt oder Sichselbstwerden zu sein. (HEGEL 1996, 24)i Unlike his idealist contemporaries, such as Kant and Schelling, Hegel described the Absolute as being able to contain differences in the form of a subject-object opposition. Hence, the Spirit is developmental and variable rather than static. Whereas Kant believed that development of the Spirit was possible, he considered it as a merely hypothetical development that might occur in a reasonably undefined future. Hegel unreservedly situated this development in the ‘here and now’, directly serving the relatively tangible τελος of freedom.6 In doing so, Hegel stressed that this eventual goal could be reached by anybody through very hard work. It is one of the reasons for Hegel’s belief in the supremacy of Thought over all other kinds of human expression. In Cartesian tradition, Hegel claimed that what makes us human – and hence what enables us to reach our eventual absolute selfdetermination – is our ability to think. As appears from the above quotation, Hegel equated truth with completeness, which meant in his philosophy: the end of a development. He thus assumed that this development occurs according to principles of reason and logicality. The dynamics of dialectical processes are logical necessities. History can therefore be explained as a logical process. Hegelian revisions This Vernunftteleologie* (SCHNÄDELBACH 1974, 18), the belief in the logicality of history impelling to a certain goal, had an impact on the intellectual life of the nineteenth century that cannot be overestimated. Peter Ramroth, in his study into the philosophical roots of the music criticism of Franz Brendel, does not exaggerate when he states that ‘die Philosophie Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels kann als Ausgangs-, Reibungs-, und Endpunkt für den Großteil des geisteswissenschaftlichen Lebens der Jahre zwischen 1830 und 1870 6 Peter Ramroth rightly observes that this stance carried the possibility of describing the present as a separate critical category (RAMROTH 1991, 67), which is important with regard to Vischer’s aesthetics. This will be discussed in Chapter Four [76]. angesehen werden’ (RAMROTH 1991, 73).ii During Hegel’s lifetime, artists, critics, and writers such as Ivan Turgenev (1818-1883), and political activists such as Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) were coming to Berlin specifically in order to attend Hegel’s lectures. Initially the impact of Hegel’s thought was predominantly philosophical, but after his death in 1831, its political implications became ever more important. So-called Young Hegelians* (Junghegelianer) of the early 1840s ‘brought an acute sense of political urgency to Hegelian thought’, states Sanna Pederson in her account of the 1848 upheavals (PEDERSON 1996, 64). Arnold Ruge, one of the more notorious representatives of the group, was, like Vischer, a member of the Frankfurt Parliament, but on the far left, and might have been a major source of inspiration for later progressive music criticism (PEDERSON 1996, 66).7 Other Young Hegelians, such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels would acquire a reputation of their own as well. The Young Hegelians interpreted Hegel’s emphasis on freedom as a sign of imminent liberation from aristocratic bonds, and proclaimed it to be historically inevitable citing Hegelian dialectics. Although the failure of the 1848 upheavals was a blow to their emancipatory and revolutionary intentions, it is well known that they did not abandon their ideals.8 At the other end of the spectrum, the more academically orientated right-wing Hegelians kept their distance from the fickle ways of politics. People such as Immanuel Fichte (1797-1879, not to be confused with his better-known father, the contemporary of Hegel, Johann Gottlieb) or Constantin Rößler maintained that Hegel had not expressed himself in any way about future developments apart from this one eventual theoretical goal of reconciliation with the Absolute. Right-wing Hegelians therefore adhered to the status quo (which sometimes, as in the case of Rößler, resulted in conservative political views); they explored the systematic classification of Hegel’s philosophy further, neatly and conservatively positioning various expressions of human civilization in clear-cut categories. Vischer’s treatise on aesthetics, started in 1846 and eventually finished in 1858, is a good example of this urge for classification according to dialectical principles. 7 The literary scholar Helmuth Widhammer states that Vischer was on good terms with Ruge, but complained at times that his thought was used by the Young Hegelians (WIDHAMMER 1972, 165). Considering Widhammer’s strained attempts to describe Vischer as the only major transmitter of Hegel’s thought, this statement should be approached with care. 8 This observation has considerable consequences for the way in which we should view the period under investigation. This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Two [32-34]. Figure 3. Hegelian dialectical classification of the manifestations of Beauty and the arts, as a starting point for the structure of Vischer’s Aesthetics (see also Figure 1 [15]) (VISCHER 1844c, 393-396). Hegel describes a similar classification in his Aesthetics (HEGEL 1995b, 254-265). The metaphysics of Beauty (subjective) (Part One – Volume 1 [1846])  Beauty in unequivocal existence (objective) (Part Two – Volume 2 & 3)  Natural Beauty (objective manifestation) ⇔ (Volume 2 [1847])  Imagination (subj. manif.) (Volume 3 [1848]) ⇓ Objectivity reconciled with subjectivity = Subjective-objective reality of Beauty = Art (Part Three – Volume 4 [1851])  Visual arts (objective art form) Architecture (Volume 5 [1852]) Sculpture (Volume 6 [1853]) Painting (Volume 7 [1854])  ⇔ Music (subjective art form) (Volume 8 [1857]) ⇓ Poetry (Subjective-objective art form) (Volume 9 [1857]) In 1843, one year before his notorious inaugural lecture, Vischer had published an outline of his aesthetic treatise (VISCHER 1844c) discussing how art grows out of the dialectical relationship between the objective manifestation of Beauty (which Vischer, following Hegel, described as natural Beauty) and the subjective manifestation of Beauty (which they both described as imagination) (Figure 3).9 Thanks to Beauty’s ability to ‘divide’, as it were, into an objective and a subjective manifestation, Beauty can embody itself in art, appearing in tangible reality as a reconciliation of subjective inner imagination and tangible outer objects. As can be observed in Figure 3, Vischer did stick to Hegel’s neat classification of the arts during the entire twelve-year period in which he wrote his treatise, meticulously connecting every volume of his series with a manifestation of Beauty. Yet, as early as the mid 1850s, he acknowledged that neither Beauty, nor the various art forms could be positioned so rigorously. This is one of the reasons why his multi-volume series on aesthetics is not particularly unified in stylistic and methodological respect. Hegel had argued that the Spirit, as an instigator of mankind’s development towards its absolute self, manifests itself in certain forms of human expression. These forms of human expression indicate how far mankind has progressed towards its ultimate goals of self-consciousness and self-determination. Hegel distinguished between three main manifestations of the Spirit: religion, art and philosophy, or in more abstract (Vischer would say: subjective) terms: God, Beauty and Thought. Although religion, art and philosophy exist side by side and depend on each other up to a certain extent, they all flourished independently throughout history, because the way in which they communicate is unique for all of them. Religion is an imaginative manifestation of the Spirit (i.e. an imaginative way for mankind to express itself and to communicate), in the sense that it exists by means of constructing an image of what the Absolute could be in the form of God. Art, according to Hegel, is a sensory medium for mankind to express itself; it requires sensory perception and the involvement of emotion and empathy. Philosophy is an intellectual way of communicating, it requires abstract conceptualization. Not surprisingly, Hegel implied that Thought in the form of philosophy is the most accurate and advanced manner of expressing the Spirit. The implications of this Weltanschauung for art, and art’s relationship towards religion and philosophy will be discussed more elaborately in Chapter Four [70] of this study. It should be stressed here that art, like religion and philosophy, had a well-defined and rather unquestioned function in Hegel’s system, a function that was adhered to by basically any philosopher who called himself an idealist in the nineteenth century. Aestheticians too, who unlike Hegel were exclusively concerned with art, took Hegel’s 9 Figure 3 about the manifestation of art should not be confused with Figure 2 [19] about the manifestation of a work of art. Figure 2 reveals the process of art’s emergence in practice, whereas Figure 3 sketches the metaphysical implications of the dialectics of art. Comparison of both figures also shows that dialectical thinking enabled aestheticians to describe the relationships between creative factors from various angles. An example is the role of imagination in relation to natural Beauty or the outer material. In Figure 3 they form the two dialectical preconditions for art; in Figure 2, which is the more detailed account of how this process develops, the sublation of their interaction (interiorized material) becomes the main dialectical counterpart for the outer material. interpretation of Beauty as a manifestation of the Spirit as an absolute premise for their aesthetics. Despite Vischer’s inclination to follow Hegel’s rather rigid categorizations, it is obvious that he was not a right-wing Hegelian. In fact, his position is unique in the sense that, apart from greatly contributing to rather conservative categorization efforts featuring the academic world, he was also committed, especially in his younger years, to an outspoken political progressiveness. He managed to incorporate the Young Hegelian urge for change and progress in a rather ‘Old Hegelian’, respectable aesthetic system. 10 As none of the Young Hegelians had an aesthetic background, Vischer’s position as an aesthetician was unique. This made him an extraordinarily popular and widely read transmitter of Hegel’s aesthetics, while he also integrated contemporary scholarly and political views. Most German intellectuals recognized their own views in Vischer’s stances. Instead of reading Hegel’s aesthetics, which only existed in a rather inaccessible edition of Hegel’s students (Appendix IIb [171]), many German artists, critics and academics resorted to Vischer’s Aesthetics. Music critics, as we will see, were attracted to Vischer’s adaptation of Hegelian views too. Vischer’s unique position offers a number of methodological problems for those who intend to study his impact on his intellectual environment. Firstly, there is the difficulty of distinguishing Vischer from Hegel. Although it is impossible to maintain that Vischer was the only ‘gateway’ into the aesthetics of the great Hegel, 11 it is justified to assume that Vischer’s aesthetics were widely considered to be the most important means of getting oneself acquainted with Hegelian philosophy. The language Vischer used in his treatise was targeted at specific Bildungsbürger* aims, such as the establishment of a national culture and the view that exposing people to Beauty through art would also make them more susceptible to truth. These aims were widely adhered to by German middle-class intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century, but they did not feature in Hegel’s own aesthetics. By further exploring them in this study, it is possible to reveal how Vischer adapted, and at times criticized, Hegel’s thought. Thus, Willi Oelmüller situates Vischer’s Aesthetics as follows: Vor allem durch dieses Werk […] dessen Wirkung und Einfluß […] weit über Deutschland hinausreichte, ist Vischer zu einer der bedeutendsten Gestalten der Geschichte der nachhegelschen Ästhetik, ja für Lukács zum bedeutendsten nachhegelschen Ästhetiker überhaupt geworden. (OELMÜLLER 1958, 251)12iii 10 11 Also observed by Sanna PEDERSON 1995, 126n. Which is argued by the literary scholar Helmuth WIDHAMMER (1972, 164), without convincing proof. Although Vischer was a major transmitter of Hegel’s aesthetics, it is highly unlikely that he was the only one, as many of Vischer’s colleagues, such as Christian Weiße (1801-1866) and Karl Rosenkranz (1805-1879), had been students of Hegel himself and exerted considerable influence on their environment. Publications such as Rosenkranz’s 1853 Ästhetik des Häßlichen and Weiße’s Philosophische Dogmatik (1855-1862) are even of interest today. 12 The interpretation of Vischer’s writings by the Marxist literary scholar Georg Lukács (1885-1971) will be addressed on several occasions later on. Oelmüller is not alone in attributing such an important role to Vischer. Carl Dahlhaus, one of the few musicologists who engaged himself with Vischer, calls him the ‘bedeutendste Ästhetiker unter den Hegelianern’ (DAHLHAUS 1967a, 47). Literary scholar Heinz Quitzsch refers to him as ‘einer der führenden Vertreter der Ästhetik in Deutschland’ (QUITZSCH 1989, 64) and his colleague Heinz Schlaffer stresses Vischer’s relevance for the twentieth century, describing his Aesthetics as the ‘Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert’ (Schlaffer in BERGER-FIX 1987, 110).iv Still, soon after his death, Vischer’s contemporaries were not particularly convinced of Vischer’s aesthetic influence in the long term. The British Hegelian Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), as well as the aesthetician Max Diez, acknowledged that most of his views could be derived from several other, sometimes even earlier sources (BOSANQUET 1892, 400; DIEZ 1889, 7). His relevance lies exactly in this lack of individuality. Vischer represented an era. He was one of the last in his generation to adhere to the view that the Idea is the basis and premise of all human expression and interaction. This urge to explain everything from one absolute principle had been immensely important for German intellectual life in general, and for the still relatively recent initiatives to establish the position of music among the other arts in particular. During the second half of the nineteenth century, this urge came under increasing scrutiny. Vischer is an excellent case for investigating this process of idealist retreat. He was considered to be such a peerless protagonist of idealist thinking during his lifetime, that writers, philosophers and critics relied on him as an intellectual and ideological stronghold. ‘Was denn der Vischer dazu sagen werde oder gesagt habe, fragte vor hundert Jahren jeder, der deutsche Zeitungen und Zeitschriften las, ob es sich um eine politische Krise oder ein künstlerisches Ereignis handelte.’v (MENCK 1966, 95) After he died, his fame died almost instantly with him. In a truly Hegelian sense, his thought did not surpass his own time. Hegelian retreat Whilst it is impossible to establish Vischer’s individuality on the basis of his views, it is possible to consider him as an orientation point indicating the position of idealist thought with regard to aesthetic movements that tried to qualify or even undermine its hegemony. With the retreat of idealist thinking, Vischer’s own fame also became something of an empty shell. He was respected and referred to as one of the founding fathers of modern aesthetics, but his views themselves were increasingly criticized, however politely and reverentially. Moreover, the nature of his aesthetic thinking changed considerably over the course of his life, not least due to the changing status of idealist philosophy in general. His early ‘New outline of aesthetics’ (VISCHER 1844c) was aimed radically to overthrow the existing thinking patterns and nurtured by a faith in Hegelian dialectics bringing humankind its freedom. It can hardly be compared with his ‘Revision of my aesthetics’ (VISCHER 1866 & 1873), in which he openly distanced himself from Hegel and focused on a kind of rudimentary, empirically motivated psychoanalysis for discovering the nature of Beauty, from which the Idea could be constructed at a later stage. Vischer’s late-nineteenth-century thought is much more individual and original than his early Hegelianism, but it was the general familiarity with his Hegelianism that brought him his fame.13 Vischer’s change in aesthetic approach, in which Hegelian concepts such as Idea and Spirit gradually lost their transcendentalism and became subject to human actions and capabilities, mirrors the gradual but irrevocable political U-turn Vischer had made on his return to Germany in 1866. After 1848, Vischer had to abandon his rebellious Vormärz ideals, losing faith both in Hegel’s strict dialectical system and in the progressive political goals connected with it. However, Vischer kept believing in the Idea as ultimate reference point for the explanation of Beauty and also in the ongoing progress of mankind, whatever that progress may be. If it could not be achieved with political means, it could at least be prepared by artistic and intellectual achievements. In proper Hegelian context, Beauty expressed the same content as Thought (i.e. the development of mankind), just with different means. Like many of his contemporaries, Vischer believed that in order to prepare people for the next stage of history, they could be elevated by means of education. The initial intentions of this so-called Bildungsbürger movement, of which Vischer was one of the most respected representatives, were genuinely progressive, but during the 1850s and early 1860s, the movement lost its élan, mainly because the goal in the (Young) Hegelian Weltanschauung (freedom for all) was increasingly fading in importance. Vischer adapted his ideal of a united Germany under democratic rule into an ideal of a united Germany irrespective of the form of government. As there was wide support for this view all over Germany, and as tangible efforts were being made to realize it, Vischer took the opportunity to return to his home country and take up his former post at the university he had once despised for its conservative attitude. He became Professor of German literature and aesthetics in Tübingen in 1866. Two years later, he supplemented this appointment with a similar position at the Polytechnikum in Stuttgart, where he stayed until his retirement in 1877. He was ennobled in 1870 for his merits not only as an academic, but also as a writer of numerous popular novels, as a poet and a painter.14 Now being Friedrich von Vischer, he fully supported Otto von Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian war and the subsequent unification of Germany. By 1871, the rebel that 13 Heinz Schlaffer argues that Vischer’s later cultural-philosophical theories focussing on psychoanalytical aspects of aesthetic perception, such as the theories of Anschauung and Einfühlung, were read and further pursued by people such as Aby Warburg, Georg Simmerl and Sigmund Freud, but never connected with his name (SCHLAFFER 1987, 54; SCHNEIDER 1996, 10). A good example of Vischer’s later thought filtering through in German idiom is the still popular German phrase ‘die Tücke des Objekts’, implying that lifeless objects can play tricks on you, for instance by being hidden. It was Vischer who developed and described this phenomenon (notably in his novel Auch Einer [1879]), but hardly anybody knows that he did. Also, the Comic (das Komische) and Coincidence (Zufall) as aesthetic categories have mostly been developed by Vischer. In fact, the category of Coincidence is of fundamental importance to his aesthetics, since he considers Beauty as the dialectical counterpart of Coincidence, being a structuring and meaningful response to the chaos of the world (see also Chapter Three [55]). 14 Vischer’s novel Auch Einer, in which much of his aesthetic views are implicitly or explicitly addressed, was indeed immensely popular, and was still compulsory in most German primary schools after World War I (Schlaffer in BERGER-FIX 1987, 110). An illustration of Vischer’s celebrity status is provided by an undated letter by Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein, in which she asks on behalf of a collector for Vischer’s autograph (Tü UB Md 787-1188a, shown in Appendix IVd [204] and annotated in Appendix III [179]). had been fighting for the ideal of freedom for all was a respected citizen of the Bismarckian empire. Protests against Vischer’s move were scarce. Karl Marx (1818-1883) was truly disappointed; in a letter to Engels in 1882 he sarcastically called Vischer the ‘Virgil of Wilhelm I’. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who had never regarded Vischer very highly, called him a ‘Bildungsphilister’. However, most German intellectuals did not particularly feel the need to speak up. They found themselves in a similar stage of life as Vischer, and in a similar safe and privileged position. They would have had too much to lose if they had strived for a radical change in society. Even Arnold Ruge’s ultra left-wing views had miraculously transformed into Bismarckian propaganda.15 Despite Vischer’s interest in the empirically motivated investigation of Beauty, he continued to adhere to a universalist Weltanschauung, in which Beauty encompasses not only art but ‘all das […], was das bürgerliche Bewusstsein als Widerspruch zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit, Gedanke und Anschauung, Abstraktion und Sinnlichkeit erfahren hatte’ (SCHLAFFER 1987, 54).vi Although Vischer seemed to be increasingly undecided about how to communicate his universalism, acknowledging the impossibility of neatly positioning these dichotomies of ‘the bourgeois consciousness’ in dialectical structures, he expressed his Weltanschauung up to his death in 1887 with a turn of phrase that was now almost like that of Rudolf Steiner: Wir kommen aus derselben Natur, woraus Baum, Luft und Stein hervorwächst. Wir gehören derselben Menschheit an, welcher alle Charaktere angehören; und weil also alles, was existiert uns blutsverwandt ist, so stehen bedeutende Geister in einem innigen Verhältnis zum Weltsysteme. (VISCHER 1907a, 209-210)vii In this late, succinctly formulated essay on aesthetics, written especially for a wider audience and published posthumously in 1897, Beauty still plays a role as a means to accomplish an eventual reconciliation with the Absolute, but this reconciliation has turned into a ‘generally human affair’ (allgemein menschliche Angelegenheit) in which man finds harmony with himself through Beauty: Das Schöne […] stellt aus dem geteilten Menschen den ganzen wieder her; es lässt ihn die volle Übereinstimmung seines Wesens mit sich selbst und mit der Welt geniessen. […] Das Schöne bringt Frieden. Sein Bilden ist in diesem Sinne ein Binden und Zusammenbinden. Wie die Kraft, woraus es entspringt, harmonisch ist und zum Einklang dringt, so ist es eine allgemein menschliche Angelegenheit und gründet Harmonie im Leben. Es herrscht überall. (VISCHER 1907a, 4)viii 15 Source: Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon, Ruge entry, accessed via the internet on 7 July 2005 at http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/r/ruge_a.shtml. Georg Lukács explains Vischer’s and Ruge’s move in Marxist (hence also thoroughly Hegelian) terms, when he argues that Vischer’s development from a rebel into a reactionary was a historical necessity of his social class. (LUKÁCS 1956, 246) With this observation, Lukács is implicitly defending Vischer against Marx’s own disappointment. By this time, most music critics and music aestheticians had abandoned the universalism that Vischer still proposed. They preferred to explain music in the context of alternative aesthetic approaches. Formalism, empiricism, and psychoanalysis found their way into the musico-intellectual discourse, offering valuable intellectual frameworks for investigations into music theory, analysis or acoustics. Vischer’s merit lies in the fact that he engaged in some way or another with all these alternative aesthetic movements, sometimes in order to refute them from an idealist perspective, but also to incorporate them in his increasingly flexible idealist thought. Chapter Two Thinking about music Literary premises Music criticism in the eighteenth century had been aimed primarily at establishing the technical merits of a musical piece and the skills of the composer. A decisive impetus for the development of a music criticism that addressed more than technical features were the contributions of Johann Friedrich Reichardt (1752-1814) and Friedrich Rochlitz (17691842). They were not primarily musicians or musical experts, but came from a classicist intellectual tradition represented by Goethe, Kant and Schelling. Their criticism had been derived from the literary tradition of studying classical authors, which formed the foundation of aesthetic thinking. The founder of the term aesthetics, Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762), expanded on issues of the nature of Beauty and perception that had been subject to discussion in the realm of literature for centuries already. As literary criticism was in fact a direct application of aesthetic theory to works of art, it seemed to be a philosophical rather than artistic affair, directly reflecting the developments in philosophical discourse. With idealist thought becoming ever more important at the turn of the century, art criticism was increasingly dealing with the nature of the Absolute, rather than with the nature of art. Criticism became a dialectical thinking method, focused on judging a work of art for its subject-object relationship, i.e. its suitability as a manifestation of the Spirit. This orientation towards an ideal or metaphysical dimension incited a number of early-romantic writers and poets to glorify music as the art that could best enter this dimension. The brothers Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck, Wilhelm Wackenroder and E.T.A. Hoffmann claimed that music ‘says most by saying nothing at all’ (DAVERIO 1993, 5). However, idealist thought in the form of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel posed a problem to the intellectual engagement with music, as Beauty seemed to be instrumental in a system that intended to reveal and explain all expressions of humankind (see Chapter One [23]). In the context of Hegel’s philosophy, the position of art in mankind’s development towards eventual self-determination and freedom needed to be established. In order to do this, it was necessary to determine what an art form or a work of art was ‘about’, what it intended to express, and how this expression was constituted. Whilst Kant had still implied that art could have a content that relates to cognition, just not defined by a concept, Hegel was convinced that verbally determinable concepts were the only means for the Spirit to become embodied in the real world. Nevertheless, Kant too encountered problems with music as an art. In assuming that all the art forms had the same content and function, just using different means to express this content, music needed to fulfil the same requirement of representational and epistemological clarity that applied to a statue of David or a story about love. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, this general consensus about the meaning and function of art, nurtured by the overwhelming omnipresence of Hegelian thought, led to a fundamental inferiority complex among those who intended to develop a consistent way of describing the various aspects and manifestations of music as an expression of mankind. After Hegel’s death in 1831, his followers continued to adhere to idealist thought patterns that were aimed at attributing conceptual content to art as a manifestation of the Spirit.16 This was a decisive incentive to the criticism of the various art forms, causing an explosion of the number of journals containing thorough intellectual engagement with literature, poetry, drama, but also with the visual arts and cultural history. In the 1820s and 1830s, music journals intending to explain the content and meaning of music in conceptual terms were sparse in comparison to the other arts. There were, of course, music journals such as the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung, Cäcilia, and Iris im Gebiete der Tonkunst, that kept the reader informed about musical events, about recently published music, and gave their views about musical education. However, existential questions touching on the essence of what music was, and what it could or should be used for, did not take priority. Only in the late 1830s with Gustav Schilling’s Jahrbücher des deutschen National-Vereins für Musik und ihre Wissenschaft and Robert Schumann’s Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, which further elaborated on ‘metaphysical’ issues raised a couple of decades earlier by writers such as E.T.A. Hoffmann, the discourse actively started to seek connection with Hegelian interpretations of art. In this respect, it is also useful to take a look at the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, which had been founded by Hegel himself in 1827 and represented the mainstream of aesthetic thinking around 1830. As can be observed in Appendix Va [207], only one article has been devoted to music in the years 1827-1835, whereas literature, poetry, linguistics, drama, visual arts, and architecture are addressed much more extensively. This 16 Due to this consensus, Arthur Schopenhauer’s Welt als Wille und Vorstellung from 1818 (SCHOPENHAUER 1974), explaining music as the art that surpasses the ideas, did not start to impose its influence on art critics until the early 1860s. Chapter Two – Thinking about music 31 is still the case, but less so, in the Jahrbücher der Gegenwart, a Hegelian journal from the early 1840s (with regular contributions by Vischer – see Appendix Va [208]). Music was not entirely absent,17 which meant that it was not consciously excluded from idealist interpretation, but since it occupied a problematic position in idealist aesthetics, the subject was avoided by mainstream critics as well as music critics. Music criticism did not seem to be a fully-fledged part of the mainstream Hegelian field of art criticism yet. Over the course of the 1840s, this situation changed dramatically. Music critics increasingly felt the need to engage with Hegelian interpretations of art, actively seeking recognition from an established intellectual movement, especially because music was considered to be problematic by mainstream aestheticians. This attempt at finding recognition essentially lasted for decades and lost its relevance only gradually in the 1860s and 1870s, when idealist thought itself had lost its aesthetic normativity. In order to sketch the early efforts that tried to bring the thinking about music into line with idealist thought, it is worthwhile to look briefly at Eduard Krüger (1807-1885), a good friend of Robert Schumann, who was regularly asked to write for Schumann’s recently founded Neue Zeitschrift für Musik (NZfM). Krüger had attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin and devoted a series of ten articles in the NZfM to Hegel’s philosophy of music in 1842. His aim was to ‘bring music’s true profundity of thought closer to scholarly practice’, 18 implying on the one hand that he wanted to inform scholarly practice of music’s profundity, and on the other hand to explain music’s profundity in a more scholarly manner. According to Sanna Pederson, his articles are a thorough attempt at negotiating Hegel’s views on music (PEDERSON 1996, 62). Krüger argued that music could possess as much conceptual specificity (Bestimmtheit des Ideals 1842, 29 & 40) as Thought, not only because it could express a national culture, but also because it could express a ‘surplus of the unsayable that cannot be expressed in words’ (PEDERSON 1996, 63). Flirting with the music theorist Adolph Bernhard Marx’s (1795-1866) concept of Tonbilder, Krüger tried to explain this specificity as music’s ability to construct images by means of tones: music as ‘künstlerisches Abbild des allgemeinen Regens, das die Natur durchbebt, in der höchsten […] Gestalt als Spiegel des ringsum kreisenden Lebens’ (KRÜGER 1842, 68-69).ix Ferdinand Hand (1786-1851) in his Aesthetik der Tonkunst from 1837 (volume 1) and 1841 (volume 2), the first explicit attempt to write an aesthetics of music, tried to define music’s conceptual specificity as the representation of emotions. Hand’s aesthetics of feeling (Gefühlsästhetik) relied on the Bildungsbürger view that art should arouse emotions in the observer, which would lead to an enhancement of his decency (Sittlichkeit) and social sensitivity. Although widespread, Hand’s musical Bildungsbürgertum was heavily criticized for reasons of lack of systematic categorization (which was quite a Hegelian criterion) by A.B. Marx in the Hallische Jahrbücher in 1838 as well as by August Kahlert 17 Eduard Krüger published a review of Adolf Bernhard Marx’s Compositionslehre in the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, according to himself (KRÜGER 1842, 57n). Marx reviewed Ferdinand Hand’s Aesthetik der Tonkunst in Arnold Ruge’s thoroughly Hegelian Hallische Jahrbücher in 1838. 18 ‘die wahre Gedankentiefe der Musik auch der Wissenschaft näher zu bringen’ (KRÜGER 1842, 25) (1807-1864) in the NZfM in 1842. The latter was a close friend of Schumann’s too and belonged to his Davidsbündlerkreis. Well versed in music, he was educated as a philosopher, attended Hegel’s lectures and published a thoroughly Hegelian treatise on aesthetics (System der Ästhetik) in 1846, a couple of months before Vischer published the first volume of his treatise. Kahlert’s work reveals great similarity to Vischer’s writings, inclined towards categorization and the attribution of ideal meaning to art. He would undoubtedly have imposed considerable influence on the further development of music criticism if he had not fallen ill just after the publication of his treatise. He became virtually non-productive after 1846, spending his remaining 18 years in bed. Thus, the (essentially idealist philosophical) question as to what music should represent or be ‘about’ did have its impact from the 1840s onwards, inciting a lively debate about music’s possible content and meaning. Mainstream adaptations of Hegelian thought, such as the revolutionary intentions of the Young Hegelians, imposed their influence as well. In his 1847 address to the German Tonkünstlerverein, the art historian and music critic Wolfgang Griepenkerl (1810-1868) stressed the importance of reviving a German opera tradition, since opera was the carrier of the present’s* consciousness* (gegenwärtiges Zeitbewußtsein), i.e. the Spirit. Griepenkerl eagerly explains music as an indispensable aid in bringing mankind further in its development towards freedom: ‘es handelt sich hier nicht nur um Musik, sondern indem es sich um Musik handelt, handelt es sich zugleich und zumal um die hochwichtige Frage: In welch’ einem Verhältniss stehen die Tonkunst und ihre Schöpfungen zu den so scharf ausgeprägten Umrissen der gegenwärtigen geschichtlichen Stellung?’ (GRIEPENKERL 1847, 4-5)x The year 1848 In his article about musical Vormärz, Ernst Lichtenhahn describes the fear of many music critics that music would be marginalized as an art if it did not truly engage with society in social, political or popular respects (LICHTENHAHN 1980, 28). The above quotation from Griepenkerl is a good example of this fear. Lichtenhahn explains it by highlighting the great impact of socio-political developments such as an increasing uncertainty due to political and industrial revolutions. However, Lichtenhahn does not address the inextricable interweaving of the relatively young discourse of music criticism with idealist philosophy requiring that the Spirit embody itself in music. This requirement may not have been explicit at all times, but it was nevertheless present, since the urge to legitimize music as an art by means of establishing conceptual content can be observed in essentially any contribution to the realm of music criticism during the 1840s. Lichtenhahn’s article is not the only example of musicological research that does not sufficiently acknowledge the intricate and ambivalent relationship between philosophy and socio-political events; the present musicological engagement with the year 1848 is another example. Sanna Pederson has claimed on several occasions that the failure of the 1848 revolts was such a blow to the Hegelian dictum of ‘freedom for all’ that idealist thinking was abandoned en masse, Chapter Two – Thinking about music 33 nurturing a powerful countermovement against the ‘romanticism’ of the first half of the nineteenth century (PEDERSON 1996). Ulrich Miehe and Ulrich Tadday in the recent MGG (2003) also stress the sudden and rigorous abandonment of ‘romantic’ ideals around 1848, connecting this with the general disappointment in Hegel’s Vernunftteleologie. Notably Pederson rather easily assumes that a political watershed implies an aesthetic turning point as well. Krüger, Kahlert and Griepenkerl all express their disappointment with the failure of the democratic upheavals: ‘Der politische Ernst der Gegenwart hat die romantische Weltansicht zu Boden geschlagen’ observes Kahlert in 1848 in the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung (AMZ), delivering a bitter reproach to romanticism itself: ‘die Romantik [hat] die politische Kraft der deutschen Nation gebrochen’ (Kahlert as quoted in TADDAY & BOETTICHER 2003, 1371-1372).xi Without wishing to get involved in the laborious discussion about the interpretation of the term ‘romantic’, which seems far from unequivocal in Kahlert’s quotation, one may conclude that all three critics increasingly distanced themselves from Hegel. Krüger, for instance, had never appreciated the left-wing attempts to use Hegel’s thought to political aspirations, but he now fully dismissed the transcendental implications of Hegelianism as such. The obvious abandonment of Hegel was, however, by no means an abandonment of idealist thought patterns, or a divergence of music critical discourse from mainstream idealist aesthetics. On the contrary, long after 1848, universalist and metaphysical aspects of idealist philosophy continued to impose their influence on German intellectual life. As we have already established, many mainstream aestheticians themselves turned away from Hegel and from the ambitious metaphysical claims for art and society that had been connected with his thought. This did not stop them from being idealists, nor did it stop idealist thinking from functioning as the main authoritative philosophical discourse far into the 1850s. In the later nineteenth century, the universalism and transcendentalism of idealist philosophy gradually died out, but in this gradual process, the year 1848 is a milestone at most, and certainly not a watershed or an aesthetic turning point. If we compare Ferdinand Hand’s Aesthetik der Tonkunst from 1837 with Gustav Engel’s treatise with the same title from 1884 (Appendix Vb [210]) it is difficult to find similarities in structure, general aesthetic outlook or allegiance to musical movements. However, both aestheticians claim that they rely on Hegel. Knowledge of and acquaintance with Hegel’s philosophy was considered to be indispensable for developing aesthetic or critical theories of any interest, in the 1880s as much as in the 1830s. The aspect that is worth investigating here, and which has been overlooked in the sparse musicological studies about the period under investigation, is the fact that Hand’s Hegel does not bear much resemblance to Engel’s Hegel.19 19 A typical example of defining all Hegelian thought as Hegel’s own is provided by Robert Determann’s study into the aesthetics of the New German School (DETERMANN 1989, 96). He supports his ‘quotation’ of Hegel with an article by Willi Oelmüller about Vischer (OELMÜLLER 1958), attributing views to Hegel that emerged after his death as a response to his philosophy. Determann’s stance has already been criticized heavily by Peter RAMROTH (1991, 6). Even though Hegel regarded music as a deficient art, Hand and Engel do refer to him on several occasions, but, like most of their colleagues, neither of them relied on Hegel himself. Most music critics had never read Hegel’s Aesthetics, which existed only in a rather inaccessible edition of his students (Appendix IIb [171]). Hegel’s thought was disseminated, interpreted, adapted and certainly also criticized by a number of followers: Hegel’s pupils Christian Weiße, Karl Rosenkranz and Gustav Hotho, and more distant followers such as David Friedrich Strauß and Vischer. They were responsible for the wide availability of Hegel’s philosophy, and for his reputation as a standard bearer for modern thought. Redefining their opinions after 1848 (and on several more occasions), their propagation of Hegel’s philosophy changed over time. Their thought became less transcendental (or less ‘romantic’, if you wish) and more practical and empirical. Nevertheless, their premises considering the Spirit and the Idea as absolute ideological strongholds remained untouched, which was problematic and made them increasingly erode those premises. This gradual undermining of idealist premises from within makes the period between 1848 and roughly 1870 a murky subject for investigation. This may the reason why cultural historical and musicological studies about this period are few in number (see also 56) and do not seem to note that a number of influential music critics and music aestheticians were thoroughly indebted to mainstream idealist aestheticians’ responses to Hegel. If music critics had merely had access to Hegel’s own Aesthetics and not to the responses to Hegel, they would not have been able to put forward their respective cases. Eduard Hanslick’s efforts to reach a concept of musical Beauty (to be addressed in Chapter Five), his opponent Franz Brendel’s rampant urge for progress before and after 1848 (Chapter Seven), Franz Liszt’s attempts to aesthetically substantiate the concept of programme music (Chapter Six) and the use of adapted Hegelianism as an ideological orientation point by several music aestheticians in the 1870s and 1880s (Chapter Eight) do not seem to have much in common at first sight. Yet they emerge rather immediately from the attempt to deal with the idealist aesthetic problematization of music as an art, something that Carl Dahlhaus described as early as 1982 as a unifying factor of music criticism in the nineteenth century (DAHLHAUS & MOTTE-HABER 1982, 83). It seemed that music critics had come to consider idealist thought, including its prejudices against music, as the most authoritative discourse in the field of aesthetic theory. These music critics’ efforts to legitimize music as an art by describing it as a manifestation of the Spirit are not merely riddled with idealist rhetoric, containing terms such as Spirit and Absolute in order to provide their views with more intellectual authority; their criticism itself was firmly rooted in the problematic position that music occupied in an idealist context. Vischer, the most widely-read and respected transmitter of Hegel’s thought in the midnineteenth century, serves as an excellent case study to show how music critics related to the established discourse of idealist thought between the years around 1848 when Hegel’s thought did indeed require thorough revision, and the late 1880s, when the authority of Chapter Two – Thinking about music 35 Spirit and Idea as obvious premises was undermined once and for all. As an illustration of the extent to which Vischer’s thought was regarded as an ideological point of orientation in the music critical realm, it is worth discussing the reception of Vischer’s treatise on musical aesthetics from 1857. Ludwig Bischoff (1794-1867), chief editor of the Niederrheinische Musikzeitung in Cologne and a staunch conservative with regard to contemporary music, took every opportunity to attack Franz Brendel’s progressive views. Eduard Hanslick’s polemics against the New German School were also often directed towards Brendel, being one of the main critical representatives of his self-declared movement. Still, all three agree that Vischer’s treatise on aesthetics has been of crucial importance for the further development of music (BISCHOFF 1857, 332; BRENDEL 1857a, 185; HANSLICK 1990, 154n – see Appendix VI [213]: Bischoff, Brendel, Hanslick). At first sight, this reveals that they all found material in Vischer’s thought to use for the support of their own views, despite their diametrically opposed aesthetic positions. They may have used an idiom or terminology that enabled them to find connection with the authoritative intellectual discourse Vischer represented. However, closer examination, to be carried out in this study, intends to show that they were in fact all concerned with the same problem: determining music’s spiritual substantiality*, its geistige content. Thus, Vischer’s aesthetics provided music criticism with more than mere rhetoric. It also provided an ideological orientation point for music critics to explain music as a spiritually determinate art. Vischer’s relative ignorance with regard to music did not seem to affect his aesthetic authority. However, not all music critics agreed on the importance of Vischer’s musical aesthetics. E. Sobolewski, a Wagnerian critic, argued: Vischer’s Aesthetik ist sehr achtungswerth; doch kann eine Aesthetik der Musik nur von jemand geschrieben werden, der zugleich Musiker und Philosoph ist. Da Vischer nicht Musiker, wenigstens nicht in dem erforderlichen Grade ist, so kann sein Werk nur in einzelnen Theilen genügen. (Sobolewski as quoted in BISCHOFF 1857, 329-330)xii Sobolewski epitomizes the distrust felt by critics who considered themselves to be musical craftsmen, and hence the only ones with the authority to speak about music (see Appendix VI [213]: SOBOLEWSKI 1857; NO AUTHOR 1869, 172). In his short and rather bluntly formulated essay Oper, nicht Drama, he stresses once again that dry aestheticians miss out entirely on the intricacies of music (SOBOLEWSKI 1857, 7). Bravely, he declares that music is incomparable to the other arts, but the aggrieved tone of his argument indicates that Sobolewski suffered from the same inferiority complex that featured the music criticism of his idealist-orientated colleagues: for Sobolewski, thinking and talking about music will grievously harm it, as the clever thinkers and talkers do not want to understand music’s own sphere of reference. Sobolewski demands that music be left alone by people such as Vischer. Leave music to the musicians. Intermezzo in Zurich: Vischer and Wagner Sobolewski’s great model, Richard Wagner, aired similar grouses, but only in the circumstances that suited him. Wagner considered Vischer to be the textbook example of a boring academic, and did not hesitate to show this time after time (Appendix VI [213]: Wagner). Conversely, Vischer despised Wagner’s megalomanic self-importance and his authoritarian ‘priesthood’. The two men knew each other from their exile in Zurich, in the second half of the 1850s. The soirées of Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein (18191887), a long-standing mistress of Liszt and a close friend of Berlioz,20 were meant as an opportunity for staff from the Polytechnikum in Zurich to join the Princess in intelligent conversation. Apart from Vischer, the art historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), the Dutch physiologist Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893) and the poet and painter Gottfried Keller (1819-1890) were regularly invited. Wagner, greatly unnerved by the ‘entsetzliche Professoren-Sucht der Fürstin’,xiii and Liszt were often in attendance as well. Vischer had an affectionate correspondence with the Princess between 1856 and 1858 (Tü UB Md 7871188a, Tü UB Md 787-1257a, and St SA A: 8802, annotated in Appendix III [180-181]), 21 and called her in a letter to a friend ‘ein verflucht gescheites, geistreiches Weib’ xiv, added however instantly that he would not support her in her efforts to promote Wagner’s music in Zurich (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952, 312).22 Wagner and Vischer also frequented the Zurich Café Littéraire, where the entire community of German exiles met on an almost daily basis (RECK 1998, 377). Vischer and Wagner were invited on one occasion by Mathilde Wesendonck, 23 who wanted them to become better acquainted. Eduard Hanslick recalled Vischer’s account of this disastrous visit: Einmal mußte ich eine Einladung, ich glaube bei Wesendonck, annehmen, weil man mich mit Wagner zusammenbringen wollte. Wagner überfloß von Beredtsamkeit über alles Mögliche; gegen Ende des Diners begann er stark auf die Deutschen zu schimpfen und nannte sie eine niederträchtige Nation. Da stieg mir der Zorn zu Kopf. Niederträchtig, rief ich, finde ich es nur, wenn ein Deutscher im Ausland seine eigene Nation herabsetzt. Es entstand eine verlegene Stille; ich nahm meinen Hut und ging 20 The Princess exerted her influence on several key compositions of both Liszt and Berlioz. As revealed in Berlioz’s memoirs, she urged him to write his Les Troyens, for instance, and made far-reaching comments on its creation and progress (BERLIOZ [no date], 372). Her passionate relationship with Liszt has been documented by Alan WALKER (1991), and her friendship with Berlioz by David CAIRNS (2000), among others. 21 22 Published incompletely and with many errors in VISCHER/SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN 1906. In a letter to Ernst Rapp (31 October 1856). The Princess could, however, be quite unpredictable in her behaviour, often being overly excited and unexpectedly bad-tempered, ‘ein monstrum per exzessum an Geist und Herz’ in Wagner’s matchless description of her character. 23 Mathilde Wesendonck (1828-1902) also greatly admired Vischer and asked him in 1867 for his advice concerning her play Genofeva (Tü UB Md 787-1165). Chapter Two – Thinking about music 37 fort. Vielleicht schreibt sich daher Wagners Haß gegen mich; denn meine Bücher hat er schwerlich gelesen. (Vischer in Hanslick’s recollection: HANSLICK 1890, 295)xv Still, an investigation into the relationship between Wagner and Vischer would justify an entire, and undoubtedly highly entertaining, thesis. Wagner and Vischer were almost exact contemporaries, both thoroughly engaged with politics, social justice, the power of religion, nationalism, and the ethical features of art. Both were political Vormärz rebels, moving to Zurich after the upheavals failed. Although Wagner was more radical than Vischer, they shared an inclination towards obstinacy and insubordination that determined their careers to a large extent. That might also have been the reason for the fact that, despite being deeply spiritual people in their own very individual ways, they were both highly critical towards the established Church. Like Vischer, Wagner became increasingly conservative once he became a more successful and authoritative figure in his field. After returning to Germany, both men adhered to a kind of federal conservatism. It should be stressed emphatically, however, that Vischer was not anti-Semitic. The biographical parallels between Vischer’s and Wagner’s development are not very distinctive, as many of their contemporaries shared a similar mentality, but their intellectual encounters are worth mentioning as they offer an insight into the mutual distrust as well as the close intertwining of philosophical and artistic discourses. Literary historians have noted how Vischer expressed his dislike of Wagner in several delightfully witty parodies (KÜRBS 1914, RECK 1998). Illustrative is Vischer’s slightly filthy, but hilarious parody Ricciardini Carradowsky der edle Viehmensch im Gletscherwald Patagoniens oder die Genesis des Dicht-Tondichters. Räuber- u. Schauder-Roman (Ma DLA A: Vischer 42532 [42820]), recently published by literary scholar Alexander Reck. It tells the brief story of the Viehmensch (human beast) of Patagonia, ‘ein im Tannenwald hausendes Dicht-Ungeheuer’xvi that assaults innocent travellers by binding them to trees and forcing them to listen to his interminable poems.24 One night, the beast encounters a traveller-musician who unluckily fell out of bed, landing on a candle with candlestick: ‘sie bohrte sich tief ein, trennte sich, weil sehr fest eingesteckt, nicht vom Leuchter’ (VISCHER 1998, 384).xvii In agony, the poor man runs into the woods, unable to get rid of the colossal candlestick in his behind.25 When the Viehmensch wants to catch the screaming musician, he is hit by the candlestick. ‘Die Todesangst hatte in den Verzweifelnden [the musician] innere Gase gehäuft.’ (386)xviii The explosive release of human gas launches the heavy candlestick in the direction of the Viehmensch, and the hollow sound that emerges from the impact on its head appeals to the ‘poetry-monster’ as wonderfully sophisticated music. While the musician escapes, the monster’s eye is drawn to what he left behind, the candle: 24 Reck notes how Wagner enjoyed being pictured wearing animal fur, which might account for Vischer’s characterization of him as a Viehmensch. The assaulting of innocent bystanders probably refers to Wagner’s sessions at the Zurich Hotel Baur au Lac, where he read out his entire Ring libretto in 1853. For further interpretation of Vischer’s parody, see RECK 1998. 25 Vischer remarks malignantly that this reminds him of Siegfried with Hagen’s spear sticking out between his shoulders (VISCHER 1998, 385). ‘sie ist mild warm, der Unschlitt auf der Oberfläche sanft aufgeschmolzen. Er frisst sie’ (386)xix and in doing so the beast is miraculously transformed into a successful and eventually celebrated ‘poetic tone-poet’. The story ‘Der Besuch: eine Pfahldorfgeschichte’ from Vischer’s famous novel Auch Einer (VISCHER 1959) contains a parody on Wagner that highlights somewhat more substantial aesthetic problems of Vischer with Wagner’s artistic experiments. The primitive village’s druid stuns the humble villagers with a poem (Dichtung), part of a trilogy, ‘wo Dicht- und Tonkunst zu ungewohnten Höhen kunstreicherer Bewegung sich aufschwingt’ (VISCHER 1959, 115).xx Uninvitedly, the self-declared priest makes the villagers perform the work at a ritual feast. Vischer mentions the pompous ‘pipes and brass’ orchestration, with overwhelming new instruments such as drums and rattles, he casually observes a total neglect of melody, and gives a sample of the druid’s poetry with the features that he regarded to be the weak points in Wagner’s libretti: an over-abundance of alliterate verse, an accumulation of genitives, and the omission of propositions and conjunctions. Woglinde’s ‘Wallala, weiala, weia’ from Wagner’s Rheingold becomes ‘Pfisala, pfnisala, pfeia’ in the druids poem, imitating the sound of sneezing. Apart from being an entertaining parody of Wagner’s egotism and his doubtful poetic capacities, the ‘Pfahldorfgeschichte’ also shows Vischer’s problems with the concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk. Although Vischer generally emphasized his ignorance with regard to music, he did have fundamental aesthetic objections against Wagner’s idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk, which he felt he could utter as Wagner was here positioning himself outside the realm of music. According to Vischer, a combination of art forms in one work of art could never lead to an equal position for all the art forms as Wagner had predicted. The one art form would always become subservient to the other, Vischer argued, and would be unable to unfold its powers to its full flourishing. Thus, Wagner’s product is an aesthetic ‘Phantom, ein Ungeheuer, eine Strapaze, […] ein utopischer Wahn’ (VISCHER 1907a, 302),xxi its comparison with the ancient interpretation of art is preposterous, leading art towards a dead end rather than greatness (VISCHER 1955, 834).26 Part of Vischer’s aversion against Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk might have stemmed from both men’s early engagements with the Nibelungenlied as a possible subject for an opera that should revive a German opera tradition. In 1844, Vischer published a ‘suggestion for a grand German opera’ in the second volume of his critical anthology Kritische Gänge (VISCHER 1844d). As mentioned earlier, the entire anthology was banned as it contained Vischer’s insubordinate inaugural lecture; it was therefore highly popular among progressive intellectuals and undoubtedly widely read. Vischer proposed the old Nibelungenlied as a means of expressing the national identity of the German people, but observed that the grand epic is not suitable to be expressed in a single theatre drama, as the time is not suitable for the spoken word. It should be set to music in order to make its material acceptable to modern feeling, without any sacrifice of 26 In a letter to Joachim Raff (12 January 1855) Chapter Two – Thinking about music 39 its true character (VISCHER 1844d, 406). Even then, the project would be far from problematic. Vischer observed an unclearness of the action as a whole and an overabundance of coincidence. Moreover, a Nibelungen opera would be such an extensive work that it could not be performed on one single occasion, but should be divided over several days (VISCHER 1844d, 436). The Nibelungenlied as a means of expressing a German national identity, as well as a means of ‘developing’ a German opera tradition, was a common idea in the nineteenth century. Apart from the many lesser gods of German cultural life, Friedrich Schlegel (1812), Hegel (in his Aesthetics) and Heinrich Heine (1836) wrote about the possibility of writing a drama on the epic. Ludwig Uhland wrote one in 1819, Henrik Ibsen in 1858 and Friedrich Hebbel in 1861 (SCHULZ 1972). Heinrich Dorn (1804-1892) wrote an opera based on the Nibelungenlied in 1854, and Fanny and Felix Mendelssohn discussed the epic’s musical possibilities in their letters. Whilst it is difficult to establish whether and to what extent Wagner was inspired or influenced by earlier engagements with the epic when he published his own libretti for the Ring in 1853, there has been much discussion about Wagner’s possible dependence on Vischer’s essay. Vischer’s essay seems to have been highly regarded among German intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1861, Friedrich Hebbel proudly presented his Nibelungen drama to Vischer, stressing in the accompanying letter that it had taken him years to get beyond Vischer’s almost unsurpassable essay. 27 For Hebbel, Vischer clearly was a great model. The way he addressed Vischer is not unique, if we regard the letters of many of his colleagues in the artistic field. Several of Vischer’s contemporaries observed Wagner’s indebtedness to Vischer’s Vorschlag. Joachim Raff (1822-1882) drew on Vischer for aesthetic support in his 1854 critical pamphlet against Wagner, Die Wagnerfrage: kritisch beleuchtet, which greatly shocked the New German inner circle, since Raff had been a fervent follower of Wagner and Liszt. Raff suggested that many of Wagner’s efforts to create a concept of a Gesamtkunstwerk were already obvious in Vischer’s 1843 outline of his aesthetics (RAFF 1854, 8 – see Appendix VI [213]: Raff). As someone who turned against Wagner, he is, however, not a very reliable source for judging the authenticity of Wagner’s artistic ideas. In 1881, the music critic Wilhelm Tappert (1830-1907) wrote to Vischer that Richard Wagner did nothing less than elaborate on Vischer’s essay (Tü UB Md 787-1057), which is surprising as Tappert was, up to the 1870s, often mentioned in Wagner’s mouthpiece, the Bayreuther Blätter, as contributing greatly to the Wagner cause (NO AUTHOR 1878, 69, 70, 71; NO AUTHOR 1879, 88).28 27 ‘Schon lang sind Ihre Kritische Gänge mit der vortrefflichen Abhandlung über die Nibelungen nicht von meinem Schreibtisch verschwunden; schon lang hat sich diese Abhandlung, die mir unwiderleglich schien, zwischen mich und meiner Jugend-Wunsch gestellt.’ Hebbel in an unpublished letter to Vischer, 1 June 1862 (Ma DLA: Vischer 41828). [For a long time now your Kritische Gänge, with the excellent essay about the Nibelungs, has not left my writing desk; for a long time this essay, which seemed incontestable to me, has placed itself between me and my childhood dream.] 28 Wilhelm Tappert was a productive and prominent Wagnerian music critic. In the 1860s, he regularly wrote for the Berliner Musik-Zeitung Echo and from 1878 onwards, he was the editor of the Allgemeine Deutsche MusikZeitung: Wochenschrift für die Reform des Musiklebens der Gegenwart. We can establish with certainty that Louise Otto (1819-1895) read Vischer’s essay. She elaborated on it with her own proposal in the NZfM in 1845, referring to Vischer in laudatory and respectful words (OTTO 1845, 49). According to Ernest Newman in his Wagner biography of 1937, her effort is ‘an appalling specimen of the libretto-German of the period’ (NEWMAN 1960, 26).29 She urged Schumann to write an opera on the text, an offer which Schumann apparently chose not to have noted. Niels Gade (1817-1890), however, did play with the idea of setting her text to music. Newman thus reaches the conclusion that Wagner must have been aware of Vischer’s proposal in one way or another: As Wagner read the Neue Zeitschrift 30 it is possible that if he did not already know Vischer’s book his attention was drawn to it by Louise Otto’s articles. The conclusion that he had read Vischer seems inescapable. […] it is not an unreasonable assumption that Vischer’s arguments, which coincided at so many points with his own ideas, played a determining part in his thing during these years. (NEWMAN 1960, 27) However, it should be kept in mind that the similarities between Vischer’s and Wagner’s mentalities were not very distinctive. Elizabeth Magee, in her more recent investigation of Wagner’s Nibelungen sources, criticizes the general consensus that Wagner knew Vischer’s proposal. ‘Whether he did or not probably made little difference. Given the climate of the age and his own field of interest, Wagner would quite possibly in due course have turned to the Nibelungs anyway as a suitable opera subject.’ (MAGEE 1990, 53) As even Newman agrees that ‘there is little similarity between this [Vischer’s] and Wagner’s work’ (NEWMAN 1960, 26) and that ‘the Nibelungensubject occupied the minds of many poets and composers’ (27), Vischer’s influence on Wagner is at least doubtful, as Magee concludes as well (1990, 214). This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that the loyal co-author of Vischer’s 1857 musical aesthetics, Karl Köstlin (see Chapter Three [61]), did not mention Vischer’s essay once in his book on Wagner’s Ring from 1877. The issue of the Nibelungen proposal is exemplary of Vischer’s position in the intellectual field. He published on a subject that occupied everybody, which led to great admiration for his work as well as rendering it impossible to establish whether it made any difference that he published on it. His functionality lies in his reputation; Vischer was the transmitter incarnate, not only of Hegel’s thought, but also of the ideologies and aspirations that surrounded him. Wagner does not seem to have been philosophically inspired by Vischer in any respect. Before Wagner turned to Schopenhauer, he seemed to have been 29 Otto’s elaboration on the first two scenes from the first act (in the NZfM 23/44 & 23/46) indeed features a rather arbitrary introduction of protagonists, and extremely simplistic rhyme schemes with very little variation. Vischer himself would have undoubtedly done a better job, considering, for instance, his witty and sophisticated parody on Goethe’s Faust (VISCHER 1889). 30 Which is doubtful, according to James Deaville who investigated the relationship between Wagner and the editor of the Neue Zeitschrift, Franz Brendel: ‘Es ist durchaus möglich dass Wagner die Neue Zeitschrift zwischen den Jahren 1843 und 1849 überhaupt nicht zu Gesicht bekam.’ (DEAVILLE 1986, 36) [It is possible by all means that Wagner did not read the Neue Zeitschrift at all between 1843 and 1849.] Chapter Two – Thinking about music 41 adopting ideas that could be described as combining Hegel’s developmental Weltanschauung with a Herderian kind of naturalism. Wagner observed that different currents of historical development were ‘active’ at the same time, sometimes as undercurrents, at other times as dominant movements that came up and went down again. Moreover, Wagner felt that the Germanness of culture came from ‘deep down’, from the Boden, if you wish, whereas Vischer, certainly in his later years, regarded Germanness as something gebildet: intellectually polished and sophisticated. Both men possessed an inclination towards eclecticism as far as their philosophical engagements are concerned. Wagner might have been the more adventurous of the two, but he was also less careful, and in his time undoubtedly less respected for his aesthetic achievements than Vischer. Hegelian strongholds and Hegelian deceptions Wagner apparently felt he could diverge from Hegelian thought patterns. This was quite exceptional in the mid-nineteenth century. Before his encounter with Schopenhauer’s thought, even Wagner could not escape Hegel’s dictum that conceptualization was the only way for the Spirit to become manifest. Interpreting music in concepts was (and still is) highly problematic, not only for philosophers such as Hegel and Vischer. Dealing with music discursively still does not provide much information about what music is ‘about’. Music critics were well aware that entering the realm of music by dissecting it, interpreting it and conceptualizing it, could only be done by means of describing it in terms of something other than music. Still, Hegelian dogmas stimulated them to establish connections with other spheres of human expression in order to set up a framework of conceptual tools that dealt with the nature and content of music discursively. Hanslick, Liszt, and Brendel, among others, were forced to deal with the discrepancy between music and conceptualization if they wanted to associate themselves with the Hegelian mainstream. After 1848, when Vischer’s adaptations of Hegel’s philosophy allowed limited space for music to manifest itself as a spiritual power (i.e. as a phenomenon that could be conceptualized), the attempts to legitimize music as an art in idealist context stood a chance to succeed. Thus, Hanslick’s search for purely musical Beauty and Liszt’s glorification of instrumental music might seem revolutionary and emancipatory in the context of Hegel’s repressive philosophy, but involvement of the mid-nineteenth-century aesthetic mainstream, represented by Vischer, leads us to suspect that these emancipatory achievements were not wholly theirs. Many of the aesthetic tools and means of grasping music in words were already lying ready for them in the aesthetic mainstream. The construction and employment of these tools brings us to perhaps the most complicated aspect of Hegelian philosophy: the use of language. When investigating the impact of idealist philosophy as an omnipresent intellectual movement on German music criticism and acknowledging that music critics often adhered to idealist thinking in a subconscious manner, we should seriously engage with the question of whether we are dealing with defined concepts or ideas, or in fact with nothing more than rhetoric; possibly, music critics only used Hegelian terminology in order to find a connection with an established intellectual movement. Concepts such as Geist, Bewußtsein or Phantasie were so widely used, and in such wide-ranging contexts, that one might wonder whether their use indicates any conclusive influence of idealist thought on music criticism whatsoever. Hegel considered language as an indiscernible aspect of his philosophical system. It is not the terms themselves, but the way and the context in which they are used that determines their meaning. This is important for the study of Hegel’s own philosophy, but also highlights the necessity of differentiating between the various manifestations of Hegelian thought after Hegel’s death. Especially when trying to sketch the development of criticism, rhetoric becomes arguably more relevant than ideas or concepts. The fact that Hanslick and Brendel both felt obliged to explain music in terms of Geist is telling enough, despite their undoubtedly different interpretations of Geist. It is possible to acquire a sense of orientation in the labyrinth of idealist philosophy by investigating how fashionable terms, concepts or rhetorical tricks were interpreted in a wide range of different ways. When Hanslick talked about Geist, did he hold a Hegelian or a Vischerian view of the concept, and if it is neither, how did his own interpretation of it differ from the mainstream idealist interpretation of his time? Since rhetoric did the trick for most critics, it is the idealist terminology and the idealist references that we should focus on, in such a way as to read between the lines and establish their interpretation from the context in which they were used. This is necessary, because those musicologists (to be addressed on several occasions later on in this study) that address Hegelian influences in German music criticism generally hardly distinguish between Hegel’s own philosophy and the aesthetics of his followers, and if they do so, they do not want to burn their fingers on the interpretation of philosophical concepts. Whilst musicological and (cultural) historical research into the period leading to the 1848 revolutions and the period after the German unification in 1871 is abundant, the period under investigation is still seriously underrepresented. It is a slippery subject as far as the meaning of critical tools is concerned [Chapter Two 33-34]. Moreover, present-day philosophers who engage with music, such as Peter Kivy and Roger Scruton, dismiss the German idealist tradition, which could have offered them valuable leads for gettig to terms with music and conceptualization. A study into the aesthetics of Friedrich Theodor Vischer can fill up the existing gaps in musicological and philosophical research. In familiarly broad terms, Carl Dahlhaus sketches the intellectual climate of the midnineteenth century as being characterized by ‘eine[r] ernüchterte[n] Geschichtsschreibung, die nach dem Sturz des Hegelianismus vor spekulativer Geschichtsschreibung zurückscheute, eine[r] Naturwissenschaft deren Methodologie sich als herrschende Denkform der Gebildeten durchzusetzen begann, und eine[r] Philosophie, die zwischen positivistischen und metaphysischen “Stimmungen” wechselte’ (DAHLHAUS 1974, 11).xxii As usual, Dahlhaus employs his admirable knowledge of various intellectual movements and ideas to sketch huge developments (in this case, the transition from romanticism to Chapter Two – Thinking about music 43 modernity), its actual details being of lesser importance to him. It is exactly this kind of development that should be described in more detail, thus inevitably also becoming subject to qualification in places. One might wonder, for instance, whether historical writing after 1848 was really that sober and sensible (ernüchtert) as Dahlhaus says. Vischer’s aesthetics, conceived in the course of the development sketched by Dahlhaus 31, serves, thanks to its limited individuality, as an excellent means critically to investigate the intellectual climate of this period, and has hardly been subject to investigation: Vischers Ästhetik ist bisher – im Gegensatz zu ihrer weiten Verbreitung im 19. Jahrhundert – nur relativ selten der Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen geworden […]. Eine Untersuchung der Musikästhetik […] steht praktisch […] ganz aus, obwohl sie gerade für die Form- und Gattungstheorie des 19. Jahrhunderts (einmal ganz abgesehen von ihrem systematischen ästhetischen Ansatz) von wesentlichem Interesse ist. (SPONHEUER 1987, 110-111n)xxiii Bernd Sponheuer stresses the systematic value of Vischer’s musical aesthetics, functioning as an intellectual model for music critics. Definitions of the role or significance of art could not be given by the various art disciplines themselves. There was a need for allencompassing contextualization, but, as we have seen earlier, this became problematic in the specific environment of the various art forms themselves. The dialectics of universalism versus particularity are a leitmotiv throughout this study, exemplified not only by Vischer’s musical aesthetics of 1857, but also by his general aesthetic theory, about the nature of Beauty and art, from the 1840s and early 1850s. Focus on Vischer’s adaptation of Hegelian thought patterns rather than on the content of his musical aesthetics (which will by no means be neglected) gives an insightful account of the gradually changing relationship between aesthetic mainstream and music criticism after 1848. Publications about Vischer’s work in English are limited to the realm of literary history. Ruth HELLER (1954/55), Harvey HEWETT-THAYER (1960) and Walter Horace BRUFORD (1975) published on Vischer’s famous novel Auch Einer, the latter also wrote about Vischer’s delightful and intelligent parody on Goethe’s Faust (BRUFORD 1967), which is a truly rich source for literary historians (VISCHER 1889). A more recent publication concerning Auch Einer is offered by M.W. SWALES (1995). English publications on Vischer in the philosophical realm are even rarer, as his aesthetics are a textbook example of Continental philosophy, which has not been particularly appreciated in English-speaking circles recently. Reinhold GRIMM (1989) published an essay in English in a German periodical, comparing Vischer to Nietzsche, and Raimonda MODIANO (1987) addressed Vischer’s views on the Comic and the Sublime in the context of Kant’s philosophy. The numerous German philosophical and cultural historical publications on Vischer, by Willi 31 See also DAHLHAUS 1967, 75 where he connects the development sketched in 1974, 11 directly with Vischer’s aesthetics. Dahlhaus does not elaborate on the way in which Vischer’s aesthetics epitomize this development. OELMÜLLER , Herbert SCHNÄDELBACH, Annemarie GETHMANN-SIEFERT, Georg LUKÁCS, Heinz QUITZSCH, Helmar ROEBLING, Helmuth WIDHAMMER, Heinz SCHLAFFER, Heribert SCHNEIDER and Wendelin GÖBEL, will be extensively addressed on several occasions in this study. Musicological literature about Vischer hardly exists, as far as I am aware, either in German or in English.32 This is not surprising as Vischer was entirely ignorant with regard to music, and moreover expressed aesthetic views that can be derived relatively easily from earlier sources. Pointing out Vischer’s direct influence on music critics would therefore surely come down to chasing shadows. Still, a glance at much English musicological literature about mid-nineteenth-century German music criticism, to be extensively discussed in the following chapters, justifies the attempt to open up Vischer’s aesthetics to English readers. All too often, the differences between Hegel’s own philosophy and that of his followers are overlooked or disregarded for matters of convenience. A study of Vischer’s aesthetics should reveal how fundamental those differences are. Thus, it will shed new light on the intellectual position of several music critics in the mid-nineteenth century, while also revealing that many premises of modern(ist) music criticism cannot be retraced to Hegel’s own aesthetics, but to mid-nineteenth-century Bildungsbürger adaptations of his thought. 32 Carl Dahlhaus has mentioned Vischer in articles about nineteenth-century aesthetics (DAHLHAUS 1967a, 1974 & 1978) and on one occasion he addressed Vischer’s genre categorizations in more detail (DAHLHAUS 1973b). Bernd Sponheuer briefly addressed Vischer in his study about ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture music (SPONHEUER 1987). Mechtild Elßner has published a rather opaque article on Hegel’s and Vischer’s ideas about form and content in music (ELSSNER 1970). Vischer is mentioned in Edward Lippman’s history of musical aesthetics (LIPPMAN 1994, 325-328), although he does not appear in Lippman’s bibliography. Enrico Fubini, in his earlier historical survey (FUBINI 1991), does not address Vischer. Contributions such as by Ernest NEWMAN (1960), Elisabeth MAGEE (1990) and Alexander RECK (1998) deal exclusively with Vischer’s relation to Wagner and do not address aesthetic issues. Part II Music and modernity Chapter Three Music as the devil Friedrich Vischer did not particularly like music. He may have been a creditable painter and a celebrated novelist, but he received no education in musical matters. When he started work on his music treatise, which required the same attention as the other arts in his multivolume series (see Figure 1 [15]), he realized that he did not have much affinity for music and could not fill the musical gap in his education (‘große Lücke in meiner Bildung’).33 In his correspondence with musicians and music critics, he repeatedly stressed his ignorance with regard to music.34 Whilst Hegel had expressed some outspoken, albeit conservative, musical preferences, Vischer avoided making any critical statement about musical matters. Vischer’s 1857 treatise on the aesthetics of music, the larger part of it written by his colleague Karl Köstlin, thus occupies a peculiar place among the nineteenth-century efforts to fit music into the generally accepted Hegelian views about art as a manifestation of the Spirit. Written in the grandiloquent, speculative tradition of idealist philosophy, the treatise expresses an urge to define and classify individual manifestations of music into clear-cut categories. Vischer focused largely on explaining the relevance of music as an art – music as an indicator and instigator of mankind’s development towards greater self-determination and reconciliation with the Absolute. Like most idealist philosophers who attempted to incorporate discussions of music into this framework, not least Kant and Hegel themselves, Vischer was confronted with numerous problems. 33 34 Vischer in a letter to Eduard Hanslick, 11 November 1854, as quoted in HANSLICK 1890, 284. Vischer’s unpublished letter to H.A. Köstlin (Ma DLA: Vischer 8933) is illustrative; Vischer elaborately addresses Köstlin’s mother, the composer Josephine Lang (1815-1880), without referring to her musical abilities once. In letters to Eduard Hanslick (HANSLICK 1890, 284), Joachim Raff (VISCHER 1955, 835) and the Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein (Tü UB Md 787-1257a, shown in Appendix IVd [200-203] and annotated in Appendix III [180-181]) Vischer makes his ignorance with music explicit. 48 Music and modernity Vischer considered his personal musical ignorance as a consequence of the problematic position music occupied in the context of idealist aesthetics. ‘[Musik] beglückt das Weib und den weichen, innigen Mann’, he argued conveniently in 1843, ‘sie genügt dem scharfen, denkenden Geist nicht’ (VISCHER 1844c, 382).xxiv However, it is important to distinguish between Vischer’s own musical ignorance and the general idealist aesthetic problems with music; it is one of the aims of this chapter to argue that Vischer’s aesthetics were in fact employed for the emancipation of music in the repressive aesthetic context of Hegelian philosophy: while Vischer expressed and confirmed many of the idealist prejudices against music as an art, he also started to undermine many of the pillars on which these prejudices were based. Vischer himself may not have followed this critique through, but he cleared the slate for contemporary music critics, such as Eduard Hanslick, Franz Brendel, and minor ones such as Ernst Gottschald, Ludwig Bischoff and Richard Wallaschek, to do so. They often referred to Vischer in terms of his contribution to music’s emancipation and recognition as an art. We have already noted that the idealist problems with music stemmed from the obligation imposed by the Enlightenment to be representative, but also from the nineteenthcentury urge to become acquainted with the metaphysical dimension of life. This intention of describing things in metaphysical terms not only fostered interest in the ephemeral, intangible and unnameable, but also the urge to conceptualize and visualize these spheres by means of clear-cut definitions and vivid images. In this context, music was seldom glorified as the highest art due to its ephemeral character and its independence from visual models or verbal means of communication. Early-romantic thinkers who glorified music, such as Ludwig Tieck, Wilhelm Wackenroder and E.T.A. Hoffmann, may have been gratefully regarded as models by later music critics, but they were not nearly as influential as idealist philosophers for German intellectual life throughout the century. Music’s ephemeral qualities hampered idealist thinkers in establishing what music’s function could be in the past, present and future development of mankind. In other words: they could not determine the way in which music was a manifestation of the Spirit.35 The idealist prejudices against music have been recognized and described sporadically mainly in German musicological research (HEINZ 1969, 255; DAHLHAUS 1983, 340). A relatively recent study is Bernd Sponheuer’s Musik als Kunst und Nicht-Kunst (SPONHEUER 1987). Sponheuer argues that the current thought pattern to distinguish between so-called ‘high-culture’ and ‘low-culture’ music is rooted in the mid-nineteenth-century urge to legitimize music as a proper fine art, able to express the Spirit in all its profundity. Music had to be explained as an art form that possessed as many spiritual qualities as its sister arts. 35 This is one of the reasons I am not convinced by Mark Evan Bonds’s attempt to explain the early-romantic enthusiasm for music (by Tieck, Wackenroder, and E.T.A. Hoffmann) as an indebtedness to idealist philosophy (BONDS 1997, 391). The fact that early-romantic thinkers were indebted to idealists (which might well be true) does not clarify the fact that they glorified music. Idealist philosophers generally distrusted music and they had good reasons to do so, if one considers the aims towards which they were striving. Chapter Three – Music as the devil 49 Some kinds of music, allegedly lacking these qualities, were marked as inferior in order to lend music a proper spiritual power.36 Following Sponheuer’s line of reasoning, I intend to explain in detail what these spiritual qualities were considered to be, and why music did not fulfil the requirements of spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit). Sponheuer meticulously distinguishes between several aspects of music’s doubtful position among the arts. I will take his argument one step further by explaining how these aspects fit into a very influential, if only implicitly present, prejudice among idealist aestheticians: the attribution of diabolical powers to music. Hegel, and Vischer in particular, described music’s power as one that surpasses human capability, but still embodies human sin. It is a ‘fallen’ art, blasphemous in its unique ability to impose its power on mind and senses* to such an extent that the enthralment it arouses could be compared to divine surrender. At the same time, music triggers basic and instinctive human drives without the mediation of verbal or visual concepts; it is uncontrollable in indulging and corrupting human sensuality. Music did not necessarily lack something in the idealist view, as Sponheuer argues. Rather, it possessed powers it was not entitled to have on the basis of its function in the further development of mankind. Music’s ‘spiritual deficiencies’ as diabolical powers There are numerous leads in Vischer’s argument that justify interpreting his stance as one that condemns music for lacking ‘objectivity’ (SPONHEUER 1987, 114-127). When Vischer talked about music, he regularly used the metaphor of darkness to describe music’s nature, taking visual perception as an obvious starting point (§ 746) for his aesthetics and thus attaching himself to an age-old tradition of aesthetic thinking. If one is unable to see, visually observe an object, and the object is still there, it must be obscured by something else (hidden/occultum in Leibniz’s words) and/or it must exist in darkness. Aspects of feeling, for instance, invisible as they are, should hence be connected with interiority and obscurity. They reside inside the subject and have not been embodied (verkörpert) or objectified. Thus, they are unknowable. At the other end of the spectrum, aspects of consciousness refer to objects that are knowable; they are or can be objectified, and become visible. Thus, they are exposed, transparent and enlightened. The close connection of ‘knowability’ and visibility had always put music in an awkward position. According to Hegel scholar Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Vischer talked about the Christian creationist dogma of ‘die Idee der ewigen Weltschöpfung durch den λογος’ (GETHMANN-SIEFERT 1988, 337).xxv Something is not only knowable because it is visible, but it also only becomes visible because it is knowable and definable. The Word is a necessary pre-condition for creation. Thus, the connection between visibility and ‘knowability’ works in two ways, and music lacks both the representational and the 36 Sponheuer’s argument is convincing, but it does not clarify why there is a division between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture in the visual arts and literature as well. In the context of the idealist requirements of representational and epistemological determinacy, these art forms did not need to be legitimized as art, so the division between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture in those realms would have had their origins elsewhere. 50 Music and modernity epistemological side of it.37 Idealist aesthetics, partly drawing on eighteenth-century aesthetic prejudices, highlighted a third aspect of music’s ‘Nicht-Objektivität’ (SPONHEUER 1987, 115): its alleged lack of tangible, ‘natural’ material. Music’s material, the tone, exists in time rather than in space. Moreover, it is not found in nature, but processed by the human mind into a tone-system before it is used as ‘building blocks’ for a musical composition. Thus, music’s lack of objectivity is threefold: it does not materialize into a tangible object, it does not reach a state of spiritual determinacy* (i.e. it is impossible to say what a musical piece is ‘about’) and it does not depend on any model in its ‘natural’ environment. Hence, in the context of idealist philosophy, the Spirit is unable to manifest itself in music. Music was considered to be geistlosig, spiritually and intellectually empty. Although Vischer followed Hegel rather closely in his description of music’s threefold lack of objectivity, he interpreted this lack in a different way. Hegel had argued that music, due to its lack of content, retreats into its own ‘musicality’ to the extent that it forsakes its sensory features as an art. Paradoxically, music’s spiritual emptiness goes hand in hand with an orientation towards the mind rather than the senses. When music becomes selfcontained – which happens most clearly in modern times (Chapter Four [72]) – it becomes a superficial display of clever musical skill and loses its spiritual profundity in the form of inwardness* (Innerlichkeit), the realm it should be trying to express: In neuerer Zeit besonders ist die Musik in der Losgerissenheit von einem für sich schon klaren Gehalt so in ihr eigenes Element zurückgegangen, doch hat dafür auch desto mehr an Macht über das ganze Innere verloren, indem der Genuß, den sie bieten kann, sich nur der einen Seite der Kunst zuwendet, dem blossen Interesse, nämlich für das rein Musikalische der Komposition und deren Geschicklichkeit, eine Seite, welche nur Sache der Kenner ist und das allgemeinmenschliche Kunstinteresse weniger angeht. (HEGEL 1993b, 145)xxvi Vischer described the same problem in a more precise and therefore slightly different way. He argued that music has become so interiorized that it cannot establish links with outer reality anymore. He observed that the relationship is unclear between the outer, material (natural) world on the one hand, and the inner, spiritual (man-made) work of art that should express or imitate this world (in Vischer’s words: ‘nachbildend umbilden’ [VISCHER 1923, § 760: 48]) on the other. Hence, it is unclear in what way the senses, indispensable for transmitting impulses from the outer material world to the inner soul of the artist, should function. The dialectical process, shown in Figure 2 [19], of objects in nature finding their man-made counterparts in works of art, is disturbed in the creation of a musical work of art. There is no connection between inner subjectivity and outer objectivity. In other words: 37 Willi Oelmüller shows how Vischer increasingly regarded Christian religion as a set of symbols, a mythical realm that was difficult to reconcile with modern ways of expression (OELMÜLLER 1959, 38). The role of Logos might therefore have been even more important for Vischer than for other idealists as it referred to the symbolic spheres of Christian belief while also stressing the requirement of representational quality for the tangible, earthly manifestations of the Spirit. Chapter Three – Music as the devil 51 music does not lose its realm of inwardness, as Hegel assumed, but rather retreats into it and so isolates it. Thus, free content is no longer expressed in a particularity of form.38 Vischer described the consequences of this process by taking the straightforward Enlightenment dichotomy of mind versus senses as a starting point. Music floats in between outer and inner materiality because it cannot connect the one with the other; it addresses both mind and senses but belongs to neither. Vischer emphasized this intermediate position by calling music ‘amphibolic’, or ambiguous, and it is in music’s ambiguity in particular, its floating in between mind and senses, that Vischer spotted music’s ephemeral capacities as the soul (Seele), the secret (Geheimnis) and the apprehension (Ahnung) of an ideal dimension: Aus der Gesamtheit dieser Grundbestimmungen ergibt sich der wesentlich amphibolischen Charakter, welcher der Musik in Vergleichung mit den anderen Künsten eigen ist. Sie ist das Ideal selbst, die blosgelegte Seele aller Künste, das Geheimnis aller Form, eine Ahnung weltbauender Gesetze. (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 62)xxvii For Vischer, music does not become spiritually empty (geistlosig), but rather, in a dangerous way, ideal. Music is not powerless, but powerful: Die Musik ist also vor lauter reiner Idealität ebensosehr nicht wahre Idealität. Geahnt und dunkel vorschwebend hat sie die ganze Welt, in klarer Wirklichkeit hat sie nichts. Sie ist die reichste Kunst: sie spricht das Innigste aus, sagt das Unsagbare, und sie ist die ärmste Kunst, sagt nichts […]. Sie erfaßt mit ihrer objektlosen Entzückung den reinen Geist an jenem dunkeln Punkte, wo in den zarten Fäden des Nervenlebens der geistige Phosphor aufblickt, und diese Fäden sind zugleich als der höchste und letzte Extrakt des Sinnlichen, die Träger der sublimsten und gerade dadurch sinnlichtsen Sinnlichkeit. (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 64 – my italics)xxviii Vischer’s description of music’s pure ideality (reine Idealität) might seem approving at first, but is in fact deeply ambivalent. He distrusted music for its transcendental powers, which defied conceptualization. Its inability to become embodied and objectified could in fact be an unwillingness to do so. Thus, Vischer implied that music is a fraud as an art: its pure ideality is a false one. Vischer’s observation of music’s ‘false ideality’ is formulated through the use of the metaphor of darkness (italicized in the quotation). He spoke in the capacity of a police 38 See also DAHLHAUS 1967, 71-78 elaborately discussing the concept of inwardness with regard to Vischer. Dahlhaus does not explicitly distinguish between Hegel’s and Vischer’s divergent accounts of music’s relation towards inwardness. Dahlhaus’s observation (1967, 77) that Vischer’s effort to connect a specificity of musical form with the freedom of inner emotion was a response to Hanslick’s formalism, is an interesting one, but seems unlikely in the light of my investigation into the relationship between Vischer and Hanslick (see Chapter Five [100ff]). 52 Music and modernity constable talking about crime, or indeed, as a priest talking about the devil: music survives in dark places; as soon as it is exposed to daylight, it loses its power. He noted how music seizes (erfaßt) the innocent bystander (reiner Geist), imposing its intangible temptation (objektlosen Entzückung) upon him. Vischer concentrated his investigation on those ‘dark places in the vulnerable threads of the nervous system where enlightened spots of thought (geistige Phosphor) appear’. In such a deep abyss of inner life, conceptual clarity cannot exist, but mind and senses still meet: as very brief moments of enlightenment, little pangs of consciousness, vanishing immediately after they emerge. Music, having the ability to emerge without the reliance on concepts or objects while still addressing both mind and senses, is the only art that can trigger this area of the human spirit. In doing so, it can arouse something so powerful that Vischer described it in tautological terms: ‘the most sublime and sensual sensuality’ (sinnlichsten Sinnlichkeit). The area where mind and senses meet on a subconscious level could be defined as the human soul. Aristotle’s so-called entelechy described how the soul impels to selfrealization, attempting to be complete, unified and in harmony with itself by means of continuously comparing the ‘thought out’ ideal with perceptible reality, thus reaching a balance between the intellect and the senses. The confrontation of the senses with the intellect, leading to their eventual sublation into self-knowledge, was important in Hegel’s dialectical account of mankind’s development for achieving autonomy (Chapter One [18ff]). However, Hegel also addressed the drawback of this quest: a free and selfconscious human being could abuse his autonomy and self-knowledge. Coming closer to the Absolute also meant that man came closer to being God for himself. For Hegel, the interaction of sensuality with intellect, as a necessary precondition for reconciliation with the Absolute, was something towards which mankind obviously and necessarily strived. However, it was not necessarily better or preferable to current stages of human capacity.39 Hegel’s ambivalent value judgement concerning freedom is important for interpreting the idealist distrust of music as the ‘freest art’. ‘Sie ist frei, hat den Fuß aus dem Boden gezogen, der Vogel unter den Künsten’, Vischer observed (VISCHER 1923, § 759: 45).xxix The grammatically loose phrase catches the eye among the generally long, well-structured and meticulously formulated sentences of the treatise. The structure serves Vischer’s intention of linking up the word frei with the word Vogel, a reference to the word Vogelfrei (outlawed) which is hardly latent.40 Music’s provocation is not limited to the aesthetic realm. In addressing both mind and senses in a totally unfathomable manner, music can exert an uncontrollable power directly on the self-impelling soul as described in Aristotle’s entelechy and hence on the capacity of man to gain his freedom. Thus, it places itself outside the normal frame of reference for art. As a ‘fallen’ art or ‘outlawed’ art it is not only dangerously insubordinate but also blasphemous. Vischer’s 39 In that sense it is also important to bear in mind that the line between Hegel’s description of reconciliation with the Absolute (as a deserved result of increasing self-realization of the soul) on the one hand, and the Apocalypse (as Judgement Day) on the other, could be considered rather fine. 40 Also observed by SPONHEUER 1987, 113. Chapter Three – Music as the devil 53 reference to the Logos, highlighted by Gethmann-Siefert, as a precondition for tangible emergence is important here. The Judaeo-Christian prohibition of depicting God, as well as the Jewish insistence on His unnameability, determined Vischer’s interpretation of music’s invisibility and unnameability. Standing in the powerful idealist tradition of thinking in terms of transcendentalism, Vischer implied that music potentially provokes the authority of God by deliberately taking the liberty to be invisible and unnameable. Music’s lack of representational and visible qualities is in fact a bonus, comparable to divine privileges, giving music unprecedented transcendental powers. This was certainly not solely an academic problem touching on the realm of aesthetics, but rather a metaphysical problem touching on the hierarchy of man and God. Some aspects of Vischer’s description of music do not refer to metaphysical issues but rather are derived from his generally accepted misogyny. Vischer is an easy victim for feminist readers. Biographical literature (SCHLAFFER/MENDE 1987, GETHMANN-SIEFERT 1988) reveals that, especially after his disastrous marriage, he was in fact afraid of women, and projected on them his fear for loosing his own ‘male’ virtues such as discipline, strength and self-containment. These are exactly the aspects he observed to be under attack in music (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 64); they are overtaken by boundless emotion and interiority, thus becoming unpredictable and unknowable. In his ‘New division of aesthetic theory’ (Neue Gliederung der Aesthetik), published in 1843, he described music as ‘the dark lap or womb from which all the specific actions of the soul emerge (‘der dunkle Schoß, aus welchem alle bestimmten Seelentätigkeiten auftauchen’, VISCHER 1844c, 381). Here, Vischer’s metaphor of darkness takes on erotic meaning, describing the lap/womb (Schoß) as an area that remains unknown to thinking man. The previously quoted observation from the same article that music is an art for women and weak men, and not for thinking minds [48], supports his description of music as a ‘feminine’ art. In Vischer’s treatise it is clear that his distrust of music as an art rested, at least partly, on gendered ideas. However, one aspect of music did not fit with Vischer’s characterization of women: ‘Die Schärfe mathematischen Unterscheidens verträgt sich trotz dem scheinbaren Widerspruche ganz wohl mit einer Kunstform, die im Allgemeinen weiblich zu nennen ist’ (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 65).xxx Whereas women are unknowable due to their emotional unpredictability, music is unknowable due to its mathematical complexity. Thus, music is not emotionally and intellectually out of control, but emotionally and intellectually superior. The attribution of this transcendental capacity to music was reason for even greater concern, and justifies the attempt to describe Vischer’s distrust of music as being focused on metaphysical rather than gender associations.41 Music’s alleged mathematical complexity was important in the attribution of transcendental powers to music. The ephemeral material of music, the tone, was thought to 41 Sanna Pederson briefly touches on the metaphor of ‘music as woman’ in her article about Brendel’s music criticism around 1848, in which she explains how music was considered to be incomplete or deficient and was therefore feminine. Pederson retraces this stance to Hegel’s ‘anti-romantic attitude towards music’ (PEDERSON 1996, 58). Pederson, too, observes a legitimation crisis for music due to Hegelian aesthetics (72). 54 Music and modernity be organized in highly complicated mathematical structures which were difficult to master. ‘Zählen und immer zählen, um auf dem längsten Umwege durch den absoluten Frost dahin zu gelangen, daß die Gluth des Herzens sich in das völlig Todte, in ein gerechnetes Nichts ergiessen könne’, Vischer wrote (VISCHER 1923, § 762: 55)xxxi in another surprisingly expressive and unscholarly passage of his music treatise. Music’s inaccessibility was often explained by the mysticism of numerical structures. Music’s technical intricacies seemed to be accessible only to a closed circle of experts, initiated into the tricks of the trade. If they were not Freemason-like heretics, they were at least enjoying their splendid seclusion. It is precisely those structures through which music was considered to exert its spell of emotional seduction and temptation, while remaining unfathomable to laymen. The allegedly inaccessible transcendental knowledge passed on through music was never explicitly condemned by idealist philosophers, but was nevertheless often implicitly associated with the mystical and the metaphysical, surpassing human capabilities. The Bildungsbürger mentality of many mid-nineteenth-century Hegelians nurtured this view. From Adam and Eve on, being knowledgeable ipso facto meant being sinful. However, the unreflective surrender to instinctive impulses and desires was considered to be just as sinful. Music embodied this inescapability: one way or the other, it represented sinfulness, being comparable both to the Tree of Knowledge in the Garden of Eden and to Sodom and Gomorrah. This combination of transcendental power and human sin could truly be considered diabolical and was unique for an art. Vischer’s references to music’s thriving in darkness, and to its status as an ‘outlawed’ art, are therefore not surprising. Neutralizing music’s powers through particularization Vischer took Hegel’s thought patterns as a starting point for his entire treatise on aesthetics. Hence, many of his prejudices against music stemmed from a general idealist distrust of music. However, over the course of the 1850s, Vischer seemed to have increasing difficulty adhering to the Hegelian system of classification and systematization. In the Kritik meiner Aesthetik of the 1860s (VISCHER 1866 & 1873), he even distanced himself from Hegel. This was partly due to changed insights into the nature and function of art. However, more important for Vischer’s tendency to start viewing matters in a different light was the fact that he was first and foremost an aesthetician. Whilst Hegel tried to fit art into a larger system containing all forms of human expression and development, Vischer focused on art only. Or to put it in Hegelian terms: Beauty, Thought and God, i.e. art, philosophy and religion were valued more or less equally by Hegel (although he often made the point that nothing could compete with Thought), whereas for Vischer, Beauty was the supreme manifestation of the Spirit: Wenn das Schöne nicht wäre, so gäbe es keinen Punkt, auf welchem die zwei extremen Seiten der menschlichen Natur, der Geist und die Sinnlichkeit, zusammentreffen, wahrhaft und ganz in Einem aufgehen, und es gäbe keinen Punkt, Chapter Three – Music as the devil 55 auf welchem die Vollkommenheit, die Harmonie, kurz die Göttlichkeit des Weltalls einleuchtete. Es ist dies nur die subjektive und die objektive Wendung eine und derselben Wahrheit: die Strahlen des vollkommenen Lebens, zerstreut durch das Welltall, sammeln sich auf einer Stelle des Raums und der Zeit; was nirgends und überall, was nie und immer wahr ist, wird ein Hier und ein Jetzt, und zwar im anschauenden Menschen, der eben dadurch den Grundgegensatz seines Wesens versöhnt und mit sich harmonisch wird. Keine andere Hauptform derTätigkeit des Geistes, keines der andern idealen Gebiete tritt in diese Lücke, die Leistung des Schönen ist unersetzlich. (VISCHER 1866, 27-28 – my italics)xxxii According to Vischer, Beauty is the only realm where both intellectual and sensual aspects of human expression exist in harmony.42 Beauty is, moreover, the dialectical precondition for the sublation of Coincidence (Zufall), providing human existence with a purpose and a sense of direction. Despite the fact that Vischer never truly escaped from the idealist emphasis on religiously motivated morality, as we saw in the first paragraph of this chapter, he implied that Beauty seems to take over the realm of religion from God.43 In no other realm the divinity of the universe (Göttlichkeit des Weltalls) is so obvious as in Beauty, something that Hegel would never have accepted. Vischer elaborated on this bold implication by observing that, in Beauty, both subjective and objective sides of truth find each other: rays of complete and fulfilled life, scattered round the universe, are concentrated at one single point in time and space: the observing human being (anschauender Mensch) who is appeased and in harmony with himself through his observation of Beauty. This makes Beauty the only manifestation of the Spirit that could be considered irreplaceable. Moreover, man is the norm for establishing what Beauty is, not metaphysical conceptions of the Idea: Nichts ist schön, was nicht die Menschen allgemein dadurch rührt, dass es ihnen die allen gemeinsame Wahrheit des Menschlichen in bleibenden Grundzügen aufdeckt und dadurch den Menschen im Menschen trifft. Der Zuschauer will und soll in allem Schönen sich selbst wiederfinden, denn er ist der Mensch und der Mensch ist das gelöste Geheimnis der Welt. (VISCHER 1866, 95 – my italics)xxxiii The Idea in Vischer’s description was replaced by, or specified as, the ‘truth of human nature shared by all’ (die allen gemeinsame Wahrheit des Menschlichen).44 Vischer took human perception as a starting point for establishing what this is. Like the Idea, it is still 42 This view can be retraced to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s (1775-1854) System des transcendentalen Idealismus of 1800. Schelling later became one of Hegel’s most powerful opponents. 43 Vischer’s inclination to regard Beauty and God as increasingly interchangeable principles is confirmed by Willi OELMÜLLER (1959, 37-76). It was stimulated by Vischer’s intention to regard both Beauty and God as products of the human mind (Geist): ‘Unser Gott ist ein immanenter Gott; seine Wohnung ist überall und nirgends; sein Leib ist nur die ganze Welt, sein wahre Gegenwart der Menschengeist. Diesen Gott zu verherrlichen ist die höchste Aufgabe der neuen Kunst.’ (VISCHER 1844e, 192) [Our God is an immanent God; his home is everywhere and nowhere; his body is only the whole world, his true presence is the human spirit. It is the highest task of new art to glorify this God.] 56 Music and modernity universal and all-encompassing, but it is derived from the down-to-earth consequences of the observation and interpretation of art, or Anschauung, a term that lingers at the background of both above quotations (italicized). Anschauung was a primarily creative capacity, featuring in the dialectical process of actively interiorizing and therefore adapting the outer material (Figure 2 [19]). With Hegel increasingly being pushed into the background, Vischer was not so much concerned with the transcendental implications of this process, but rather with its down-to-earth features, such as reactions in the human brain and psychological differentiations in the human psyche. He always connected grandiloquent statements, such as the above quotation, with tangible explanations of human capabilities. He was orientated towards contemporary empiricist movements of thought, which considerably changed the nature of his aesthetics. Vischer’s conviction as to the supremacy of Beauty rested on the assumption that Beauty should be empirically perceived, and that art should therefore have a content that could be ‘empirically registered’, at least to some extent (VISCHER 1923, § 749: 15). Thus, he agreed with Hegel that music occupied a problematic position in the idealist system, that it had a tendency to get out of control, ignoring the spheres of consciousness (Bewußtsein) that should provide a safety net of reflectivity and moral responsibility (Sittlichkeit). Most problematic was the fact that music’s power resided in its deliberate unnameability and invisibility. Vischer’s primary concern was therefore to conceptualize the content of music – to reveal its meaning and function in order to neutralize its spell. Crucial to this project was Vischer’s focus on empiricism and a rudimentary form of psychoanalysis. Despite his musical ignorance, Vischer dwelt on what he considered to be the content of music: inner emotional life. In his efforts to differentiate between the various aspects of this inner emotional life and to establish the links between emotional and musical processes, Vischer used concepts (such as Anschauung) with an established idealist history, giving them their own distinct meanings in his application of them. The manner in which he defined these concepts gave his aesthetics (which appear straightforwardly Hegelian at first glance) leads for re-interpretation, for altered value judgements, and paradoxically enough, in the case of music, for emancipation. Music critics were likewise concerned with explaining music in conceptual terms. In the wake of the idealist intention of neutralizing its spell, they tried to legitimize it as an art. Vischer’s contemporary empiricism, employed in the context of an authoritative idealist aesthetic system, served as a model for them. Vischer started his music treatise with the claim that the philosophy of music lagged behind in comparison to the other arts, because it had never taken the effort to properly define and explain the content of music. It had bluntly marked the diverse aspects of inner 44 It would be worth investigating to what extent Vischer has been influenced by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Several aspects of Vischer’s aesthetics seem to have been inspired by Kantian rather than Hegelian idealism, such as his acknowledgement that art can have a content that relates to cognition, just not one defined by a concept (cf. Kant’s idea of ‘free play of the cognitive faculties’ with Vischer’s idea of ‘sentient imagination’ [59]). Also, much more than Hegel, Kant explored the opposition of idealism and materialism involving the moral consequences of the human being as a free subject on the one hand and as a determined organism on the other. This interest is obvious in Vischer’s decriptions of Anschauung. Chapter Three – Music as the devil 57 emotional life (innere Leben der Empfindung) as ‘feeling’ (Gefühl). Vischer only considered feeling to be a dark and undifferentiated matter when compared to consciousness (Bewußtsein). ‘Blickt man genauer in das Dunkel, so erkennt das Auge in demselben eine reiche Welt innerer Unterschiede’ (VISCHER 1923, § 751: 28).xxxiv It was Vischer’s aim to specify the various aspects of inner emotional life, not only because of his interest in psychological processes but also in order to provide music with a well-defined content. When music’s dark and unfathomable ways became exposed to the enlightened realm of consciousness, its seductive spell might lose its power. Without wanting to explore fully the complex idealist usages of the word consciousness, we should remember how crucial the concept was in the context of idealist philosophy. For Hegel, referring to consciousness as a demarcated concept was necessary in order to position the human being as a thinking subject, i.e. to define what makes humans human. For Vischer, in the context of the Vormärz period and Bildungsbürgertum, the concept gained practical dimensions: moral as well as nationalist ones. Being conscious of an object meant being able to define it, to describe how it functioned and what it could be used for. German culture, unlike the ‘superficial’ French and the ‘instinctive’ Italian, was permeated by consciousness; it was reflective, which accounted for its slow and therefore more profound development. Consciousness, in short, was inextricably bound up with the issue of conceptualization that proved to be so problematic with regard to music. Conceptualizing the various aspects of feeling (the content of music) was a first step in exposing music’s seductive powers to daylight: Das Gefühl in seiner Reinheit, d.h. ohne begleitendes Bewusstsein [kommt] empirisch nur als verschwindender Moment vor […], wie es vielmehr in seinem Wesen liegt, dass es stets im Sprung ist, überzugehen in die bestimmte, Objekte aufzeigende Geisteswelt, so wird es auch in der Kunst zu einer Anlehnung hinstreben, worin eine andere, das Objekt nennende Kunst-Gattung seinem Dunkel zu Hülfe kommt und ihm bestimmten Inhalt gibt. (VISCHER 1923, § 749: 18)xxxv Feeling cannot exist without an accompanying consciousness, because consciousness needs to tell the subject what it is that he feels. ‘Feeling in its purity’, Vischer argues, ‘i.e. without consciousness, only exists in fleeting moments’. If we are unable to determine what we feel, the feeling may well be there, but it is impossible to register it empirically. Even in art, the very domain of inner life, Vischer continues, ‘feeling always reaches out for an art form that can name the object (eine das Objekt nennende Kunst-Gattung), thus giving it determinate content’. In this statement, Vischer is straightforwardly Hegelian, although the way in which he describes the relationship between feeling and consciousness bears witness to influences of empiricist psychology. However, these observations lead him to the introduction of quite original terminology, notably his interpretation of imagination as a sentient* (empfindende) capacity which in fact criticizes Hegel’s concept of imagination as 58 Music and modernity a formative* (bildende) one. Vischer’s concept of empfindende Phantasie directly grows out of the unique position he attributed to Beauty as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit. Vischer argued that it would be too simplistic just to describe the realm of Beauty as feeling. Artistic creation does not depend solely on the sensory, but also on the reflective interiorization of an object: ‘was auf die Sinne […] einwirkt, muß erst von der Seele ergriffen, ihrem Innewerden angeeignet sein, ehe es ein bestimmtes Gefühl, Lust oder Unlust, bewirkt’ (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 5).xxxvi Vischer made an emphatic distinction between Gefühl as a reservoir of as yet undefined, or only partly defined feeling, and Empfindungen as determinate emotions that can be named and located. These emotions emerge from the reservoir of feeling (Gefühl) by means of the involvement of the mind (i.e. exposure to consciousness). Impulses from outside are transmitted by the senses, but the subject can only deal with those impulses once they have been processed by the mind. At that point, Lust* (inclination) and Unlust* (reluctance), another pair of regularly used idealist concepts, come into play. Inclination and reluctance are basic psychological drives, their ‘battle’ in the realm of feeling (Gefühl) constitutes the innumerable types of determinate emotions (Empfindungen). This process of indeterminate feeling becoming specific emotions is shown visually in Figure 4 [59]. Vischer considered this structure and working of the human psyche as a premise for his statements about the realm of Beauty and aesthetics. Feeling, emotions, moods or sensory perception are not of interest to art, he argued (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 5). However, they constitute our inner emotional life as a whole, which is a framework that determines our ability of imagination (Phantasie): ‘als Tätigkeit des reinen Schauens’xxxvii (VISCHER 1923, § 384: 374).45 The senses play an important role in this ability, generating particularized emotions by means of their interaction with the mind, and, at the same time, perceiving those emotions on various levels in the human psyche (Figure 4). Yet, Vischer regarded imagination (Phantasie), like observation (Anschauung), primarily as a creative ability, not as a perceptive one. As established in Figure 2 [19], the ability to empathize with and conceive of an object was considered to be indispensable for creating a work of art. This required sensory as well as intellectual abilities. Imagination requires the ability to form an image in one’s head. When Hegel talked about imagination he always, if only implicitly, refered to ‘formative imagination’ (bildende Phantasie). Despite the fact that Vischer was orientated towards the visual arts and towards establishing a determinate representational content for art, he took the effort to answer the question how we should depict inner emotional life. Hegel had never bothered to do this, despite his assumption that imagination cannot exist without inner emotional life. 45 This was to become a key quotation for Eduard Hanslick (see Chapter Five [96]). Occasionally, Vischer also used the more prosaic word Einbildungskraft, of which imagination is a more literal translation, referring to Bilder or images. He also stressed, however, that Phantasie and Einbildungskraft are different, Phantasie being a more creative kind of imagination than Einbildungskraft (VISCHER 1923, § 492: 17). Hegel made a similar point in his Aesthetics (HEGEL 1994, 363). This is why Einbildungskraft assumes a relatively marginal role in Vischer’s Aesthetics, and will not be considered further here. The same distinction should be made between Anschauung (creative) and Wahrnehmung (passive) (VISCHER 1907a, 213). Chapter Three – Music as the devil 59 Vischer acknowledged that there is an alternative for the precision of verbal or visual images in conceiving of an object: Nach jener Bezeichnung wäre das Gefühl eigentlich ein Unsagbares, Unaussprechliches, denn ohne alle und jede Hülfe objectiver Prädizierung, läßt sich doch im Grunde kein Wort finden, zu sagen, wie mir zu Mute ist; eben in dieser Lücke aber werden wir nun die Phantasie als empfindende eintreten sehen. (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 6)xxxviii Vischer’s concept of sentient imagination (empfindende Phantasie) relied on the ability to conceive of an object in emotional rather than intellectual terms, because the emotional manner of imagining comes closer to the actual object it tries to conceive of than intellectual actions. This did not mean that the two excluded each other. For Vischer, imagination was still an ability that required both intellectual understanding and emotional sensitivity, but he constructed a concept that managed to overcome the requirement of verbal or visual determinacy, at least to some extent. He needed to do this because he 60 Music and modernity acknowledged that there existed spheres of human expression that could not be captured in words or images. The concept of sentient imagination therefore played an important role in his musical aesthetics: Kein Bild, kein Wort kann dies Eigenste und Innerste des Herzens aussprechen wie die Musik, ihre Innigkeit ist unvergleichlich, sie ist unersetzlich, ein rein selbständiges, in reiner Eigenkraft bestehendes Wesen. Ja die Betrachtung der Musik müßte eigentlich in ganz anderem Umfang, als der andern Künste, in die Psychologie gezogen werden. (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 6-7)xxxix Vischer put his finger on an area of the human mind in which the dichotomy of consciousness and feeling is still relevant, but where the two have only just begun to interact. This was the realm of music and of imagination as a sentient (empfindende) rather than formative (bildende) capacity (Figure 4 [59]). It is an easy prey for sensual temptation on the one hand and for basic, only partially controlled actions of the mind on the other. In suggesting that the study of music should be considered as a kind of psychology, Vischer implies that further empirical research, conceptualizing music’s drives and substance, is necessary in order to fathom and eventually cure this unique and interiorized patient. Vischer constructed his argument by means of focussing on processes that did not interest Hegel in the least: tangible reactions within the human psyche. Whilst Hegel intended to reveal large-scale transcendental processes in the development of man, Vischer set about finding out how these processes were initiated by the human mind. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Hegel’s Spirit as an absolutist metaphysical concept changed into Vischer’s Spirit as the human mind directed by chemical reactions in the body. Imagination was in Vischer’s aesthetics no longer a ‘gateway’ accessing the transcendental dimensions of an ideal world, but rather man’s observing and interpreting (anschauende) abilities in order to get to terms with the objective world around him. Hence, Vischer was less inclined to fit all aspects of human expression, such as music, in one all-encompassing system. Vischer was quite explicit on this, introducing the concept of what he called ‘mediated idealism’ (indirekter Idealismus)*.46 In modern times, he argued, it was impossible to derive the manifold instances of our complex society from one all-encompassing principle; it would be more appropriate to reach a definition of the Idea by means of describing the instances (VISCHER 1858, 3). Those instances could be 46 Georg Lukács observes how this concept illustrates Vischer’s thought filtering through in the aesthetics of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries while hardly being noticed. ‘Jene Umbildung seines [Vischer’s ] eigenen Systems nach der Achtundvierziger Revolution […] wirkt viel stärker, als es auf der Oberfläche sichtbar ist, “unterirdisch” weiter. […] So hebt der von 1900 an immer einflussreicher werdende Begründer der irrationalistischen “Lebensphilosophie”, Dilthey, schon in den achtziger Jahren hervor, dass die Entdeckung der “indirekten Idealisierung” eine “wirkliche ästhetische Entdeckung” Vischers ist.’ (LUKÁCS 1956, 279) [Much stronger than can be observed from the surface, every change of his own system after the 1848 revolution has a ‘subterranean’ effect. Dilthey, for instance, who became increasingly influential after 1900 with his foundation of the irrational ‘philosophy of life’, emphasizes already in the 1880s that the discovery of ‘mediated idealism’ is a ‘real aesthetic discovery’ of Vischer.] Chapter Three – Music as the devil 61 anticipated (geahnt) by the power of imagination, but could not be thought out in unequivocal conceptual terms. This was an indirect manner of reaching the Idea and a merely temporary reconciliation with the Absolute. It exemplified the increasing awareness that the absolutism of idealist metaphysical concepts was unsustainable. Neutralizing music’s powers through categorization ‘Ich quäle mich nun mit der Musik’, Vischer wrote to his friend David Friedrich Strauß in 1854. ‘[Ich] arbeite passiv, indem ich noch lange nicht ans ausführen komme, arbeite ungern, weil mir die Materie dunkel und nicht ganz nach Neigung ist, schweife daher mit den Gedanken leicht ab’xl (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952/53, 57).47 Over the course of the following year, he acknowledged that he would not be able to learn enough about the technical intricacies of music to the extent that he could to write an aesthetic treatise on the subject. Vischer thus decided to leave the music volume to someone with more knowledge about, and affinity for, music. He contacted Bernhard Gugler, a mathematics professor at the Polytechnikum in Stuttgart, but by 1855 it turned out that Gugler had not made any progress. On 1 August 1855, Vischer wrote to Strauß that Karl Köstlin, ‘der Musik versteht und unsere wissenschaftliche Bildung hat’ (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952/53, 89)xli, might be prepared to stand in for Gugler. Karl Reinhold Köstlin (1819-1894) had succeeded Vischer as Professor of aesthetics and German literature in Tübingen. He was not a musician, but had apparently received the musical upbringing that Vischer lacked. Vischer complained to Strauß that Köstlin did not work quickly enough: ‘Köstlin ist mit seiner Musik immer noch nicht fertig’ (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952/53, 110),48xlii but in December 1856 the volume was ready. The fact that Vischer and Köstlin had not talked in detail about its form then became apparent: Der Köstlin ist fertig, aber recht erschrocken bin ich, als mir sein ganzes opus zukam: die Musik umfaßt jetzt 23 Bogen, ist dicker als jeder andere Teil, auch als die Lehre der Poesie! Ich wußte es nicht bei Zeit um ihn noch beschränken zu können; […]. Das Mißverhältnis wird mich nun, so lange ich lebe, ärgern, so oft ich das Buch nur ansehe (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952/53, 113).49xliii 47 48 Letter to Strauß 12 June 1854. Letter to Strauß 18 October 1856. 49 Letter to Strauß postmarked 22 December 1856. Köstlin himself noticed the discrepancy between his and the other volumes as well, as revealed by his unpublished letter to Vischer (2 April 1857 – Tü UB Md 787-539), transcribed and translated in Appendix IVb [186]. 62 Music and modernity In matters of actual content, the volume is nevertheless surprisingly coherent.50 The correspondence between Vischer and Köstlin (Tü UB Md 787-539) reveals that Köstlin proposed a ‘publicity plan’ in 1857, contacting several music journals with the request to review the treatise or to announce its publication.51 However, there seems to be no correspondence from the period Köstlin was writing the volume, between the second half of 1855 to December 1856, that points at a regular exchange of aesthetic ideas. It is difficult to establish to what extent Vischer exerted his influence on the treatise. Vischer mentioned in the Preface to his treatise on poetry (the next and last volume of the series, also dating from 1857 – Figure 1 [15]) that Köstlin wrote the larger part of the music volume (§ 767 - § 832), whereas Vischer himself wrote the introduction (§ 746 - § 766) and a concluding paragraph on dance (§ 833). Köstlin, like Vischer, found himself in the tradition of idealist philosophy, trying to establish what music’s content and meaning could be. Like Vischer and Hegel, he distrusted music’s intangibility and he saw it as his task to solve the secret (Geheimnis) of ‘what makes music worth listening to’, i.e. what makes it a proper manifestation of the Spirit. It seems, however, that Vischer formulated the basic premises of the treatise, such that Köstlin had little freedom to manoeuvre. Apart from Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’, set out mainly in the introductory paragraphs of the treatise (§ 746 - § 766), the intellectual framework of the treatise seems to be an exercise in categorization, just as in the other treatises in the multi-volume work. Vischer and Köstlin developed a classification of musical styles and genres according to the features of what Vischer called, in proper idealist tradition, the musical material. The various branches (Zweige) of music determined the division of parts and chapters in the treatise. Köstlin’s apparent task was to name and describe these branches, but Vischer seems to have provided the criteria for division. Whilst Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’, based on an empirically motivated investigation of the various aspects and manifestations of feeling, was aimed at determining music’s unique character, the exercise in style and genre categorizations seems to have been aimed at reaching the opposite: explaining music as an art with the same features as its 50 Strauß – who was better versed in music than Vischer – devoted several laudatory words to Vischer’s volume on music. ‘Jetzt lese ich an dem Heft über Musik. Was Du dazu gegeben, muß ich loben, nur ist Einzelnes aus Mangel an Beispielen, etwas dunkel; ganz vortrefflich aber Dein § 764 [the paragraph about music’s doubtful ideality!]; der wäre gar nicht besser zu machen und entscheidet namentlich die Rangestreit zwischen Vokal- und Instrumentalmusik aus dem Grunde [to be addressed later in this chapter]. Köstlins Arbeit finde ich, auch beim Lesen im Zusammenhang, höchst tüchtig; der Mensch ist gesteckt voll von musikalischen Eindrücken und Anschauungen und hat eine feine Unterscheidungs- und Beurteilungskraft. In diesem Handel hast Du wirklich Glück gehabt.’ (16 May 1857 – VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952/53, 118) [I am now reading the volume on music. Your contribution I find praiseworthy, just a few things are slightly obscure, due to a lack of examples; your § 764, however, is excellent; this could not have been made better and particularly resolves the competition between vocal and instrumental music from its foundation. Köstlin’s work I find very proficient, also in the context of the whole; the man is full of musical impressions and observations and has a fine discerning and power of judgement. You have really been lucky in this business.] 51 In a letter to Vischer (2 April 1857), transcribed and translated in Appendix IVb [186], Köstlin proposes to contact the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, the Niederrheinische Musikzeitung, Echo, the Fliegende Blätter and “das Kunstblatt”. Brendel (NZfM) and Bischoff (NRM) addressed the treatise at great length. Echo and the Fliegende Blätter placed a publication announcement (see Appendix VI [213]: No author = Bischoff, Brendel, Echo, Elterlein and Lobe for bibliographical details). Chapter Three – Music as the devil 63 sister arts. In Vischer’s adapted Hegelianism, the dialectics of particularity and universalism gained importance, because Köstlin’s description of musical style and genre categories (a universalization) was based on Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’ (a particularization). There is a lack of decisiveness in applying either of those strategies in order to neutralize music’s intangible powers. One could either study the psychiatric patient and determine what made him so different from the rest, or one could put him away in a mental institution demanding that he behave normally. Vischer and Köstlin did both. The attempt to curtail music’s boundless freedom, to cage the outlawed art, the free bird (‘Vogelfrei’- VISCHER 1923, § 759: 45), was undoubtedly for its own good. Categorizing music’s features in similar branches to those of the other arts, made respectable by their representational and epistemological transparency, would provide music with a similar status of respectability, so that it could potentially become a fully-fledged manifestation of the Spirit. The crudest example of Vischer and Köstlin reining in music was their blunt attempt to apply painting style categories to music (§ 793). Style*, in idealist ideology, was the perfect balance between content and form, between message and manner of communication (Figure 5). Therefore, Köstlin simply distinguished between three style categories: firstly, form dominates content; secondly, content dominates form; and thirdly, the two are in balance. Within these categories, he listed a number of styles, mentioning a couple of features for every style, without any practical examples of musical compositions. According to proper Hegelian habit, Köstlin dialectically opposed the style categories in order to reveal their characteristics. The so-called ‘strict style’, which he associated with the formal strictness of polyphonic counterpoint, opposed the ‘high’ or ‘ideal’ style, featured by an ‘easiness’ of movement (gewisse Leichtigkeit der Bewegung), clarity and ‘avoidance of 64 Music and modernity particularization’.52 Both styles belonged to the first category. The ideal style opposed the ‘characterizing’ (malende) style (second category), because this style was objectifying, epic and dramatic. Another opposition that reminds one of eighteenth-century painting styles was the ‘sentimental’ (pathetisch) style, which was gracious, expressing sentient affects, versus the ‘expressive’ style, (both second category) ‘starting where all formal styles stop’, reflecting the emotions ‘in their warmth and liveliness’ (VISCHER 1923, § 793: 242). The total arbitrariness of this description of musical style categories reveals that the collaboration between the two aestheticians was not always as smooth as they would have liked. The style categorizations were indeed heavily criticized by music aestheticians in the later nineteenth century, as we will see in Chapter Eight [135ff]. Other attempts to categorize music’s features were more successful, as there were aspects of Vischer’s reinterpretation of Hegel’s aesthetics, notably those aspects not directly related to music, that allowed music to have a more accepted position among its sister arts. Thus, Köstlin was able to develop musical genre categorizations that may have been slightly far-fetched from the perspective of musicians, but were at least intelligently embedded in Vischer’s general theory without entirely ignoring the features of music as an art. Vischer’s interpretation of the nature and function of the artistic material was crucial in Köstlin’s genre categorization. In idealist philosophy, the artistic material had always been an important criterion for describing the differences between various manifestations of an art form. Vischer made the concept into one of the core aspects of his aesthetic theory, addressing it most extensively in the 1851 treatise of his aesthetics series (the volume on ‘art as such’ [Kunst überhaupt] – Figures 1 [15] & 3 [22]). In his attempt to attribute spiritual (i.e. conceptual) content to art, Vischer adhered to the concept of Stoff* (matter). Stoff can be explained in three different ways, which should carefully be kept apart. Firstly, Stoff is the Idea as the content of a work of art, indispensable in determining the meaning of a work of art. Secondly, Stoff can be the Idea in the form of a natural object that can be chosen by an artist as a model. And thirdly, Vischer refers to the raw material as Stoff, the plain and unprocessed ‘building blocks’ for a work of art. (VISCHER 1923, § 55: 156-157) It is exactly these three definitions of Stoff, in its epistemological, representational and material aspects, that refer to music’s threefold ‘lack of objectivity’ as described by SPONHEUER (1987, 114-127). In the idealist view, the Spirit needed Stoff in order to manifest itself (Figure 2 [19]). If there was no Stoff, a work of art remained ‘unobjectified’. Stoff was therefore of extreme importance to art. Thus far, Vischer is on common idealist ground, describing concepts that have been addressed by Kant and Hegel in similar terms. However, with regard to the last category of Stoff, the material of art, Vischer took a considerably different angle, and although he did not entirely change the definition of what artistic material could be, he altered the emphasis on certain aspects of it. 52 As an example of the latter, Köstlin mentions Mozart’s Zauberflöte, the only example that illustrates his classification. Chapter Three – Music as the devil 65 To a greater extent than Hegel, Vischer focused on the kind of material that has been provided by the development of human civilization itself, rather than by nature. In his 1851 volume, Vischer classified features of art by looking at Darstellungsmittel (paint, stone, etc.), but also by looking at the ‘Sinnlichkeit, wie sie sich in den Geist hineinerstreckt und das ihr entsprechende Material ergreift. Dadurch erst wird auch eine Gliederung innerhalb der einzelnen Kategorien des Materials möglich’ (VISCHER 1923, § 534: 170).xliv Thus, Vischer allowed sensory (sinnliche) elements in the dialectical process of the artist’s choice of the material. This led him to the conclusion that artistic material should not only be defined as paint for a painting or stone for a sculpture, as did Hegel, but also as loosely defined sensory (sinnliche) means available to an artist for making a work of art. These could have appeared as art before: artistic techniques, fashions, cultural movements, etc. Unlike Hegel, Vischer was interested in phenomena as products of individual human actions rather than in abstract or metaphysical processes. Vischer’s emphasis on the ‘man-made’ types of artistic material had consequences for the way in which he described the process of creating a work of art. Again, Vischer took widely used idealist dogmas as a starting point. A sign of true artistic genius is the ability to individualize the available material in a work of art or style. As I mentioned earlier (Chapter One [19]), this ability is the artist’s imagination or Phantasie. A piece of stone cannot be turned into a sculpture if the sculptor is unable to mentally summon up a picture of the work of art beforehand. Conversely, imagination needs the material to become activated; both are necessary dialectical conditions for the emergence of art (VISCHER 1923, § 490: 9 – Figures 3 [22] & 6). Vischer added a further dimension to this view. If material consists not only of stone or paint, but also of fashions or techniques, the role of the artist’s imagination becomes more 66 Music and modernity pressing. Fashions and techniques are not universal, like stone and paint, but have been developed in a certain place and, most importantly, at a certain time. They are subject to historical development. For, since the material has been subject to earlier actions of imagination already, imagination is tied closer to the material. Thus, the material becomes almost more important than the artist (VISCHER 1923, § 832: 454), because his imagination is not necessarily the artist’s individual imagination, but is rather dependent on the material shared by several artists in a certain time or tradition. Many music critics, notably Hanslick (see Chapter Five [93ff]), were orientated towards Vischer’s conception of the relationship between material and artist, rather than to Hegel’s. Vischer’s sensory interpretation of the artistic material, as well as his concept of sentient imagination relying on it, enabled a revaluation of music’s material, the tone, which was also preformed by the artist’s imagination. Due to Vischer’s adapted Materialbegriff, Köstlin could describe music in a similar way as Vischer had described the other arts in the earlier volumes of his treatise. The larger part of the treatise is taken up by genre classifications according to the ‘sensory material’ (sinnliche Material). Thus, Köstlin was able not only to point out the various musical genres within the realm of music, but also to explain how music is an expression of inner emotional life. He carried out the actual application of Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’, the way in which inner emotional life emerges in the raw ‘building blocks’ for a musical work. Köstlin had provided music with at least two kinds of Stoff (a material and a representational one), being indispensable stages in the process of objectification of the Spirit. The intangible aspects of music – its manifestation in time rather than in space, its mathematical complexity and inaccessibility, its direct impact on the senses – could thus be conceptualized, explained and pinned down. The most obvious categorization that Vischer passed to Köstlin was the division between vocal and instrumental music. Like Hegel, Vischer claims that vocal and instrumental music depend on fundamentally different manners of communication. Köstlin described this in detail (VISCHER 1923, § 796: 248-251): whilst vocal music has been attached to text, assisting in transmitting verbally determinate meaning, instrumental music withdraws from this. Its domain is the realm of pure feeling, where determinate emotions have not yet begun to become crystallized. The earlier discussed concept of sentient imagination (empfindende Phantasie), a key concept in Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’, determines the division between vocal and instrumental music. It dialectically ‘divides itself’, which brings about the division of vocal and instrumental music: vocal music refers directly to the Empfindung, the crystallized and definable particular emotion, whereas instrumental music refers to the realm of Phantasie in its purest form: the reservoir of pure feeling (reines Gefühl) (Figures 4 [59] & 7).53 53 In glorifying instrumental music as an independent form of expression, Köstlin may have been flirting with the popularity of Hanslick’s Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, which appeared three years before Vischer’s music treatise. Chapter Three – Music as the devil 67 Figure 7. Köstlin’s dialectical classification of genres according to sentient imagination. The Absolute as Idea  Sinnlichkeit (sensory internalization of the Idea)  ⇔ Geistigkeit (spiritual internalization of the Idea) Senses ⇓ ‘Soul’ Sentient imagination (see Figure 6 [65])  Imagination (objective) Instrumental music: autonomous instrumental execution  Instrumental music - Sonata - Symphony ⇔ Epic, dramatic (displaying objective) - Recitative  Sentience (subjective) Vocal music: dependent on text  Lyrical (abstract subjective.) - Lied - Cantata ⇓ Opera1 1 Note that Köstlin grants opera the same function in his system as Hegel granted poetry (Figure 3 [22]): the sublation of all art forms/musical genres, yet also surpassing these genres, endangering its own specificity of expression. Like many aspects of Köstlin’s aesthetics, this can be retraced to eighteenth-century aesthetics regarding opera as lyrical tragedy which could easily be equated with poetry. These aesthetics were based on practices in the French theater and on Aristotelian aesthetic models. Köstlin regards Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk as the only solution to the free subjectivity of modern music, and stresses the necessity of reviving a German opera tradition, whilst sharing Vischer’s concern that music has to give up its autonomous manifestation for this specificity of expression (§ 832: 453). 68 Music and modernity Once the basic distinction between vocal and instrumental music had been made, Köstlin described a number of genres and their relation to the expression of emotion. The lied, for instance, Köstlin described as a Stimmungsbild, in which a simple melody should express a lyrical poem. (§ 800). The recitative was divided in two categories: a purely lyrical recitative and a dramatic-lyrical recitative. The division depended on the stage of inner life (Figure 4 [59]) towards which the recitatives refer; a purely lyrical recitative triggers deeper stages of inner life than the dramatic-lyrical recitative. The genre categories in instrumental music were more difficult for Köstlin to establish. Köstlin stated that all instruments are related to the human voice as an ‘unmittelbare[s] Abbild der ganz und voll von einer Empfindung ergriffenen […] Seele’ (§ 805). He continued by associating certain emotions or moods with instruments: percussion arouses an ‘elementary tone power’ (§ 806), the violin is light and agile, with a clarity of character and, at times, a certain sharpness (§ 807). Although Köstlin admitted that genre categorizations could not be built on the characteristics of instruments, since the instruments are almost always combined in musical pieces, he employed the use of instruments as a primary criterion for establishing the instrumental genres. In the polyfonic instrumental piece, several instruments are combined ‘um ein durch die Natur derselben und durch ihre qualitative und quantitative Gesamtwirkung bedingtes Instrumentalbild hervorzubringen’ (§ 807). Thus, there are polyfonic instrumental pieces for strings, for winds and for brass bands. Furthermore, the orchestra piece unites ‘Hauptgattungen von Instrumenten […] zu einer alle Schallkräfte und Klangfarben verschmelzenden gediegenen Tonmasse’. Hence, the orchestra piece allows features of a greater style. Köstlin’s most basic genre categorization thus depended directly on Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’, differentiating between the various aspects of feeling. It was a categorization according to music’s particular content. Köstlin was, moreover, able to connect these ‘aesthetics of feeling’ with the artistic material. The material, in the form of musical transmitters (instruments or voice), composition forms or musical parameters, ‘directs’ the way in which the artist’s imagination works (Figure 6 [65]). The alleged mathematical complexity of musical form, distrusted for its inaccessibility by idealist thinkers, was now devoid of any transcendental power, because Vischer and Köstlin meticulously explained how it functioned as a straightforward transmitter of a reasonably well-defined inner emotional life. With Vischer differentiating between manifestations and stages of feeling, such as determinate emotions versus pure feeling, Köstlin could neatly classify the various ways in which music emerged as genres. The fact that Köstlin’s classification criteria were mainly based on the nature of actions, emotions or textual content rather than on musical grounds was of secondary importance to Vischer and Köstlin.2 Their primary aim was to describe the manifestations of music as no longer 2 The almost total absence of musical examples is also striking. Köstlin does mention composers, but hardly any musical pieces that could have served to exemplify the various genres he addresses. The only occasion where Köstlin mentions specific pieces is in the ‘music theory’ section. Considering the fact they appear nowhere else in the treatise, he may have taken them over from a theory book he could have consulted. The examples (limited to Chapter Three – Music as the devil 69 mysterious and intangible, but well-defined and clear-cut. They could now describe music in similar terms as its sister arts, they had found a way of making it behave like everything else. However, this successful reintegration project was acquired at a certain price: the undermining of Hegel’s philosophical system. Vischer had formulated an alternative for Hegel’s concept of imagination (sentient instead of formative [60]), based on the supreme importance he attributed to Beauty as a manifestation of the Spirit, and on his assumption that the Spirit was a human rather than a metaphysical phenomenon. He also broadened the concept of the material of art as something that was not only found in nature but also preformed by the human Spirit through earlier artistic expressions. These adaptations could be used to neutralize music’s God-provoking unnameability and immateriality, by appointing a relatively well-defined and down-to-earth content to music and by normalizing its ephemeral material. Vischer was the last idealist philosopher who made a serious attempt at explaining music as an art comparable to all the other arts. He might not have succeeded from a musical point of view, but did contribute to it in a philosophical respect. The results of his attempt contained leads for further debate and reinterpretation, which nurtured the intellectual engagement with music and the development of music criticism, as will be revealed in Part III of this study. However, with his adaptations of Hegel’s philosophy, he also had to give up the Idea as a unified concept. He developed his earlier discussed view of ‘mediated idealism’ considering the Idea as a collection of manifold instances depending on the changing makeup of those instances. In Vischer’s Aesthetics, the Idea turns from an absolutist unchangeable concept into a dynamic, multi-facetted category. Thus, Vischer opened the way for other previously clear-cut concepts, such as Beauty, truth, Spirit, and last but not least art, to turn into categories that could be subject to critical debate. His attempt to conceptualize music succeeded only because he had already started to undermine the very premises of the tools he was using. As will become clear in later chapters, many musicians and music critics were aware of this, and used his views to put music in a more favourable light. Thus, Vischer’s intention to cage the free bird (freie Vogel), to give the outlawed art a respectable but modest place in society would eventually lead to its aesthetic liberation from idealist bonds. Handel’s oratorios and Bach’s passions, some symphonies and dramatic works by Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, and a couple of works by Gluck, Mendelssohn, Ferdinand David and Gretry) suggest that the theory book (to which Köstlin does not refer) was either quite conservative, or at least a few decades old. Chapter Four The end of art Art’s dissolution into philosophy Idealist philosophers, Hegel in particular, attributed a straightforward function to art. Like religion and philosophy, art was considered to be one of the three major vehicles for human expression, i.e. one of the three major manifestations of the Spirit. From the manner in which religion, art and philosophy developed, the development of mankind as a whole could be observed. The extent in which each of them flourished provided information about the way in which humankind communicated, whether that was imaginative, sensitive, or reflective. Thus, and this was of the utmost importance to Hegel, religion, art and philosophy indicated how far humankind had developed towards its ultimate destination of freedom and reconciliation with the Absolute. In this capacity, the three human expressions could be associated quite unequivocally with certain periods in history, because, just like history, they functioned as a kind of log, registering the subsequent stages of mankind’s development. According to Hegel, they could reach their peak only when their form appropriately transmitted their respective contents. Whilst religion and philosophy improved over time, reaching their peak in modern times, Hegel argued that art had reached its peak in ancient Greece and had been in decline ever since. Pre-Greek (‘symbolic’) art could not express its message adequately, since the message was not fully-fledged and determinate. Post-Greek (Christian ‘romantic’) art could not express the message adequately since the message was too deep and complex for a sensory medium. Only in Greek (‘classical’) art, the message (content) and the medium (form) coincided (INWOOD 1993, xxvi). Hegel often insisted that this was the case because the content of Greek art was religious. A statue of Zeus was an artistic expression of a religious content. Its form was suited to its content: what you saw Chapter Four – The end of art 71 was what you got. Thus, only when paired with religion could art function as a proper means of expression. With this ideal of ancient art firmly at the back of his mind, Hegel encountered some severe problems with contemporary art.3 He explained these problems by sketching yet another huge transcendental development: he observed that human interaction of the time, requiring an increasing sense of judgement and discussion, had become so complex and took place on such high abstraction levels, that what Hegel considered to be a purely sensory means of expression such as art could not contribute to this. ‘Deshalb’ Hegel stated plainly ‘ist unsere Gegenwart ihrem allgemeinen Zustande nach der Kunst nicht günstig’ (HEGEL 1994, 24-25).xlv He observed that art’s intellectual dimension, more than its sensory and creative aspects, became of primary importance: Was durch Kunstwerke jetzt in uns erregt wird, ist außer dem unmittelbaren Genuß zugleich unser Urteil, indem wir den Inhalt, die Darstellungsmittel des Kunstwerks und die Angemessenheit und Unangemessenheit beider unserer denkenden Betrachtung unterwerfen. Die Wissenschaft der Kunst ist darum in unserer Zeit noch viel mehr Bedürfnis als zu den Zeiten in welchen die Kunst für sich als Kunst schon volle Befriedigung gewährte. Die Kunst lädt uns zur denkenden Betrachtung ein, und hat zwar nicht zu dem Zwecke, Kunst wieder hervorzurufen, sondern, was Kunst sei, wissenschaftlich zu erkennen. (HEGEL 1994, 25-26)xlvi Hegel assumed that thinking about art – what it is, what it should be – started to exert its influence on the production of art itself, and in many ways could not easily be distinguished from creative production any longer. He evaluated this development ambivalently. On the one hand, he deplored the loss of sensory expression and the alleged impossibility of regaining it. He found that intellectual reflection excluded spontaneous creativity, thus hampering art’s power to trigger the senses and move the heart. On the other hand, Hegel acknowledged that the development of Thought ‘ruling’ over Beauty represented the historically and dialectically logical development of the Spirit. He admitted that the existence of aesthetic theory relied entirely on this development, and also stated that art in general gained ‘its higher appraisal’ (höhere Würdigung) (HEGEL 1994, 83) in the development of mankind through this situation. Still, the negative aspects of this development for art predominated in Hegel’s aesthetics. He was convinced that art’s increasing orientation towards Thought was caused by its abandonment of religious content and resulted in a contemporary art that could only appeal to experts and no longer provided any sensory enjoyment for laymen. It became increasingly difficult to say what a work of art was ‘about’, requiring the accompaniment of thinking to explain its abstract, inaccessible content. Not only was art criticism becoming 3 Hegel was certainly not the only one who encountered problems with contemporary art. Around the turn of the century, Friedrich Schlegel, for instance, uses the word entartet (degenerate) for contemporary art, expressing the widely felt notion that art as a whole was unmistakably in decline (WENDORFF 1995, 359). 72 Music and modernity more important, subject matters for works of art were becoming increasingly indiscernible, and artistic techniques increasingly unfathomable. Art thus seemed to qualify its own sensory identity, it became ironic, dismembered and dissonant. Contemporary art could only be spiritually substantial (geistvoll) if it allowed Thought into its domain, but in the end, art’s increasing complexity and abstraction would lead quite literally to spiritual emptiness: the Spirit would abandon art as a medium in which to appear, and would move on to philosophy. This led Hegel to the conclusion that art, as a sensory medium of the Spirit, had lost its relevance for the further development of mankind: ‘In allen Beziehungen ist und bleibt die Kunst nach der Seite ihrer höchsten Bestimmung für uns ein Vergangenes. Damit hat sie für uns auch die echte Wahrheit und Lebendigkeit verloren.’ (HEGEL 1994, 25)xlvii Hegel openly stated that music was the herald of art’s dissolution into philosophy: Wenn wir nun im allgemeinen schon die Tätigkeit im Bereiche des Schönen als eine Befreiung der Seele, als ein Lossagen von Bedrängnis und Beschränktheit ansehen können, indem die Kunst selbst die gewaltsamsten tragischen Schicksale durch theoretische Gestalten mildert und sie zum Genusse werden lässt, so führt die Musik diese Freiheit zur letzten Spitze (HEGEL 1993b, 141).xlviii Hegel described how music’s ‘liberation of the soul’ illustrates the unavoidable breach between inner subjectivity and outer objectivity for art in general. Figure 8 is my schematic interpretation of Hegel’s dualist* description of this process (HEGEL 1993b, 145-149). Music’s overly subjective nature initiates the process of retreat into the isolation of the inner self. Its sensory features are subjective to such an extent that their manifestation requires to be accompanied by Thought in the form of skilful musical technique or conceptualization in order to appear in outer materiality and become understood. Music thus exists in a no man’s land between imagination in its purest sensory form and imagination as a merely reflective capacity. It is undecided between the two, and is no longer able to connect the one with the other. Hence, the Spirit cannot objectify itself in music. This problem has been extensively addressed in Chapter Three [50], yet it is interesting to mention here that Hegel added a developmental dimension to this situation, comparing music’s dubious ideality to the development of modern art in general. It is music’s freedom, in being boundlessly subjective, that gradually and irrevocably leads to the loss of its sensory character. Art’s increasing orientation towards philosophy is caused by exactly this over-abundance of subjectivity. Music’s situation thus epitomized the direction in which the other arts would now develop, since they too became ever more subjective, abstract and interiorized in Hegel’s eyes. Chapter Four – The end of art 73 74 Music and modernity Hegel’s condemnation of contemporary art, depicting it as a kind of second-rate philosophy never able to compete with its verbal accuracy, had an immense impact on the decades that followed. The doubtful status of art in contemporary society led to a great variety of theories about art’s function and meaning. Although often described as Hegel’s famous ‘end of art’ statement, it is highly unlikely that Hegel hinted at the termination of art as such. Willi Oelmüller argues that Hegel speaks instead of the end of art’s development. Art does no longer serve the goal of freedom as it is no longer inhabited by the Spirit; it will not reach a higher manifestation, therefore it will keep existing (OELMÜLLER 1965, 89).4 Hegel’s association of ever greater abstraction and inaccessible complexity with the onward movement of time and further development of mankind was endorsed by many German intellectuals after his death in 1831. However, Hegelian aestheticians, who unlike Hegel were primarily concerned with art, were confronted with the difficult task of proving that, in the context of this Hegelian Weltanschauung, art as a sensory medium was still of primary importance to the further development of mankind. Their aim, as we have seen in Vischer’s aesthetics (Chapter Three [55]), was to defend the supremacy of Beauty at all cost. By focusing on the way in which art and Beauty could regain their position as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit (VISCHER 1923, § 2: 7) Vischer came up with a range of proposals that meticulously described art’s future prospects. Like many of his progressive Hegelian contemporaries, Vischer equated these prospects with the long-awaited political freedom that many middle-class intellectuals were striving for. Once mankind was susceptible to Beauty, it would also be able to gain freedom of expression in general. Hegel’s metaphysical teleology gained a specific social and political dimension, which led Vischer to adopt a fundamentally different interpretation of modernity. Whilst Hegel had argued that modernity was the generally deplorable aftermath of romanticism as far as art is concerned, Vischer took quite a different stance: zwischen den beiden [romanticism and modernity] steht doch die ungeheure Kluft der Aufklärung, welche die moderne Kunst als ihre negative Voraussetzung niemals verleugnen darf, noch kann, die der Autorität entwachsene freie Subjektivität, die sich in einer verständig zusammenhängenden Weltordnung umschaut, die Trennung der Kunst von der Religion, die Verweltlichung der Kunst (VISCHER 1844c, 364).xlix Like Hegel, Vischer observes that it is difficult to determine the content of a contemporary work of art, because it is now ‘free’ from religious content. Vischer, however, evaluates this development in a much more positive way than Hegel.5 Modernity does not have 4 Carl Dahlhaus stresses the emancipatory aspect of Hegel’s statement, assuming that Hegel only meant the end of art as religion in its ancient appearance and hinted at the beginning of art as art (DAHLHAUS 1983, 341). I will show [80] that not Hegel but Hegelian aestheticians such as Vischer hinted at this, since they were primarily concerned with art. 5 Also observed by the Hegel scholar Annemarie GETHMANN-SIEFERT (1984, 321-322): ‘Vischer meint, dass im Gegensatz zu Hegels Annahme die Kunst erst mit dem Sinken der religiösen Interessen “steigern”, sich vollenden Chapter Four – The end of art 75 anything to do with romanticism, Vischer argues; it has been severed from romanticism by the Enlightenment.6 Vischer thus criticizes Hegel’s stance that modernity is the deplorable aftermath of romanticism. It is rather the start of a new era, with a new function and new possibilities for art.7 Vischer mentions ‘free subjectivity’ (freie Subjektivität) as the main feature of this new era. However problematic and intangible, this is the realm that provides the possibilities for future art to regain its position as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit. In their early years, Vischer and his contemporaries insisted on the necessity of truly engaging with the present production of art in all its incomprehensibility and inaccessibility in order for the new creativity to become active. The present orientation towards Thought (elsewhere specified as art criticism [1844c, 371]) was in Vischer’s eyes necessary, but also temporary: Eine fruchtbare Periode der Poesie liegt hinter uns. […] Ein Wissen, ein Wissen um ihre Werth und um ihre Mängel ist unser Erbtheil. Dieß Wissen wieder in ein Seyn und Werden umzusetzen, in eine Natur, aus welcher ein neuer Strahl der schöpferische Gestaltung ausschießt, dieß ist unser Streben, unsere Sehnsucht. Dieß wird nicht früher gelingen, da ist keine Hilfe, als bis dieses Wissen ein ganzes Wissen geworden seyn wird. Wir sind aber noch nicht aus dem Halbwissen heraus, und eben dieses bleibt in der Reflexion stecken und findet nicht den Uebergang zu der Ueberwindung des Wissens, zur Umsetzung desselben in der That. (VISCHER 1845b, 346)l Vischer admitted that it is, in fact, impossible to create art in a time that values intellectual rather than artistic expression. Nevertheless, art should also ‘express’ its present by adapting to its sometimes inartistic features: könne, weil sie von inhaltlichen Festlegungen frei werde. Er beurteilt also diese Freiheit der Gestaltung genau gegenteilig wie Hegel.’ [Unlike Hegel, Vischer thinks that art can grow and finalize itself only when religious interests diminish, because it will be freed from fixed contents. Thus, his judgement of this freedom of formation is diametrically opposed to Hegel’s.] 6 DAHLHAUS (1969, 269) rightly observes how Köstlin switches between the various interpretations of modernity in his attempt to construct a brief history of music (§§ 822-832). He opposes modernity to antiquity in calling Italian sacred and secular music of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries modern (§ 827), thereby following Hegel’s interpretation of modernity. He also opposes modernity to the Middle Ages, calling German music (Bach and Handel) modern (§ 822), and he describes modernity as roughly equivalent to the present, encompassing the period after Beethoven’s death: ‘die Stufe des unglücklichen Bewußtseins’ (§§ 831/832). These three interpretations of modernity are not as inconsistent as Dahlhaus would have us to believe if one keeps in mind that Vischer regarded modernity as a dialectical synthesis (unlike Hegel, Vischer occasionally uses the term synthesis [VISCHER 1923, § 746: 2]) of classicism (antiquity) and romanticism (the Middle Ages). Modernity opposes them both, but also grows out of them. 7 Pederson observes that, as early as 1830, Christian Weiße tried in his System der Ästhetik to put art in a more prominent position in the idealist system by stressing that the modern period is a culmination of antiquity and romanticism. Weiße reaches the conclusion that music is the freest of all arts, and therefore the purest embodiment of the modern ideal. Pederson remarks that Weiße’s adaptation of Hegel’s system initially went unnoticed due to Hegel’s own authority, as Hegel was still alive in 1830 (PEDERSON 1996, 61). Literary historian Hans Robert Jauß makes a similar claim with regard to the French writer Stendhal (1783-1842). Jauß does not give any dates but says that Stendhal was the first person to regard modernity as a sublation of romanticism. Stendhal thus anticipated the thought of the ‘spätere Kritiker der Hegel’schen Epocheneinteilung, Friedrich Th. Vischer, Feuerbach und Marx’ (JAUSS 1974, 129). 76 Music and modernity Die reiche Gedankenwelt unsere Gegenwart drängt und ringt nach allen Seiten zu einer Umwälzung der Wirklichkeit hin; je mehr Geist, je mehr Tiefe und Kraft sie in diesem Sinne hat. Gerade um so mehr widerstrebt sie der unmittelbaren Umbildung in eigentliche Poesie, denn sie ist pathologisch, sie ist Stimmung der Unzufriedenheit, Reflexion mit Blitzen zürnender Ungeduld vermischt, Kritik, Zersetzung, Ahnung, Prophezeihung, aber immer keine Poesie. (VISCHER 1844a, 166-167)li In Vischer’s eyes, artists who do not incorporate the present dissatisfaction (Unzufriedenheit), impatience (Ungeduld), criticism (Kritik), disruption (Zersetzung), suspicion (Ahnung) and prophecy (Prophezeihung) in their works of art do not make art that is relevant to the further development of mankind. He criticizes Joseph Eichendorff (1788-1857) and Georg Herwegh (1817-1875), for instance, for constructing artistic utopias that offer a refuge from the present rather than expressing the present in all its complexity and richness (VISCHER 1844f, 295-296). Their art could not prepare the artistic realm for the next stage in history or its observers for a next stage in their consciousness. For a transformation of reality (Umwälzung der Wirklichkeit) we cannot make poetry at the moment, Vischer stated, we need to carry through our consciousness and knowledge (Wissen) up to the point that intellect and senses are united again. Only then can reality be united with the Idea by means of Beauty rather than Thought. Aestheticians such as Vischer recognized the artistic crisis described by Hegel as an inevitable historical necessity, but at the same time they described it in fundamentally different terms to what Hegel would ever have allowed. Vischer maintained that the crisis was a temporary one, a necessary Zwischenzeit (‘in-between time’8) between a monumental artistic past and a grand revolutionary future (VISCHER 1845b, 353). Exactly because this ‘in-between-time’ was ‘digesting’ earlier artistic achievements by means of art criticism as well as increasingly abstract elaborations on those earlier achievements, it carried the seeds of a promising future. Als dritte Hauptform nun setze ich also das moderne Ideal [the first and second being antiquity and romanticism] […]. Die Auflösung der bisherigen Gegensätze in dieser letzten Form des Ideals zeigt an, dass der Begriff der Schönheit nun reif ist, in die wahrhafte und höchste Form seiner Verwirklichung einzugehen. (VISCHER 1844c, 371)lii Modernity’s complexity, the decadence of its abstractness and its lack of determinate content may be problematic, but they are also necessary to prepare mankind for a new stage of consciousness (Bewußtsein), essential in acquiring a greater sense of self-knowledge and self-determination. Vischer considered art to be a sensory anticipation of this future consciousness (ROEBLING 1971, 106), thus immediately connecting future artistic prospects 8 Conscious of this term’s stylistic inadequacy, I am translating Zwischenzeit literally. Chapter Four – The end of art 77 with past artistic achievements. ‘The anticipation of what is new in the future is realized only through remembering (Eingedenken) a past’, Walter Benjamin stated almost a century after Vischer (quoted by Jürgen HABERMAS 1987, 12). Our present image of the past (brought about by our actual, present environment) determines our present image of the future. Anticipation cannot exist without remembering, or to put it in the terminology used by Reinhart Koselleck (quoted by HABERMAS 1987, 12): our ‘space of experience’ determines our ‘horizon of expectation’. The present has a pivotal function in connecting the two, but it can only fulfil this function when it is conscious of itself as ‘the’ present. In Vischer’s thought, and in that of his fellow-Hegelians, Ruge, Feuerbach, Marx and David Friedrich Strauß, ‘the’ present becomes a separate critical category that exists thanks to self-regulating dynamics.9 These dynamics of art as an anticipation of a future consciousness were described in detail by many Vormärz critics and artists, also outside Germany, in France and Italy. Inspired by Hegel’s concept of historical necessity as well as by their own progressive ideals, they came up with a nihilistic interpretation of modernity, that prefigured Vischer’s interpretation of it in many respects. As soon as ‘the’ present starts to be a demarcated concept, it needs to be opposed to its past and future, including its immediate past and future. Thus, the present renews itself constantly by turning away from its immediate past. The notion of being modern had featured in centuries of aesthetic thinking, but the notion of the transitoriness of modernity was a distinct aspect of nineteenth century aesthetics (JAUSS 1974, 50-51). ‘Modern’ was now not so much opposed to ‘old’, but rather to ‘timeless’. This power of continuous self-renewal was peculiarly Hegelian in its assumption that renewal necessarily involved a dialectical sublation into a new stage of history by reconciling mind and senses (HABERMAS 1987, 7). The present functioned as the connection between the often confusing and seemingly dismembered instances of historical development. With its dominant quality of reflection, the present guaranteed the continuity and logicality of history. Thus, it became inextricably bound up with one of the most powerful concepts of aesthetic thinking after Hegel: the concept of progress. It is often taken for granted in musicological studies (DETERMANN 1989, STEVENSON 1994, TARUSKIN 2004) that the concept of progress is an important feature of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel, however, did not talk very much about progress. He rather used the more neutral concept of development; development in a certain direction, but without any judgement as to whether the eventual goal would be desirable or not. An almost militant assurance of positivism was added only in the 1830s and 1840s by Hegelian aestheticians and critics. The teleology of Hegel’s Weltanschauung was highlighted and used to pursue 9 Also observed by the Marxist literary scholar Georg Lukács: ‘Eine der wesentliche Änderungen, die Vischer an der Hegelschen Ästhetik vollzieht, ist ja gerade die Konzeption, daß die Gegenwart eine selbständige neue Periode für die Ästhetik bedeutet. Er bekennt sich zu der “groß, aber unschön kämpfenden und ringenden Gegenwart.”’ (LUKÁCS 1956, 236) [One of the substantial changes Vischer performs on Hegel’s aesthetics is precisely the conception of the present as constituting an independent new period for aesthetic theory. He commits himself to the ‘great, but unbeautifully battling and struggling present’.] 78 Music and modernity specific goals.10 In Vischer’s case, this goal was the prospect of Beauty and art once again being the most suitable means of unifying reality with the Idea. Everything that happened in the present was hence interpreted as preparing for art’s glorious rebirth as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit. In Vischer’s view, the present consciously anticipated this rebirth. The concept of progress depended to a large extent on the allegedly self-regulating dynamics of the present as a separate critical category. The implicit attribution of human capacities to developments, processes or periods was easily incorporated in the idealist (and Enlightenment) view that man as an individual was nothing but a cog in the machine, a machine that carried on working irrespective of the actions of single individuals. Vischer, as one of the last idealists adhering to this ‘philosophy of the system’, meticulously described the features of this present as a reasonably demarcated ‘in-between time’, and he also implied how the present could be conscious of itself as ‘the’ present. Art had the opportunity to account for its present by expressing it and responding to it. (VISCHER 1923, § 530: 154) This was the only way to anticipate the future in which art could again become the supreme manifestation of the Spirit. Vischer unequivocally sides with the dramaturge and critic Heinrich Theodor Rötscher (1803-1871), quoting him with a metaphor that sounds rather ominous to post1945 ears, but was, in Vischer’s time, a perfectly decent Bildungsbürger expression of the anticipation of a grand artistic future: ‘das Blut des historischen Geistes, das sich auf den Trümmern der untergehenden Welt ein neues, freies Reich erbaut, muß sich in die Adern der Poesie ergießen.’ (Rötscher as quoted by VISCHER 1845b, 353)liii Art could function as an infrastructural device enabling the present (in the form of the historical Spirit) to come to life and reveal itself as a ‘new free empire’. Art could thus be a direct manifestation of the features of an era. Rather than stemming from Hegel’s own aesthetics, these progressive views about art and society emerged after his death in 1831, as a response to his statement pertaining to the ‘end of art’. Hegel did not talk in terms of ‘the’ present that should be judged on the basis of its own features. Only occasionally did Hegel talk about progress, being far from positive about the eventual goals of the development he sketched. Hegel quite unequivocally condemned modern art, he did not attempt to justify it by establishing connections between art and its surrounding contemporary environment. Hegel regarded art’s orientation towards Thought as generally deplorable and irrevocable, and not as a preparation for future artistic flourishing. Whilst philosophical and literary studies have been clear in distinguishing between Hegel’s own thought from that of his followers, musicological research, and notably the studies in English (STEVENSON 1994, TARUSKIN 2004) tend to neglect the differences between Hegel and his followers. Thus, some of the midnineteenth-century views on the further prospects of music have been erroneously traced 10 In his study about the New German School, Robert Determann does distinguish between development and progress, but fails to observe that this was a crucial difference between Hegel’s thought and that of his followers (DETERMANN 1989, 74). Chapter Four – The end of art 79 back to Hegel. Even when nineteenth-century music critics refer to Hegel, their interpretation of Hegel’s thought has been mediated by aestheticians such as Vischer. The legitimation of modern art The upheavals in the year 1848 have entered history for their symbolic rather than their actual influence. Seldom had expectations for an entirely new political system run so high throughout Europe. Never before were middle-class intellectuals so united in their efforts to participate in the political field. It is, in fact, difficult to find progressive composers, poets or philosophers who were not in some way or another affected by the revolutions. Vischer entered the Frankfurt Parliament and made his way to Zurich after it was muzzled by the aristocracy. Eduard Hanslick witnessed the execution of his friend and colleague, the music critic Julius Becher, in Vienna.11 Richard Wagner stood on the barricades in Dresden, together with Mikhail Bakunin, and narrowly escaped Becher’s fate by fleeing to Zurich as well. In Germany, expectations were raised even higher by the intention to unify the German-speaking countries. It is not surprising that Vischer, like his contemporaries, often equated political prospects with the hope for a grand artistic future. The failure of the upheavals left its scars on the thought of Hegel’s progressive followers. J.W. Burrow describes how an ‘intellectual melancholy’ spread after 1848 among many writers, artists and intellectuals in Europe, a ‘world-weariness, a sense of a world grown old and of belonging to a prematurely exhausted, post-Romantic generation’ (BURROW 2000, 16). Apparently, the reconciliation with the Absolute, announced by Hegel, did not refer to the political events in 1848, despite decades of hope to the contrary. The former Proudhonist Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) succinctly formulated the critique against the Hegelian conception of history by stating that the truth of history is not the same as logical truth (BURROW 2000, 26). Long before 1848, Vischer, in true Bildungsbürger tradition, had observed that the crisis of modernity was not limited to the aesthetic realm, but was inextricably bound up with the features of modern society as a whole. The excessive rationality in social and economic processes lead to human relationships being dismembered, to social alienation, religious nihilism and to the individual being disregarded (SCHLAFFER/MENDE 1987, 47). However, he had always assumed that the materialism of the modern state was a temporary dialectical countermovement in mankind’s development towards freedom and regained spirituality. This view needed revision by the time it emerged that the upheavals had not led to any of the expected social, political or indeed artistic transformations. The problematic aspects of the present were not transitory, but turned out to be permanent. Although it is 11 Julius Becher (1803-1848) was an Austrian journalist, musician, and revolutionist. He was perennially poor, and eked out a precarious existence writing for the Sonntagsblatt and the Wiener Musikzeitung, being a staunch champion of Mendelssohn and Berlioz. In the spring of 1848, Becher became the head of the radicals, fomenting a revolt in Vienna, and assumed editorial charge of the revolutionary organ, Der Radikale. While the revolution lasted, Becher was a popular hero. When the tide turned and Vienna fell into the hands of the imperial troops, Becher was betrayed and subsequently tried for treason. Found guilty, he was shot early in the morning of 23 November. 80 Music and modernity clear that the year 1848 caused fundamental changes in the political mindset of many midnineteenth-century German intellectuals and artists, they were not willing immediately to adapt their aesthetics to the new situation. Deception and increased caution affected their rhetorics, but not their eventual goal: the attempt to prepare and observe the unification of reality with the Idea through Beauty and art. After 1848, Vischer became increasingly vague about the tangible outcomes of ‘the’ present as an ‘in-between time’. It was now certain that they would not include glorious liberation of mankind from the bonds of aristocracy or liberation of artistic creativity from the choking embrace of reflective criticism. In 1851, he wrote: In dunklen Wehen arbeitet unsere Zeit an der Schöpfung dieser neuen Form des Bewusstseins. Wie sie herbeigeführt werden soll? Was ihre bestimmte Gehalt sein werde? Niemand weiss es, nur dass die alte Form ausgelebt ist, darüber täusche sich niemand. (VISCHER 1920, 111)liv Just as he had before 1848, Vischer intended to ‘re-spiritualize’ (begeistern) the materialist coldness of modern society by means of art. As a Bildungsbürger, he was vague about the outcomes of these ‘dark pains’ (dunkle Wehen), but became increasingly determined about the way in which they should be brought about. He openly intended to educate the people (Volkserziehung), still believing, as he always had done, that exposing people to Beauty, made them also more susceptible to truth. Beauty and truth, in the true idealist sense, unveiled the same message by different means, but Beauty was a more effective response to the alienation and dismemberment of the modern world than Thought, because Vischer considered cold rationality to be the cause of the modern problems. However, enhancing people’s consciousness by exposing them to contemporary art (permeated with critical doubt and reflection) was nevertheless necessary, because it could make them aware of their time, thus preparing them for the next stage of history. Even if this ‘new form of consciousness’ (neue Form des Bewußtseins) is uncertain, especially when it is uncertain, it should be clarified, anticipated and revealed. Vischer believed that if the goal of freedom and self-determination could not be achieved by political means, it had to be prepared by artistic ones.12 Education – art education – becomes the main weapon in the fight against the banality and repression of modern society. This view was of extreme importance to late 12 Gethmann-Siefert also addresses the nationalist aspect of Vischer’s urge for education, and emphasizes on several occasions (1988, 337; 1992, 227) that Hegel never considered art in terms of a tool that could be employed to reach social and political goals: ‘Es sind dies die Frage nach einer grossen “deutschen” Dichtung, die Bemühung um eine deutsche Kunst und die historische Kultivierung einer der eigenen nationalen Zukunft zugute kommenden “germanischen” Vergangenheit. Vischer will in diesen Bemühungen erreichen, dass das Humanitätsideal der großen Künstler und Dichter der eigenen Nation Bestand verleihe. Er will, mit seinen eigenen Worten, eine nationale Gegenwart durch die Kunst vorbereiten, wo sie im politischen Handeln nicht direkt zu erwirken ist.’ (GETHMANN-SIEFERT 1988, 334) [There is the demand for a great ‘German’ poetry, there is the effort to realize a German art, and there is the historical cultivation of a ‘Germanic’ past that benefits the own national future. With these efforts, Vischer wants to make sure that the ideal of humanity of the great artists and poets gives credit to the own nation. In his own words, he wants to prepare a national present by means of art, at those instances where this cannot be achieved immediately in the political discourse.] Chapter Four – The end of art 81 nineteenth-century as well as twentieth-century artists and critics. It stems from midnineteenth-century Bildungsbürger ideals and not from Hegel’s own aesthetics. Once the problematic aspects of the present had turned out to be permanent, Vischer’s aesthetics were aimed at revealing the inner essence of Beauty in terms of justifying the modern world. If it remained impossible to make beautiful art in an ugly present, the concept of Beauty needed to be extended beyond its traditional borders (OELMÜLLER 1959, 156).13 For Vischer, Beauty was not so much an objective manifestation of the Spirit that can be fathomed by means of systematic philosophy, but rather a subjective means for the observer to interpret the work of art of his choice. His theory of Anschauung (Chapter Three [56]) taking the observing subject as a main point of focus, takes off after 1848, just like his concept of mediated idealism (Chapter Three [60]), as a temporary, loosely defined and changeable unification of reality with the Idea. Literary scholar Georg Lukács describes Vischer’s use of mediated idealism as follows: Kurz gefaßt lautet die Fragestellung so: die Gegenwart als Inhalt und Stoff der Kunst macht eine Gestaltung, auf die die Kategorie ‘Schönheit’ in ihrer herkömmlichen Fassung anwendbar wäre, unmöglich. Dieser für die Verwirklichung der ‘Schönheit’ ungünstige Charakter der Gegenwart muß von der Ästhetik anerkannt werden. […] Es dürfen jedoch aus dieser Sachlage nicht jene Konsequenzen gezogen werden die Hegel selbst gefolgert hat [i.e. Hegel’s statement that the role of art in the development of mankind was over], sondern es muß der Schönheitsbegriff so ausgedehnt werden, daß er die Tendenzen der modernen Kunst als ‘Moment’ in sich aufnehmen kann.lv (LUKÁCS 1956, 222)14 Like Lukács, Helmuth Widhammer observes that Vischer’s primary goal remained the unification of reality with the Idea through Beauty, before as well as after 1848 (WIDHAMMER 1972, 183). Vischer tried to make Hegel’s system fit by working in a thoroughly Hegelian thought mould; he was an idealist in the sense that he intended to reconcile Idea and reality in an a unity which, if not harmonious, was at least historically defensible [76] . In doing so, he was forced to pull out the carpet from under Hegel’s system. Vischer quite simply assumed that if reality could not be adapted to the Idea, the Idea should be adapted to reality. It hardly needs mentioning that this greatly undermined 13 Several attempts to broaden the concept of Beauty were made around 1850, but they were not always positive about the (contemporary) works of art that required an expansion. Dietmar Strauß notes that Karl Rosenkranz’s 1853 Ästhetik des Häßlichen was aimed mainly at rejecting, or at least questioning, the newest artistic achievements by classifying them under the category of the Ugly (STRAUSS 1994, 440). 14 As a Marxist scholar, Lukács has a clear political agenda. He intends to point out that Vischer in his early years (including the early 1850s) was a progressive aesthetician, genuinely intending to get to terms with social reality and trying to find ways in which art could render account for its ‘inartistic’ present. Lukács shows this in order to emphasize Vischer’s later abandonment of progressive ideals. According to Lukács it was a necessity of Vischer’s class to become fervent nationalists whilst at the same time betraying the social commitment that featured their younger years. Ultimately, Lukács argues, this prefigured the social and political indifference of the liberal middle classes when the National Socialists seized power in 1933. 82 Music and modernity the supremacy of the Idea, almost totally overthrowing Hegel’s system – the clearest indication that Vischer was not so much concerned with transcendental processes, but much more with down-to-earth social aims. Whereas Vischer’s aesthetics give ample explanation about why modernity should emerge in art [76], and why art should respond to its extra-artistic environment, he never thoroughly explores how modernity can emerge in art. He takes it for granted that it does. In order to understand this, we need to return to Vischer’s interpretation of the artistic material, as addressed in Chapter Three [65]. Hegel mainly regarded the material of art as ‘raw’, unprocessed ‘building blocks’, that could be found in nature: stone for a sculpture, paint for a painting, etc. Vischer, by contrast, focuses primarily on the material that had been preformed by human hands at a certain point in time: artistic techniques, fashions or cultural movements. This kind of material has been touched by the Spirit in that it is a product of the human mind; it is therefore necessarily historicized. Thus, up-to-date art reflects the most recent achievements in an artistic respect, but it also expresses the age-old roots of the tradition that produced these achievements.15 For Vischer, present-day art becomes a historical point of focus, in which its entire previous development has been accumulated. It is the historically determined material of art that transmits this development because the features of a work of art, the technique that has been used (e.g. a sonata form), the object it tries to express (e.g. a landscape), a fashionable genre (e.g. opera seria, still life) all reflect the time in which it emerged. Similarly, style is a direct product of both the material as a collection of historicized ‘building blocks’ and imagination (Figure 6 [65]). By way of the material, the Idea emerges almost without mediation into a style. Vischer is very explicit about this, and not only before 1848. In his music volume of 1857 he states: Stil […], von Volk an Volk mitgeteilt […] erhält die allgemeinere Bedeutung, als Ausdruck des Geistes einer ganzen Völkergruppe, ja aller gebildeten Völker auf einer bestimmten geschichtlichen Stufe der Weltanschauung zu erscheinen; d.h. die verschiedenen Gestaltungen des Ideals verkörpern sich in stehenden technischen Formen und die Geschichte des Ideals heißt nunmehr Geschichte der Stile.(VISCHER 1923, § 530: 154-155)lvi Heinrich Heine, Vischer argues, is an artist with style because he is able to express his own blasé time in his art (VISCHER 1923, § 529: 154), thus implying that in order to express one’s time one needs to use the features of this time. His art is beautiful, not because it is pretty in the sense of sensory enjoyment, but because it is conscious of its own time as a historical 15 Carl DAHLHAUS (1973a, 182) observes a similar connection of actuality and antiquity in the nineteenth-century interpretation of the concept of originality, which lingers in the background of Vischer’s interpretation of the artistic material as a transmitter of the features of a period in time. Dahlhaus describes originality as an obsession with the moment of the emergence of the work of art, when it is still untouched by the course of history, hence unspoilt, ‘true’ and authentic. Whether this moment of emergence is situated in the distant past or in the most current present does not matter for originality as a concept. Chapter Four – The end of art 83 cumulation of earlier artistic achievements. This consciousness is so important, because a next stage in history can never be reached if the present stage is not left behind, and in order to leave behind a stage of history one needs to be able to identify it as a demarcated period. If art were ever to regain its position as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit, there should be a conscious choice of the most up-to-date material for the most up-to-date work of art that reflected the Spirit of its time (Zeitgeist). This became a matter of social responsibility for Vischer, as refraining from it would hamper mankind as a whole to move on. Vischer’s interpretation of art as the anticipation of a future enhancement of consciousness had adequately qualified Hegel’s ‘end of art’ statement. Thus, the function of music as the herald of art’s dissolution into philosophy needed to be revised as well. Vischer, and Köstlin too, were still inclined to connect music (the abstract and complex art) with the present (the abstract and complex era). The metaphor of femininity was once again extremely suited emphasizing the similarities between music and modernity. Köstlin observes the ‘Mangel an durchgreifender Kraft, an einfacher Männlichkeit […], an Natur’ of modern times (VISCHER 1923, § 832: 454).lvii It comes close to Vischer’s characterization of music mentioned earlier as an art that suits the woman ‘und den weichen innigen Mann’ (VISCHER 1844c, 382). Did music not, like modernity itself, lack a determinate content, while still appealing to the intellect for appreciation and understanding? Was music not, like the present, corrupted by an all-consuming abstraction and complexity, entering the human soul at such deep levels that nothing conclusive or objective could be said about it? Music, in fact, carried modernity in its essence: Die Modernität ist an sich nicht zu verwerfen, sie ist eine Form der Musik, welche deren Entwicklungsgang mit sich bringt […], sie hat ihre Berechtigung in der stoffbeherrschenden, selbstbewusst auftretenden Freiheit des musikalischen Gedankens, Ausdrucks, und Effekts; aber dass hier die Gefahr des Effektmachens, den Brillianten, des Inhaltslosen usw. nahe liegt, und dass diese Modernität nur ein Durchgangspunkt ist, dass sie eine Sättigung mit konkreterem Gefühlsinhalt fordert, ist klar. (VISCHER 1923, § 831: 452)lviii Sensationalism (Effektmachen) and lack of content (Inhaltslosigkeit) are becoming dangerously dominant in contemporary music because both music and modernity are susceptible to it. However, Köstlin suggests more in this quotation than merely deterioration. He also states that modernity finds nothing less than its justification (Berechtigung) in the self-conscious (selbstbewußt) emergence of the freedom of musical thought, expression and effect. Moreover, this emergence is stoffbeherrschend: in command of the matter (Stoff), i.e. the material. The circle is closed: modernity emerges in music by means of its material, music thus has the dubious honour of being the modern art par excellence, embodying modernity’s powers and weaknesses. Modernity’s lack of content 84 Music and modernity is, in Köstlin’s post-1848 aesthetics, a temporary stage (Durchgangspunkt) reaching out for tangible substance in the form of emotional content (Gefühlsinhalt), in the same way as music’s lack of objectivity is only a temporary stage in Vischer’s pre-1848 aesthetics: ‘Diese Form [die des Sichtbaren, der Verkörperung] […] hat die Musik hinter sich gelassen und die Wiederherstellung deselben in einer höheren Weise noch nicht gefunden.’ (VISCHER 1844c, 381)lix Music is no longer objective with regard to its outer manifestation, and not yet objective with regard to its inner specificity. 16 Music’s lack of objectivity, as described in Chapter Three [50], thus gains a developmental dimension. Its search for particularity is a historical search for renewed artistic creativity, which can potentially be found in future stages of history, when reality will once again be reconciled with the Idea through Beauty. For the moment, however, both music and modernity (‘die mit Stoff und Form absolut frei waltende Subjektivität’ - VISCHER 1923, § 830: 451) lack true artisticity because modernity robs music from its well-defined forms, and hence from its ability to imagine a determinate content. Thus, music loses its character as a self-determinate art: Die Modernität bekennt, dass sie inhaltslos war und Inhalt suchen muss, und sie schwingt sich zugleich nun erst zur ganzen Absolutheit empor, sie beseitigt die Formen, durch welche die Musik selbständige Kunst wird, sie nimmt der Musik ihre durch diese Formen bedingte Ausbreitung zu eigener Gestaltung und damit ihr Phantasieelement. (VISCHER 1923, § 832: 455)lx Like a parasite, modernity sucks out music’s lifeblood in order to use it for its own formation (Gestaltung). Music is an easy prey, as abandonment of its forms and content is imminent in its very nature. This nature also means that music is the art that is most conscious of its own time, which both Vischer and Köstlin claim in mitigation for music. Music’s subjectivity of expression is compensated by the objectivity that it is given by its congruence with the features of the time in which it emerged. Vischer states in the introductory paragraphs of his music volume: Die Musik […] als Kunst des objektlosen Gefühls wäre gerade die rechte Form, das Gemüt zu dem unsichtbaren Geiste des Ganzen zu erheben und den Verlust der bildenden Phantasie durch die tiefen Bewegungen der empfindenden zu ersetzen. (VISCHER 1923, § 750: 24)lxi By replacing Hegel’s concept of formative imagination (bildende Phantasie) with his own concept of sentient imagination (empfindende Phantasie) (Chapter Three [58]), Vischer grants music the importance which he feels it deserves in modern times. It carries the present’s problematic features (in the form of ‘tiefe Bewegungen der empfindende 16 This is also observed by Bernd SPONHEUER 1987, 115. Chapter Four – The end of art 85 Phantasie’) in its material.lxii Therefore, just like Heine’s poetry, music is a beautiful art, as it is conscious of its time and of itself. Thus, it is an important factor in ‘the’ present becoming conscious of its own identity, which is necessary for mankind to move on to a next stage of history. Music seems to fulfil the function of providing the necessary dialectical countermovement in Beauty’s development from an unquestioned sensory manifestation of the Spirit towards its sublated future appearance as a harmonizing and ‘transfiguring mirror of life’.17 With Vischer’s description of ‘the’ present as a self-regulating entity that develops according to self-governing dynamics, it might be possible to summarize Vischer’s interpretation of music as the self-conscious ‘soul’ of the present – it may be problematic, abstract, complex, overly free, corruptive, licentious or possibly even diabolical, but it is precisely this that makes it the only true ‘self’ of the present. It was a most ambivalent honour. For Hegel, this was how music led art to dissolve into philosophy [72-73]. However, in the context of Vischer’s aesthetics, there is room for hope, even after 1848. Maybe art, and notably music, had not obliterated the material world. Maybe music had just temporarily hidden it in order to find it again: Die Kunst wird daher das Sichtbare der Körperwelt nun verlassen dürfen, um es wieder zu suchen, sie wird es nicht getilgt sondern in Wahrheit nur verborgen haben […]. Jede Kunst zeigt durch ihre Mangel hinüber auf die anderen, keine so fühlbar, so schwebend wie die Musik. (VISCHER 1923, § 746: 3-4)lxiii Carl Dahlhaus observes that so-called ‘Hegelian’ music critics only partly relied on Hegel, since what Hegel situated in ancient art (the harmony between a spiritual content and its artistic manifestation) was positioned in modern music by the ‘Hegelian’ music critics, as they considered modern music to be the most musically characteristic (DAHLHAUS 1983, 346). I would like to formulate Dahlhaus’s observation more forcefully: ‘Hegelian’ music critics were (sometimes desperately) seeking this harmony between content and form in modern music because it was felt necessary to legitimize music as a proper fine art in the context of Hegelian philosophy. Music needed to have a function in the further development of mankind. Statements from Vischer such as the above opened up the possibility of interpreting music as the most suitable art form to safeguard the continuity of art as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit. Vischer himself was not particularly inclined to come to this conclusion. However, I intend to show that contemporary music critics did explicitly use this argument in order to demonstrate that music was at least as crucial in the development of art as its sister art forms. It is striking that they sometimes referred to Vischer as the aesthetician who introduced music’s emancipatory dimension as the herald of contemporary art, skilfully highlighting those aspects of his aesthetics that could be 17 ‘Das Schöne ist das in sich gespiegelte, im Spiegel verklärte Leben.’ (VISCHER 1866, 106) The italics are Vischer’s. 86 Music and modernity interpreted as such. With music still firmly linked to modernity, modernity’s emancipation eventually led to music’s emancipation as well. Hence, without intending to do so, Vischer’s aesthetics became an impetus for the manifestation of music as an independent, fully-fledged art form. Part III Case studies Chapter Five Musical forms as ‘spiritualized material’: repositioning Eduard Hanslick Formalism and an ‘aesthetics of content’ In 1854, Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904) made an attempt at formulating a theory of musical Beauty, resulting in his treatise Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: ein Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik der Tonkunst (VMS). In the context of the idealist prejudices against music and against contemporary art, this was a brave enterprise. Positioning Hanslick’s musical aesthetics is not straightforward, as his own terminology, mainstream aesthetic viewpoints, and personal tirades are often found to be inconsistent or even blatantly contradictory. Still, present-day scholarship agrees that his attempt should be considered emancipatory and revolutionary for the development of music criticism as well as for the position of music among the other arts. Hanslick cleverly exploited the widely acknowledged fact that it is impossible to reduce musical content and musical meaning to clear-cut epistemological concepts, and he also stressed the growing awareness that it was impossible to find universal definitions for all the arts. Thus, he interpreted musical Beauty in purely musical terms. There is a considerable amount of musicological literature about Hanslick, dealing with his interpretation of musical Beauty, the emancipatory function of his treatise, and his indebtedness to mainstream aesthetic movements.18 Recent research has also revealed that Hanslick was well aware of the contemporary aesthetic and journalistic views that surrounded him.19 Hanslick’s alleged adherence to aesthetic formalism, represented by his 18 Dietmar Strauß provides an excellent survey of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature about Hanslick’s aesthetics (STRAUSS 1990, 20-65), critically interpreting it and placing it in its historical and ideological context. 19 Geoffrey Payzant has discovered how Hanslick basically plagiarized a colleague in Prague, the prematurely deceased music critic Bernhard Gutt (1812-1849), in reviewing the music of Hector Berlioz. Hanslick’s views on Berlioz changed dramatically in 1846 and 1847, and Hanslick ‘heavily leaned’ on Gutt’s critical legacy to express 90 Case studies close friend and colleague Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898), is regularly highlighted in this research. It is tempting to explain Hanslick’s emancipatory focus on musical Beauty as a formalist stance, all the more since Hanslick regularly seems to express himself in formalist terms. In some musicological literature (FUBINI 1991, 349; BECKERMAN 1983, 388; PAYZANT 1991, 21n) it is assumed that, after a thorough engagement with Hegel in his younger years, Hanslick abandoned idealist thought altogether. However, closer observation of his VMS reveals that such an assumption is difficult to sustain. Hanslick occupied a peculiar position between formalism and Hegelian idealism, two discourses that were, to a large extent, mutually dependent on each other and existed thanks to a continuous and fruitful exchange of arguments. This may have been observed before, but has never been thoroughly investigated.20 Hanslick’s thought is permeated with idealist views, but these views do not fit in with the modest aesthetic position Hegel had attributed to music. For placing Hanslick’s theory of musical Beauty in its contemporary aesthetic context, post-1848 idealist responses to Hegel’s thought, such as those by Vischer, need to be investigated in more detail. Like many German-speaking intellectuals, Hanslick regarded Vischer as the most important aesthetician of his time (see Appendix VI [213]: Hanslick). After its publication, he sent his VMS to Vischer in order to bring it to his attention and to ask his opinion of it.21 The unpublished letter (Tü UB Md 787-360), transcribed and translated in Appendix IVc [192], surpasses the usual nineteenth-century politeness with regard to manners of address. Hanslick simply adores Vischer. In the 1850s, Hanslick made conscious attempts at getting personally acquainted with Vischer, which Vischer greatly appreciated. More than once, Hanslick attended Vischer’s lectures in Zurich, and he faithfully documented his warm encounters with Vischer in an essay called ‘Begegnungen mit Friedrich Theodor Vischer’ (HANSLICK 1890). His accounts are at times euphoric: ‘da bewegte mich die Sehnsucht nach den Berner Alpen und dem Vierwaldstädter-See kaum stärker, als der Wunsch, meinen innigst verehrten Vischer in Zürich kennen zu lernen’ (HANSLICK 1890, 281).lxiv Hanslick’s and Vischer’s friendly personal relationship led to persistent misunderstandings about the co-authorship of Vischer’s 1857 musical aesthetics. After reading Hanslick’s VMS, Vischer seriously considered Hanslick as a possible co-author: ‘Lebten Sie in meiner Nähe – denn das ist für eine solche Verbindung nöthig – so hätte mir Ihre Schrift den Gedanken eingegeben, mich zu diesem Zweck an Sie zu wenden’ (Vischer’s letter to Hanslick 11 November 1854, as quoted in HANSLICK 1890, 284).lxv Vischer must have mentioned this intention to Wagner at one of their memorable encounters (see Chapter Two [36]), since Wagner continued to believe that Hanslick was Vischer’s co-author, insisting that Vischer himself had told him so. Wagner, always his changed allegiance (PAYZANT 1991, 110-113). 20 Carl DAHLHAUS (1967, 76 & 80), Bernd SPONHEUER (1987, 89) and Dietmar STRAUSS (1990, 96) note Hanslick’s orientation towards idealist thought patterns and his ambivalent relationship with aesthetic formalism. 21 Hanslick was not alone in doing this. Many intellectuals sent their work to Vischer in order to fish for compliments; Hebbel would send Vischer his Nibelungen drama (see Chapter Two [39]), and Mathilde Wesendonck would send him her poem Genofeva (Tü UB Md 787-1165). Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 91 portraying Hanslick as a Jew, took this opportunity to air his anti-Semitic views in a particularly foul way: So saß denn die musikalische Judenschönheit mitten im Herzen eines vollblutig germanischen System’s der Ästhetik […]; die eigenthümlichsten und schwierigsten Fragen der Ästhetik der Musik, über welche die größten Philosophen […] sich stets nur noch mit muthmaßender Unsicherheit geäußert hatten, wurden von Juden und übertölpelten Christen jetzt mit einer Sicherheit zur Hand genommen, daß Demjenigen, der sich hierbei wirklich Etwas denken […] wollte, etwa so zu Muthe werden mußte, als hörte er der Verschacherung der Gewänder des Heilandes am Fuße des Kreuzes zu. (WAGNER 1888, 251-252. See Appendix VI [213]: Wagner for the full quotation)lxvi Wagner’s repeated referral to Hanslick as Vischer’s co-author (see Appendix VI: Wagner) did affect the general consensus on the authorship of Vischer’s musical aesthetics.22 Why Vischer eventually decided against asking Hanslick to be his co-author remains a matter for speculation. Considering the sparse communication between Vischer (in Zurich) and Karl Köstlin (more than a hundred miles over the border, in Tübingen), Vischer’s excuse for not asking Hanslick does not seem very convincing. Vischer must have been aware of the fame and importance of Hanslick’s treatise,23 but he must also have noted the aesthetic differences between him and Hanslick.24 From his student days onwards, Hanslick had been close friends with the prominent formalist Robert Zimmermann. Zimmermann’s aim was to turn aesthetic thought into an empirical science, considering all statements about anything other than a work of art’s form (and especially those about possible ideas or contents beyond its outer appearance) as unscholarly speculation. Zimmermann leaned to some extent on the formalist ideas of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), focusing on the observation of the work of art as a starting point for its investigation. However, whereas Herbart’s thought had been firmly rooted in Kantian interpretations of human perception,25 Zimmermann was much more of a 22 In his Richard Wagner in Zürich, Hans Bélart around 1900 still assumed that Hanslick was Vischer’s co-author (as quoted in RECK 1998, 377). 23 Appendix Vb [210] reveals how many late-nineteenth-century treatises on musical aesthetics bear Hanslick’s title, representing the wide range of reactions in support of as well as against his treatise. 24 Dahlhaus argues (1967, 76ff) that Vischer wrote the introductory paragraphs to his music volume consciously attempting to connect particularized musical form with unobjectified feeling (Chapter Three [58-61] in response to Hanslick’s rejection of emotions as the content of music, published three years earlier in his VMS. 25 Michael Podro, in one of the very few English-language studies of German aesthetic theories of the nineteenth century, addresses Herbart extensively (PODRO 1972, 63-72). Herbart developed an aesthetics on the basis of psychological perception of artistic objects, which he described as ‘presentations’. Apart from this, he also intended to explain outer objects as determining inner states of mind and vice versa; he deliberately connected concrete levels of perception with metaphysical speculation, and he felt the urge to describe new experiences as fitting into a unified inner mindset. These premises of his thought account for the fact that he stood in an idealist tradition. Characterizations of Herbart’s thought as being anti-idealist, such as by Michael BECKERMAN (1983, 389), thus miss the point entirely. 92 Case studies ‘materialist’ in his formalism, at times blatantly denying that such a thing as the Idea could exist (ZIMMERMANN 1858, 667). At other times, he admitted that the Idea may well exist, but that it was still impossible to comment on it in a scholarly manner (ZIMMERMANN 1870a, 251ff). He reached the conclusion that the Beauty of a work of art did not reside in an indefinable content or Idea, but in its outer features, the manifold relationships of structures, colours or tones. Beauty should be watched, listened to, sensed, i.e. observed, and it could only be observed in tangible outer features. Aesthetic investigation of the Idea or contents beyond these features was therefore, in Zimmermann’s eyes, not only speculative, but also superfluous for reaching a definition of Beauty. Zimmermann’s simple dismissal of the Idea was unacceptable to idealists such as Vischer. He felt it his duty to refute Zimmermann’s formalism, which he considered empty in its reduction of the very concept of Beauty to a collection of banal mathematical principles. According to Vischer, this epitomized what he observed in modern times: a country of poets and scholars was gradually turning into a country of managers and engineers (BERGER-FIX 1987, 109). The materialism of the modern state turned out to be permanent after the failed democratic upheavals of 1848, and the only way to fight it was to employ artistic animation and inspiration, in other words: Beauty. Thus, Zimmermann’s formalist claim on Beauty needed to be fought vigorously. This vigour made Vischer one of Zimmermann’s most prominent opponents. When Zimmermann published his formalist review of Hanslick’s VMS in the Österreichische Blätter für Literatur und Kunst in 1854 (ZIMMERMANN 1870a), a polemic developed between Vischer and Zimmermann that would exert its influence up to Vischer’s latest writings in the 1880s. He regularly took it personally as defending the concept of Beauty against Zimmermann’s materialism was nothing less for him than defending everything he stood for: his world view, his way of life and his entire aesthetic oeuvre. On 30 July 1858 Vischer writes to his friend David Friedrich Strauß: ‘Robert Zimmermann in der “Geschichte der Ästhetik” packt mich als Substantialisten, und ich werde wohl den Anlaß benützen, den Punkt noch einmal genauer zu nehmen. Er ist verteufelt schwer und doch das ABC der Ästhetik.’ (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952, 148)lxvii In the same year, 1858, Zimmermann had published his Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophischer Wissenschaft, a conscious attempt at qualifying the discourse of idealist thinking, and provoking Vischer in particular. Zimmermann directly challenged Vischer, inviting him to explain what this deeper meaning or content or Idea of a work of art would be, if he was so certain that it was there and something scholarly could be said about it. Vischer clearly struggled with this: ‘dreimal, da ich anfangen wollte, […] bin ich ins Stocken gekommen, habe Robert Zimmermann […] wieder vorgenommen und mich in Knäuel verwirrt, die mich nicht vorwärts gelangen ließen.’ (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952, 287)lxviii he complained to Strauß in 1871. From a musical point of view, Zimmermann’s undermining of the Idea was nothing less than emancipatory. It offered leads for music to free itself from its problematic Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 93 aesthetic position in the context of idealist philosophy. Zimmermann stated simply that epistemological and representational capacities were entirely irrelevant in the expression of Beauty. Hanslick’s flirtation with the formalist discourse, which – especially in his hometown Vienna – came to be considered as an ever more valuable aesthetic alternative to the restrictive idealist views, is not surprising. Hanslick dedicated six of his ten editions of VMS to Zimmermann, thus not only stressing their friendship, but also his affiliation with the aesthetic formalism Zimmermann propagated. Hanslick’s identification with Zimmermann’s thought is further supported by the changes he made in the various editions of his famous treatise, many of them at Zimmermann’s instigation. References to idealist philosophers, and formulations that could be interpreted as idealist jargon were increasingly omitted in the later editions of VMS.26 Together with Hanslick’s occasional verbal attacks on the ‘verrottete Gefühlsästhetik’, and his focus on ‘tönend bewegte Formen’ (HANSLICK 1990, 75)lxix as the sole content of music it is easy to assume that he considered himself to be a formalist.27 However, closer examination of Hanslick’s aesthetics reveals that there is an interesting ambivalence in his writings, and notably in his VMS. On the one hand, he openly attacks an ‘aesthetics of feeling’ as a short-sighted attempt to attribute extra-musical meaning to music. On the other hand, however, in trying to find an alternative for this ‘aesthetics of feeling’, he still feels obliged to specify what this ‘purely musical’ meaning or content might be. Like many of his musical contemporaries, he feels the duty to legitimize music as an art that could be compared with its sister arts by determining what it is ‘about’. This urge is nagging at the back of his mind and he never really escapes from it, not even in his last writings. The ambivalence in his argument results in a rhetoric that constantly insists on describing music in purely musical terms, but between the lines there are passionate attempts to describe music in terms of spiritual (geistige) processes in order to conceptualize these purely musical terms, as if he were a true idealist. In formulating an ‘aesthetics of the musically specific’, Hanslick used aesthetic tools derived from Vischer. For establishing Hanslick’s position with regard to formalism, it is necessary to examine more closely what he meant by ‘form’. He was not always consistent in his use of terminology. At times he used the word in quite an abstract general sense, as for instance in his retrospective on his life and work Aus meinem Leben from 1894: Wie ist in der Musik beseelte Form von leerer Form wissenschaftlich zu unterscheiden? Ich hatte die erstere im Auge, meine Gegner warfen mir die letztere 26 Dietmar Strauß, in his 1990 publication, documents these changes very carefully and also rightly interprets them as initiatives of Zimmermann rather than Hanslick himself. Thus, Strauß argues, the eradications of idealist references in VMS do not necessarily mean that Hanslick turned away from idealist thought, because Hanslick kept adhering to idealist viewpoints in other late writings (STRAUSS 1990, 96). 27 ‘Tönend bewegte Formen sind einzig und allein Inhalt und Gegenstand der Musik’ [Sounding forms of motion are solely and exclusively content and object of music], from 1865 (3rd edition) made slightly less emphatic: ‘Der Inhalt der Musik sind tönend bewegte Formen’ (HANSLICK 1990, 75) [The content of music are sounding forms of motion]. 94 Case studies vor. Vischer selbst, in seiner ‘Selbstkritik’ [VISCHER 1873] bekennt die außerordentliche Schwierigkeit, mit den Begriffen ‘Form’ und ‘Inhalt’, deren Harmonie ja das Schöne begründet, aufs reine zu kommen, in der Ästhetik überhaupt, ganz besonders aber in der Musik. ‘Die Form ist nichts anderes, als die Form des Inhalts, das Äußere des Innern; man kann sie nicht trennen, denn man hat schon dieses in jener, diesen in jener, man muß sie mitwägen; es sind nicht zwei Werte, sondern es ist nur ein Wert.’ (HANSLICK 1894, 244)lxx Hanslick describes form, in true idealist tradition, as the outer appearance of inner essence, and considers the unity of form and content as a precondition for the emergence of Beauty. Beauty has to be observed in form, but since form is inseparable from content, Beauty resides in content. He quotes Vischer in order to support his stance. The quotation is striking but certainly not unique. In VMS, he refers regularly to Vischer (see Appendix VI [213]: Hanslick), often in order to stress that a musical piece should express an ‘einheitliche Durchführung des Grundgedankens’ or a ‘klar erfaßte Idee’ (HANSLICK 1990, 109).lxxi Although Zimmermann succeeded in persuading Hanslick to remove some of the references to Vischer, the above quotation reveals that Hanslick kept expressing his adherence to Vischer up to his latest writings. Hanslick had engaged himself intensively with Hegel in his younger years, but his faith in the logic and reasonability of history (in Hegel’s Vernunftteleologie [Chapter One – 20]) received a fatal blow in 1848. He turned away from the grandiloquent intentions of German idealism, only to regain his interest when he lived in the remote town of Klagenfurt between 1850 and 1852. Here, he read the first volumes of Vischer’s treatise on aesthetics, and was taken by it to such an extent that he asked his father to send him the recently published third volume (1851), so that he could read more of Vischer’s encompassing work. What was it that appealed to him in those first three volumes of Vischer’s aesthetics that motivated him to develop an extremely friendly and long-lasting professional as well as personal relationship with Vischer, despite his outspoken decision to distance himself from Hegel’s pretentious systematic philosophy, and despite Vischer’s intemperate dispute with Hanslick’s friend Zimmermann? The material of music In the third volume of his treatise on aesthetics (1851), Vischer had used his most powerful ‘trump card’ against Zimmermann, his ultimate argument that the Idea resides in everything: it was his interpretation of the material of art as the primary determinant of a work of art. This served the particular purpose of showing how inner meaning could emerge in outer appearance. Thus, Vischer could agree with Zimmermann that Beauty could be observed in outer features only, without giving up his point that these outer features had been determined by the Idea as much as a work of art’s inner aspects. As discussed in Chapter Three [65], Vischer’s interpretation of the material differed from Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 95 Hegel’s on fundamental points, which helped Vischer questioning Zimmermann’s formalism. Hegel had implied that the features of a certain period in time could be observed in the use of certain artistic material; Vischer took this view one step further. He implied that the material of art was actively expressing its time, describing the material not only as stone for a sculpture or paint for a painting but also as artistic techniques, fashions or cultural movements. These sensory (sinnliche) means which were available to an artist in his creation of a work of art had been subject to earlier expressions of an artist’s imagination, which originated from a certain period of history: a poet’s choice of a villanelle or a sonnet, a composer’s decision to use the fugue or a sonata form, a painter’s use of perspective in his painting indicated the current stage in the development of mankind, and Vischer did not consider this development to be a metaphysical process that surpassed human capability, but rather a process in which artists, by means of their above-described use of the available material, could actively interfere (VISCHER 1923, § 518: 113). Whereas paint and stone (the Hegelian material) were to be found in nature, being universal and essentially unchangeable, a sonnet or a fugue (the Vischerian material) had been preformed by the human spirit, being particular and historicized. As established in Chapter Four [82-83], Vischer’s concept of Beauty depends on this historicized Weltanschauung. An artist has style (i.e. produces beautiful art) when he is able to express his own time in all its aspects (VISCHER 1923, § 529: 154). In order to do so, he needs to access the historically available material which can only be done by means of his imagination (Phantasie). This is the way in which Vischer tries to refute Zimmermann’s insistence on pure mathematical proportions engendering Beauty. Even those mathematical proportions, Vischer argues, are a product of their time, they express their time in being what they are, and therefore carry extra-artistic meaning. If they did not carry this meaning, they would constitute ‘untrue works of art’.28 This early textbook example of modernist criticism will be further explored in Chapter Seven [121]; it is important to mention here that the triangular relationship between material, imagination and style (Figure 6 [65]) is a crucial part of Vischer’s aesthetics as it shows how inner meaning appears in outer features. Vischer’s peculiar interpretation of the material made it easier for music critics to explain how inner meaning and outer features related in music. In Hanslick’s first edition of VMS, dating from 1854, his enthusiasm for Vischer’s interpretation of the material is obvious. Like Vischer, Hanslick focuses on the triangular relationship between material, imagination and style, quoting Vischer literally when he discusses it. In his search for an alternative to feelings as providers for musical meaning, 28 Vischer sketches what happens if outer form is severed from inner content: ‘die Formenwelt, die sich vor uns entfaltet, ist entweder bedeutungslos […] oder sie stiehlt sich unter der Hand eine zwar hinreichende und würdige Bedeutung, welche aber von der angeblichen Idee, dem buchstablichen Ausgangspunkte sich ganz unorganisch lossagt. Dann entstehen unwahre Kunstwerke. Von grösster Wichtigkeit ist diess für das richtige Urtheil in der Kunstgeschichte.’ (VISCHER 1858, 16-17 – my italics) [The world of forms that unfolds before our eyes is either meaningless or it stealthily appropriates an adequate and worthy meaning. This meaning, however, disconnects inorganically from the alleged Idea, which is the literal starting point, and causes untrue works of art to emerge. For a proper judgement in the history of art this observation is of the utmost importance.] 96 Case studies Hanslick quotes Vischer in order to lay down his view that not feeling but imagination (Phantasie) is ‘das Organ, womit das Schöne aufgenommen wird’ and he quotes Vischer further, specifying this perception as ‘Thätigkeit des reinen Schauens (Vischer’s Aesth. § 384)’lxxii (HANSLICK 1990, 28).29 The imagination of an artist in a certain time or place individualizes the historically available material by perceiving and forming it into a particular work of art or style. As discussed in Chapter Three [65], imagination must have the material in order to become activated; both are necessary preconditions for the emergence of a work of art. The role of imagination becomes even more closely intertwined with the material if earlier products of artists’ imagination are considered as material too (e.g. a sonnet or a fugue), which is the case in Vischer’s aesthetics. Hanslick felt attracted to the close intertwining of material and imagination, because it enabled him to explain the outer features of a musical work as meaningful and spiritually substantial (geistig) outcomes of music’s own development. Hanslick’s description of style, which again leans heavily on Vischer’s definition of it, is rooted in the close relationship between material and imagination. Hanslick describes style as the capability to develop a manner of artistic creation, be it national, historical or individual, that adapts to the available artistic material: ‘Wir möchten den Styl in der Tonkunst von seite seiner musikalischen Bestimmtheiten aufgefaßt wissen, als die vollendete Technik, wie sie im Ausdruck des schöpferischen Gedankens als Gewöhnung erscheint.’ (HANSLICK 1990, 108)lxxiii Vischer’s definition of style from 1851 must have been present somewhere in Hanslick’s mind: ‘die jeder Kunst zukommende Behandlungsweise des Materials als eine durch ihre notwendigen Bedingungen festgestellte gewohnheitsmäßige Übung’ (VISCHER 1923, § 532: 163).lxxiv Following Vischer, Hanslick described style as a series of adaptations to the material, from which a certain pattern, a habit, can be observed that should be consistent with the ‘objectiv musikalische[n] Bestimmungen’ (HANSLICK 1990, 109).lxxv The development of this manner does not primarily depend on technical skill, but rather on the artist’s imagination. As a creative process of empathizing with the Spirit, imagination is indispensable in the transformation of raw material into specific, marked styles. From the comparison of Vischer’s and Hanslick’s definitions of style, it appears that Hanslick was not always consistent in the use of terminology for what Vischer called the ‘material’. Hanslick regularly talks about ‘musikalische Bestimmtheiten’ (musical particularities) or ‘musikalische Elementen’ (musical elements), sometimes about ‘material’, and quite often about ‘forms’ as well, as in the following quotation: Es gibt keine Kunst, welche so bald und so viele Formen verbraucht, wie die Musik. Modulationen, Cadenzen, Intervalfortschreitungen. [sic!] Harmonienfolgen nützen 29 Dietmar Strauß has pointed out that the reference to Vischer was removed from the fourth edition of VMS (1874) onwards, probably on the instigation of Zimmermann. However, Hanslick did not touch the text itself; it remained as it was (STRAUSS 1990, 96). For bibliographical details concerning other places in which idealist references were removed, see STRAUSS 1990, 88-114. Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 97 sich in 50, ja 30 Jahren dergestalt ab, dass der geistvolle Componist sich deren nicht mehr bedienen kann und fortwährend zur Erfindung neuer, rein musikalischer Züge gedrängt wird. Man kann von einer Menge Compositionen, die hoch über den [sic!] Alltagsstand ihrer Zeit stehen, ohne Unrichtichkeit sagen, dass sie einmal schön waren. Die Phantasie des geistreichen Künstlers wird nun aus den geheimursprünglichen Beziehungen der musikalischen Elemente und ihrer unzählbar möglichen Combinationen die feinsten, verborgensten entdecken, sie wird Tonformen bilden, die aus freister Willkür erfunden und doch zugleich durch ein unsichtbar feines Band mit der Nothwendigkeit verknüpft erscheinen. Solche Werke oder Einzelnheiten derselben werden wir ohne Bedenken ‘geistreich’ nennen. (HANSLICK 1990, 86-87)lxxvi Apart from using the word ‘form’ in an abstract sense, as related to ‘content’, Hanslick uses it here for the material in the Vischerian sense. Forms are not the pure relationships between colours, tones or outer structures, as meant by Zimmermann, but instead spiritual particularities (geistreiche Einzelnheiten) that have been discovered by the imagination of the intelligent and spiritual artist (geistreicher Künstler). They are connected with the necessity of history (mit der Nothwendigkeit verknüpft), 30 because they can only be used in specific eras. After fifty or even thirty years they have become obsolete; they are no longer geistreich: in accordance with the Spirit of the time in which they find themselves. Hanslick explicitly mentions that (musical) Beauty depends on the work of art being geistreich in that he argues that even some works of art that surpassed the average endeavours of their time were beautiful then, but not now: the Spirit does no longer inhabit them. Whereas Beauty was an objective, universal concept in Hegel’s aesthetics, Hanslick’s idealist stance depends on a concept of Beauty that exists in the context of its time, it is therefore subjective, changeable, and (notably) transitory. Vischer was the one who incorporated this Vormärz interpretation of Beauty into an idealist systematic philosophy. Hanslick directly supports his interpretation of Beauty with Vischer’s interpretation of the material, thus relying on contemporary idealist thought patterns that qualified Hegel’s speculative and transcendental aesthetic theory, but at the same time refused to deal solely with the outer features of art. Thus, Hanslick always looked at the time of the emergence of a work of art to judge it. He dismissed, for instance, Mozart’s La Clemenza di Tito on the basis that it adhered to the conventions of the opera seria which were, in his eyes, obsolete by 1791 (HANSLICK 1994a, 81). He required that a musical work engage the most up-to-date practices of the time in which it appeared. What distinguishes Hanslick from earlier art critics talking about the importance of the material is, as Dietmar Strauß observes, the possibility that the material can develop in a historical respect.31 Paint, stone or tones are universal entities, the sonnet, 30 31 See Chapter Seven [121] for the implications of the use of ‘the’ necessity without further explanation. ‘Für aktuelle Aufführungen älterer Musik setzt er [Hanslick] zumindest voraus, daß sie zur Zeit der Enstehung modern, auf dem Stand des Materials gewesen sei. Diese meist auf Adorno zurückgeführte Auffassung über das Material der Musik findet sich in Hanslicks VMS und seinen Kritiken mehrfach. Den Terminus übernimmt er von 98 Case studies the sonata form or still lives are important and actual in one time, but irrelevant and obsolete in another. The development of the artistic material was, however, by no means always a deterioration in a historical sense, as Hanslick shows by comparing the use of material by Mozart and Spohr: Dass bei Spohr vieles mozartisch klingt, ist bekannt. Aber es gibt in Mozarts späteren Werken Stellen, von welchen man unwillkürlich sagt, sie klingen spohrisch. Meistens charakterisiert sie eine bei Mozart selten angewendete harmonische Chromatik […] Momente der Steigerung, welche wie ein Vorausklang der romantischen Schule klingen. (HANSLICK 1982, 274n)lxxvii The artistic material as Hanslick sees it: ‘rarely used harmonic chromaticism’ (selten angewendete harmonische Chromatik), or ‘moments of heightening’ (Momente der Steigerung) gives an indication of how far an art form has developed technically, expressively and intellectually. Not only can a work of art become artistically uninteresting due to the frequent use of its material, it can also prefigure future developments (Vorausklang), thus surpassing the Beauty of its own time. Leaning on Vischer’s Materialbegriff, Hanslick reaches the conclusion that the originality of a musical work is a precondition for its autonomous emergence. The legitimation of music In order to establish Hanslick’s aesthetic position, it is important to bear in mind what he intended to achieve with VMS. Hanslick felt the need to reveal that music did have a content, i.e. that it was as artistically valuable as its sister arts in being spiritually substantial, but that this content did not consist of feelings or emotions. When it came to determining what it could be instead, Zimmermann had little to offer to Hanslick, which may have occurred to Zimmermann himself, when he criticized Hanslick’s use of idealist terminology: Es thut nichts zur Sache, dass Hanslick den Act der Betrachtung des objectiv Schönen mit Vischer Anschauung, das Vermögen desselben Phantasie nennt, da er doch nichts als rein intellectuelle Auffassung dieser Verhältnisse von Seiten des Beschauers meint, durch welche das interesselose ästhetische Urtheil des Beifalls oder Missfallens herbeigeführt wird. Gefährlich bleibt aber die Benennung desshalb, weil unter Anschauung im Hegel’schen Sinn die Wahrnehmung des Unendlichen im Endlichen, Vischer und Hegel. Sein Materialbegriff ist zwar schon geschichtlich, aber nicht gesellschaftlich determiniert. So spricht er gelegentlich vom Verfall des Materials und der Formen.’ (STRAUSS 1994, 409-410) [For contemporary performances of earlier music Hanslick requires, at least, that the music at the time of its emergence was modern and in accordance with the status of the material. This interpretation of the material of music, often retraced to Adorno, appears more than once in Hanslick’s VMS and in his criticism. He derives the term from Vischer and Hegel. His interpretation of the material is already historically, but not socially, determined. For instance, he occasionally speaks of the decline of material and of forms.] Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 99 unter Phantasie das Vermögen dieser Wahrnehmung verstanden, damit also zugleich auf einen bestimmten und zwar den einzigen Inhalt des Schönen hingedeutet wird, was die wichtige Erkenntniss, dass das Schöne blosse Form sei, wieder aufhebt. (ZIMMERMANN 1870a, 241)lxxviii Zimmermann tries to tone down Hanslick’s reliance on Vischer but does not entirely succeed. As he observes himself, the concepts of Anschauung and Phantasie can be easily associated with specific content of Beauty (bestimmten Inhalt des Schönen), and that is exactly what Hanslick tries to reach. For him, Beauty is not mere form (blosse Form) as it is for Zimmermann. It is indeed the observation of the infinite in the finite (die Wahrnehmung des Unendlichen im Endlichen), but without a Hegelian focus on the infinite, and instead with a Vischerian focus on the finite, regarding the Spirit as something characteristic rather than metaphysical.32 Vischer’s interpretation of Beauty as appearing in historicized material and imagination (Figure 3 [22]) enabled Hanslick to explain music in terms of its own development. Music’s spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit) lay in the topicality and originality of its appearances in styles and works of art. Despite the fact that Vischer was not particularly inclined to regard music as an art that could compete with its sister arts as far as its Geistigkeit was concerned, Hanslick cleverly used Vischer’s interpretation of the artistic material to show that music possessed at least as great a spiritual capacity as the other arts: Das Componieren ist ein Arbeiten des Geistes in geistfähigem Material. […] [Die künstlerische Phantasie] baut nicht wie der Architekt auf rohem, schwerfälligem Gestein, sondern auf der Nachwirkung vorher verklungener Töne. Geistigerer, feinerer Natur als jede andere Kunststoff nehmen die Töne willig jedwede Idee des Künstlers in sich auf. Da nun die Tonverbindungen, in deren Verhältnissen das musikalisch Schöne ruht, nicht durch mechanisches Aneinanderreihen, sondern durch freies Schaffen der Phantasie gewonnen werden, so prägt sich die geistige Kraft und Eigenthümlichkeit dieser bestimmten Phantasie dem Erzeugniss als Charakter auf. (HANSLICK 1990, 79-80)lxxix Because Vischer had acknowledged that the material of art could be preformed by human hands and mind, the tone as relatively abstract and already partly processed material was not the ‘odd one out’ to such a great extent. Hanslick stresses in the above quotation that tones are more spiritual (geistigerer) and subtler (feinerer) than the material of the other arts. Moreover, musical material could express its time much better than the other arts, because music is the modern art par excellence. Hanslick finds that the musical material is better able to ‘absorb any of the artist’s ideas’ (die Töne [nehmen] willig jedwede Idee des 32 It might be worthwhile to remind the reader that one might conclude from Hanslick’s regular use of the word Geist as opposed to Gefühl, that he referred to the intellectual (Mind) rather than spiritual (Spirit) capacities of the concept. 100 Case studies Künstlers in sich auf), because it does not so much depend on natural material (rohes schwerfälliges Gestein) like architecture, but rather on the historically meaningful consequences of sounds previously realized (die Nachwirkung vorher verklungener Töne). Like Hegel and Vischer, Hanslick observes that music, of all the arts, stimulates the increasing Vergeistigung* of art (Figure 8 [73]) thanks to this spiritual sensitivity, but unlike Hegel, he evaluates this process very positively. Hanslick specified music’s role in the process of Vergeistigung by arguing that music lacks content (Inhalt) in order to prove that it does possess meaningful substance (Gehalt). Because music’s form (musical structures) requires (musical) intelligence to create as well as to perceive, the composer has to think rather than feel: ‘Daraus, daß der Tondichter gezwungen ist, in Tönen zu denken, folgt ja schon die Inhaltslosigkeit der Tonkunst, indem jeder begriffliche Inhalt in Worten müßte gedacht werden können’ (HANSLICK 1990, 169).lxxx Music lacks epistemological content (begriffliche Inhalt), which makes music an abstract, thought-out art, but it only lacks this content because it needs to be musically specific. This constitutes music’s meaningful substance (Gehalt). As Bernd Sponheuer observes, it was Hanslick who thus granted music its ‘spiritual self-determination’ (SPONHEUER 1987, 172). Following in Hanslick’s footsteps, other music aestheticians focused on the triangular relationship between material, imagination and style, constituting musical styles and ‘forms’ that were self-contained manifestations of the Idea, deriving their meaning from music’s own development. In 1861, the anti-Wagnerian journal Deutsche Musik-Zeitung, edited by Selmar Bagge in Vienna, published an article by one ‘Dr Lorenz’ that epitomized this new musical confidence. Lorenz directly derived his stance from Vischer’s aesthetics, and explicitly connected it with Vischer’s name (NO AUTHOR = ‘DR. LORENZ’ 1861, 33 – see Appendix VI [213]: No Author). In the psychological and physiological research of music, the role of the material did not remain untouched either. Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894), for instance, noted in his Lehre von den Tonempfindungen (1863) that the musical material, more than that of the other arts, is in fact already subject to ‘laws of artistic Beauty’ (allgemeine Regeln der künstlerischen Schönheit), because it has been formed by the artist himself (HELMHOLTZ 1865, 555). Helmholtz generally chose to stay far away from aesthetic theory; for aesthetic issues on music he refers the reader to Hanslick and Vischer, effectively mentioning them in one breath (HELMHOLTZ 1865, 2-3). Nevertheless, he considered the peculiar status of the musical material being preformed (das System der musikalischen Töne und der Harmonie) to be a very interesting case for the physiological investigation of musical perception, his main field of interest. Hanslick’s effort to announce music’s self-determination in the context of the powerful idealist prejudices against music needed courage and a willingness to indulge in confrontations and polemics, which we know Hanslick possessed. However, without the leads provided by Vischer’s interpretation of the material, which were ripe for elaboration, Hanslick would never have been able to set up his legitimation project. Vischer undermined the idealist tendency to dismiss music’s material as being preformed and hence corrupted Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 101 by the human Spirit because he recognized that all artistic material needed to be preformed in order to be geistig. It was essential for music to be described as an autonomous art with its own spiritual substantiality if a concept of musical Beauty was to be established. However, it is precisely this concept that Hanslick seems to lose sight of in his treatise. At times, he seems to equate musical Beauty with music’s autonomous Gehalt, but nowhere does this equation become explicit. In Hanslick’s eyes, establishing music’s spiritual substantiality was apparently enough to indicate its Beauty, which is another indication that, consciously or subconsciously, Hanslick was still thinking in an idealist ‘thought mould’. Vischer has often been described as the ‘last idealist’, standing for the impossible task of adapting his idealist aesthetics to the notion that the manifold instances of artistic practice could not be derived from the Idea as an absolutist principle. One could say that Vischer sorted through the debris of the idealist system to collect the aspects which he could use to give an account of it. Hanslick identified with Vischer as standing amidst the debris, rather than with the system itself. It provided him with tools to liberate himself from it, without having to dismiss it. For both men, the most pressing question seems to have been whether the Idea is omnipresent or not. Whereas Zimmermann had conveniently answered this question with a firm ‘no’, Hanslick explores it seriously, and, despite aspects of prevarication in his argument, tends towards a ‘yes’. Thus, his effort to formulate a theory of musical Beauty is shaped not so much by an indecision between Zimmermann’s formalism and Vischer’s idealist ‘aesthetics of content’, but by a direct orientation towards mid-nineteenth-century idealist criticism of Hegel’s absolutist aesthetics.33 Hanslick’s basic orientation towards idealist thinking does not mean that he was not influenced by Zimmermann’s emancipatory formalism. The formalist aesthetic climate in late-nineteenth-century Vienna, where Zimmermann taught and had many followers, contributed greatly to the way in which Austro-German Musikwissenschaft developed in the decades that followed. Hanslick certainly functioned as a model within this aesthetic environment (see Appendix Vb [210]). The interpretation of music as an autonomous phenomenon, relying entirely on its own features, along with the rejection of speculative aspects in the interpretation of music and the focus on formal (visible and tangible) aspects of music, produced a musicological tradition that ranged from Heinrich Schenker’s analytical projects to the quasi-scientific aesthetics of the Second Viennese School and beyond to the post-1945 work-in-progress of the composers that visited Darmstadt. 33 Contrary to the present engagement with Hanslick’s aesthetics, there was a fairly general consensus among Hanslick’s contemporaries, such as Ottokar Hostinsky (in 1877, as quoted in STRAUSS 1990, 24), Richard WALLASCHEK (1886, 44), and Arthur SEIDL (1887, 3n), that Hanslick was inspired more by Hegelians, such as Vischer, than by formalists. In a study that came to my attention after I wrote the present chapter, Christoph LANDERER (2004) pursues the hypothesis that Hanslick was indebted to Zimmermann’s teacher Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848). Landerer’s analysis of the relationship between Hanslick and Zimmermann is similar to mine, although Landerer rather forcefully draws his investigation of Hanslick’s concepts of form, Idea, Spirit and imagination to Bolzano, whereas Hanslick clearly refered to Vischer rather than Bolzano when he was using those concepts. Landerer has to admit that ‘insgesamt läßt sich eine gewisse idealistische Beeinflussung im Fall Hanslicks (vor allem durch Vischer) sicherlich nicht leugnen’ (LANDERER 2004, 99). Geoffrey Payzant too (PAYZANT 2002) notes Hanslick’s mentioning of Vischer. 102 Case studies Still, Theodor Adorno might have been quite right when he implied in his article about the philosopher Edmund Husserl, that it is, in fact, impossible to escape idealist thinking if one wants to engage with questions that touch on the nature of art’s essence and being (ADORNO 1940, 18). Schenker as well as the protagonists of the Second Viennese School certainly did not escape the speculative grand narratives and transcendental pretensions of idealist thinking. One could even argue that Zimmermann himself had difficulties getting away from it. At times, he describes form in such general and abstract terms that his descriptions are not far removed from Vischer’s account of spiritual substantiality (ZIMMERMANN 1870b, 256). Vischer himself acknowledged that formalism is nothing more than a ‘negative aesthetics of content’ (VISCHER 1858, 24). Like idealist aestheticians, formalists try to figure out what a work of art is ‘about’; they try, however, to avoid an attribution of meaning that lies outside its own realm. It should be noted that Vischer, unlike Hegel, tried increasingly to avoid this too, which was what made his theory so appealing to people like Hanslick. Despite his ambivalent stance towards the discourse of German idealism, Adorno himself acknowledged on several occasions that he was profoundly influenced by idealist thought patterns. Considering Vischer’s interpretation of the material, Adorno seems to have been indebted not only to Hegel and Karl Marx, but to those various instances of idealist thought that transformed into more relaxed interpretations of Spirit and Idea, which became increasingly important in the second half of the nineteenth century.34 For instance, Adorno’s interpretation of the material’s tendency to ‘wear out’ and hence become artistically uninteresting (ADORNO 1958, 37) depends to a certain extent on Hanslick,35 but indirectly much more on Vischer’s historicized and socially motivated aesthetics, requiring that art be conscious of its own time. Thus, when Adorno deviates from Hegel in certain fundamental respects, expressing his distrust of Hegel’s absolutist thinking, it was not solely distrust felt on an individual level, but one common amongst mid-nineteenth-century Bildungsbürger. Adorno, like most intellectuals who received their education in the first decades of the twentieth century, knew the movement’s most authoritative representative, Vischer, and addressed Vischer’s critical stance towards Hegel on more than one occasion. Although a direct line of influence between Vischer and Adorno is unlikely, 36 Vischer’s 34 Note Dietmar Strauß’s implicit borrowing of Adorno’s famous title when he argues that ‘ohne geschichtsphilosophischen, oft teleologischen Überbau gab es hinfort keine Philosophie der neuen Musik mehr’ (STRAUSS 2002, 408). [Without a historical-philosophical, often teleological superstructure there was no longer a philosophy of new music]. 35 As established by BURDE 1971; STRAUSS 1994, 409-410 and PADDISON 1997, 66, amongst others. It should be noted that also Arnold Schoenberg hinted at the possibility of the material ‘wearing out’ – becoming uninteresting due to its frequent use (SCHOENBERG 1975, 207). 36 Unlikely, but not entirely impossible, considering the fact that Vischer was considered to be an unquestionable authority on aesthetic matters in the first half of the twentieth century. Overly laudatory accounts of Vischer’s thought, such as, for instance, by Hermann Glockner in the early 1930s, bear witness of his status (GLOCKNER 1931, 72). Glockner regards Vischer as a grand representative of the supreme and unbroken tradition of absolute idealism, ranging from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to Glockner’s own time, in which – it hardly needs mentioning – the greatness of German culture had become an extremely sensitive issue. There is no evidence to suggest that Adorno had read Vischer’s 1851 account of the material of art, but he must certainly have read some of Vischer’s compulsory novels at school, and considering his references to Vischer, he was familiar Chapter Five – Eduard Hanslick 103 Materialbegriff is an excellent example of how his thought gradually filtered through the aesthetic thinking of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. with his thought to a certain extent. Chapter Six Programme music: Franz Liszt’s negotiation of Hegelian aesthetics An aesthetic changeling Apart from Hanslick’s polemical pamphlet, the year 1854 witnessed another controversial publication: Hector Berlioz’s La Damnation de Faust for orchestra, choir and soloists. Long-winded declamatory sections, large orchestral passages carrying the dramatic action and grand choral passages deeply startled many of Berlioz’s contemporaries.37 Operatic, symphonic and oratorio features seemed to be have been combined haphazardly in one huge score. Berlioz himself called La Damnation a légende dramatique, suggesting that it should be read out, rather than staged.38 The aspect, however, that aroused most controversy, notably in Germany, was Berlioz’s ‘desecration’ of Goethe’s Faust. Every German claimed to be familiar with Goethe’s version of the popular story. Hence, in the early 1850s, when Berlioz toured Germany with the piece prior to its publication, the Germans were nothing less than appalled. In 1853, Otto Jahn (1813-1869),39 supported by 37 A good example of purely instrumental music carrying dramatic action is the ‘Ballet of the sylphs’ in Part II, Scene vii. The sylphs enter Faust’s dream by ‘tripping about’ in waltz motion with transparent flageolet semiquavers and demisemiquavers, launching little ‘surprise attacks’ with sudden fortepianos. An unmistakable sense of dramatic action is aroused by the fact that the sylphs seem to approach and ‘enter the stage’ at the beginning of the piece and leave it at the end. The texture of the score becomes denser and the dynamics increase, dissolving again towards the end. Berlioz used this way of evoking the presence of a theatre stage on more occasions in his programmatic oeuvre, like for instance in his previously published programmatic symphony/viola concerto Harold en Italie (1834), after Byron’s Childe Harold. 38 In 1847, Berlioz entertained the notion of rewriting his dramatic legend as an opera, called Méphistophélès, on new texts by Eugène Scribe, but abandoned the idea after discussing it with the librettist (KERN HOLOMAN 1992, 1056). 39 Otto Jahn, a classical philologist and respected music critic, was coincidentally considered by Vischer as a possible co-author for his music volume. According to a letter to David Friedrich Strauß (18 December 1854), Jahn had been recommended to Vischer by Vischer’s colleague in Tübingen, the philologist Wilhelm Sigmund Teuffel (1820-1878) (VISCHER/STRAUSS 1952, 73). Whether Vischer ever approached Jahn is not known. Chapter Six – Franz Liszt 105 Eduard Hanslick (HANSLICK 1994b, 351),40 wrote a devastating review of the piece, which he concluded as follows: Wir Deutsche haben nicht nur das Recht, sondern die Pflicht, gegen eine solche schmachvolle Verstümmelung und fratzenhafte Entstellung eines Werkes, das der Nation theuer und werth ist, zu protestieren. Ist ein solches Appretiren desselben den Franzosen gemäß, können sie es in dieser Gestalt genießen, so mißgönnen wir es ihnen nicht; für uns Deutsche ist und bleibt es ein Wechselbalg, den uns keine Wichtelmännchen ins Haus tragen sollen. (JAHN 1867, 94)lxxxi Berlioz’s interest in Goethe’s Faust had been raised by the French poet Gérard de Nerval’s translation of the poem from 1828. Proudly presented as his opus 1, Berlioz published his Huit scènes de Faust, also for orchestra, choir and soloists, in 1829. It consisted of relatively disjointed scenes from Nerval’s translation of Goethe’s story. Considerable parts of it would find their place practically unaltered in La Damnation, written in 1845-46. Berlioz even sent the Huit scènes to Goethe himself in order to fish for compliments, but never received an answer. Goethe was not well versed in music and forwarded the work to his friend Carl Friedrich Zelter (1758-1832), who must have reached a conclusion pretty soon after browsing through it. Zelter called it ‘einen Absceß, eine Abgeburt welche aus gräulichem Inceste entsteht’ (Zelter in BERLIOZ 1970, xiv).lxxxii In Zelter’s verdict of the late 1820s and Jahn’s review of 1853 (the composer and the philologist), the textual and the musical criticism of Berlioz’s Faust works are – possibly deliberately – not held apart. Jahn stresses that Berlioz’s selective use of Goethe’s text is a disgraceful mutilation (schmachvolle Verstümmelung) and a grotesque deformation (fratzenhafte Entstellung) of a national monument. However, the sexually and diabolically charged metaphors of changeling (Wechselbalg) and ‘deformed foetus’ (Abgeburt),41 enhanced by Zelter’s interpretation of it as ‘a product of incest’, rather refer to the mixture of musical genres, or – to continue the two gentlemen’s imagery – ‘generic adultery’ (REEVE 1992, 153n) of the work. Eduard Hanslick, following Jahn, mentions the music’s slick artificiality, its focus on manipulative effects that attempt to disguise the work’s problematic musical form and manner of communication (HANSLICK 1892a, 214).42 Hanslick calls it an opera that rejects the stage and yet is unable to function without it (1892a, 215). 40 For Hanslick’s youthful enthusiasm for Berlioz’s music, and his subsequent radical change of allegiance, see PAYZANT 1991, 66ff. 41 Abgeburt is a non-existent word, yet unmistakable in what it communicates. The particle Ab- arouses the association with the derivative and the degenerative. The word Geburt refers to a birth as well as to something that has been born. Abgeburt seems to indicate something that has been born, but is nevertheless still undeveloped and malformed. 42 Jahn’s published musical comments before that are similar to Hanslick’s, mentioning instrumental effects that push aside the dramatic content and lead to a ‘pretentious hotchpotch of effects’ (pretentiöser Effecthascherei) and ‘bizarre brooding’ (bizarre Grübelei – JAHN 1867, 88). 106 Case studies Zelter, Jahn and Hanslick all imply that the alleged mistreatment and dismemberment of Goethe’s organically formed text necessarily leads to musical disorder.43 In the late 1840s and early 1850s, Berlioz extensively discussed his Faust works with his friend Franz Liszt (1811-1886). Berlioz had played with the idea of writing a ‘descriptive symphony’ (REEVE 1992, 152) rather than a vocal work on the subject, and not surprisingly, Liszt published a Faust-Symphonie a few years after the publication of Berlioz’s La Damnation. He dedicated the Symphony to Berlioz as Berlioz had dedicated his work to Liszt. The Symphony, also loosely based on Goethe’s version of the story, consists of three movements each sketching the character of the protagonists: Faust, Gretchen and Mephisto. Berlioz’s and Liszt’s Faust works are closely bound together, despite their fundamentally different manners of communication. The orchestration of Liszt’s Symphony is reminiscent of Berlioz’s compositional practices, clearly exploring orchestral techniques and colours to realize musical effects. Both composers, for instance, associate Marguerite/Gretchen with a long and fragile melody line of flutes and clarinets, with a somewhat sturdy viola accompaniment at the background. The teasing and jerking pizzicati representing Mephisto may be considered a platitude, twisting Faust’s and Gretchen’s musical themes and thus leaving no doubt about the devil’s character and intentions. Liszt’s Faust-Symphonie encountered similar criticism to that levelled at Berlioz’s dramatic legend. Hanslick maliciously described Liszt’s music as ‘boastful musical spasms’ (prahlerische Ohnmacht, Genialitätskrampf) (1892b, 239), focusing especially on the ‘defective’ musical representation of Mephisto. Richard Pohl, an outspoken advocate of the New Germans, diplomatically stated that with the attempt to express the ‘Faust idea’ in instrumental music, Liszt touched on ‘the most pressing contemporary questions with regard to music’ (POHL 1883). Even the most fervent advocate of Berlioz’s and Liszt’s music, the chief editor of the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik Franz Brendel, had problems with explaining the relationship between manner of expression and content in the piece.44 43 In the preface to the score of La Damnation, published in 1854 after the outrage it caused, Berlioz defended himself against the allegations of textual mutilation, by saying that not even the basis for his dramatic work has been derived from Goethe: in Goethe’s version Faust is saved; in Berlioz’s dramatic legend – as the title indicates – Faust goes to hell. Berlioz argued that it is impossible to set dramatic poems to music without modifications; Louis Spohr’s Faust, for instance, did not bear much resemblance to Goethe’s story either. ‘La légende du docteur Faust peut être traitée de toutes manières: elle est du domaine public.’ (BERLIOZ 1979, [no page indication]) [The legend of Doctor Faust may be treated in all manners; it belongs to the public domain.] Berlioz did, however, hardly engage with the musical criticism. He just stated that he made decisions about the structure of the work for purely musical reasons (ibid.). 44 ‘So sehr mich nun auch die beiden ersten Sätze gewaltig ergriffen hatten, so muß ich gestehen, daß im ersten Augenblick der dritte mich mehr abstoßend berührte, und ich geneigt war, einer Verstimmung Raum zu geben, bewirkt durch den Gedanken, daß hier denn doch ein Ueberschreiten der Grenzen, welche der Instrumentalmusik gezogen sind, vorliege, der Schritt gethan sei zu einer Musik hin, die nicht mehr auf dem Boden des Gefühls sich bewegt.’ (BRENDEL 1857b, 122) [No matter how tremendously the first two movements have gripped me, I do have to admit that, initially, the third movement slightly put me off, and I was inclined to give room to a bad mood. This was caused by the thought that there is a violation of borders here, set up around the domain of instrumental music; that a step has been made towards a kind of music that does no longer found itself on feeling.] Chapter Six – Franz Liszt 107 An obvious cause for outrage aroused by Berlioz and Liszt with their Faust works was their attempt to express discursive content with instrumental music. Thus, they defied a boundary that, partly thanks to idealist aesthetics, had up to then been considered prohibitive. Beyond this defiance, however, a wider range of aesthetic problems lingered, touching directly on the problematic content of music in general. Due to the adaptation and revisions within mainstream idealism, they gained in topicality and urgency. Hegel, drawing on eighteenth-century commonplaces, already emphatically distinguished between vocal and instrumental music, calling upon the realm of feeling (Gefühl), the content of music, to support this division. This was discussed by Vischer in more detail in the midnineteenth century. Hegel and Vischer distinguished between basic, undifferentiated inner feeling (Gefühl) and conceptually defined emotions (Empfindungen) (Chapter Three [58]). Music is able to express the former, text can express the latter. If musical and textual means of expression are combined, as is the case in vocal music, the content of this expression will necessarily encompass the determinate emotions only, as pure feeling has already been conceptually determined by means of text (Figure 4 [59]). At that point, music no longer has anything to add, it has become superfluous to the expression of inner meaning. Vocal and instrumental music communicated different stages in the process of feeling that could never be reconciled, an acknowledgement that led Hegel and Vischer to different conclusions. Hegel still preferred vocal music to instrumental music because it expressed the more conceptual spheres of inner life, albeit defectively (HEGEL 1998, 41). For Vischer, however, instrumental music was aesthetically more objective than vocal music, despite its undifferentiated content of inner feeling, because it expressed inner life with the appropriate means (VISCHER 1923, § 796: 248-251). Berlioz and Liszt simply seemed to disregard this fundamental difference between vocal and instrumental music by attempting to use instrumental music to express the conceptual stage in the process of feeling that according to idealists such as Hegel and Vischer could only be transmitted through text. For Berlioz’s and Liszt’s contemporary music critics, it now became even harder to situate music’s content, to establish its ways of expression, hence to describe music as a manifestation of the Spirit. The fact that Zelter and Jahn describe Berlioz’s achievements as dangerous satanic misfits is functional in an aesthetic respect: it is clearly reminiscent of idealist verdicts about music’s diabolical powers (Chapter Three [49-54]). Thus, the influence of idealist aesthetic theory was not limited to journalistic rhetoric; it exerted its influence on fundamental aesthetic issues as well. In this context, programme music needed a forceful aesthetic legitimation that should also – at least implicitly – address the content of music itself. In 1855, Liszt published his famous review of Berlioz’s programmatic symphony Harold en Italie in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik. The review had been co-authored by Liszt’s mistress the Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein (1819-1887), who was considerably better versed in the 108 Case studies philosophical intricacies of contemporary aesthetic theory. Their primary aim was to explain the way in which programme music communicated its content. The authors emphatically referred to Hegel for supporting their stance, which was a deliberate attempt at finding legitimation from the aesthetic mainstream. However, they also thoroughly reinterpreted Hegel’s statements, quoting him rather selectively, and attributing a meaning to his statements that would have been more suitable in the context of mid-nineteenthcentury idealist aesthetics. In other words, Liszt was using Hegel to explain something vaguely idealist, but certainly not Hegelian: he focused on the content of music, inner feeling, as a self-contained realm in the human psyche (something that Hegel would not have agreed with). It is interesting to observe Liszt’s struggle with the way in which human consciousness is involved in ‘accompanying’ the developments of feeling, i.e. how we want these feelings to be ‘determinate’ in the sense that they can be described in words or empirically registered, without losing their independence from the realm of Thought. In 1857, two years after Liszt published his review, Vischer published his musical aesthetics, written largely by his co-author Karl Köstlin. The introductory paragraphs of the treatise, by Vischer himself, have been discussed in Chapter Three [54-61]. They are an attempt at neutralizing the allegedly uncontrollable diabolical powers of music by giving them a certain degree of determinacy. For doing this, Vischer too needed to describe the realm of feeling as an independently functioning area in the human psyche. There is no bibliographical evidence to suggest that Vischer read Liszt’s review, and considering the circumstances, it is highly unlikely that he did. Vischer’s musical genre categorizations in the same 1857 treatise, developed mainly by Köstlin, miss out almost entirely on the concept of programme music, probably because Vischer would not have been able to situate it in his system.45 It is, moreover, unlikely that Vischer read music journals or actively kept up with current musical developments. 46 Conversely, Liszt and notably the Princess were on good terms with Vischer and probably well aware of his literary and aesthetic publications. The Princess regularly invited Vischer at her soirées in Zurich, where Liszt and Wagner were present as well. Whereas Wagner’s contempt of Vischer was obvious, the Princess’s admiration of him was just as clear. The affectionate correspondence between the Princess and Vischer (Tü UB Md 787-1188a, Tü UB Md 7871257a, and St SA A: 8802, shown in Appendix IVd [199] and annotated in Appendix III 45 Köstlin might have been more inclined towards a serious engagement with programme music, considering the fact that he also greatly admired Wagner. Later in his life, Köstlin wrote a book about Wagner’s Ring (KÖSTLIN 1877), but while collaborating with Vischer, he only addressed contemporary musical innovations as a kind of apropos (VISCHER 1923, § 802: 285) in the context of his genre categorizations (see Chapter Seven [127]). As for Wagner, Köstlin probably kept a low profile, considering Vischer’s problems with both Wagner himself and his idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk (see Chapter Two [38]). 46 Vischer might have been sympathetic towards Berlioz’s and Liszt’s Faust works, if he had known about them. Vischer himself wrote a brilliant parody of Goethe’s Faust, in which the protagonist enjoys a fairly unpleasant fate as well (VISCHER 1889). Vischer’s adaptation of Goethe’s model also met with both enthusiasm and dismay in German intellectual circles. In his devastating review of Liszt’s Faust-Symphonie, Hanslick mocks the final choral movement of the work by quoting the final lines of Vischer’s Faust parody (HANSLICK 1892b, 241 – see Appendix VI [213]: Hanslick). Chapter Six – Franz Liszt 109 [180-181]), exchanged between 1856 and 1858 does not reveal a profound exchange of aesthetic ideas, but they must have been well-acquainted with each other’s stances. Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’, although postdating Liszt’s and Sayn-Wittgenstein’s review by two years, reveal how all-encompassing philosophical systems like Hegel’s were gradually replaced by empiricist science in the 1850s, studying human behaviour and interaction on a more individual basis. Considering Vischer’s regular faithful references to earlier authors (among others to Karl Planck’s Die Weltalter from 1850-51),47 we may assume that Vischer’s engagements with the various aspects of feeling were, like much of his thought, a skilful synthesis of already existing views on the subject. Formulated within the context of a Hegelian system, Vischer’s statements gain in relevance. The review by Liszt and Sayn-Wittgenstein illustrates extremely well how eager mid-nineteenth-century intellectuals were to associate themselves with Hegelian philosophy. Vischer’s revisions of Hegel’s own aesthetics undermined idealist systematic philosophy from within. This resulted into statements that could serve as leads to put music as an art (and its realm of pure feeling) in a more favourable light. The autonomous realm of feeling Hegel had argued that music’s assignment (Bestimmung) is abstract inwardness (abstrakte Innerlichkeit – HEGEL 1998, 26) in its purest form. It would lead beyond the scope of this study to develop a full interpretation of Hegel’s concept of inwardness.48 Hegel never coherently explained what he meant by the term, possibly because he held the view that it could not be subject to conceptual interpretation. He dialectically opposes it to outwardness (Äußerlichkeit), and these dialectics determine his musical aesthetics to a large extent. Because music never achieves a full outer appearance – Hegel expresses regret that music’s only outwardness is time (HEGEL 1998, 26) – it must reside in inwardness. Hegel states that this inwardness is not always feeling in its purity, but could also be ‘thinking inwardness’ (denkende Innerlichkeit). Hegel focuses on feeling as a product of the thinking mind, as something that has been conceptualized: Was ich empfinde, ist, dass ich das Empfundene nur in der Idee habe. […] Im Denken bin ich Mensch im allgemeinen Sinn. Dies ist die Form, in die der höchste, erhabenste 47 Karl Christian Planck (1819-1880) also studied at the Seminary in Tübingen, receiving his doctorate in 1840. However, he opposed the Hegelianism of the time. In Die Weltalter (1850-51), he developed a philosophy based on the view that Thought should proceed from nature to the highest forms of spiritual existence. Due to his individuality of opinion his books were practically disregarded. After his death, a summary of his work came into the hands of Karl Köstlin, who published it in 1881 under the title Testament eines Deutschen: Philosophie der Natur und der Menschheit. Planck’s views were widely discussed, but the way in which he presented them worked against their acceptance. He regarded himself as the Messiah of the German people. Vischer regarded Planck very highly and gave him credit for his views on several occasions. In his letter to Vischer of 2 April 1857 (Tü UB Md 787-539 [187], transcribed and translated in Appendix IVb [188-191]), Köstlin implies that Planck has assisted him in writing the music volume. I have not been able to find sources in which Planck’s collaboration is specified. 48 Adolf Nowak has devoted a chapter to Hegel’s concept of inwardness in his investigation of Hegel’s musical aesthetics (NOWAK 1971, 145-162). Nowak relies exclusively on Hotho’s 1842 edition of Hegel’s Aesthetics (see Appendix IIb: Hegel [171]). 110 Case studies Inhalt gesetzt ist; indem ich ihn empfinde, ist er der meinige. […] Das ist die Sphäre der Empfindung.lxxxiii (HEGEL 1998, 34-35)49 For Hegel, nothing could escape Thought. In Cartesian tradition, thinking was a precondition for being human. Therefore, instrumental music remained empty without an accompanying text. Ist diese [text] nicht vorhanden, sucht man gewisse Vorstellungen, oder man hat Langeweile, denn ohne Inhalt läßt sich keine Musik denken. Als Grundlage dienen hier nicht Leidenschaften, bestimmte Empfindungen. Die Ausführung wird hier nicht mehr von einem Gange der Leidenschaft beherrscht. Die Empfindung bleibt mehr oder weniger leer, und das ist doch eigentlich die wesentliche Bestimmung des Tons. (HEGEL 1998, 40)lxxxiv Vischer, adhering to the supremacy of Beauty, and admitting that ‘es läßt sich doch im Grunde kein Wort finden, wie mir zu Mute ist’ (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 6)lxxxv dares to disconnect the realm of pure feeling entirely from intellectual or conscious interference. What is really interesting with regard to music, Vischer states, is not Empfindsamkeit that can be defined and categorized, but the ‘Aussonderung des reinen Gefühls aus seiner Vermischung mit dem Bewußtsein’ (VISCHER 1923, § 748: 10).lxxxvi He admits that feeling interacts in various ways with the workings of the mind, but these interactions can only be studied properly when the impact of the mind and the senses on the process of feeling are regarded as independent spheres. In doing so, the aesthetician Vischer develops a fundamentally different interpretation of the function and status of feeling than the general philosopher Hegel. This interpretation might still incorporate reservation against the dark, unsettled and inaccessible inner spheres of the human psyche, but Vischer does regard it as an independent realm, ‘durch keine andere zu ersetzen und eben dadurch berufen, eine selbständige Kunstform zu begründen’ (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 4).lxxxvii It is a (partly unwilling) admittance that music deserves its own right to exist. Parallel to Hegel’s concept of inwardness, Vischer further elaborates on his concept of sentient imagination (empfindende Phantasie), addressed in Chapter Three [66]. Whereas Hegel’s inwardness encompasses feeling, wanting and thinking at once (NOWAK 1971, 145), with thinking as the most powerful and functional of all, Vischer’s sentient imagination 49 Put more elaborately in Hotho’s edition: ‘denn die eigentliche Objektivität des Inneren als Inneren besteht nicht in den Lauten und Wörtern, sondern darin, daß ich mir eines Gedankens, einer Empfindung usf. bewußt bin, sie mir zum Gegenstande mache und so in der Vorstellung vor mir habe oder mir sodann, was in einem Gedanken, einer Vorstellung liegt, entwickle, die äußeren und inneren Verhältnisse des Inhalts meiner Gedanken auseinander lege’ (HEGEL 1993b, 144). [‘For the proper objectivity of the inner life as inner does not consist in the voices and words, but in the fact that I am aware of a thought, a feeling, etc., that I objectify them and so have them before me in my ideas or that I develop the implications of a thought or an idea, distinguish the inner and outer relations of my thought’s content or its different features in their bearing to one another’ (HEGEL 1999, 898)]. This is why it is useful to refer to the original lecture notes (HEGEL 1998) here, as Hegel himself was much more emphatic about the supremacy of thought than Hotho’s edition (HEGEL 1993b) would have us believe (see Appendix IIb: Hegel [171]). Chapter Six – Franz Liszt 111 encompasses all three actions primarily in order to conceive of, and truly understand, something without conceptual tools. As is the case with most idealist aesthetics, Hegel’s included, imagination in Vischer’s aesthetics seems to rely both on intellectual understanding and emotional sensitivity, but – and this is the ticking time bomb under Hegel’s supremacy of Thought – Vischer puts feeling before thinking, and states bluntly that feeling begets, or at least precedes, the consciousness and determinacy of the Spirit: ‘Wir werden sehen, wie das Gefühl […] auf die tätige, entwickelte Geisteswelt hinausweist’ (VISCHER 1923, § 748: 13). In almost Schopenhauerian terms, Vischer describes how sentient imagination seems to skip representations such as the observation (Anschauung), empathy (Einbildungskraft) or construction (Erzeugung) of the inner fundaments of the soul (reines inneres Urbild). Sentient imagination goes beyond them in order to establish the nature of the inner Urbild for itself: Allein wir sind im ästhetischen Gebiete, wir reden nicht vom Gefühl überhaupt, sondern von der Phantasie als Gefühl, also von dem Gefühl, wie die Kraft der Phantasie sich in dasselbe legt und das Ganze ihrer Tätigkeit in diesem Elemente durchführt, so daß, was in andern Gebieten Anschauung, Einbildungskraft, Erzeugung des reinen inneren Urbilds ist, auch hier, jedoch in anderem Sinn, anderer Form vor sich geht. (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 6)lxxxviii Vischer makes his point that consciousness and self-consciousness, as preconditions for reconciliation with the Absolute, cannot emerge without a basic inner prefiguration (Urbild) of one’s own identity. This prefiguration cannot be thought, only sensed. However, with feeling firmly established as the centre of all spiritual and intellectual (geistige) existence, Vischer still neglects to define it. Defining something that predominantly exists without conceptualization seems to be an impossible task; Vischer does not seem to have decided entirely about how feeling and consciousness mutually relate. On the one hand, Vischer suggests a dominant role for pure feeling, implying that it inhabits undefined dialectical forces that initiate its own development into determinate emotions (VISCHER 1923, § 748: 13-14). This even tends towards the acknowledgement of feeling as a self-affirming dialectical precondition for the emergence of consciousness, because consciousness only joins at a later stage. On the other hand, as addressed in Chapter Three [57] and summarized in Figure 4 [59], Vischer describes how feeling is ‘accompanied’ by thought in this development, attributing a guiding and domineering role to consciousness in the same process. Even in Vischer’s account of the process, there remains distrust of pure feeling, which generally lingers in the background, but now and then becomes explicit. Vischer clearly states that feeling without the involvement of (intellectual) reflection is dangerous (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 67). It becomes uncontrollable and elementary. Feeling as the centre of spiritual life is surrounded and enclosed by the Mind/Spirit, accompanying the development 112 Case studies of feeling on its way to the surface of the human soul. Vischer’s statement that music’s greatest and unique power is to access the very area of the human psyche where the Mind/Spirit does not exert much influence, is therefore, as Sponheuer points out (SPONHEUER 1987, 109), a doubtful compliment. Music’s insubordinate character is once again subtly brought to the reader’s attention. However, unlike Hegel, Vischer intended to put the sensory realm of Beauty back on the map. The fact that he does this in the context of his musical aesthetics could be regarded as an attempt to grant music an important position, or at least to describe it as a proper art with its own content. However, Vischer seems to reject the logical next step that could be taken from his glorification of inner emotional life, i.e. music as the art that embodies this realm in its own inimitable way could be regarded as the supreme art, or as the art that forms the basis for all the other arts: music as ‘Urkunst’. Schopenhauer had argued as early as 1818 that music surpassed the ideas (SCHOPENHAUER 1974, 366). For Vischer, that was one step too far. The legitimation of programme music Liszt, undoubtedly well aware of the contemporary idealist efforts to put the realm of inner feeling on the map, gratefully used them to show the supremacy of instrumental music and the indispensability of modern music. In doing so, he must have sensed that describing the realm of feeling as a self-contained sphere became ever more acceptable in the midnineteenth century. Liszt describes the realm of instrumental music as pure feeling, located in the very inner spheres of the human soul (LISZT 1855, 41). Partly drawing on the earlyromantic view that music ‘says most by saying nothing at all’ (DAVERIO 1993, 5), Liszt argues that music is the only art that can enter these spheres exactly because it is independent from verbal concepts, from the realm of Thought: Das Gefühl incarnirt sich in der Musik, ohne, wie in seinen übrigen Erscheinungsmomenten, in den meisten Künsten und vornehmlich denen des Worts, seine Strahlen an dem Gedanken brechen, ohne die Nothwendigkeit sich mit ihm verbinden zu müssen. (LISZT 1855, 40)lxxxix However, unlike the early romantics – Liszt refers several times to E.T.A. Hoffmann and Jean Paul – he feels obliged to give an indication of where this pure feeling is situated, and how it differs from verbally definable emotions. In doing so, he has to engage with the way in which pure feeling relates to the actions of mind. His review of Berlioz’s programmatic music epitomizes the struggle with the dichotomy of pure feeling and consciousness, that also features in Vischer’s aesthetics. Liszt must also have had Berlioz’s La Damnation at the back of his mind, while discussing Harold en Italie. Liszt states that contemporary ‘philosophical’ poems and epics such as those by Goethe and Byron are dramas of inner development, and he explicitly mentions Faust as the greatest philosophical epic of all (LISZT 1855, 53). Outer scenes and actions are just means, or metaphors, showing the Chapter Six – Franz Liszt 113 ‘dramatic action’ of the inner world. Stories such as that of Faust, Liszt argues, are not suitable to be sung (LISZT 1855, 54); Faust’s character, as well as the tragedy of his fate, can only be properly and subtly expressed through the medium of pure instrumental music. Liszt quotes lengthy passages of Hegel’s Aesthetics, skilfully twisting Hegel’s statements in order further to support his own stance. Hegel’s reservations against vocal music (being a mixture of the expression of determinate emotion [text] and not yet determinate feeling [music] (Figure 4 [59]) are reversed by Liszt to glorify the independence of instrumental music. When Liszt argues that the character and fate of Faust are not suitable to be sung, he means that the text is superfluous, rather than the music: the profundity of inner feeling is harmed when it is specified or pinned down by text (LISZT 1855, 51). Yet more spectacular is where Liszt ‘quotes’ Hegel’s statement that Beauty is the liberation of the soul and that music carries this liberation to its ultimate peak (HEGEL 1993b, 141; – see Chapter Four [72] and Figure 8 [73]), in which Hegel wanted to communicate his opinion that music is the herald of art’s dissolution into philosophy, because it increasingly draws on Thought. Liszt simply ignores this message. He concludes that this liberation can solely be carried out by programme music, since it has the capacity to affect the listener’s soul, while at the same time directing the mind towards a logical development that agrees with the inner world. (LISZT 1855, 81). Liszt interprets the liberation of the soul as a process in which inner feeling independently transforms into determinate emotions, gradually drawing on the mind for conscious accompaniment, but definitely retaining command of the process. This interpretation is difficult to reconcile with Hegel’s insistence on the supremacy of Thought. Liszt defines the mind’s accompaniment or guidance of feeling as the programme. The programme, as in Berlioz’s Harold en Italie, is the core of the work; it determines the work’s entire being – its form, its substance, its meaning. Musical developments, such as modulations, recapitulations and variations of musical material are no longer dependent on structures of musical form, but on the poetic idea (LISZT 1855, 81). Thus, the musician as a humble craftsman is turning into the ‘tone poet’ as an artistic genius. He has to be able to deal with poetic texts as much as with musical technique. This fulfilled another Hegelian requirement, namely poetry being the ultimate art form in that it sublates the objectivity of the visual arts and the subjectivity of music. Hence, a programme was of crucial importance in giving instrumental music its autonomy (LISZT 1855, 79). This, however, required an entirely new manner of listening; the attention of the listener had to be primarily directed by the poetic idea, not by musical structures. Thus, Liszt clarified the reservations of his contemporaries against Berlioz’s music. Liszt would never have been able to have such confidence in his conviction that feeling was a fully-fledged alternative to consciousness if his allegiances had lain solely with Hegel. In stressing that programme music was the one and only means to access the processes of the human psyche properly (LISZT 1855, 40), he implied that music guaranteed that art would not become subservient to Thought, and – as an equally valuable alternative 114 Case studies to philosophy – would therefore become indispensable in mankind’s further reconciliation with the Absolute. Liszt justified music’s right to exist by explaining it as programme music, since programme music dealt with the realms of feeling and thinking as equal independent spheres. However, Liszt still had to engage with the question of how these two equal spheres relate, since programme music draws on both. The dichotomy of inner feeling and consciousness was still an idealist dilemma that could not be solved. Liszt viewed the content of instrumental music as pure and undefined feeling, independent and untouched by conceptual meaning. He indeed glorified this independence, but in wanting to protect it, he needed to submit it to the guidance of poetic content. Hegelian dialectics were responsible for this dilemma: in order to declare a realm as independent, one has to be able to establish its identity, which can only be done by means of conceptual Thought, not by means of music. It is a dilemma pointed out by Carl Dahlhaus in his 1967 essay on musical aesthetics: what music wins as an art (conceptual clarity), it loses as music, and what it wins as music (access to the inner spheres of the human soul), it loses as an art (DAHLHAUS 1967, 47).50 Mid-nineteenth-century interpreters of Hegel’s concept of the Spirit were arguably even more preoccupied with explaining spiritual substantiality as particularity than Hegel himself. This was undoubtedly due to an increasing interest in empirically motivated research, intending to explain the features of human existence as definable objects rather than as metaphysical superstructures. In attributing spiritual content to music, Liszt also drew on the contemporary idealist view of das Geistige* as a manifold category of particulars rather than on Geist as a unified concept. However, in his eagerness to associate himself with contemporary idealist thought, he simultaneously adopted several possible interpretations of particularity. At times, Liszt seems to stress the poetic content of programme music, in the form of the programme. He ignores the requirement of conceptual clarity that applies to a literary text in arguing that the programme enters the very inner spheres of human feeling. Elsewhere, he seems to focus on the characteristic content of programme music, in the form of the specificity of emotions, thus implicitly admitting that programme music, in being characteristic, cannot escape a certain degree of conceptualization. He never really distinguishes between these two aspects of spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit), trying to obscure the dichotomy between pure feeling and consciousness.51 50 Vischer observes this as well and he deplores it. In the introduction to his musical aesthetics, he writes about a ‘difficult choice’ with regard to the manner of musical expression: ‘entweder reines Gefühl, aber behaftet mit einem Bedürfnis der Ergänzung, die es deutet, seiner Objektivität abhilft, oder gedeutetes, auf das Objekt bezogenes, aber nicht mehr in seiner Reinheit vorliegendes Gefühl’ (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 68). [either pure feeling, but tied to a need for supplementation that interprets it and meets its need for objectivity, or interpreted feeling, related to the object, but no longer feeling that is present in its purity]. 51 The dualism* of the poetic and the characteristic, as well as the question to what extent the poetic could or should be characteristic, was not only Liszt’s problem, but featured in the aesthetics and art criticism of the entire nineteenth century; it has been mentioned in earlier musicological research, amongst others by Dahlhaus. In Liszt’s case, the requirement of spiritual substantiality that engendered both concepts once again appears as a powerful determinant of art criticism. Chapter Six – Franz Liszt 115 This dilemma was used by Hanslick to attack Berlioz’s hybrid Faust oratorio as well as the concept of programme music in general. For Hanslick, the message is simple and straightforward: instrumental music cannot communicate specific texts; therefore the projects undertaken by Berlioz and Liszt are doomed to fail. The entanglement of the expressive capacities of text and music must result in the fact that the music’s form does not transmit its content properly, which leads to disorder and arbitrariness that is textual/literary as well as musical (HANSLICK 1892a, 215-216). Vischer himself attacks the concept of Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk (Chapter Two [38]) with the same argument. He describes the Gesamtkunstwerk as a kind of dangerous pressure cooker, about to explode at any moment. Wagner grants music a prominent position, but at the same time he makes it dependent on non-musical manners of communication. This gives rise to a tension between various means of artistic expression, as it prevents music from expressing what it should express: Jenes inkongruente Verhältnis von Wort und Ton, das zunächst im Gesang allein vor uns stand [ist] nicht gelöst, sondern durch die verdoppelte Macht der Musik nur noch erschwert, ihr durch soviel Gewicht verstärkter Schwung droht den hinfortzureißen, zu überfluten und wenn sich hier wieder die Aufforderung darzubieten scheint, daß die Musik um so enger an diesen gebunden werde, so steht dem entgegen, daß sie dadurch gefesselt den vermehrten Reichtum ihrer Mittel nicht zu seiner ganzen Entfaltung bringen könnte. (VISCHER 1923, § 764: 67)xc For Vischer, Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk seems to enhance the ‘in-between’ position of music in general. Floating between text and music, a Gesamtkunstwerk cannot submit itself to an independence from consciousness (Bewußtlosigkeit), which is necessary to access the realm of pure feeling. However, since music is in fact predominant in the Gesamtkunstwerk, music threatens to rip apart the dramatic meaning that could have been expressed appropriately through text. Vischer prefers music to stay in its inner indeterminate sphere of feeling, surrounded by the safety net of enlightened consciousness. In the context of the idealist necessity to attribute a conceptual meaning to art, music placed itself outside art’s normal frame of reference. Programme music, an attempt to solve the determinacy problem, placed itself outside music’s normal frame of reference. Terms such as ‘changeling’ or ‘product of incest’ thus became very tempting metaphors to describe its nature. They correspond with Vischer’s implicit characterization of music as an ‘outlaw’ among the arts (Vogelfrei – VISCHER 1923, § 759: 45). Vischer defines music’s realm of pure feeling as an area of considerable importance and with a certain degree of self-determination. It is, however, still surrounded by the enlightened, tangible realm of the Spirit, in which every single emotional utterance will eventually dissolve. Liszt is trying to break out of this cage, by announcing the independence of instrumental music from the realm of Thought. He does, however, seem to reconcile himself with the fact that 116 Case studies instrumental music needs the accompaniment or absorption of Thought in order to manifest itself as the art form that could safeguard the further development of art as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit. Chapter Seven Furthering a ‘new form of consciousness’: Franz Brendel’s concept of a new German school The features of the present When Franz Brendel (1811-1868) addressed the German Tonkünstlerverein in 1859 with a lecture about the aims and prospects of the ‘music of the future’, he had a considerable task on his hands. Brendel’s contemporaries were anything but convinced that the artistic ambitions of the musical innovators would safeguard and continue an existing artistic tradition, as Brendel claimed. Thoroughly skilled in Hegelian dialectical thought, Brendel turned to Hegelian rhetoric in order to bolster his statements with more intellectual authority.52 For Brendel, as for Liszt, the effort to reach beyond the realm of consciousness proved to be important. Whereas Liszt had explained how music related to the realm of consciousness in the human psyche, Brendel interpreted consciousness as an awareness shared by a certain group of people in a certain time, which could have immediate social consequences. Once music could exert its power on ‘the consciousness of its time’ (Zeitbewußtsein), it would regain its creativity and become indispensable for the further development of mankind. The understanding and conceptualization of art (denkendes Begreifen) was crucial for its historical continuation, Brendel argued (1859, 270). By reflecting on and becoming conscious of past artistic achievements, present art could prepare for a prominent artistic future. Thus, Brendel announced the existence of a new German school (BRENDEL 1859, 271). The composers of this school, concentrated around Richard Wagner, Franz Liszt and 52 Brendel spent four semesters in Berlin studying with Christian Weiße, Georg Andreas Gabler, Heinrich Hotho, and Henrik Steffens, all students of Hegel himself. For an insight into the potential political implications of Hegel’s philosophy, as compared to the idealism of Kant or Schelling, see RAMROTH 1991, 60-72. 118 Case studies Hector Berlioz,53 had taken the logical next step from the music of the old German masters: Handel, Gluck and Mozart. The fact that two out of the three new German protagonists were not German, did not detract from the Germanness of their music, Brendel argued. Their artistic roots were to be found in German music, and notably in Beethoven’s, which was widely considered to possess both the authority of the old masters and the innovative power of contemporary music (BRENDEL 1859, 272). Brendel’s sketch of the past, the present and the future being connected and mutually dependent was a common tactic to point out the importance or relevance of a modern art form, genre or work of art. Hegel’s concept of the Spirit had been thoroughly politicized, and the Young-Hegelian notion of progress (Chapter One [20-21]) was considered to be a useful means of legitimizing one’s stance. Inevitably, this led to the role of art being placed in the same league as the role of social and political achievements. In the years leading to the upheavals in 1848, it was generally believed that art would soon free itself from the choking embrace of present reflectivity, because a social liberation from aristocratic bonds was equally imminent. Wolfgang Griepenkerl (Chapter Two [32]), as well as minor but fierce critics, such as Theodor Hagen, regularly linked music with the possibility of a social revolution (LICHTENHAHN 1980, 26-27). Brendel was not the only socially motivated music critic, but he nevertheless provided a textbook example of the mid-nineteenth-century urge to parallelize social and artistic developments. Sanna Pederson observes that Brendel relied primarily on the Young Hegelian Arnold Ruge (PEDERSON 1996, 66), which posed problems for him, since Ruge felt even more negatively about music than Hegel, describing it as ‘an occasion for regressive behavior’ hindering the ‘Spirit’s struggle for freedom’ (PEDERSON 1996, 67). Peter Ramroth describes Brendel’s Hegelianism in more detail, reaching the conclusion that Brendel was inspired by a range of Hegelian thinkers and aestheticians (RAMROTH 1991, 76-92). Since many Young Hegelians denied art a social function as they were not interested in aesthetics, Brendel could not rely on them exclusively. Vischer, despite his Young-Hegelian inclination, adhered to the supremacy of Beauty as a manifestation of the Spirit. He has never been mentioned as a possible ideological point of orientation for Brendel. This is not surprising, since Brendel only sporadically referred to Vischer. Nevertheless, Brendel must have been familiar with Vischer’s thought to a certain extent.54 Heinz Quitzsch argues that before 1848, Vischer’s reviews (Chapter 53 Other ‘members’ of the School were Peter Cornelius, Joachim Raff, Richard Pohl and Theodor Uhlig. See also RAMROTH 1991, 5. Whether the New German composers should really be considered as forming a School is questionable. Robert DETERMANN (1989) and Peter RAMROTH (1991) have briefly addressed this question, but they fail to give conclusive answers. 54 Brendel mentions Vischer in several of his articles in the NZfM (BRENDEL 1849a, 177; 1857a, 185; 1858d, 74n) highlighting his aesthetics as a means of familiarizing oneself with the philosophy of art, indispensable in his eyes. Under Brendel’s editorship, the NZfM published C. Kretschmann’s review of Vischer’s general aesthetics (NO AUTHOR = KRETSCHMANN 1849) as well as Ernst von Elterlein’s lengthy and laudatory reviews of Vischer’s musical aesthetics (ELTERLEIN 1857a & 1857b). Vischer’s Aesthetics were also addressed in Brendel’s journal Anregungen für Kunst, Leben und Wissenschaft in 1858 (see Appendix VI [213]: Brendel). Franz Liszt mentions Vischer in a letter to Brendel of 3 April 1853 (see Appendix VI [213]: Liszt). Brendel might have encountered increasing problems with Vischer’s anti-Wagnerianism, although there is no bibliographical evidence that supports this Chapter Seven – Franz Brendel 119 Four [74-76]) had quite an immediate impact on the art criticism of his time (QUITZSCH 1989, 64). They were seen as models of sensible Hegelian judgement that also reflected the views of many middle-class citizens. Moreover, Vischer claimed that art was heading towards its peak (VISCHER 1844c, 371), something which both Hegel and Ruge vigorously denied, and Vischer insisted that social change was necessary before art could reach it (1844a, 166-167). Artists from the Vormärz period, such as Heinrich Heine, expressed similar views, but Vischer incorporated them in his systematic philosophy and he was not particularly willing to abandon them after 1848, although he had to revise them in some respects. If Brendel was not influenced by Vischer’s revisions of idealist prospects, he must at least have felt supported by them. In order to point out the importance, or even indispensability, of his New German School, Brendel had to engage with idealist aesthetic reservations against music, as well as against modernity. Hegel’s own implication that contemporary art was in fact nothing else but second-rate philosophy had been problematic for all idealist aestheticians in the first half of the nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, Brendel partly drew on their arsenal of counter-arguments in order to reveal the importance of contemporary art. However, with regard to the idealist reservations against music, Brendel had a more lonely battle to fight. He needed to attribute spiritual determinacy to music by pointing out both its content and – more importantly in Brendel’s politicized historicism – its function. Thus, Brendel cleverly exploited the idealist inclination to link music with modernity, as described in Chapter Four [83-85]. Now that mid-nineteenth-century aestheticians had admitted that modernity as a demarcated period had its own spiritual (geistige) merits after all, why would the modern art par excellence, music, not have those merits too? In focussing on the features of ‘the’ present as a demarcated period, Brendel could kill two birds with one stone: he could prove the relevance of the New German School by presenting it as a safeguard for all further prospects both of music as an art and of art as a manifestation of the Spirit. Brendel’s clever project, however, required thorough engagement with, and stealthy negotiation of, existing idealist aesthetics dealing with the present. Thus, Brendel availed himself of straightforward Young-Hegelian ideology, and continued to do so after the upheavals if 1848, e.g. in his 1852 music history book, stressing the importance of the role of the present in the development of mankind. Brendel considered the present artistic crisis to be a historical necessity, brought about by the current availability of the artistic material: Aus den früheren Formen ist Geist und Leben entflohen; wir haben nur noch ein äusserliches Bestehen derselben, eine Scheinexistenz; der neue Geist aber hat sich in die neuen Formen noch nicht zu schaffen vermocht. So sehen wir jenes innerlich Ungesunde, Gemachte, und Hohle, jene Lüge und Heuchelei, welche das gesammte Dasein durchdringt, den Fluch unserer Tage. (BRENDEL 1867, 479)xci speculation. 120 Case studies This quotation demonstrates Brendel’s tendency to immediately connect an entire social situation (‘this unhealthiness, artificiality, and emptiness; this lie and hypocrisy’ as ‘the curse of our days’) with the existence and topicality of certain musical forms. Just like the Young Hegelians, he stated that his present time was merely an interval, an ‘in-between time’ between a monumental past and a revolutionary future (Chapter Four [76]). Brendel intended to overcome this interval by taking the necessary preparations for the future artistic flourishing. Like Vischer and Hanslick, Brendel stresses the importance of adapting to the historically determined material, by ‘listening’ to the voice of the Spirit: an die Spitze zu stellen ist das, was wahrhafter Ausdruck der Gegenwart ist. Stets nur ‘überwundene Standpunkte’ vorzuführen, ist ein Unrecht gegen die weiterstrebenden Künstler, eine Bevormundung des Publikums, so wie eine Wirksamkeit im Interesse des Rückschritts. Daß im Augenblick die Zeitverhältnisse der Kunst nicht günstig sind, wer wollte das verkennen. […] Die Geschichte verfolgt höhere Zwecke, als daß sie Rücksicht nehmen könnte auf das größere oder geringere Wohlbefinden einzelner Generationen. Die diese Zwecke erkannt haben, beugen sich der Nothwendigkeit und fühlen sich gehoben, indem sie die Stimme des Weltgeistes vernehmen. Nur die armen, nackten, irdischen Existenzen, deren Leben aller geistigen Güter baar ist, jammern. (BRENDEL 1849b, 224)xcii The best preparation for the future is, in Brendel’s eyes, the ‘truthful expression of the present’ (wahrhafter Ausdruck der Gegenwart), even if this leads to the discomfort of ‘single generations’. Brendel associates himself not with Hegel’s notion of development as surpassing human actions, but rather with the mid-nineteenth-century efforts to actively redirect the course of mankind’s development towards an often politically motivated goal: freedom for the people, a greater self-consciousness of the general public, a respiritualization of society, etc. Choosing the ‘appropriate’ (i.e. historically relevant) material was the way in which the artist could actively interfere in the course of history. Brendel’s post-1848 claims bear striking resemblances to Vischer’s art criticism from the Vormärz period: Der weichliche Halbenthusiasmus unserer Zeit, der über Reflexion und Kritik sich so bitter beklagt, weil dadurch das zarte Seelchen Erfindung, der stätige Schöpfungsdrang erstickt werde; der bringt uns am meisten rückwärts, weil er das Eine hindert, ohne das Andere fördern zu können, weil er weder zu wissen, noch zu wagen weiß. (VISCHER 1845b, 346)xciii Vischer and Brendel talk in similar terms about the duty of the artist and the public to be committed to the development of man, but in Brendel’s statement, rather abstract concepts Chapter Seven – Franz Brendel 121 are presented as separate entities developing according to self-regulating dynamics. They have their well-defined tasks in the greater development of mankind. Brendel is not only talking about ‘the’ present (die Gegenwart), but also about ‘the’ regression (der Rückschritt), ‘the’ history (die Geschichte), and ‘the’ necessity (die Nothwendigkeit) without being more specific. Whereas these concepts were part of a dialectical system in Vischer’s aesthetics, in Brendel’s criticism they have become unquestionable entities in their own right, rhetorical tools that serve to prove him right without too much explanation.55 Another of those unquestionable Hegelian tools in Brendel’s writings is his use of consciousness (das Bewußtsein), occupying a key function in his defence of the New German School. A ‘new form of consciousness’ Art critics in the Vormärz period believed that the sublation of the alleged lack of Beauty in present times would be imminent. This optimism needed to be revised after 1848 (Chapter Four [80]), but the goal of reconciling reality with the Idea through Beauty and art remained. Vischer stated in 1851 that a ‘new form of consciousness’ is being prepared, although nobody knew what this new form would eventually look like (VISCHER 1920, 111). Exposing people to contemporary art was, according to Vischer, the most appropriate means of enhancing their susceptibility, in aesthetic as well as moral respect, thus turning them into (self-)conscious citizens. If the goals of freedom and self-determination could not be achieved by political means, they could at least be approached with artistic ones.56 Education thus became the main weapon in the fight against the banality and repression of modern society. In this Bildungsbürger context, consciousness was a catchword for the entire generation of post-1848 idealists. They could adhere to Hegel’s dictum that the Spirit was inclining towards Thought, forsaking the sensory qualities of Beauty, whilst at the same time being able to predict art’s glorious rebirth because it could become conscious of its new ‘beautiful’ identity. In Hegelian context, only consciousness established identity, and identity led to self-determination and freedom, and hence to renewed progress. These revisions of Hegel’s thought after the failed upheavals of 1848 provided Brendel with new opportunities to put music as an art in a more favourable light. The fact that he kept adhering to Hegelian terminology after 1848 is hence not just a matter of rhetorical 55 See Chapter Five [97] for Eduard Hanslick’s use of ‘the’ necessity, like Brendel similarly refering to the necessity of history without further explanation. Geoffrey Payzant’s translation of this passage [264] misses out on Hanslick’s and Brendel’s employment of Hegelian rhetoric. 56 See also Gethmann-Siefert for Vischer’s efforts to use art for educational purposes: ‘[Vischer] will […] anders als Hegel am Postulat festhalten, dass die Gegenwart einer eigenständigen Kultur, eines Vaterlandes durch den Vergangenheits- wie Zukunftsblick auf die Kunst zu gestalten sei. So tritt an die Stelle religiösen Interesses in der Kunst die moderne Version, das Sinnliche sittlich zu machen, nämlich ein Vaterland zu entwerfen, zum Vaterland zu erziehen.’ (GETHMANN-SIEFERT 1988, 337) [Unlike Hegel, Vischer wants to adhere to the postulate that it is possible to construct a self-contained culture, a homeland for the present, built from the past and future of art. Thus, a religious interest in art is replaced by the modern version. The senses are the new morality, and a new homeland is founded for the education of our own homeland.] 122 Case studies convenience, but a clever realization that music’s spiritual substantiality now stood a chance, with certain Hegelian prejudices against contemporary art coming under scrutiny. 57 Brendel admitted that the present was featured by an over-abundance of intellectual reflection. This led to the Spirit ‘fleeing’ (entflohen) from earlier artistic forms and not yet ‘settling’ (noch nicht zu schaffen vermocht) in new artistic practices (BRENDEL 1867, 479 – see above [119]). Like Vischer, he noted that music was no longer objective with regard to its outer manifestation, and not yet objective with regard to its inner specificity (VISCHER 1844c, 381 – see Chapter Four [84]). It was Vischer’s eventual goal to find this inner specificity, which meant that he ultimately permitted music a limited amount of spiritual substantiality. Like his contemporaries, Brendel employed the catchword ‘consciousness’ to bring music’s spiritual substantiality within reach. The way in which he described consciousness (freely switching from interpreting it as reflectivity in general to viewing it as the awareness of belonging to a certain era, or as music criticism) reveals that he used current Hegelian terminology to enhance the respectability of his own New German stance. However, in doing so, Brendel also contributed to aesthetic thinking in general, applying the mainstream aesthetic views of the mid-nineteenth century to music. Brendel’s premise was a defensive one. As explained in Chapter Six [104], the music of the New German School had already been heavily criticized before the term ‘New German’ emerged in 1859. In the context of idealist thought patterns, the programmatic ‘aesthetic changeling’ struggled with a similar legitimation crisis to that of music, the ‘outlaw’ among the arts. In the eyes of many critics, programme music enhanced the problematic aesthetic position of music in general. Brendel regarded it as his task to counter the accusations of ‘generic adultery’ (REEVE 1992, 153n), problematic musical form and incomprehensible manner of communication (HANSLICK 1892a, 215) by dismissing those accusations as ‘misunderstandings’ (BRENDEL 1857c, 45). Those who criticized the music of Franz Liszt, for instance, were simply missing out on the most current developments in the realm of music, psychology and social human interaction, Brendel argued (BRENDEL 1858c, 86). Brendel explained that Liszt’s music was so difficult to appreciate because it managed to connect the conscious (in the form of a poetic idea) with the subconscious (in the form of pure instrumental music) – it made the subconscious conscious. In doing so, it stimulated the advance of a new artistic consciousness (BRENDEL 1858c, 121). As a method of reaching this new consciousness, Brendel mentioned ‘a different psychological process (…) a different kind of mindset’ (BRENDEL 1858a, 173). People would have to learn and listen in an entirely new manner; they would have to adapt their perception to the current production of art that digs deep into their inner selves. Thus, art became a means to a greater end: the education and elevation of the people, ‘to broaden their spiritual and intellectual (geistige) horizon, to stimulate and enhance their susceptibility’ (1858a,173). In Brendel’s view, the 57 Seen in the context set out here, Sanna Pederson’s claim that Brendel’s progressive ideals lost viability when the general belief in Hegel’s Vernunftteleologie was shattered in 1848 (PEDERSON 1995, v) is not sustainable. Brendel still had a battle to fight, and with contemporary idealist philosophy he sensed he could win it. Chapter Seven – Franz Brendel 123 Beauty of Liszt’s music depended directly on its loyalty to the expression of this new artistic consciousness: ‘Die Hauptsache ist, daß die neue Form als künstlerisch schön, in ihrer Beziehung zum Inhalt als psychologisch wahr erscheint.’ (BRENDEL 1858c, 86)xciv The extremely fine line between artistically beautiful (künstlerisch schön) and psychologically true (psychologisch wahr) in Brendel’s criticism came from the YoungHegelian inclination to equate Beauty with truth, but it also served the purpose of connecting aesthetics with psychology. Brendel was probably familiar with mainstream aesthetic investigations into the realm of feeling as the content of music, as described in Chapters Three [58-59] and Six [110-112], and shown in Figure 4 [59]. Although he did not engage with its empirical intricacies (like Liszt), he used the opportunity to describe music as an instance that connects psychology with aesthetics. 58 According to Brendel, music’s unique ability to touch the German heart (1858c, 100) and to access those aspects of the human psyche that otherwise would remain undisclosed to the realm of consciousness indicated that psychological research was an important new area in the realm of aesthetics (1858c, 97-100). Vischer (as well as Hanslick) had argued that psychology did not have anything to do with theories of Beauty (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 5), claiming that it just provided insights in the framework of emotional life in which certain art forms, and notably music, could appear. Brendel, however, wanted to connect psychology with aesthetics in order to attribute a social function to music. For him, the psyche of the individual could only develop when it came to terms with its social environment. By connecting psychology with aesthetics, Brendel was able to explain art, and music in particular, as a participant in the individual’s engagement with social reality. In doing so, he affiliated himself with the general aesthetic consensus that if society could not be ‘re-spiritualized’ immediately, the concept of Beauty had to be harmonized with its environment by other means (Chapter Four [81]). Vischer’s acknowledgement that Beauty was no longer an objective manifestation of the Spirit that could be fathomed by means of a systematic philosophy, but rather a subjective means for the observer to interpret the work of art of his choice, enabled Brendel to make Beauty directly dependent on its social environment. Like Vischer’s post-1848 aesthetics, Brendel’s criticism was an attempt to justify the modern world, an attempt that factually turned Hegel’s transcendental system upside down. In order to counter the accusation that the music of the New Germans was futuristic and unachievable (contained in the reference to it as ‘Zukunftsmusik’), Brendel needed to describe Liszt’s innovations as a logical continuation of an existing artistic tradition. Brendel pompously stated that Liszt’s music was the logical next step from Beethoven’s music (1858b, 20). The present is necessarily unsuitable for new art, Brendel argued (1858c, 142); it is a time of preparation, taken up by the ‘digestion’ and dissemination of 58 Guido Adler would follow Brendel in this (HEINZ 1968, 37), similarly adhering to a kind of aesthetic thinking that had been developed to show music’s indispensability for mankind, whilst also associating himself with empiricist psychology of the mid-century (see Epilogue [147-148]). 124 Case studies earlier artistic achievements, such as Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. Liszt secures and continues the tradition of these earlier achievements: In diesem Sinne kann ich zunächst fest und bestimmt die Ueberzeugung aussprechen, dass Liszt’s Werke das Ideal unserer Zeit sind auf dem Gebiet der Instrumentalmusik, dasjenige, was kommen musste, wenn ein wirklicher Fortschritt stattfinden sollte, das Bedeutendste, was unser Zeit auf diesem Gebiet besitzt, dasjenige, worauf Schumann und Berlioz bereits hingearbeitet haben. (BRENDEL 1858c, 75)xcv Liszt’s works are ‘the ideal of our time’, because they refer to the future (dasjenige, was kommen musste, wenn ein wirklicher Fortschritt stattfinden sollte), the present (das Bedeutendste, was unser Zeit auf diesem Gebiet besitzt), and the past (dasjenige worauf Schumann und Berlioz bereits hingearbeitet haben) all at once. Brendel implied that in his present, both past and future are contained. The present was a moment in history in which the entire development of music so far had been accumulated, thus containing the seeds for a new era. Brendel was thus torn between two slightly paradoxical strategies to give Liszt’s music its right to exist.59 On the one hand, he insisted that Liszt was an original genius, exposing his audience to new manners of perception, spirituality, and artistic consciousness. All those who had not yet grasped this advanced stage of artistic consciousness, could not keep up with Liszt’s achievements. On the other hand, Brendel stated that Liszt was forced by the ‘inartistic features of the present’ (Chapter Four [76]) to exploit the achievements of his predecessors. It was therefore unfair to reproach him with something that lay in the historical unavoidability of his time. Brendel’s latter approach has been inspired by Hegel’s notion of the Spirit surpassing human interference, fulfilling the necessary course of history by moving on according to its own laws. The former approach, however, relies on contemporary Bildungsbürger ideals in which the ‘right’ course of history needs to be enforced with the full commitment of individual responsibility. This sense of responsibility also provides an effective third argument for Brendel’s defence of Liszt’s music. Liszt is willing to express his present in all its complexity, abstractness and ephemerality, potentially sacrificing ‘romantic reverie’ (romantische Träumerei) and 59 Peter Ramroth’s thorough investigation into the philosophical roots of Brendel’s criticism reveals how music critics were struggling to fit their views into the generally accepted idealist aesthetic premises of the midnineteenth century. Ramroth also emphasizes that these premises cannot be retraced to Hegel only: ‘Gerade am Beispiel Brendels läßt sich zeigen, wie die nach Hegels Tod auftretende Vielfalt der philosophischen Strömungen zwischen metaphysischen Idealismus, Materialismus und Agnostizismus auf peripheren Gebieten wie der sich erst entwickelnden Musikwissenschaft und Musikgeschichtsschreibung zu aporetischen Situationen führte, die den Autoren zum Teil gar nicht bewußt waren.’ (RAMROTH 1991, 49) [Particularly Brendel’s situation shows how, after Hegel’s death, a multiplication of philosophical currents drawing on metaphysical idealism, materialism and agnosticism led to contradictory situations in peripheral fields (such as the young and partly undeveloped field of musicology and music history), contradictions that remained partly unnoticed by the authors.] Chapter Seven – Franz Brendel 125 ‘musical emotion’ (musikalische Empfindung) for it. Liszt’s willingness to do this is more important for Brendel than the sounding result of his music: Die Zeitbedingungen sind romantischer Träumerei und dem einseitigen Schwelgen der musikalischen Empfindung nicht mehr günstig. In Liszt’s Werken ist sonach ein Ideal hingestellt, welches den Verhältnissen dieser Zeit entspricht. Dieses bestimmte Ergreifen des Programms, die Vereinigung von Bewußtem und Unbewußtem, ist gerade das, was die Instrumentalmusik für unsere Zeit und die Zukunft erhält. (BRENDEL 1858c, 142)xcvi In his attempt to connect the conscious with the subconscious, Liszt not only anticipates the future, he also expresses the present. In fact, he expresses the present by anticipating the future, since the present is nothing but an anticipation of art’s glorious rebirth. This widely expressed Vormärz ideology was still important after the failed upheavals in 1848, albeit in a slightly more cautious rhetorical manifestation. Vischer’s attempts to deal with ‘a new form of consciousness’ (VISCHER 1920, 111) after 1848 illustrate this very well (Chapter Four [80]. Brendel cleverly employed this ideology to put across his own stance. Programme music, the expression of poetic content through purely instrumental music, was by far the most suitable means to account for the present as a reflective ‘in-between time’. It was the imminent sublation of consciousness and subconsciousness in a nutshell, the almost tangible expectation of reality being reconciled with the Idea, if only problematically and indirectly. Vischer’s concept of ‘mediated idealism’ is mentioned nowhere in Brendel’s defence of the New Germans, but it continually lingers between the lines. Brendel’s emphasis on the German quality of the music of Berlioz, Liszt and Wagner was instrumental to his engagement with consciousness. It was obvious for every intellectual before as well as after 1848 that being German meant being profound and slow and pondering, in other words, being conscious. With consciousness being a distinct feature of the present, Brendel could easily link up the new with the German; the name ‘New German’ thus bore all the implicit connotations that were required for revealing the indispensability of the School’s music in post-1848 idealist context: newness and consciousness that constituted a direct relation with its social environment. Thus, Brendel argued, the achievements of the composers of the New German School provided music with a conceptual specificity of expression (Bestimmtheit des Ausdrucks – BRENDEL 1856, 82). Music had become a fully-fledged manifestation of the Spirit. The herald of truth Brendel used music’s similarities with modernity as means of presenting music as a straightforward conceptual art form, and he exploited statements such as Vischer’s claim that music’s subjectivity in being abstract and complex was in fact an objectivity in being 126 Case studies in accordance with its time (VISCHER 1923, § 750: 24 – see Chapter Four [84-86]). This enabled Brendel to be extremely emphatic about his view that the New German School was the only possible way forward. Music should derive its social function from its ability to make the subconscious conscious. The kind of music that was able to express the conscious present safeguarded the very future prospects of music as an art as well as the future prospects of art as a manifestation of the Spirit. Choosing in favour of or against the New Germans was the equivalent of choosing whether to grant music a place in the idealist pantheon of the arts (BRENDEL 1856, 82-83). Meanwhile, Brendel’s defence of a kind of music that allegedly connected the consciousness with the subconscious happened to serve another of Brendel’s ideological intentions: the legitimation of criticism as a means of guiding musical practice towards a next stage in its development. He observed that the visual arts and literature had powerful aesthetic and critical discourses that addressed the relevance, meaning and function of painting, sculpture and literature. The reason why music occupied such a problematic position in aesthetic respect was solely because, as he argued, musicians had not been involved in establishing music’s importance (BRENDEL 1858e, 346). They had not yet taken their social responsibility. A new kind of music, as Brendel saw it, thus needed to be explained and understood intellectually. This would stimulate the critical debate and the subsequent determination of an aesthetic position for music. Here too, Brendel elaborated on a widely acknowledged Vormärz conviction, that true artistic creativity could only reemerge once poignant criticism had dealt with previous artistic achievements (VISCHER 1845a, 346-347 [Chapter Four, 76]). The idealist description of ‘the’ present as a self-regulating entity that develops according to self-governing dynamics, addressed elaborately in the context of Vischer’s aesthetics in Chapter Four [78], is applied in a specifically musical fashion in Brendel’s criticism. Thanks to treatises such as Vischer’s, Brendel was able to describe music as an indispensable vehicle for furthering the consciousness of the present. With music firmly linked to modernity, there was space to reconsider music’s position in an idealist context, especially after 1848, when Hegelian concepts and categories were tested against social reality by aestheticians such as Vischer. Brendel took his chance: thanks to music, the realm of art could reflect the features of its time. Beauty could become a fully-fledged alternative to Thought for the expression of the Spirit, since music was fully able to compete with Thought in matters of particularity. Brendel deliberately described music not merely as a conceptual art, but even as a conceptualizing art. This is why he does not explicitly distinguish between music criticism on the one hand and the music of the New German School on the other. Both discourses are able to turn music into a conceptualizing art. Brendel no longer needed to describe music in problematic terms such as ‘diabolical’, ‘feminine’ or ‘overly free’. Instead, he stressed music’s self-consciousness and historical necessity. Rather than a changeling or an outlaw, music was the herald of truth. Chapter Seven – Franz Brendel 127 Vischer and Köstlin, however, did not appreciate Brendel’s view that only the newest music had a right to exist thanks to its ability to express the present and anticipate the future. In a letter to Vischer on 2 April 1857, Köstlin wondered whether he should send the music volume to Brendel for review, since he had opposed Brendel’s stance. 60 Köstlin indeed distanced himself firmly from the ‘Zukunftsmusiker’, apparently quoting Brendel literally: und die Verteidiger der Zukunftsmusik irren sich mithin gewaltig, wenn sie uns sagen, unser jetziger musikalischer Geschmack sei durch die “musikalische Melodie”, die uns noch immer “in den Ohren klinge”, so verdorben und verwöhnt, daß er eine nicht absolut musikalische, deklamatorische Melodie gar nicht mehr zu begreifen im Stande und daher auch einer richtigen Würdigung der neuesten Richtung unfähig sei xcvii (VISCHER 1923, § 802: 285).61 Köstlin was a reasonably well-known admirer of Wagner, but as Vischer’s loyal co-author he primarily dismissed not the music Brendel was trying to defend, but rather Brendel’s arguments. He was in no way inclined to connect Brendel’s arguments with his own qualification and adaptation of Hegelian aesthetics. Brendel and Köstlin (as Vischer’s coauthor) clearly belonged to different camps. Thus, it was Brendel more than Vischer, who participated in the emergence of a long and powerful modernist critical tradition. Brendel’s conviction that the inaccessibility of contemporary music should be explained by its willingness to account for the problematic present, for instance, can be easily connected with Theodor Adorno’s belief that only radically modern music was mindful of its social responsibility in that it isolated itself from society.62 It should be borne in mind, however, that Brendel’s relentless optimism was far removed from Adorno’s ‘negative dialectics’ that took the impossibility of reconciling reality with the Idea as a starting point. Still, in more general terms, debates on the problematic definition of music as a fine art, the historical determination of the artistic 60 ‘Da ich S.[eite] 1010 lin.[ea] 1-6 v.[on] u.[nten] dem Herrn Brendel, obwohl ohne ihn zu nennen, direkt opponirte, so wiederrieth ich Mäcken [the publisher], das Buch ihm zur Anzeige zu schicken, fügte jedoch bei, daß ich es nicht gerade unbedingt für unthunlich halte. Ich möchte Sie bitten, hierüber definitiv zu entscheiden.’ [Because I have opposed Mr Brendel, albeit without mentioning him, on page 1010 six lines from below, I have advised Mäcken not to send him the book for review – although I did add that I do not regard it to be entirely impossible. I would like to ask you to make the final decision on this.] Unpublished letter from Köstlin to Vischer, 2 April 1857 (Tü UB Md 787-539); for the original see Appendix IVb [187]. 61 This is the actual passage Köstlin referred to in his letter (see previous footnote): the six ultimate lines of page 1010 in the 1857 edition are VISCHER 1923, § 802: 285 in Robert Vischer’s edition from 1923 (see also Appendix IIb: Vischer [170]). 62 For instance in his Philosophie der neuen Musik: ‘Die Isolierung der radikalen modernen Musik rührt nicht von ihrem asozialen, sondern ihrem sozialen Gehalt her, indem sie durch ihre reine Qualität und um so nachdrücklicher, je reiner sie diese hervortreten läßt, aufs gesellschaftliche Unwesen deutet, anstatt es in den Trug der Humanität als einer schon gegenwärtigen zu verflüchtigen.’ (ADORNO 1958, 124-125) [The isolation of radical modern music does not stem from an anti-social nature, but from a social substantiality: rather than volatilizing the disarray of society into the deceptive belief of an already present humanity, it indicates this disarray by means of its pure quality, which becomes more emphatic as it becomes purer.] 128 Case studies material, the perceived impossibility of producing ‘beautiful’ art in an ‘ugly’ present, and the urge to elevate mankind have all been extremely important issues in twentieth-century (music) criticism. It is tempting to explain Brendel’s position as a Marxist one, or even as a Leninist one avant la lettre, eager as he was to decide on other people’s behalves what they should do and what they should appreciate in order to acquire a better future. Vischer’s criticism from the Vormärz period reveals, however, that Karl Marx was only one protagonist of a much more general Hegelian current which manifested itself in aesthetics as much as in political thought. Brendel was one of the more influential music critics to apply this way of thinking to music. He preached the merits of a musical avant-garde, turning the old Christian image of the shepherd guiding his flock into a precondition for further development. Modernist music criticism of the twentieth century would have been unthinkable without this. Brendel’s role in the emergence of modernist criticism is increasingly recognized, also in English-speaking musicological circles. A good example of a thorough and insightful study into Brendel’s music criticism is Sanna Pederson’s dissertation (PEDERSON 1995). Despite Pederson’s intelligent argument, her insistence on the year 1848 as an aesthetic watershed that quite suddenly sidetracked Brendel’s progressive ideals (PEDERSON 1995, 264-265) has been refuted here. Even more implausible is Robert Determann’s claim that Brendel was influenced primarily by Wagner in putting across his theory of progress (DETERMANN 1989, 119). In this chapter, I have shown that Brendel’s emphasis on progress was embedded in a much more fundamental urge for the legitimation of music in the context of idealist philosophy, after 1848 as much as before. His progressiveness as well as his nationalism were just means to connect with the revisions in mainstream idealist aesthetics. These revisions assisted him in legitimizing music as an art. There have also been misleading attempts to explain Brendel’s criticism as a direct result of Hegel’s own philosophy, thus disregarding the mainstream aesthetic responses to Hegel’s thought, which exerted such an immense influence on the mid-nineteenth century, and which form the main subject of this study. Johannes BESSER (1956) and Robert DETERMANN (1989) fail to recognize the differences between Hegel and his followers, wrongly retracing a number of Brendel’s idealist views to Hegel himself. A more recent example of an insufficient differentiation between Hegel and the Hegelians is provided by Richard Taruskin in his article ‘The poietic falacy’ (TARUSKIN 2004). Taruskin recognizes Brendel’s importance as anticipating modernist criticism, introducing him as prefiguring Arnold Schoenberg’s aesthetic position.63 Taruskin, unlike Pederson, (2004, 19), implicitly 63 Taruskin was possibly remembering the pleasant and thought-provoking conversations I had with him during the Conference of the Dutch-Flemish Society of Music Theory (Vereniging voor Muziektheorie) at the Royal Conservatory in The Hague (Netherlands) in February 2001, when we discussed Brendel’s defence of the New German School and Adorno’s defence of the Second Viennese School. Partly thanks to the insights that emerged from our discussion, I could present a systematic investigation of the possible links between Brendel and the aesthetics of the Second Viennese School at the RMA Conference in Cardiff in September 2003 (‘A truthful expression of the present: Theodor Adorno’s dependence on 19th-century German idealism’), a couple of months before Taruskin’s article emerged. Chapter Seven – Franz Brendel 129 attributes later Hegelian concepts such as ‘progress’ and the notion of the present as a separate critical category to Hegel himself.64 This justifies the attempt to study the mainstream idealist responses to Hegel’s philosophy in more detail. Aestheticians such as Vischer were primarily concerned with the legitimation of art as a proper spiritual power, as the ultimate expression of humankind. Their revised interpretation of modernism and the adaptation of Hegelian concepts, testing them against a tangible social reality, provided Brendel with opportunities to contribute to this legitimation project and expand it to include music’s problematic position. Brendel only went one step further than Vischer, drawing the conclusions that Vischer had been unwilling to draw, but which were already obvious in his aesthetic theory. Like Hanslick and Liszt, Brendel was concerned first and foremost with the problem of music’s status as a conceptual art, which should constitute its spiritual substantiality. Carl Dahlhaus observed in 1982 that this problem surpassed music critical allegiances (DAHLHAUS/MOTTE-HABER 1982, 83). Still, it deeply affected the way in which these respective stances were presented. 64 This has also been observed by Michael GRAUBART (2004), in an article that came to my attention after I wrote the present chapter. Graubart, however, merely states that ‘Hegel’s philosophical idealism is far from the crude normative teleology of Brendel’s musical history’ (2004, 24n) and does not address the question – answered in this chapter – of where Brendel might have got his ‘crude normative teleology’ from. Chapter Eight The twilight of the god and the ‘advance’ of musical scholarship Intellectual self-confidence Bis zur Gegenwart herab hat die Tonkunst unter den Musen der bildenden Künste und schönen Literatur das Los eines Aschenbrödels zu tragen gehabt. Die Philosophen, Kulturforscher, Historiker, Volkswirtschaftslehrer und Statistiker, denen allen sie zu denken und zu raten geben möchte, wußten mit der tönenden Sphinx nichts anzufangen. Sie ließen sie deshalb auf sich beruhen. – Selbst ein Kunstphilosoph wie Fr. Vischer überantwortete dem Tübinger Professor K. Köstlin die Aufgabe, sein großes Lehrsystem der Ästhetik durch kongeniale Bearbeitung des musikalischen Teiles zu ergänzen (MEINARDUS 1888, 1).xcviii Thus begins Ludwig Meinardus’s book about the history of German music. Educated as a composer, Meinardus (1827-1896) made a name for himself with his successful oratorio Luther in Worms (1876). His anti-Wagnerian writings and reviews were highly respected too, although he slightly marginalized himself in the increasingly diverse and professional field of musical aesthetics by continuously antagonising his colleagues. He was, nevertheless, productive and up to date on the aesthetic, critical and music theoretical developments of his time: he contributed to the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, the Deutsche Musik-Zeitung, and his autobiography of 1872 contains valuable information about contemporary musical life, composers and musicians. In the later nineteenth century, the mainstream of the musico-intellectual discourse was increasingly dominated by people such Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 131 as Meinardus: diligent music biographers and music theorists attempting to intervene in the debate on aesthetic issues that influenced general thinking about music. Meinardus is pursuing two aims with his focus on Vischer in the opening sentences of his book. Like E. Sobolewski in the late 1850s (Chapter Two [35-36]), Meinardus observes that music has been, and still is, misunderstood as an art. He compares it to Cinderella (Aschenbrödel), neglected and despised by her sisters. But unlike Sobolewski, Meinardus implies that mainstream ‘philosophers, cultural scholars, historians, economists and statisticians’ have missed the opportunity to engage with an artistic phenomenon that possesses so much that can be thought about and commented upon. Meinardus refuses the aggrieved defensive tone of Sobolewski, who held that only those with a musical background were allowed to enter the discourse on music. Meinardus argues instead that philosophers and historians could have developed valuable theories about music if only they had truly engaged with it. Vischer is an extremely suitable example for Meinardus: by showing his familiarity with the great ‘art philosopher’, Meinardus bolsters his own statements with intellectual authority; at the same time, he illustrates his point that mainstream philosophers underestimate the role and indeed the intellectual importance of music. Meinardus still has an ambivalent stance towards the discourse that stigmatized music as a doubtful art – he refers to it with a combination of awe and disappointment [130] – however, he also makes active attempts at bridging the gap between musical and mainstream aesthetics, proposing a tangible solution that would not have occurred to Sobolewski, about a quarter of a century earlier: Meinardus emphasizes the need to consider both music theory and musical aesthetics, and to explore what the two disciplines might offer each other. In addition, Meinardus focuses on musical practice itself, with the intention of establishing tangible links between thinking about music and making it. He often uses idealist language to describe contemporary musical developments, pointing out that the attempt to apply idealist thinking to music works both ways. Not only does the theory of music benefit from the intellectual structures of mainstream philosophy, but music has something to offer mainstream philosophy as well: its unique substance for thought and discussion. In the context of the idealist obligation to determine an art form’s content and meaning, Meinardus’s conclusion was an important sign that music critics felt they could attribute this meaning to music by themselves. The question which requires more detailed exploration is whether Meinardus’s generation actually did this. Whilst publications on musical aesthetics were rare in the first half of the nineteenth century, treatises on the subject proliferated from the 1860s onwards.65 Their tone was often polemical, with frank and open allegiances to various musical movements. There was a distinct eagerness to aesthetically position oneself. The emergence of a self-contained 65 Only Ferdinand HAND (1837) described his ideas about music as ‘aesthetics’; Amadeus Wendt (1836), Adolf Bernhard Marx (1837-1847), W. GRIEPENKERL (1847) and Eduard Krüger (1847) formulated their musical aesthetics in the context of other discourses: a theory of music, a guide to music, a history of music, etc (see Appendix Vb for bibliographical details [210]). 132 Case studies musico-intellectual discourse was nurtured not solely by the increasing confidence of music aestheticians, but also by developments within mainstream aesthetic thinking itself. The Austrian music ethnologist of Czech descent Richard Wallaschek (1860-1917) had a considerable influence on the emergence and development of this branch of musical investigation.66 According to Gregor KOKORZ (2001), Wallaschek was important for music ethnology because he was so well versed in contemporary musical aesthetics, being influenced by Ferdinand Hand and Eduard Hanslick. Kokorz also holds that Wallaschek’s success as a music ethnologist was stimulated by developments in mainstream aesthetics: Die interessante Frage ist nun, wie und aus welchen Gründen außereuropäische Musik, die zunächst keinen Gegenstand ästhetischer Untersuchungen darstellen konnte, da sie als etwas Primitives und Kunstloses betrachtet wurde, dennoch ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit rückt. Einer von zweifellos mehreren Gründen für diesen Wandlungsprozess ist in einer Entwicklung innerhalb der Ästhetik selbst zu suchen, die sich unter dem dominanten naturwissenschaftlichen Einfluss von einer philosophisch-metaphysischen Betrachtungsweise zu einer psychologischnaturwissenschaftlichen Disziplin entwickelt. (…) Mit der Erkenntnis der kulturellen Verschiedenheit ästhetischer Wertvorstellungen wird die ethnologische Forschung zu einer unentbehrlichen Ergänzung der Ästhetik (KOKORZ 2001, 1267).xcix Music ethnology in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries benefited directly from the fact that idealist cultural absolutism became subject to questioning. Kokorz even states that music ethnology became indispensable because it supplemented an aesthetic theory that was stripped of its absolutist pretensions. Cultural differences now needed to be explained. It goes without saying that these cultural differences were not only geographical (as is the case with music ethnology), but also historical and social. The process Kokorz sketches is nevertheless not as unequivocal as it might seem at first sight. In the midnineteenth century, the different art forms within the canon of Western art gradually became considered as autonomous realms, a process that is comparable, in a way, to the process of the various ‘musics’ of different cultures becoming considered as equally valuable. Sponheuer, as discussed in Chapter Three [48-49], observes that this autonomy was acquired at a certain price: several ‘musics’ within Western musical practice were 66 Wallaschek’s main music-ethnological work is his book Primitive music (WALLASCHEK 1893). In 1903, the book was translated into German with the rather different title Anfänge der Tonkunst which suggests that the investigation of ‘music of savage races’ was instrumental to the discovery of the origins of music in general. Indeed, a central aspect of Wallaschek’s theory is his Ursprungstheorie, the view that music developed from rhythm. He states, ‘from the character of primitive music, as exhibited by the musical practice of savages, I venture to conclude that the origin of music is to be sought in a general desire for rhythmical exercise, and that the “time-sense” is the physical source from which it arises’ (1893, 294). Note the empirically motivated terminology of ‘time-sense’, and the approach of the psyche being taken as a physical phenomenon. 67 This article was accessed via the internet (on 21 November 2004 at http://www-gewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/moderne/ heft6k.htm), since the journal Newsletter Moderne. Zeitschrift des Spezialforschungsbereichs Moderne was not readily available in any of the libraries I can access. The quotation is taken from the beginning of the article, so the reference to page 12 is an estimate. Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 133 dismissed as lacking spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit) in order to present music as an art that could meet the geistige requirements set out by idealists. This approach did not immediately change when idealist aesthetics lost its absolutist features and was gradually replaced with the ‘psychological-scientific’ approaches mentioned by Kokorz. On the contrary, German Bildungsbürgertum of the later nineteenth century further explored and emphasized the benefits of a ‘high culture’. Vischer’s and Brendel’s art criticism, as we have seen, are excellent examples. Kokorz is right to observe that a change in mainstream aesthetic theory contributed to the acceptance and even necessity of the study of ‘other musics’. However, the ‘cultural diversity of aesthetic value judgements’, which he suggests was behind this, only existed to a certain extent. Non-European (folk) music might have been increasingly appreciated for its peculiarity, but it is debatable whether it was also appreciated aesthetically. I would argue that while anthropological research might have benefited from this shift in mentality, it is doubtful whether music ethnology really ‘supplemented’ aesthetic theory, as Kokorz claims. Nevertheless, the possible multilateral spheres of influence between music ethnology and mainstream aesthetic theory are interesting, and Wallaschek is a case in point. Before he made a name for himself as a music ethnologist, he had engaged himself with musical aesthetics, publishing a treatise on the subject two years earlier than Meinardus, titled Ästhetik der Tonkunst (1886). Like Meinardus, he actively addressed the problems raised by mainstream aestheticians, and, again, Vischer was his main point of orientation. In the table of contents, Ästhetik der Tonkunst is divided into ‘historical-critical’ and ‘systematic’ parts, subdivided in paragraphs that are clearly reminiscent of the idealist penchant for classification. Wallaschek shows that he knows his way around the aesthetic debates of his time: the problematic position of music as an art, the opposition of formalism and an ‘aesthetics of content’, and the discussions surrounding programme music. Like many of his musical contemporaries, Wallaschek discusses Vischer at length, and seemingly reverentially (1886, 35). Whereas the 1846 treatise by the Hegelian aesthetician August Kahlert, who was well versed in music and who regularly contributed to important music journals (Chapter Two [32]), receives a mere three and a half pages in Wallaschek’s historical-critical survey, Vischer’s 1857 treatise covers no less than nine pages.68 But unlike Hanslick, Brendel, or Ludwig Bischoff (Chapter Two [35]), Wallaschek’s respect for Vischer is a prelude to the heavy criticism that follows. It is clear that Wallaschek has given the position of music in the context of idealist philosophy much thought. His primary focus is on the idealist problem of music’s alleged threefold lack of objectivity (Chapter Three [49-50]), all three aspects of which he counters. Firstly, Wallaschek questions the blunt assumption that music is a subjective art. Is music really more subjective than the other arts, he wonders (1886, 36). If one considers art to be an objectification of an artistic rather than a natural idea, as Vischer does, does it matter 68 Vischer’s 1857 treatise was specifically about music, whereas Kahlert’s Aesthetics (1846) was a general one. 134 Case studies whether an art has an example in objective reality or not? Wallaschek continues in a Vischerian line of thought, involving, as well as critically examining, Vischer’s interpretation of the musical material, which was the second argument for idealist aestheticians in support of their conviction that music lacked objectivity. Wallaschek observes that Vischer confuses the concept of musical material (the tone, which is found in nature, like all artistic material) with the systematization of it (the tone system, a product of spiritual imagination [geistige Phantasie] – 1886, 40). The process of the (natural) musical material being constructed into a musical work as ‘end product’, by means of structuring it in a tone system first, is not fundamentally different from the process of shaping a piece of stone into a sculpture, which, similarly, can be subdivided into different stages of shaping material. This is not a sound argument for claiming that music lacks ‘objective, natural’ material, argues Wallaschek. The third aspect of the idealist qualification of music’s objectivity – the alleged lack of a meaningful content – also comes under scrutiny. By opposing Vischer to Hanslick, Wallaschek carefully distinguishes between the polemic Vischer had with Zimmermann, on the one hand, and the aesthetic differences between Vischer and Hanslick, on the other. Although Wallaschek puts Hanslick and Zimmermann in the same formalist category (in his chapter titled ‘Die formalistische Ästhetik: Herbart, Zimmermann, Hanslick’), he also cites Hanslick’s indebtedness to Hegel and ‘the Hegelian School’ (Die Hegelsche Schule), as well as Hanslick’s idealist interpretation of the relation between form and content. Wallaschek admires Hanslick mostly because he distinguishes between Gehalt (meaningful substance) and Inhalt (content). As we saw in Chapter Five [100], Hanslick managed to show that music does not have conceptual content (begrifflicher Inhalt) in order to be musically meaningful, possessing musical substantiality (musikalischer Gehalt). Vischer, according to Wallaschek, wrongly assumes that music has no proper content (Inhalt) (1886, 44), because he disregards music’s meaningful substantiality (Gehalt).69 Wallaschek’s detailed and intelligent dissection of Vischer’s argument is revealing in several respects. His familiarity with idealist ways of thinking and with idealist terminology enables him to question Vischer’s assumptions by following Vischer’s own line of reasoning. It appears that, despite playing an active part in toning down Hegel’s strict hierarchy of the arts, Vischer’s own fame and authority were fading as Hegelianism lost ground. The attacks, initiated by Vischer, on the absolutist nature of idealist thinking were thus turning back on him. Zimmermann’s critiques, addressed in Chapter Five [91-93], are one instance of the increasing urge for pluralism, as was Wallaschek’s confidence. It seems that any music critic – Wallaschek was not the only one to speak about Vischer’s aesthetics in the manner described above70 – was able to handle the aesthetic tools that had emerged 69 Wallaschek is not entirely correct here. Vischer did distinguish between Inhalt and Gehalt (VISCHER 1858, 14) certainly with regard to music, but he valued conceptual content (begrifflicher Inhalt) more highly than nonconceptual content. 70 In addition to the music aestheticians mentioned in the main text, Karl Heinrich Ehrlich (1822-1899) and Arthur Seidl (1863-1928), a good friend of Richard Strauss, use praise of Vischer to introduce criticism. Seidl was, however, indebted to Vischer in several respects (see Appendix VI [213]: Ehrlich, Seidl). Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 135 from mid-nineteenth-century responses to Hegel’s own aesthetics, such as the importance of the artistic material, its peculiar relationship to imagination and the growing variety of the interpretations of Beauty. Wallaschek was not only confident enough to criticize Vischer; he was also competent enough to do so. The undermining of idealist philosophy Whereas Wallaschek argued that music does not differ fundamentally from the other arts, other music critics emphasized music’s difference, albeit not as Sobolewski did in the 1850s, complaining that nobody who is unfamiliar with the technical aspects of music has any right to say anything about it, but rather highlighting music’s special meaning and function as an ephemeral art. It is interesting in this context to take a look at August Reissmann’s Allgemeine Musiklehre of 1864, written more than twenty years before Wallaschek’s treatise. Reissmann (1825-1903) initially studied with Liszt, but later became a crusader against the New German School, and is best remembered as an excellent biographer of musicians. His quick judgements and animosity against people with views different to his own, however, made him a marginal figure. In this respect, he resembles Meinardus. In the preface to Allgemeine Musiklehre, Reissmann uses the word Musikwissenschaft,71 which he employs for indicating music theory, but also criticism and aesthetics, because, he argues, the theory/principles of music (Musiklehre) can no longer consist solely of rules. In his book, music history, music theory and brief explanations of aesthetic terminology, result in an interesting engagement with idealist thought patterns. The attention Reissmann devotes especially to Vischer’s musical aesthetics is a good illustration of this engagement.72 Like Wallaschek, Reissmann’s discussion of Vischer’s thought is tempered by a superficially laudatory tone; he calls him ‘einer der geistvollsten und unterrichtesten Aesthetiker’ (1864, 308), and ‘der berühmte und verdienstvolle Aesthetiker’ (309)c, quoting lengthy passages from the 1857 treatise (entire §§ 792 & 793). This, however, does not prevent him from attacking Vischer’s engagement with music. Reissmann proceeds from the Vischerian stance that the style of a work of art has been determined by ‘die eigenthümliche Weise, wie dieser sich in Formen darstellt, die besondere Art der Gestaltung des Materials bedingt die besondere Stylart’ (1864, 313),ci thus unreservedly connecting style and material (Figure 6 [65]). However, unlike Vischer, he considers this ‘peculiar manner of shaping the material’ as a musical skill, not as an ability to deal with idealist concepts determining the content and meaning of a musical work. Whereas Vischer still sought the perfect balance between form and content in style as an idealist capacity 71 According to Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart, this would be a relatively early use of the term (see Volume 6 (Sachteil), 1790 [entry: Musikwissenschaft] as well as BUJIĆ 1988, 342). 72 Contemporaries, such as Arthur SEIDL (1887), stressed that Reissmann was influenced by Vischer, although no details are given. 136 Case studies (Figure 5 [63]), Reissmann disapproves of this and regards style as down-to-earth musical craftsmanship, a practice or technique. The consequences of Reissmann’s qualification of Vischer’s style concept reached further than he could have imagined himself. For whilst Köstlin’s style categorizations (Chapter Three [63-64]) may seem far-fetched in a musical respect, they made sense in an intellectual context and effectively served the purpose of explaining music’s intangible features as straightforward transmitters of the various well-defined aspects of emotional life (Figure 4 [59]). Moreover, they exemplified the fundamental importance of Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’; Köstlin made his genre categorization according to the material in Vischerian sense: as building blocks for a work of art that have been spiritually and historically manipulated already, as products of the artist’s imagination. As Figures 6 [65] and 7 [67] reveal, Köstlin’s genre categorizations are connected with his style categorizations through the concept of sentient imagination, discussed in Chapter Three [66]. However, the way in which genre and style relate to each other remains ill-defined. In their own ways, they rely on sentient imagination and they both proceed from the Idea, descending from transcendental spheres. With Reissmann’s statement that styles do not depend on these spheres any longer, the entire web of various dialectical interrelations, representing the way in which a work of art manifests itself, becomes redundant. If it were not for the concept of sentient imagination, which keeps the system together regardless of the Idea, the structure would collapse like a house of cards. In attacking an instance of the system, Reissmann essentially undermines the integral system and the dualist ‘thought mould’ that underlies this system. Thus, the connections between various aesthetic concepts, such as material, style and genre, needed to be re-established and redefined. It is worthwhile to elaborate briefly on Köstlin’s genre categorizations, in order to get an impression of what it was that Reissmann dismissed. As mentioned earlier, the relevance of Köstlin’s work does not lie in musical aspects, but in philosophical ones. An important aspect was the relationship between the universal and the particular, between the macroand the micro-level, the quantitative and the qualitative. 73 Dialectical thinking allowed Köstlin to address both, without the need to exclude the one or the other, describing their tension as a historical necessity. This became, however, increasingly unconvincing when idealist concepts eroded. Reissmann, as well as Meinardus and Wallaschek were well aware of this. They appreciated the genre categorizations as an intellectual exercise, and as a model or starting point for further debate. Similar dualist thinking patterns can be spotted in the works of Hugo Riemann (1849-1919),74 Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894), Heinrich 73 It is interesting to note Köstlin’s use of concepts that may not be identical to those of his contemporaries, but do bear certain linguistic similarities revealing that there existed a kind of dualist ‘thought mould’ that shaped the conceptualization of music in the later nineteenth century. Köstlin talked, for instance, about the difference between eigentliche Melodie (melody as such) and uneigentliche Melodie developing over the course of a musical movement (VISCHER 1923, § 779: 177ff). It is reminiscent of Wagner’s concept of unendliche Melodie. Köstlin also stressed the need to differentiate between qualitative musical details and quantitative large-scale musical entities (§ 781: 191), using an analytical idiom (Melodienharmonie, for instance) that vaguely prefigured Schenker’s Ursatz. 74 Riemann attended Karl Köstlin’s lectures and studied with him in Tübingen for a few semesters. He wrote his doctoral thesis under the supervision of Eduard Krüger (see Chapter Two [31]). Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 137 Schenker (1868-1935) and last but not least, the man who entered history as the ‘founder of modern musicology’, Guido Adler (1855-1941) (see Epilogue [147]). This reveals that the urge to conceive of a theory as an integral system was still an intellectual norm. However, the supremacy of the Idea in these systems came under increasing scrutiny. The widely accepted view that the efforts of these early musicologists were largely determined by positivist thought is correct to a certain extent, but it is must be borne in mind that this positivism was already partly considered obsolete by the time they adopted it. The problematic starting point of Vischer’s musical aesthetics was the idealist account of the interaction between (genius) artist on the one hand and the material on the other, which generates the imagination of the artist that ‘individualizes’ the material into a work of art or a style (Figures 2 [19] & 6 [65]). The ingenuity of the work of art depends directly on its individuality of expression, which Vischer unreservedly connected with Anschaulichkeit: ‘observability’ (VISCHER 1923, § 765: 71). Music disturbs the neat scheme: ‘Das Individuelle wird […] in der Musik seinen Ausdruck finden, aber nur wie ein Geahntes, das im Augenblick, wo man es fassen will, wieder als zu unbestimmt ins Dunkel entschwindet’ (VISCHER 1923, § 765: 69).cii Due to its temporal rather than spatial manifestation music emerges at the surface, but retreats again into the inner dark spheres of the soul. However, Vischer brought up an alternative to purely visual manners of conceptualizing a work of art: the phenomenon of sentient imagination (empfindende Phantasie – Chapter Three [58]). It constitutes its own kind of individualization since it has command over the inner parts of the soul, over feeling in its subconscious and not yet verbally determinate existence (Figure 4 [59]). The concept of sentient imagination bears a striking resemblance to the way in which Vischer interpreted the artistic material as conceived of by the Spirit rather than by nature. The distinction between material and imagination became increasingly vague in Vischer’s aesthetics (Chapter Three [65-66]). In order to establish his genre categorizations, Köstlin emphasized the direct relationship between sentient imagination and the spiritualized material (VISCHER 1923, § 796: 248-251). He explained how sentient imagination individualizes itself by dialectically splitting up in vocal and instrumental music (Figure 7 [67]). Köstlin’s entire genre classification has been based on this division. Despite the fact that he considered instrumental music to be the more objective of the two (due to its independence from other means of expression) Köstlin devoted much more attention to the genres of indirect, subjective vocal music than to instrumental music. He defended this by arguing that subjective art forms need more differentiation than objective ones (VISCHER 1923, § 794: 244), but considering the fact that Köstlin makes the genre differentiations largely on the basis of extra-musical criteria, such as the nature of emotions, the choice of subject-matter, or the nature of action, he might have had more practical reasons for focusing on vocal rather than instrumental music (Chapter Three [68]). Dahlhaus observes (1973b, 873) that apart from Ferdinand Hand, Köstlin was one of the few aestheticians who truly engaged with the fundamental classicist categories of genre theory: the epic, the lyrical and the 138 Case studies dramatic.75 Köstlin tried hard to explain genres as belonging to either the epic, the lyrical or the dramatic, classifying the cantata, for instance, as a lyrical genre by describing it as a ‘reproduction of the lied at a higher stage and in a more universal manner’ (VISCHER 1923, § 804: 293). He thus chose to neglect all dramatic and epic aspects of the cantata, or else explained them simply as musical means of expression (294), which were apparently exempt from classification. However, since Köstlin was concerned with dialectics, subjective and objective manifestations of the Idea could be relatively easily combined or mixed, which makes Köstlin, according to Dahlhaus, ‘ein Apologet der Stil- und Gattungsmischung’ (1973b, 877).ciii Dahlhaus points at Köstlin’s description of the lied genre (VISCHER 1923, § 800: 261) and the aria (§ 802: 271-286), the latter being particularized in such detail as a mixture of the lyrical and the dramatic that it seems to lose its generic features as an aria. In fact, Köstlin described an aria as a ‘dramatic monologue’, Dahlhaus argues (1973b, 894). Dahlhaus’s remark seems to confirm my observation that Vischer’s treatise tried to maintain the systematic aesthetics of the idealist tradition, but in doing so, caused it to implode. Köstlin undermined the clarity of his genre classification by particularizing the genres to such an extent that they became almost individualized on the level of works of art. However, Dahlhaus fails to observe that in the entire 150 pages of his genre theory, Köstlin hardly mentioned one single musical piece, which makes even an unintentional deconstruction of genre entirely ineffective.76 The genre is a focal point in which the tension between a particularization of idealist aesthetics and a generalization of individual works of art emerges in a most urgent way. This makes Köstlin’s genre categorizations interesting. As observed in Chapter Three [68], his categories were based on Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’ that were aimed at finding a particular content for music as a manifestation of the Spirit. Köstlin succeeded in this by resorting to the connection of specific genres (whether vocal or instrumental) to particular characteristics, emotional states of mind and ways of expression (Chapter Three [68]). These essentially extra-musical features provided music with its spiritual particularity because they related directly to music’s content: the realm of inner feeling (Figure 4 [59]). Thanks to the tight connection between imagination and material in Vischer’s aesthetics, the content of music (inner feeling) could be presented as a range of historicized features (such as states of mind and ways of expression). Through the concept of sentient imagination that functions both as imagination and as (historicized) material, Köstlin was able to describe the genres, like the styles, as historicized and as proceeding from the Absolute as Idea. 75 Dahlhaus’s article contains, to my knowledge, the only reasonably detailed engagement with Köstlin’s musical genre categorizations so far. 76 The genre theory (150 pages) formed the major part of Köstlin’s book. He also quite extensively addressed what he called ‘music theory’ (another 150 pages): a description of intervals, keys, harmony, rhythm, dynamics, and a very basic explanation of counterpoint and composition forms. Shorter passages in his book contained an odd 30 pages on instruments, and about 40 pages on music history. Musical pieces were mentioned only in the context of his ‘music theory’, none were used for the explanation of genres, where they would have been much more useful. Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 139 Style, the ability to fit in with the material (Figure 6 [65]), was an indispensable medium between Idea and reality: it was considered to be the perfect balance between form and content, between unmediated* and mediated idealism (Figure 5 [63]). The historical development of styles depended on the amount of these two components (form dominating content or vice versa). Modern music, Köstlin argued, is characterized by an overabundance of mediated idealism, breaking out of its forms; it cannot be classified because it is ‘durch keinen Typen mehr gebunden’ (VISCHER 1923, § 831: 451). The only solution to this free subjectivity in stylistic respect is reviving a genre: German opera (Figure 7 [67]). Reissmann’s critique of Vischer’s and Köstlin’s style concept touches directly on the insufficiently defined relationship between style and genre in Vischer’s aesthetics. Reissmann, quoting Köstlin’s rather far-fetched style categories (discussed in Chapter Three [63-64]), quickly reaches the conclusion that they do not make sense with regard to music (REISSMANN 1864, 309). Despite this, he acknowledges the merit of them as an intellectual exercise in attributing a specificity of expression to music. Thus, he proposes a number of his own style categories on the basis of a musical specificity of expression, and in so doing specifies what Vischer and Köstlin left unaccounted: the relationship between style and genre. Reissmann bases his styles not on vaguely defined proportions of form and content (unmediated and mediated idealism), but on the genres. Thus, Reissmann derives the style categories from what Vischer had labelled genre categories, distinguishing between vocal and instrumental styles, as well as madrigal, oratorio and lied style, for example. The tangible appearances of music are more important for Reissmann than their origins in the Idea. Yet, like Vischer, he is unwilling to give up the supremacy of the Idea. He concludes his book by stating how important it is for an artist to have command (Herrschaft) over the entire range of artistic material. Only the artist who possesses this command is able to adopt a particular style under the compelling influence of a particular Idea (1864, 318 – See Appendix VI [213]: Reissmann). Reissmann uses the musical material as a criterion for genre classification because it safeguards a musical particularity (in the form of compositional techniques) and also refers to the historicized Spirit. He is indebted here to Vischer’s historicized interpretation of the material. Reissmann’s book was written two decades before Meinardus and Wallaschek formulated their criticism of Vischer’s aesthetics and idealist lines of reasoning remain rather unquestionable for Reissmann. However, once underway the gradual undermining of the Idea’s supremacy and relevance was unstoppable. In the later nineteenth century, it became increasingly acknowledged that musical style should be determined by looking at musical aspects: its material as technique rather than as a product of the Spirit. It was considered more important to engage with musical style as a technique than to determine how music fitted in the larger context of human expression and development. In the 1870s and 1880s, an increasing number of aestheticians began to suggest that Vischer and Köstlin, with their relatively limited knowledge of music, had said 140 Case studies little about the former, because they had been interested solely in the latter. Thus, it was also felt that an insight into the one did not necessarily lead to intelligent engagement with the other. This meant that the effort to explain all forms of human expression, including music, from one sole principle was gradually abandoned. The retreat of the Idea The retreat of the Idea can be observed even better in the aesthetics of Vischer’s most loyal follower, Ernst von Elterlein, a pseudonym for the music critic Ernst Gottschald. Elterlein had reviewed Vischer’s musical aesthetics in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik (1857a & 1857b), and wrote a book about Beethoven’s symphonies (Beethoven’s Symphonien nach ihrem idealen Gehalt) with the intention of applying Vischer’s aesthetics directly to music. The first edition of this book, published anonymously, dates from 1854. The second edition of 1858, ‘entirely revised and extended’, served to make Vischer’s ‘epochemachende Geistesthat’ more accessible to musicians (ELTERLEIN 1858, viii).77 The 1858 edition, published shortly after Vischer’s 1857 volume on music, was dedicated to Vischer (‘Herrn Prof. Dr. Friedrich Theodor Vischer in Zürich aus innigster Verehrung und aufrichtigster Dankbarkeit gewidmet vom Verfasser’),civ with a two-page eulogy to Vischer (ELTERLEIN 1858, v & vi). Throughout the book, Vischerian terminology is obvious in Elterlein’s descriptions of Beethoven’s music. 78 Like Vischer, Elterlein argues that ‘particularity of expression’ (Bestimmtheit des Empfindungsausdruckes) should be the first and foremost concern of any artist. He draws on Vischer’s works in invoking the concepts of Lust (inclination) and Unlust (reluctance), which determine the range of moods (Empfindungen) that safeguards this particularity of expression (1858, 83) (Figure 4 [59]). Vischer’s division of music into vocal and instrumental and their different modes of expression is used by Elterlein to show Beethoven’s superiority compared to other composers, notably contemporary ones (1858, 91). Beethoven was peerless, because he was a master of particularity of expression. Even in his symphonies and instrumental music, he could express any mood in all its specificity. However, Elterlein does observe problems in the music after Beethoven: Das Streben nach möglichst bestimmten Ausdruck führt aber zuletzt dahin, die Musik als Musik aufzuheben. Ein solches Princip welches die Grundlage des Selbstmords der Musik bildet oder bilden kann, kann unmöglich höchstes Princip derselben sein. Darauf ist bei Berlioz und Liszt zurückzukommen. (ELTERLEIN 1858, 91)cv 77 I have managed to locate the second (1858) and third (1870) editions of Elterlein’s book. Considering that the 1858 edition is Vischer’s 1857 music volume in a nutshell, the first edition of Elterlein’s book (1854) must have been quite different, as it was written before Vischer’s treatise appeared. 78 Elterlein, like many of his contemporaries, also draws on E.T.A. Hoffmann without acknowledging him. He compares Beethoven’s music with Haydn (childlike idealism – 1858, 20) and Mozart (beautiful, free, harmonic humanity [Menschlichkeit]), and describes Beethoven’s music as ‘great and rich artistic subjectivity’ (1858, 21). In 1813, Hoffmann described the music by Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven in very similar terms (HOFFMANN 1947, 58). Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 141 The quest for particularity has become impossible for the music of the present. After Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, music can no longer express anything determinate without the assistance of words. With Hegel’s and notably Vischer’s characterization of vocal music at the back of his mind, Elterlein concludes that music strives for its own dissolution if it strives for verbal particularity, which is at the same time a sublation (Aufhebung). Elterlein addresses contemporary music in order to illustrate the process of the end of art, and music’s crucial role therein, as described by Hegel and Vischer (Figure 8 [73]). The music of Berlioz and Liszt is the first step towards music’s suicide (Selbstmord). What Liszt and Berlioz call a poetic idea, establishing a programme for their music, is not a musical idea, but rather a thought. Therefore, it does not have much to do with the peculiar development and prospects of music (ELTERLEIN 1858, 130).79 Like Vischer and Hanslick, Elterlein turns against the alleged mixture of genres in programme music, because it violates the boundary between vocal and instrumental music, which obscures the kind of meaning that music could express. More than Hanslick or Brendel, Elterlein is an idealist philosopher in the Hegelian sense: he thinks in classification categories, and believes in unequivocal and unified developments that move towards well-defined goals. Elterlein holds that Beethoven’s music has replaced ancient art as the model for all art production because of its particularity of expression. He therefore turns against the concept of absolute music (1858, 81). Abstract, general content, even if it is connected with musical features, is not particular enough for Elterlein. Ideal content in the guise of conceptual clarity is more important to him than musical form and the kind of unidentified feeling it is able to express. This stance shows once again that Elterlein was primarily concerned with directly applying Vischer’s theory to music. Elterlein does not approach Vischer’s theory as intelligently as Hanslick; he does not seem to have clearly defined views of his own and does not elaborate on or explain Vischer’s concepts, nor does he adapt them to his own critical stance. Elterlein’s lack of critical sense is unique in the musical-aesthetic reception of Vischer’s thought. On the one hand, this accounts for Elterlein’s naivety, but, on the other hand, Elterlein’s book highlights the emancipatory nature of Vischer’s aesthetics for music. Elterlein adored Vischer, because he felt that Vischer had given music its ideal content and ideal value by means of his differentiated ‘aesthetics of feeling’. He described the merit of Vischer’s aesthetics for the musical realm: it contributed to the ‘Gleichberechtigung der Musik mit den anderen Künsten’ (1858, 3),cvi evaluating music more positively than Hegel’s aesthetics because Vischer appreciated the ‘peculiar relationship between content 79 This observation is not Elterlein’s; he follows August Wilhelm Ambros (1816-1876): ‘Er [Ambros] nennt die Musik, wie sie Berlioz giebt die Musik des in den Ton aufgelösten Wortes, sein Princip ein nicht sowohl un- als aussermusikalisches Princip und meint, dass Berlioz sein Genius an einen Punct getragen habe, wo alle Musik eigentlich schon aufhöre. Auch wir bekennen uns zu dieser Ansicht.’ (ELTERLEIN 1858, 124) [Ambros argues that in Berlioz’s music, words dissolve in tones, that his premise is an extra-musical rather than an unmusical one, and that Berlioz has driven his genius to a point where all music has in fact already stopped. We agree with this point of view.] 142 Case studies and form in the realm of music’ much better than Hegel.80 Throughout, I have shown that the image of Vischer as bringing music into the hallowed realm of fine art is exaggerated, if not blatantly incorrect, and that Vischer distrusted music as a proper spiritual power in several respects. However, aspects of his Materialbegriff (also referred to by Meinardus, Wallaschek, and Reissmann) could be used to counter accusations that music is an art that lacks objectivity and hence an ideal content. Aspects of his ‘aesthetics of feeling’, meticulously describing the kind of feeling music was able to express, and the exact place in the human psyche that music could access, could be, and indeed were, used to put music in a more favourable light. Reissmann’s style categories and Elterlein’s ‘aesthetic of feeling’ illustrate this. Considering Elterlein’s respect for Vischer, the third edition in 1870 of Beethoven’s Symphonien, commemorating the centenary of Beethoven’s birth, does have several rather surprising aspects. This time, the book is dedicated not to Vischer, but to ‘Herr Professor Dr. Karl Köstlin in Tübingen’. Although Vischer is regularly mentioned and quoted, he now has to compete with other philosophers: Moriz Carrière, Eduard Krüger, Franz Brendel, Eduard von Hartmann and, above all, Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer (17881860) had written Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung as early as 1818, formulating quite a radical alternative to Hegel’s strict hierarchy of the arts. It is not surprising therefore that Schopenhauer’s theory did not enter mainstream aesthetic thinking before 1850, when Hegel’s pantheon of the arts started to be considered increasingly problematic. Schopenhauer interpreted a manifold collection of ideas as nothing more than representations, modes of (human) experiences, of the Will. Music, in Schopenhauer’s system, surpasses the ideas, and thus also surpasses representation; it is a direct manifestation of the Will (SCHOPENHAUER 1974, 366). Schopenhauer’s description of the supreme position of music coincides with a clear degradation of the function of the ideas. Schopenhauer abandons the historical systematization of the arts; he does not consider poetry or drama as the ultimate art, for which music is a mere dialectical precondition, but attributes this universal position to music, without a historical dimension. Thus, he implicitly also disconnects music from modernity. Vischer’s fear that music’s features and powers could defy his aesthetic system may in fact have been justified. With Hegel’s hierarchy of the arts becoming subject to increasing scrutiny, many music critics were attracted to Schopenhauer’s view; influential people such as Wagner as much as minor critics like Elterlein. In the third edition of Beethoven’s Symphonien, Elterlein hardly refers to the ‘attribution of ideal content’, whereas particularity of expression, inner life and Gefühl are still important. They now function without the supervision of the Idea. Whether this happened only under the influence of Schopenhauer is debatable. Hilmar Roebling argues that it is not correct to assume that the concept of the Idea had become unimportant in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Roebling notes that Schopenhauer, like 80 ‘eigenthümliche Verhältniss zwischen Inhalt und Form in der Sphäre der Musik’ (ELTERLEIN 1858, 3) Chapter Eight – The twilight of the god 143 Vischer, still regarded Beauty as the presentation of the Idea; the two philosophers only formulate this differently (ROEBLING 1971, 104). Vischer’s concept of sentient imagination (empfindende Phantasie) similarly avoids representational capacities of the Spirit, getting beyond them in order to sense rather than consider what the pure inner essence of emotional life is (VISCHER 1923, § 747: 6). Karl Köstlin skilfully applies Vischer’s concept of sentient imagination to explain the extraordinary power of instrumental music as a means towards a temporary unification of sentient and intellectual capacities, and hence a temporary reconciliation with the Absolute (a form of mediated idealism) (§ 796: 251). This is only a few steps removed from Schopenhauer’s interpretation of music surpassing the ideas. Whereas Schopenhauer refutes the Hegelian hierarchy of the arts, Vischer tries to expand it, adapting it to his time, even if his inclusion of contemporary views makes the system come apart at the seams. As discussed earlier, Vischer became increasingly vague about how and when the eventual reconciliation with the Absolute would take place. Elterlein follows him in this respect, describing musical particularity as a kind of ‘schöner freier Menschlichkeit’ (1870, 12-13).cvii Like Vischer, Elterlein formulates this teleology in increasingly non-committal terms, as an aspect of human behaviour and human nature rather than as a metaphysical process. What this all reveals is that, after 1850, a gradual but irrevocable change in value judgements started to occur. Idealist aesthetic issues and concepts themselves remained important, but the way in which they came to be interpreted changed radically. Nietzsche is important in this respect as he elaborated on Schopenhauer’s insight that the metaphysical structures set out by idealists such as Kant and Hegel had become ordinary and human, and seemed to have lost their transcendental power. Whereas Schopenhauer seemed to find this discomforting, Nietzsche interpreted it already in his very early writings as an empowering, life-affirming, and positive liberation from choking structures (MORITZ 2002, 82). The fact that Nietzsche associated this liberating process with the ‘Dionysian’ rather than ‘Apollonian’ aspects of art implies that the association of music with the licentious, uncontrollable, intoxicating, and possibly even diabolical, was still manifest, but that it was valued entirely differently. At first sight, this development seems to contain emancipatory consequences for the emergence of a musico-intellectual discourse. Existing intellectual frameworks, such as categorizations, aesthetic terms and tools, such as Beauty, material and imagination, were increasingly interpreted in musical terms. Reissmann felt that he could base his style categories on musical features, without having to legitimize music as a manifestation of the Idea. Substantial contributions to the discourse of musicology emerged thanks to this fruitful symbiosis of idealism and empiricism. Helmholtz’s attempt to establish a physiological basis for the theory of music (1863), Oettingen’s harmonic dualism (1866), Adler’s sketches for a Musikwissenschaft with various neatly classified branches (1885), 144 Case studies Riemann’s theories of harmony (from the last years of the nineteenth century), 81 the efforts of Curt Sachs (1881-1959) and Erich von Hornbostel (1877-1935) to set up an integral classification of musical instruments (1914), and Schenker’s division in Hintergrund, Mittelgrund and Vordergrund for the analysis of music all draw on the conceptual framework set out by mid-nineteenth century systematic philosophy for carrying out their empirically motivated investigations. The retreat of the Idea as the foundation of aesthetic thinking nurtured an aesthetics of music that was able to develop into various directions: Zimmermann’s formalism and Wallaschek’s ethnology are examples of aesthetic theories that managed either to put the prejudices of idealist philosophy behind them or to use them in such a way as to put music’s unique position in a favourable light. Aesthetic theory as the study of Beauty was thus stripped of its promise of providing clear-cut answers to the question of what Beauty was. As it would no longer function as one of the three manifestations of the Spirit, Beauty needed define itself from something else. With idealism losing its authority, the question of what Beauty could be was in fact more pressing than ever. If it was not a transcendental manifestation of the Spirit, was it perhaps simply sensory enjoyment? Essence? Functionality? Particularity of expression? Due to the necessity to legitimize music as a proper spiritual power, Hanslick, Brendel and Liszt were forced to engage with the question what musical Beauty was. This led to problematic, sometimes confusing or far-fetched, but also thought-provoking essays exploring the way in which the ‘essence’ of music could be put into words. Once this legitimation crisis had been dispelled, music scholars no longer felt the urge to explain the musical premises, on which they based their theories, in conceptual terms. With the critical and aesthetic views uttered by Vischer, Liszt, Hanslick and Brendel, more and more alternatives were considered possible for the conceptualization of music, grasping music by means of sentient imagination, mediated idealism or the musical material. Music history, music ethnology, music theory and analysis provided the young discipline with academic respectability, investigating the outer features of music in great detail, but the awkward relationship between music and conceptualization was left aside. Meinardus, as mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, confidently implied that he could attribute meaning to music on the basis of musical features. Attributing meaning to an art, however, depends on the art’s function or position in a larger context or on its character or identity, whatever that may be. If this identity is formulated in purely musical terms, what consequences does this have for the attribution of meaning? Whilst fruitful and necessary research into the outer features of music proliferated, this poignant question remained largely unanswered among the music scholars of the later nineteenth century. 81 Alexander Rehding, in his insightful study into Riemann’s thought, extensively addresses the dichotomy of the speculative and the practical side of Riemann’s music theory (REHDING 2003, 65-66), and notes the ‘holistic illusion’ of Riemann’s system (184), which tried to fit all musical styles in the framework of his theoretical assertions (107-112). Rehding describes Riemann’s ‘harmonic dualism’ as a tool to keep the system together. The systematic and organic nature of his investigations safeguarded their academic respectability. Epilogue The feeble foundations of musicology This investigation into the relationship between mid-nineteenth-century mainstream idealist aesthetics and a developing musico-intellectual discourse has revealed that music critics with diverse musical backgrounds and allegiances were all concerned with the legitimation of music as a proper fine art. This effort gained a chance to succeed when Hegel’s strict aesthetic system was adapted and revised by his followers, before it finally lost its viability in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The large-scale transcendental developments sketched by Hegel were interpreted, specified, or simply changed by a generation of midnineteenth-century aestheticians, represented by Friedrich Vischer. These adaptations gave music critics the opportunity to connect with a normative intellectual discourse, which had, up to then, dismissed music as an art that did not meet the requirement of spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit) in the form of conceptual clarity. The adaptations of Hegel’s aesthetics led to a fundamentally different view on the concept of Beauty. Beauty was to be derived from tangible manifestations of art in the form of contemporary works of art, or from current social goals, not from its function as a ‘gateway’ into a metaphysical dimension. Although the failed democratic upheavals in 1848 confirmed the need to make Hegel’s system less transcendental, the primary goal of reconciling reality with the Idea through art and Beauty, remained important after 1848. Thus, art was still expected to be conceptual in order to be spiritually substantial. The greater variety of interpretations of how this reconciliation could take place allowed music critics to contribute their own interpretations. Franz Brendel took his chance and put music on the map as the art that could best prepare a ‘new form of consciousness’. Due to its abstract and subjective qualities, music was best able to express its own abstract and subjective time. In Brendel’s thought the distinction between modern music and music 146 Epilogue criticism became extremely vague. Both had the purpose of transforming music into an art that is able to transmit conceptual content in the form of the features of its time. Eduard Hanslick’s interpretation of musical Beauty is similarly indebted to mainstream idealist aesthetics dating from after 1848. Vischer’s emphasis on the material of art as something that has been preformed by the human spirit rather than by nature made the tonal system (being the preformed and relatively intangible material of music) more acceptable in an idealist respect. Vischer’s emphasis on the prominent function of the material in the realization of a work of art enabled Hanslick to highlight the capabilities of the musical material to absorb and contain the extent to which the development of music itself had advanced. This played an essential role in Hanslick’s aim to explain music’s spiritual substantiality, contrary to Brendel, in musical rather than conceptual terms. Franz Liszt, assisted by the philosophically well-versed Princess Carolyne von SaynWittgenstein, also presented his idea of programme music in the context of mid-nineteenthcentury idealist aesthetic requirements. In the context of Hegel’s Aesthetics, music did not stand a chance of expressing epistemological content without the assistance of text. In Vischer’s Aesthetics, however, the content of purely instrumental music (the inner realm of feeling) was investigated in such detail that music’s allegedly uncontrollable powers could be presented as straightforward transmitters of well-defined content. This served Vischer’s aim of describing music as a respectable art. The result of this project, however, was that the realm of inner feeling could be considered as an almost equal alternative to the realm of consciousness. Vischer implicitly suggested the possibility that it could contain meaning independently from conscious (i.e. conceptual) understanding. Liszt grasps this possibility to announce the independence of instrumental music possessing its own meaningful realm. He selectively ‘quotes’ from Hegel’s Aesthetics, actively seeking a link with the authoritative intellectual discourse that Hegel represented, but is in fact drawing on Vischerian responses to Hegel’s aesthetics. The attempts to construct and describe a realm that exclusively belonged to music were instigated by the idealist requirement that music should be described as a manifestation of the Spirit. This requirement gradually became less important during the second half of the nineteenth century. Whilst all-encompassing systematizations and classifications of musical features were still considered to be normative in the 1870s and 1880s, the urge to attribute a conceptual content to music (which underlay these classification attempts in the first place) was increasingly lost from view. There was a distinct tendency to describe music in its own musical terms, but without the necessity felt to think about what these musical terms might be or might mean. Thus, musical genres and styles could at last be described according to musical features rather than to discursive or representational ones. Aesthetic formalism, music analysis and scientifically orientated research of acoustical and psychological perception, as well social-scientific investigations into the music of non-Western cultures, slowly acquired scholarly respectability. The feeble foundations of musicology 147 These achievements undoubtedly contributed to the development of an independent musico-intellectual discourse that could handle an increasing range of aesthetic concepts such as the material of music, style, genre, and form more freely. These concepts, however, had been created and employed in order to describe music as a conceptual art, as a manifestation of the Spirit. The multifaceted musico-intellectual discourse that gradually acquired a basis as an academic discipline called Musikwissenschaft adhered to these concepts, but it abandoned the requirement that music transmit conceptually definable meaning.82 While it was accepted that music’s content and meaning defied conceptualization, hardly any thought was given to the question of the conditions by which they could be grasped instead, if they could not be described in concepts. Since conceptualization remained normative in the academic world, the study of music’s content and meaning was increasingly neglected. The musicological attention moved towards conceptualization of music’s outer features instead. Some musicologists used Hanslick’s fame in order to describe music solely in terms of the ‘sounding forms of motion’ (HANSLICK 1990, 75), thus ignoring the philosophical context, put forward in this study, in which Hanslick had brought up this statement.83 The much-discussed contributions by Guido Adler and Hugo Riemann in the last decades of the nineteenth century are decisive in this development. For their presentation of musicology as an academic discipline, both men relied on the existing critical debates about music, as initiated a couple of decades earlier by Hanslick and Brendel. Bojan Bujić, in his historical survey of nineteenth-century aesthetic thought, observes that both Adler and Riemann had practical intentions with their efforts to transform the thinking about music into a respectable academic discipline (BUJIĆ 1988, 343). In the same way as Brendel used music criticism as an instrument in his social Bildungsbürger ideology, Adler was concerned primarily with what Volker Kalisch describes as a ‘wissenschaftlich kontrollierte[n] Brückenschlag zwischen Musikwissenschaft und Musikkultur’ (KALISCH 2000, 71),cviii which, he adds, was a double task (eine Doppelaufgabe). This is clearly reminiscent of the double legitimation crisis that Brendel and his companions were struggling with a couple of decades earlier. It was not only Brendel’s colleagues in the philosophical world who were sceptical about music’s ability to be subjected to critical investigation (and hence to a function in society); his fellow musicians doubted whether criticism would contribute anything to the prospects of music itself. Whereas Brendel did not seem to be affected by these reservations, travelling along his own path of formulating music’s conceptual clarity unperturbed, Adler wanted to appease both camps. 82 For the problematic translation of the word Musikwissenschaft into English ‘musicology’, see BUJIĆ 1988, 342 and REHDING 2003, 1n. The intention to unite Musik and Wissenschaft draws on the intellectual climate in which systematic thought and empiricism needed to be combined, and it was carried out by people ‘who occupied the middle ground between philosophical speculation and scientific rigour’ (BUJIĆ 1988, 341). 83 In the first decade of the twentieth century, Ferruccio Busoni, in his ‘Sketch of a new aesthetic of music’ (1907), complained about this: ‘man [macht] eine Ehrensache daraus “musikalisch” zu sein, das heisst, […] hauptsächlich sie [music] in ihren technischen Ausdrucksmittel zu verstehen und deren Gesetze einzuhalten’ (BUSONI [c. 1916], 26). [People feel in honour bound to be “musical”, that is: understand music predominantly in terms of its technical means of expression and observe their laws]. 148 Epilogue Adler intended to give musicology a place among the other humanities, just as midnineteenth-century critics had wanted to give music a place in Hegel’s pantheon of the arts. He chose to concentrate the study of music on the musical work, preferably in its historical context. In this way, he could present his discipline as the study of a tangible ‘object’, fulfilling the academic (read: idealist) requirement of objectivity, whereas he could also keep in touch with the realm of ‘music production’: the sceptical composers and performers. The most striking feature of Adler’s interpretation of musicology, however, was his dualist approach of its historical aspects versus ‘the rest’, which he conveniently summarized as ‘systematic musicology’, but which he clearly valued less (KALISCH 2000, 73).84 Adler brought forward this classification, because he felt he had to appeal both to speculative systematic idealism (with an exclusive focus on history) and to rigorous empiricism (with an exclusive focus on observability). By focussing on the history of the musical work of art as an object he could unite these two normative academic approaches that had dominated the intellectual climate in the mid-nineteenth century, but came under increasing scrutiny during Adler’s own time (Chapter Seven [123n]). Thus, Adler stayed in line with similar, but earlier, efforts to institutionalize the study of the visual arts (appropriately called ‘art history’) and literature. Adler’s ad hoc solutions to problems that were partly obsolete and hence cosmetic in nature rather than fundamentally aesthetic led to methodological premises that were, according to Kalisch, extremely superficial and fortuitous (2000, 80). The fundamental aesthetic questions about music’s essence and meaning as an ‘expressive’ or communicative force rather than as a collection of straightforward objects were entirely sidelined in Adler’s interpretation of musicology, which is ironic, since – as established in this study – precisely those questions had created the idealist norms that Adler was still drawing on, but certainly did not understand. As observed by Jim Samson, among others, Adler’s ‘influential scheme […] effectively distanced the unworthy art of the present from the perfection of a classical canon’ (SAMSON 1999, 39). Adler thus turned away from the necessity felt by mid-nineteenth-century critics to use the art of the present as an interpretative tool for interrogating their subject for its meaning, function and content in a larger context. Adler’s system would undoubtedly have been forgotten if today’s institutionalized musicology, especially on the Continent, would not have been almost exclusively based on its premises.85 Bruno Nettl observes that musicology, thanks to Adler and unlike the other art studies, still cherishes ‘holistic’ pretensions that are difficult to live up to (NETTL 1999, 288). Anselm Gerhard states, in the same self-critical anthology in which Kalisch’s essay 84 Parts of Adler’s 1885 essay from the Vierteljahrschrift für Musikwissenschaft are available in English in Bujić’s anthology (1988, 348-355). See Appendix IIc [174]. 85 Bujić formulates the same observation in a somewhat friendlier manner: ‘by overstressing the diversion [between history and aesthetics] [Adler] weakened the chance of an interaction between historical studies and the areas covered by the discipline forming his ‘systematic musicology’ and it could be argued that the legacy of this is noticeable in the entire subsequent history of musicology’ (BUJIĆ 1988, 343). Bruno NETTL (1999, 287), Jim SAMSON (1999, 35) and Alastair WILLIAMS (2001, 2) observe these consequences too. The feeble foundations of musicology 149 appeared, that not even the position and indifferent behaviour of German music academics in the dark years between 1933 and 1945, a period which is generally acknowledged to have emerged from the ideological climate of the later nineteenth century, provided enough reason for revising late-nineteenth-century premises, stances, and views about music as consisting of nothing but self-contained ‘objects’ that would never be employed politically or ideologically. (GERHARD 2000, 7). This does not mean that Adler’s approach has not led to fruitful musicological investigations, to thought-provoking insights into the various musical works as objects, as well as into aspects of music as a phenomenon of human expression. However, the premises of this approach, adopted in a musico-intellectual climate that had just halfheartedly liberated itself from the choking embrace of German idealism, have – until recently – hardly been subject to investigation. In the past decades, the expressions of unease with established musicological practice have been growing in number, in the English-speaking academic world to start with (the so-called ‘new’ or ‘postmodern’ musicology in the 1980s and the orientation towards ‘performativity’ and deconstructivism in the 1990s), but increasingly also in German musicological circles. The gap between history and philosophy seems to be narrowing slightly and hesitantly. Many of these recent achievements, however valuable and necessary they may be, do not seem to be able or willing to engage with the reasons for Adler’s neglect of interpretation that determined the further development of the musicological discipline to such a large extent. Take, for instance, Kevin Korsyn’s recently published critique of contemporary musical research (KORSYN 2003). Korsyn observes how three components of aesthetic ideology, (1) the self-identical subject, (2) the work of art as object, and (3) its unified historical context, form a ‘Bermuda Triangle’ in keeping each other imprisoned and disorientated (KORSYN 2003, 45-46). He notes that this situation (which is, in fact, Adler’s conception of the discipline, although Korsyn does not mention him) leads to factions and interest groups within musicology which seek to present themselves as legitimizing musicology, thereby disqualifying the other instances of the discipline as unessential or unimportant (2003, 79). This rather easily leads Korsyn to the statement that an ‘essence of music does not exist’ (2003, 41), adding quickly that by essence he means: an ‘unchanging or timeless’ essence. With all his good intentions and critical observations Korsyn, like Adler, fails to see the issue at hand, namely a methodological issue that should not be seen as causing a ‘crisis of musical research’ (KORSYN 2003, 34), but rather as having been an intrinsic part of the study of music ever since Hegel disseminated the eighteenth-century requirement of conceptual clarity. In dismissing an ‘essence’ of music, Korsyn implicitly admits that there is a problematic relationship between music and hermeneutics, which, in part, relates to music’s difficult conceptualization, but Korsyn is unwilling to pursue this problem as an aspect of the issue he is investigating. Korsyn’s book seems to find itself in the middle of his aesthetic Bermuda Triangle, because it does not engage with the history of his discipline 150 Epilogue and, indeed, with aesthetics. The conviction that it was necessary to establish such thing as an ‘essence’ for music became powerful in the context of Hegelian idealism. Aestheticians such as Vischer intended to discuss music in similar terms as other forms of human expression, purely in order to set up a framework of descriptive tools that could intellectually deal with music as an art that transmitted a conceptual content. What do we do with those tools if we insist that music does not transmit a conceptual content? And which tools are we going to use instead? Adler did not ask himself these questions, nor does Korsyn. He does not want to connect his own dismissal of an ‘essence’ of music with the rather peculiar roots of his discipline. These roots have not only a historical dimension, but also a more general philosophical implication. Arnold Whittall observes that the relationship between music and the use of words touches on the issue of music’s autonomy. We need words as soon as we want to understand something ‘in its own right’ (WHITTALL 1999, 73). Whittall explores the Hegelian dictum that acquiring an own identity, and hence autonomy, can only be reached through conceptual thought (Chapter One [20]). This premise is, indeed, very difficult to get away from. However, it gives rise to the paradox, made painfully explicit in the context of idealist thought, but increasingly smothered by Adler and his contemporaries, that a phenomenon allegedly functioning independently from concepts needs to be conceptualized in order to be regarded as an independent realm. Only few musicologists (STROHM 1997, 263; WILLIAMS 2001, 42) have realized that, due to this very paradox, present musicology, regardless of its postmodern or poststructuralist inclinations, is still determined by the ‘grand narrative’ of idealist dialectical thought. Unlike Hanslick, Liszt and Brendel, musicologists from Adler to Korsyn have failed to consciously establish their position with regard to this ‘grand narrative’. They adhere to the intellectual means that were used to describe music as a conceptual art, while also insisting on music’s ‘musical’ autonomy. This attends the widely perceived lack of interpretative theory, musicology’s alleged impotence when it comes to going beyond the description of music’s outer features, leading to an insecurity which does not seem to be identified as such. When conceptualizing music in its own musical terms, musicologists feel obliged to legitimize themselves as scholars in the academic world, whilst conversely showing a desperate need for the acknowledgement of the musical world too.86 This situation would be comparable to Brendel, Liszt or Hanslick trying to combine Robert Zimmermann’s stance (the formalist scholar arguing that music is a self-contained object with clearly definable features and nothing else – Chapter Five [92]) with E. Sobolewski’s (the musician arguing that music is ‘castrated’ by the evil conceptualizers of academia – Chapter Two [36]), a situation that would have been inconceivable for mid-nineteenth-century music critics. One of the indications of musicology’s insecurity is the fact that it adopts its main scholarly approaches from other disciplines, applying them to music almost unaltered. Adler derived his historiographic approaches from (art) historians, ethnomusicologists took 86 I am indebted to Dr Sander van Maas (Universiteit van Amsterdam) for this and a couple of other observations. The feeble foundations of musicology 151 their starting points from anthropologists, and new musicologists simply took their premises from literary scholars, when these premises had long passed their peak in their own discourse. The same could be said about the rare and hesitant attempts to submit music to theories of deconstructivism and ‘performativity’. This does not make these efforts less valuable or necessary, but it is illustrative for the fact that musicology assumes the role of a ‘delayed discipline’ (GERHARD 2000).87 The recognition and philosophical exploration of the dialectics of music’s conceptual autonomy/dependence might indeed be a valuable lead in the search for an alternative to Adler’s rather narrow conception of the discipline which seems to obstruct the development of musicology’s full academic potential. Adler’s view can be broadenend only by means of a willingness to engage with the issues he smothered: the relationship of music with its nonmusical environment, the question where the one meets the other and the willingness to critically investigate how the one can be distinguished from the other. The ‘new’ movements within musicology (with Korsyn’s book as the most recent update) have not provided any substantial contribution to this, since they are, roughly speaking, inclined to view an artistic expression solely in the context of its own (sub)culture. This reliefs one from the duty to put it in a larger context, to compare it with something else, thus killing all interpretative potential. Leo Treitler has argued that in order to ‘assure interpretations that are rich and have depth’ we need ‘a re-alignment: the re-aestheticization as well as the rehistoricization of music’ (TREITLER 1999, 377). Treitler is right in observing that in present poststructuralist thinking, the aesthetic is being side-lined as something too allencompassing, too constructive and too restricting. Still, as Alastair WILLIAMS (2000) has shown, there are certain ‘grand narratives’ one cannot escape from. The current lack of selfcritical awareness in determining one’s position in relation to the ‘grand narrative’ of the dialectics of music’s conceptual autonomy/dependence hampers the interpretative dimension of musicology as much as Adler’s uncritical adoption of the reminiscences of idealist thinking. The concepts of Beauty and the aesthetic, one could utter in response to Treitler, are historically charged products of idealist philosophy too, and, moreover, culturally inflated constructs. They may well be unworkable for present-day art theory. Rather than searching for an interpretation of the aesthetic, it may be worthwhile to explore the question that lies beyond the nineteenth-century idealist endeavours to formulate a concept of Beauty. The real test is to grasp music by means of (conceptual) tools that relate in one way or another to what is not music. At first sight, this may seem an attempt to recycle nineteenth-century dialectics: Hegel tried to determine the identity of subject and object by means of opposing them to each other; Hanslick developed his theory of musical Beauty on the basis of 87 Music criticism was ‘delayed’ in adopting the normative Hegelian views in the 1820s and 1830s, as has been shown in Chapter Two [30-31] and Appendix Va [207]. This was exactly because there was distinct hesitation, felt by musicians as well as philosophers, to describe music in conceptual terms, to expose it to confrontation with ‘the rest of the world’. The same has been observed in Chapter Eight [137] with regard to the positivist thought patterns in the later nineteenth century, which were already considered obsolete to some extent when Adler and Riemann became interested in them. 152 Epilogue showing what it was not; Liszt wrote his programmes in order to narrow down the possible extra-musical associations of his audience while they listened to his music. Still, the search for those tools, however general, all-encompassing and old-fashioned, could lead to new prospects for the musicological discipline. This search should not be directed solely towards the one-directional, positivist course of history (as it used to be the case in idealist philosophy, in most modernist criticism after that, and which Treitler proposes to do again), but rather towards the diversity of cultures. One could conceptualize music in terms of its relationship and its dialogue with the culture it emerges from, by means of a losely defined categorization. 88 Without saying anything about the quality a work of art or a fragment from a work of art, one could classify three different kinds of music. Firstly, there is music that, for various reasons, consciously or subconsciously agrees with the (sub)culture it emerges from. It is in accordance with its culture, because the expectations of what it is supposed to represent coincide with what it actually represents. Examples are Pierre Boulez’s Structures Ia, in being a straightforward product of Darmstadt ideology, or Michael Jackson’s 1980s dance song Beat It. Secondly, there is music that consciously opposes the culture that engendered it, or tries to get away from this culture. Examples are Richard Strauss’s Der Rosenkavalier, consciously rejecting the aesthetic requirements of its cultural environment, or most of John Zorn’s musical endeavours. Thirdly, there is music that is conscious of its own culture and deliberately mystifies its own cultural background. Frank Zappa’s and Isang Yun’s music are obvious examples. To some extent, this manner of categorization functions independently from the absolutism of transcultural value judgements or modernist requirements of progress, and from the restrictions of the work concept (GOEHR 1997), since the categorization can, and should, be applied also to passages from a musical work of art, or to styles or genres. It investigates and interrogates the music and its composer for their relationship with the culture(s) that formed them. Rather than dealing with Beauty, one deals with the cultural placement, or indeed displacement, of a work of art, a fragment of a work of art, a genre or a style. In this way, it is possible to establish a ‘locus’ where the artistic/musical on the one hand and the extra-artistic/extra-musical on the other meet. They are interpreted by investigating the way in which they get to terms with each other, how they comment on each other in conceptual and non-conceptual respect, as self-regulating and self-conscious but not independent or isolated entities. At first sight, the approach may seem straightforwardly postmodern. However, unlike most postmodern achievements, it is an attempt towards classification, albeit a loose one, resting on the acknowledgement of the dialectical ‘grand narrative’ of establishing identity through comparison and juxtaposition, which necessarily precedes critical judgement. In this way, it will be possible to consciously compare Michael Jackson’s Beat It with Pierre Boulez’s Structures Ia, opening 88 I am indebted to the musicologist Johan Kolsteeg, who should receive full credit for developing this categorization. The feeble foundations of musicology 153 up a huge range of possibilities for interpretative and critical stances in the musicological realm. Observing whether and how an artistic expression fits in its (sub)culture, whether it consciously wants to fit in, or choses not to, may, at first sight, seem to disregard the influence of history, but can in fact be employed historically as well. Historicized examples of the above-mentioned third category of music mystifying its cultural background contain, for instance, Handel’s use of renaissance counterpoint at crucial dramatic turning points in his operas, the conscious and deliberate displacement of musical styles in the music of Stravinsky, Satie or Kagel and the way in which Schumann uses baroque counterpoint in his piano works. Research that focusses on these procedures in the context of the ‘locus’ for an artistic expression and its (sub)culture, could provide a valuable and necessary new impetus to historical musicology by surpassing the focus on one period of history only. Transhistorical research is urgently needed in order to engage with, and demystify, many of the historical artefacts that are often uncritically used in the present-day study of music. Many of those artefacts have been subject to investigation in this study, such as the importance attributed to the artistic material and its allegedly historical determination, music’s association with the expression of emotions, and, last but not least, the leitmotiv in this book: music’s destabilizing powers and its diabolical potential. All too often, these aspects of music are mentioned in the context of one specific ‘historical culture’, whereas the comparison of ‘historical cultures’ could lead to valuable new insights into what has grown historically, and what has not, and whether there exists something like ‘historically grown’ at all, thus opening up new levels of abstraction in the historical approach of music. Such endeavours would enable music historians to acquire more initiative in the valuable and lively debate that currently interrogates historical musicology for its raison d’être. Appendices Appendix I Hegelian glossary The entries below address complex philosophical issues that are more elaborately discussed in Michael Inwood’s A Hegel Dictionary (INWOOD 1999). This glossary only aims to serve the present argument, leaving the most detailed philosophical intricacies aside. ABSOLUTE Contrary to other IDEALIST philosophers, such as Kant and Schelling, Hegel argued that the Absolute could contain differences because it was the result of a development that took place according to subject-object oppositions, which impelled towards SUBLATION. The Absolute was the ultimate (theoretical) outcome of a never-ending series of these DIALECTICAL oppositions. Hegel’s entire philosophical system relied on the assumption that mankind in its entirety strove for reconciliation with the Absolute, which meant that mankind was aspiring to become reconciled with its ‘absolute’ self. Only when it did not depend on anything outside itself it could be free. By formulating this reconciliation as an absolute one, Hegel stressed that any reconciliation with the self that could not be described as absolute did not lead to freedom, as there was no total independence from anything else. The totality or absoluteness of the reconciliation safeguarded the teleological dimension of the development. Thus, the Absolute was the core aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel described the twofold impetus of mankind’s development in similar terms, by distinguishing between the Absolute as SPIRIT and the Absolute as IDEA, two counterparts of the same Absoluteness. In this study, SPIRIT and IDEA are therefore used interchangeably. 158 Appendix I BEAUTY (Schönheit) Together with God and Thought, Beauty was one of the three main manifestations of the ABSOLUTE SPIRIT (or ABSOLUTE IDEA), which meant that it was considered to be one of the three main ways in which mankind expressed itself. Beauty was generally objectified in art (Figure 3 [22]), although Vischer implied that religion was increasingly drawing on Beauty too, rather than on God. Beauty, like Thought and God, functioned as a kind of log in which the development of mankind could be followed. Hegel argued that Beauty in the form of art, due to its sensory nature, was less and less able to function as a manifestation of the SPIRIT because the abstract and complex stage in the development of mankind increasingly required intellectual means to be accurately expressed. Vischer, however, adhered to the supremacy of Beauty as manifestation of the SPIRIT. He argued that the increasing intellectualization (VERGEISTIGUNG) of art safeguarded its prominent position. He acknowledged that art was increasingly drawing on intellectual rather than sensory means, but he expanded the CONCEPT of Beauty to such an extent that it could incorporate these intellectual means. BILDUNGSBÜRGERTUM As a result of the progressive ideals of the VORMÄRZ period, Bildungsbürger thinkers relied on the Hegelian assumption that art, like philosophy, expressed the development of mankind, just with other means. This led them to believe that exposing people to BEAUTY would also make them more susceptible to truth. PRESENT society was generally believed to be complex and fragmented. Political and industrial revolutions had left people estranged and alienated in both social and material respects. When the attempts to change this failed in 1848, middle-class intellectuals thought about other means to ‘re-spiritualize’ (begeistern) the cold and prosaic society. Education, and notably art education, was believed to be the best way of using art to bring about what had not been obtained by political means: a new society in which the rights of the individual reflected the BEAUTY of the community. This was also explicitly connected with a new period of flourishing for art itself, since BEAUTY would have regained its supreme position as manifestation of the SPIRIT. The initial goals of the Bildungsbürger movement, of which Vischer was its most prominent representative, were genuinely progressive. In the 1860s and 1870s, when the representatives of the movement became increasingly established in material and political respects, their quest to change society lost its drive. CONCEPT (Begriff) / CONCEPTUALIZATION (Das Begreifen) Rather than intuitive or impassioned, Hegel believed that philosophy should be conceptual. Conceptual thought should capture, rather than sidestep, the wealth of empirical, emotional and religious experience. Conceptualization was for Hegel the grasping, incorporating and encompassing of this wealth. It was a primarily intellectual exercise, although sensory perception and feeling were not excluded. In the context of Vischer’s aesthetics, Hegelian glossary 159 conceptualization acquired the connotation of particularization and definition to an increasing extent. CONSCIOUSNESS (Bewußtsein) For Hegel, being conscious depended largely on the ability to think and Hegel often DIALECTICALLY opposed consciousness to feeling. Hegel held that CONCEPTUALIZING impulses that reach the subject from its environment enabled them to be registered empirically, inviting further reflection. In this way, the subject could differentiate between the various objects he CONCEPTUALIZED. This would lead to the ability to distinguish between the self and the other (see SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS), which was essential in the attainment of freedom (reconciliation with the ABSOLUTE). Vischer acknowledged that actions other thinking could be responsible for the formation of consciousness; the DIALECTICS of consciousness and feeling are more complicated in his aesthetics than in Hegel’s (see Chapter Six [110-111]). DETERMINACY (Bestimmtheit) The ability to name or designate or establish something with a voice (Stimme) was considered to be an immediate result of the ability to CONCEPTUALIZE. Bestimmtheit was important in IDEALIST philosophy because it revealed whether the objects it named or designated were inhabited by the SPIRIT or not. CONCEPTUALIZATION and determinacy were therefore directly dependent on an object’s SPIRITUAL SUBSTANTIALITY (Geistigkeit). DIALECTICS Hegel claimed that the SPIRIT manifested itself in the history of the world, the history of humankind in its entirety. The developments instigated by the SPIRIT were necessities, unavoidable outcomes of mankind’s urge to develop into itself (see ABSOLUTE) Thus, they were essentially unilinear. In order to describe the actions of the SPIRIT as dynamic processes, Hegel had to specify how one development could necessarily grow out of another. He did this by means of his dialectics. These are often summarized as opposing developments or situations (often described in Marxist terms as thesis and antithesis, neither of which Hegel ever used) creating a new development or situation by means of their opposition. Hegel was primarily concerned with establishing identity, or SELFCONSCIOUSNESS, which can only be attained by focussing both on oneself and on other things. By dialectically opposing oneself to other things, one is able to establish one’s identity. Thus, Hegel was not so much interested in situations opposing each other, but rather in the process of SUBLATION (Aufhebung) between the two, which would lead to a new situation or premise. Figure 2 [19] provides an example of a dialectical process. The habit of thinking in terms of dialectics exerted a huge influence on German intellectual life in the entire nineteenth century, also when the metaphysical context in which they had emerged became increasingly eroded. 160 Appendix I DUALISM Although the oppositions in the DIALECTICAL process are merely the dynamics of the process of SUBLATION, the latter being of much more importance to Hegelian thought, they enabled IDEALIST philosophers to address two sides of the same phenomenon without dismissing either one of them, since they were in DIALECTICAL respect both equally necessary for the SUBLATION that would follow their opposition. Thus, Hegelian thought was responsible for the possibility, not only of describing things in terms of development, but also of pointing out dichotomies or even paradoxes without regarding this as a problem. This was important for the development of a professional and nuanced aesthetic intellectual discourse. FORMATIVE IMAGINATION (bildende Phantasie – Hegel) The ability to empathize with, and conceive of, an object was considered to be indispensable in the creation of a work of art. This required sensory as well as intellectual abilities. IMAGINATION required the capability to form an image in one’s head. When Hegel talked about IMAGINATION, he implicitly always referred to formative or visualizing IMAGINATION (bildende Phantasie), which required the intellectual construction of CONCEPTS. Vischer acknowledged that IMAGINATION was not necessarily an exclusively CONCEPTUALIZING capability (see SENTIENT IMAGINATION). DAS GEISTIGE Over the course of the nineteenth century, Geist (see SPIRIT), a unified transcendental CONCEPT in Hegel’s philosophy, was gradually transformed into a manifold category in which the association of Geistigkeit with particularity became increasingly emphatic. The category referred to a range of ‘particularizations’: individuality of expression, the poetic, the characteristic, etc. IDEA Hegel’s interpretation of the ABSOLUTE as Idea included a CONCEPT of something (which requires IMAGINATION) together with the reality of that CONCEPT (which could be observed sensorily). When compared to the SPIRIT, the Idea was the relatively more objective counterpart of the ABSOLUTE, since it possessed content. In this study, Idea and SPIRIT are used interchangeably, both representing the transcendental dimension of the development of mankind into itself (see ABSOLUTE). Hegelian aestheticians such as Vischer increasingly loosened up Hegel’s strict interpretation of the Idea (see MEDIATED IDEALISM ). IDEALISM The importance attributed to the ABSOLUTE as IDEA provided an entire German philosophical movement with its name: idealism. The movement consisted, besides Hegel, of Schelling, Kant, Johann Fichte, and Feuerbach, among others. Idealist philosophy further explored the Platonist view that reality has a metaphysical counterpart that cannot be readily observed or Hegelian glossary 161 described, but needs a form of IMAGINATION or logical deduction to be accessed (see also IDEA and SPIRIT). The most characteristic and also most problematic aspect of idealist philosophy was that it intended to explain every single aspect of human expression and interaction from one all-encompassing principle. IMAGINATION (Phantasie) Both in Hegel’s and in Vischer’s aesthetics, imagination transcended the boundaries between CONSCIOUSNESS and subconsciousness, as well as those between the MIND and the SENSES. It was a DIALECTICAL reconciliation of sensory, emotional and intellectual abilities, reflecting the position in which PRESENT art was finding itself. Vischer insisted that the involvement of imagination was the only way to bridge the gap between sensory and intellectual manifestations of the SPIRIT. Imagination was directly dependent on the MATERIAL of art, to which it was also DIALECTICALLY opposed; it was the ability to grasp the MATERIAL in sensory as well as intellectual respect and submit to it. The artist used his imagination to handle the MATERIAL in such a way as to individualize it into specific works of art or STYLES (Figure 6 [65]). Because of the close interrelation with the MATERIAL of art, Vischer’s interpretation of imagination was different to that of Hegel, since his interpretation of the MATERIAL was also different. In Vischer’s aesthetics, the MATERIAL of art had already been subject to earlier handlings by the imagination of artists. Thus, the MATERIAL occupied far more of a prominent position in the creation of a work of art than in Hegel’s aesthetics. Rather than an individual capability, imagination became a capacity that was shared by artists who used a certain kind of MATERIAL in a certain context (time or culture). Thus, Vischer’s interpretation of imagination was less metaphysical, and more orientated to the tangible features of an artist’s environment. INWARDNESS (Innerlichkeit) and OUTWARDNESS (Aüßerlichkeit) Inwardness and outwardness could be considered as roughly equivalent to essence and appearance, if Hegel had not described inwardness in rather crystallized and CONCEPTUAL terms already. Inwardness, or inner life, encompassed feeling, wanting and thinking at once, but thinking was undoubtedly superior to the other aspects, being more powerful and more functional. Hegel insisted that even the most profound emotions could only be perceived as such if they had been CONCEPTUALIZED, at least to some extent. It was therefore impossible for inner life to manifest itself independently from Thought. In Vischer’s aesthetics, this premise was abandoned (see SENTIENT IMAGINATION). LUST (inclination) and UNLUST (reluctance) Lust and Unlust are basic psychological drives, caused by the interaction of CONSCIOUSNESS and sensory impulses. Their infinite number of combinations constitute an infinite number of particular emotions (Empfindungen) (Figure 4 [59]). Due to his interest for psychological processes, Vischer attributed rather an important function to these two concepts, but they 162 Appendix I had already been used in Enlightenment philosophy. They also had quite a prominent position, for instance, in Kant’s Critique of judgement (KANT 2001, 31). MATERIAL Vischer focused, more than Hegel, on the kind of material that had been provided by the development of human civilization itself, rather than by nature. In the 1851 volume of his Aesthetics (Figure 1 [15]), Vischer classified features of art by looking at Darstellungsmittel (paint, stone, etc.), but also by looking at the ‘Sinnlichkeit, wie sie sich in den Geist hineinerstreckt und das ihr entsprechende Material ergreift. Dadurch erst wird auch eine Gliederung innerhalb der einzelnen Kategorien des Materials möglich.’ (VISCHER 1923, § 534: 170)cix Thus, Vischer allowed sensory (sinnliche) elements in the dialectical process of the artist’s choice of the material as laid down in Figure 2 [19]. This led him to the conclusion that artistic material should not only be defined as paint for a painting or stone for a sculpture, as Hegel did, but also as loosely defined sensory (sinnliche) means available to an artist for creating a work of art. These could have appeared as art before (as products of artists’ IMAGINATION): artistic techniques, fashions, cultural movements, etc. Unlike Hegel, Vischer was interested in phenomena as products of individual human actions rather than in abstract or metaphysical processes. In Vischer’s aesthetics, the description of the way in which material could be particularized (by means of IMAGINATION) into specific works of art and STYLES was better specified than in Hegel’s thought. MEDIATED IDEALISM When the ambitious prospects connected with Hegel’s IDEALISM turned out to be unsustainable in 1848, idealist philosophers needed to adapt their views if they wanted to adhere to their belief in the reconciliation of reality with the ABSOLUTE as IDEA. Vischer acknowledged that in PRESENT times, it was impossible to derive the manifold instances of our complex society from one all-encompassing principle; it would be more appropriate to reach a definition of the IDEA by means of describing the instances. Those instances could be anticipated (geahnt) by the power of IMAGINATION, but could not be thought out in unequivocal CONCEPTUAL terms. This was an indirect way of reaching the IDEA and a merely temporary reconciliation with the ABSOLUTE. It exemplified the increasing awareness that the absolutism of IDEALIST metaphysical CONCEPTS was unsustainable. The assumption that if reality could not be adapted to the IDEA, the IDEA should be adapted to reality, in fact turned Hegel’s system upside down. Somewhat confusingly, Vischer and Köstlin also used mediated idealism as a DIALECTICAL CONCEPT for content (mediated idealism) as opposed to form (unmediated idealism), in order to show that form and content descended directly from the IDEA, and that their harmony established BEAUTY as a direct manifestation of the SPIRIT. Hegelian glossary 163 MIND AND SENSES The Enlightenment dichotomy of mind and senses played an important role in IDEALIST philosophy, and gained a DIALECTICAL dimension in that they functioned as preconditions for the SUBLATION into artistic capabilities such as IMAGINATION. The German word Geist (mind), moreover, took on increasingly metaphysical pretensions (see SPIRIT). Like many DIALECTICAL relationships in IDEALIST philosophy, the mind and the senses are roughly equivalent to other dialectical structures, such as Sittlichkeit and Sinnlichkeit, but they cannot be compared. Sittlichkeit and Sinnlichkeit are dependent on the actions of both the mind and the senses, and carry an explicitly moral connotation. In Hegel’s and Vischer’s aesthetics, the sensory (and especially the sensual) always needed to be accompanied by reflection and a sense (not CONCEPT) of moral decency. Idealists devoted most of their attention to the collaboration of the mind and the senses, not to their separate manifestations. PRESENT (Gegenwart) In artistic respect, Hegel considered his present time as the deplorable aftermath of romanticism, a historical period in which BEAUTY had lost more and more of its power as a sensory manifestation of the SPIRIT, because it became increasingly difficult to express the stage in which the SPIRIT found itself in sensory means. In art, form and content were being torn apart and art was hence turning against itself (Figure 8 [73]). Left-wing Hegelians, including Vischer, regarded their present as a separate critical category, the features of which should be judged according to its own merits. Vischer stated that the Enlightenment had changed things to such an extent that romanticism on the one hand and his own modern time on the other were in fact incomparable. As an aesthetician – primarily concerned with art – Vischer needed to find ways to explain BEAUTY as the supreme manifestation of the SPIRIT. He succeeded in doing this by regarding his own time as a DIALECTICAL countermovement that only denied BEAUTY its supreme manifestation on a temporary basis. If the features of the present (i.e. an over-abundance of Thought resulting in materialism and formalism, but also in an extreme degree of self-consciousness) would be SUBLATED, a new stage of history would allow BEAUTY back into its realm. This prospect received a blow when democratic upheavals (which should have been this SUBLATION of the banality and materialism of the time) failed in 1848, but it was by no means immediately abandoned. It was, however, formulated more cautiously, and other means were employed to reach it (see BILDUNGSBÜRGERTUM). SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS (Selbstbewußtsein) Self-consciousness was considered to be a necessary precondition for freedom (reconciliation with the ABSOLUTE), since freedom implied that the self was no longer dependent on things outside itself. In order to reach this independence, the self had to know how it differed from the other, i.e. it had to know and recognize itself. Thus, 164 Appendix I of objects was indispensable for becoming conscious of the other and the self. In Hegel’s philosophy, the process of DIALECTICAL development was aimed primarily at establishing identity, not at indicating oppositions. CONCEPTUALIZATION SENSES, MIND AND The Enlightenment dichotomy of mind and senses played an important role in IDEALIST philosophy, and gained a DIALECTICAL dimension in that they functioned as preconditions for the SUBLATION into artistic capabilities such as IMAGINATION. The German word Geist (mind), moreover, took on increasingly metaphysical pretensions (see SPIRIT). Like many DIALECTICAL relationships in IDEALIST philosophy, the mind and the senses are roughly equivalent to other dialectical structures, such as Sittlichkeit and Sinnlichkeit, but they cannot be compared. Sittlichkeit and Sinnlichkeit are dependent on the actions of both the mind and the senses, and carry an explicitly moral connotation. In Hegel’s and Vischer’s aesthetics, the sensory (and especially the sensual) always needed to be accompanied by reflection and a sense (not CONCEPT) of moral decency. Idealists devoted most of their attention to the collaboration of the mind and the senses, not to their separate manifestations. SENTIENT IMAGINATION (empfindende Phantasie – Vischer) Vischer’s concept of sentient IMAGINATION (empfindende Phantasie) relied on the ability to conceive of an object in emotional rather than intellectual terms, because Vischer believed the emotional way of imagining came closer to the actual object it tried to conceive of than CONCEPTUALIZING actions. Thus, it directly opposed Hegel’s CONCEPT of FORMATIVE IMAGINATION. Sentient IMAGINATION addressed an area in the human mind in which the dichotomy of CONSCIOUSNESS and feeling was still relevant, but where the two had only just begun to interact. Vischer suggested on several occasions that this area was the realm of music (Figure 4 [59]). Vischer’s concept of sentient IMAGINATION could be regarded as an elaboration on Hegel’s concept of INWARDNESS, attributing a more autonomous role to the inner realm of feeling than Hegel. SPIRIT (Geist) The ABSOLUTE as Spirit is basically untranslatable. The German word Geist encompasses the English words Spirit as well as Mind, amongst other things, and its meaning is directly dependent on its development in the nineteenth century from a transcendental metaphysical CONCEPT into an aspect of the human brain. This development can be observed very well in Vischer’s aesthetics. In Hegel’s philosophy, the Spirit was still primarily metaphysical. Whereas the ABSOLUTE as IDEA possessed some kind of determinable content, the ABSOLUTE as Spirit did not have a content. It was nothing more and nothing less than a driving force, an instigator of mankind’s development into its absolute self. Due to the DIALECTICAL development of the Spirit, Hegel’s interpretation of the ABSOLUTE, unlike that of other Hegelian glossary 165 philosophers such as Schelling and Kant, could contain differences – it was a changeable CONCEPT. Since Spirit and IDEA were considered as two counterparts of the same Absoluteness, these two terms have been used interchangeably in this study. IDEALIST SPIRITUAL SUBSTANTIALITY (Geistigkeit) Geistig means being inhabited by the Spirit. In the context of IDEALIST philosophy, the SPIRIT needed STOFF (matter or substance) in order to become manifest; therefore human expressions needed to be tangible and objectified in order to be geistig. IDEALIST philosophers often connected objectivity with visibility and with CONCEPTUAL content. Music, in IDEALIST context, suffered from Geistlosigkeit because it did not appear in a tangible or visible shape and did not transmit a content that could easily be CONCEPTUALIZED. STOFF In proper IDEALIST and Enlightenment tradition, Vischer distinguished between three kinds of Stoff functioning as tools to attribute an ideal meaning to art. Firstly, Stoff was the IDEA as the content of a work of art, indispensable in determining the CONCEPTUAL meaning of a work of art. Secondly, Stoff could be the IDEA in the form of a natural object that could be chosen by an artist as a model. And thirdly, Vischer mentioned the raw MATERIAL as Stoff, the plain and unprocessed ‘building blocks’ for a work of art (VISCHER 1923, § 55: 156/157). It was exactly these three definitions of Stoff – a CONCEPTUAL, representational and MATERIAL – that referred to music’s threefold ‘lack of objectivity’, as described by SPONHEUER (1987, 114127). In the view of IDEALIST philosophers, the SPIRIT needed Stoff in order to manifest itself (Figure 2 [19]). If there was no Stoff, a work of art remained unobjectified and non-existent. The SPIRIT could not inhabit it. Stoff was therefore of extreme importance to the SPIRITUAL SUBSTANTIALITY of a work of art. STYLE Both Hegel and Vischer (VISCHER 1923, § 530: 155) derived their definition of style from the art historian Carl Friedrich Rumohr (1785-1843), who described style as the adaptation to an art form’s MATERIAL (or STOFF): style ‘als ein zur Gewohnheit gediehenes sich Fügen in die innere Fo[r]derungen des Stoffes’ (RUMOHR 1827, 87).cx Vischer described style as a series of adaptations to the material (‘ein gewaltiges, großartiges Erfassen der Bedingungen des Materials’ [Vischer § 532: 162]), from which a certain pattern, a habit, could be observed. The notion that this STOFF or MATERIAL had been historically determined by the SPIRIT was specifically Hegelian. Hegel and Vischer regarded style as the ability to bring form (UNMEDIATED IDEALISM) and content (MEDIATED IDEALISM) of a work of art in harmony, a harmony which would engender BEAUTY as a direct manifestation of the SPIRIT (see also MEDIATED IDEALISM and Figure 5 [63]). They regarded style primarily as a transcendental CONCEPT, not as one that referred to artistic techniques or practices. Style’s triangular relationship with MATERIAL and IMAGINATION served this description. The way in which a style 166 Appendix I was an adaptation to the MATERIAL did not primarily depend on technical skill, but rather on the artist’s IMAGINATION. As a creative process of empathizing with the SPIRIT, IMAGINATION was indispensable in the transformation of raw MATERIAL into specific, marked styles (Figure 6 [65]). SUBLATION (Aufhebung) Sublation means dissolution, as well as elevation, of DIALECTICAL oppositions. The ambivalent meaning of sublation expresses the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century preoccupation with ‘the process of life’ (Lebensprozeß) in which destruction and creation, death and birth are mutually dependent upon one another. Sublation is the process that brings mankind further. Sublation is also the process by which to retrace the roots of a situation, development or premise. These dialectically opposing factors preceded the process of sublation and were merely the dynamics which triggered the process; their opposition is transitory, whilst functional and subservient to the concept of development, as instigated by the Spirit. UNMEDIATED IDEALISM (form) and MEDIATED IDEALISM (content) Somewhat confusingly, Vischer and Köstlin also used mediated idealism (in the German original: indirekter Idealismus) as a DIALECTICAL CONCEPT for content (mediated idealism) as opposed to form (unmediated idealism), in order to show that form and content descended directly from the IDEA, and that their harmony established BEAUTY as a direct manifestation of the SPIRIT. VERGEISTIGUNG Vergeistigung was an ambivalent term with regard to art, since IDEALIST philosophers observed that art was forsaking its sensory features and was increasingly relying on intellectual ones. It was no longer drawing on BEAUTY, but rather on Thought. The Vergeistigung of art was a historical necessity, the obvious way for the SPIRIT to go in the search for its own ultimate identity (see ABSOLUTE), but it was also detrimental to art as a sensory manifestation of the SPIRIT. Hegel implied that art might even dissolve in philosophy. This process, regarded by Hegel as irrevocable, is summarized in Figure 8 [73]. Hegelian aestheticians, such as Vischer, explained the Vergeistigung of art as a positive development, a temporary DIALECTICAL countermovement preparing for the glorious rebirth of BEAUTY as the supreme manifestation of the SPIRIT in a future stage of history. VERNUNFTTELEOLOGIE A term used by Herbert Schnädelbach (1974, 18) describing the belief in the logicality of history impelling towards the goal of freedom. This belief was entirely nurtured by the superior position Hegel attributed to Thought. Man’s ability to think was responsible for the fact that he could become conscious of himself, leading to his self-determination and Hegelian glossary 167 freedom. This development therefore had to be a logical one. Vernunftteleologie was embraced by left-wing Hegelians in the 1840s, the VORMÄRZ period, leading to the democratic upheavals in 1848. The failure of these upheavals caused great disillusion and Vernunftteleologie, as well as the ambitious political goals connected with it, were increasingly abandoned. VORMÄRZ period The term Vormärz is used to refer to the years leading to the political upheavals of 1848, in which the middle class almost successfully demanded political participation and freedom of expression. The upheavals took place in all the major cities in Europe – Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna – but were enhanced even further in German-speaking countries due to the hope of political unification. After the suppression of the revolutions, many intellectuals fled into exile (Wagner and Vischer moved to Switzerland, Arnold Ruge to England), others paid with their lives for their insubordination (the music critic Julius Becher, for instance [Chapter Four [79]). YOUNG HEGELIANS The Young Hegelians formed a group of philosophers and thinkers – Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, among others – who interpreted Hegel’s reconciliation with the Absolute through self-determination as an imminent liberation from aristocratic bonds. They consciously employed Hegel’s thought to reach their political ideals, striving for freedom of speech and political power of the middle class. Thanks to their efforts, the expectations of imminent political upheaval were extremely high in the years leading up to 1848, also known as VORMÄRZ period. Appendix II Editorial procedures a. Reference system References to printed primary and secondary sources are according to an author-date abbreviation system in the main text. The author and the date refer to the following information about the source in the Bibliography [224]: For monographs: Author, co-author, year of consulted publication, title (in italics), year of first publication (when retrieved), editor(s), place of publication, ‘[etc.]’ in case of more places, publisher, ‘[etc.]’ in case of more publishers, series in which the study appeared and serial number (between round brackets). For articles in anthologies: Author, co-author, year of consulted publication, title (between single inverted commas), year of first publication (when retrieved), author of anthology in which the article appeared, title of anthology (in italics), editor(s) of anthology, place of publication, ‘[etc.]’ in case of more places, publisher, ‘[etc.]’ in case of more publishers, series in which the study appeared and serial number (between round brackets), page numbers. For articles in journals: Author, co-author, year of consulted publication, title (between single inverted commas), year of first publication (when retrieved), journal title (in italics), volume: year/instalment, date or month or season of instalment, page numbers. 170 Appendix II References to manuscript sources (mainly letters) are according to sigla in the main text, listed and annotated in Appendix III [175]. Editorial procedures 171 b. Editions This study relies on source manuscripts (see Appendix III), first editions or – if those were not readily accessible – second or third editions that were chronologically as close to the first edition as possible (see Bibliography [224]). In four cases, there were reasons to deviate from this premise: Vischer – Aesthetik, oder Wissenschaft des Schönen (Figure 1 [15]) First edition 1846-1858. Second edition, ed. Robert Vischer, 1922-1923 (used for this study and referred to by means of paragraph number and page number, e.g. § 4: 20). The main reason for referring to the second edition of Vischer’s treatise, edited by his son, is that it is more widely available than the first one, in libraries on the Continent as well as in the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, comparison of the two editions reveals that the second edition is extremely faithful to the first edition and to its author. Robert Vischer states in his Preface that he has deliberately left his father’s treatise as untouched as possible. He even adhered to the rather old-fashioned German Fraktur typeface. Robert clearly made his edition with his father’s copy of the first edition in his hand. At the end of the last volume, Robert Vischer made a list of changes: ‘Verzeichnis der nach einem Handexemplar Fr. Th. Vischers veränderten Stellen’.cxi Precise references, pointing at the page and exact line of both editions show these changes. Even the slightest adaptations (for instance the addition of conjunctions and adjectives, like nur, auch, eben) have been listed. According to the list, Volume 5 on music has not been adapted at all. Another indication that Robert Vischer based his edition on his father’s copy of the first edition is his insertion of a number of cynical comments, which he could hardly have considered himself to be necessary as improvements or corrections if they would not have been scribbled in the margin of Friedrich Vischer’s copy. One example is Friedrich Vischer’s comments on artists. The first edition reads as follows: ‘Der Künstler dagegen muß zwar ein Inneres herausarbeiten’ (§ 4: 20). In Robert Vischer’s edition of 1923 we read: ‘Der Künstler dagegen (und wenige sind Künstler) muß zwar ein Inneres herausarbeiten’cxii (§ 4: 20). The most substantial change Robert Vischer made was a slight adaptation of the structure. Robert Vischer’s edition consists of six volumes instead of the original nine volumes (Figure 1 [15]). The dialectical structure of the treatise, as set out in Figure 3 [22], is, however, hardly harmed by it. The natural and imaginative manifestation of Beauty (Volume 2 & 3 in the first edition) appeared in one volume in the second edition. Architecture was published in one volume with the general description of art. Sculpture and painting ended up in one volume, but music and poetry, being ‘subjective’ and ‘subjectiveobjective’ art forms, were published in separate volumes. Both first and second editions 172 Appendix II have a consecutive paragraph numbering. In the first edition, the volumes 4 to 9 have a consecutive page numbering as well, in order to stress their coherence as forming the ‘theory of art’ (Kunstlehre) in the manifestation of Beauty. This consecutive page numbering has been abandoned by Robert Vischer. Reference in this study to paragraph as well as page number should enable the reader to check the references in both editions. Other unacknowledged changes in the second edition are the adaptation of old-fashioned spelling (Teil instead of Theil; Objekt instead of Object; sei instead of sey, Schoß instead of Schooß) and meticulously corrected printing mistakes. Hegel – Musical aesthetics Edition based on Gustav Hotho’s 1842 compilation of Hegel’s lectures, eds. Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel, 1993b. Edition based on Hegel’s own lecture notes (on music specifically) from 1826, ed. Alain Olivier, 1998. Hegel lectured on aesthetics over a period of twelve years (1818-1829), during which his opinion on several matters changed considerably (OLIVIER 1998, 20). Since he did not write a treatise on aesthetics, like Vischer, the fragmentary and often contradictory lecture notes are the only source material that provides an insight into Hegel’s aesthetic viewpoints. The edition that exerted such an immense influence on the decades after Hegel’s death was compiled by his students, notably Gustav Hotho (1802-1873), in 1835 and 1842. Hotho’s first edition from 1835 was rather messy and opaque; the second edition from 1842 was more nuanced and easier to read stylistically. Both editions, however, were susceptible to important departures from Hegel’s own thought. Firstly, Hotho had to unify Hegel’s lecture notes, which forced him to re-interpret a number of issues, possibly mediating between incompatible views. Secondly, Hotho ‘wrote’ Hegel’s Aesthetics in a period in which aesthetic viewpoints had changed since Hegel had taught. Thirdly, Hotho was better versed in music than Hegel and did not always agree with Hegel on several matters. A comparison of the edition based on Hotho (HEGEL 1993b & 1994) with Hegel’s own fragmentary lecture notes on music from 1826, recently published by Alain Olivier (HEGEL 1998), reveals a number of substantial differences. In his original lecture notes, Hegel is much more outspoken in condemning instrumental music as being geistlos (HEGEL 1998, 39) than in Hotho’s edition; Hegel also expresses a much clearer preference for vocal music, arguing that the meaning of text and the meaning of music, in fact, add up to each other (HEGEL 1998, 41). Hegel’s statements concerning the problematic nature of modern art as well as his critique of empty virtuosity were softened or censured by Hotho as they opposed faits accomplis of the later 1830s. In the original lecture notes, it emerges that Hegel expressed late-eighteenth-century ‘Sturm und Drang’ aesthetics, based on Jean- Editorial procedures 173 Jacques Rousseau’s preference for melody over harmony, and on an Enlightenment theory of affects. This is less obvious in Hotho’s edition. It is necessary to draw on both editions for different purposes. In order to distinguish Vischer from Hegel, it is more appropriate to rely on Hegel’s 1826 lecture notes (HEGEL 1998). Hotho and Vischer belonged to the same generation, and, although Hotho had been an actual student of Hegel, he adapted Hegel’s thought to his time, which was also Vischer’s time. Differences between Hegel and Vischer (such as, for instance, the above evaluation of instrumental music and of modern art) are hence obscured by Hotho’s adaptations. However, when pointing out how Hegel’s thought filtered through in the decades after his death, it is impossible to disregard Hotho’s edition (HEGEL 1993b & 1994). Apart from Hegel’s own pupils, such as Hotho himself, Weiße and Rosenkranz, who had attended the lectures themselves, everybody, including the Hegelians in Tübingen, David Friedrich Strauß and Vischer, only had access to Hotho’s edition to learn more on Hegel’s thought (GETHMANN-SIEFERT 1992, 226). Hegel’s thought became authoritative largely thanks to his followers. Hotho and Vischer both played an important role in this, but in order to deal with Hegel, Vischer needed to get past Hotho’s writings first. When referring either to the 1993b or the 1998 edition of Hegel’s musical aesthetics, both widely available and carefully drawing on the original material, these issues have been consciously considered. Hanslick – Vom Musikalisch-Schönen Ten editions (1854-1902), ed. Dietmar Strauß 1990. Strauß addresses all ten editions of Vom Musikalisch-Schönen that appeared during Hanslick’s lifetime, documenting every single change in spelling and language as well as devoting a second volume to the aesthetic implications of the more substantial changes in the various editions. Strauß’s edition is indispensable for every scholar who wishes to engage seriously with Hanslick, and is particularly useful for the present study as it addresses Hanslick’s ambivalent relationship with the discourse of idealist philosophy, appearing primarily in the differences between the editions of his treatise. This study draws on the first edition of Hanslick’s VMS (1854), because it best illustrates Hanslick’s orientation towards Vischer. Although the later editions suggest Hanslick’s slight alienation from Vischer’s thought, Strauß himself denies that Hanslick ever turned away from idealist thought (STRAUSS 1990, 96), something that is confirmed in Chapter Five of this study. 174 Appendix II Hanslick – Daily-press reviews and articles Sämtliche Schriften: historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Dietmar Strauß. 1994-2002 Another of Strauß’s all-encompassing editions of Hanslick’s writings has so far progressed up to the year 1858. All references to Hanslick’s reviews before this year have been derived from this edition, because it has been based on a thorough investigation and account of the original source material, something that cannot be automatically assumed of the many latenineteenth- and early-twentieth-century anthologies of Hanslick’s reviews. Material from after 1858 has – necessarily – been extracted from other sources. c. Translations This study predominantly relies on sources in the original language, which means that the majority of the quotations are in German. Those few works that have been published in English first, such as Wallaschek’s music-ethnological study (WALLASCHEK 1893), Adorno’s article on Husserl (ADORNO 1940) and Schoenberg’s Style and Idea (SCHOENBERG 1975) have been quoted in English. The same approach has been adopted for Liszt’s review of Berlioz’s Harold en Italie. It was written in French, but seems to have been first published in German in a translation by Richard Pohl (LISZT 1855). Translations of the German quotations have been provided in endnotes with Roman numerals. They are by myself, unless otherwise stated. If existing translations were available, they have been used, even if they obscure the meaning of the quotation. In those cases, I have added short comments in the endnote on the interpretation of the quotation. Moreover, the quotations are always ‘unpacked’ in the main text immediately preceding or following the quotation, which should enlighten the reading by non-German-speakers. A number of translations used in this study need some precautionary remarks: Hegel – Aesthetics: lectures on fine art, transl. T.M. Knox (1975), 1999. Knox relies on Hotho’s first (1835) as well as second (1842) edition of Hegel’s Aesthetics (see Appendix IIb: Hegel [171]). Knox’s translation is a valuable source; despite being almost thirty years old, it is the most recent translation of Hegel’s work. However, as Sanna Pederson observes (PEDERSON 1996, 59n), Knox’s translation always needs to be consulted side by side with the German original, mainly because Knox has not developed a policy of dealing with Hegel’s deliberately inconsistent use of terminology (Chapter Two [42]), which leads to even more confusion than the original. Editorial procedures 175 Hanslick – On the musically beautiful (1891), ed. and transl. Geoffrey Payzant, 1986. Payzant’s translation illustrates extremely well how dangerous it can be to rely on a translated source, as a translation is inevitably also an interpretation. It is particularly the case with German idealism that the language is inextricably interwoven with the manner of thought. Transferring these formulations into another language obscures the manner of thought that appears in those formulations. Payzant is inclined to regard Hanslick as a formalist (PAYZANT 1991, 21n),89 which affects his translation in that it occasionally misinterprets Hanslick’s words. I have highlighted these instances in the endnote in which the translation appears. Sources which are available in English have been marked with an asterisk in the Bibliography [224]: ADLER, Guido 1885 ‘Umfang, Methode und Ziel der Musikwissenschaft’, transl. Martin Cooper. In BUJIĆ 1988, 348-355 (incomplete). BRENDEL, Franz 1857a ‘Die Aesthetik der Tonkunst’ transl. Martin Cooper In BUJIĆ 1988, 129-131 (incomplete). BUSONI, Ferruccio 1911. Sketch of a new esthetic of music (1907) transl. Theodore Baker. New York: G. Schirmer. ELTERLEIN , Ernst von [no date]. Beethoven’s symphonies in their ideal significance, transl. Francis Weber. London: William Reeves. KÖSTLIN, Heinrich Adolf 1879. Die Tonkunst: Einführung in die Aesthetik der Musik. transl. Martin Cooper. In BUJIĆ 1988, 152-158 (incomplete). LISZT, Franz 1965. ‘From Berlioz and his ‘Harold’ symphony’ (1855) in Source readings in music history: the romantic era, ed. Oliver Strunk. New York [etc.]: Norton, 107-133 (incomplete) VISCHER, Friedrich Theodor 1857. Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen, §§ 746-767 of the musical volume, transl. Martin Cooper. In BUJIĆ 1988, 82-89 (incomplete). ZIMMERMANN, Robert 1865. Allgemeine Aesthetik als Formwissenschaft, transl. Martin Cooper. In BUJIĆ 1988, 40-50 (incomplete). 89 Later publications (PAYZANT 2002), however, suggest that Payzant increasingly recognized Hanslick’s indebtedness to idealist thought, and indeed to Vischer. Appendix III Manuscript sources Only a small number of Vischer’s letters has been published. The larger part of Vischer’s intellectual heritage (Nachlass) can be found in manuscript form (and on microfilm) in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar, Germany (D-Ma DLA). Smaller parts of it are administered by the University Library of Tübingen University (D-Tü UB), the Municipal Archive in Stuttgart (D-St SA), and the Municipal Museum in Vischer’s place of birth, Ludwigsburg (D-Lu SM). For this study, the material in Marbach, Tübingen and Stuttgart has been thoroughly studied, the material in Ludwigsburg (mainly letters) was temporarily unavailable. Study of this material leads to a number of conclusions relevant to this study. Firstly, it is obvious that music hardly played a role in Vischer’s life. He only talks about it with regard to the writing of his music volume, complaining about music’s inaccessible nature and complexity. Secondly, Vischer did not maintain long-lasting contacts with music critics or musicians. The few letters to music critics and musicians (Richard Pohl, Heinrich Adolf Köstlin, Liszt’s ghostwriter Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein) do not contain any substantial expression of aesthetic ideas. Vischer, moreover, repeatedly emphasizes his ignorance with regard to music. Thirdly, the letters from music critics to Vischer (Eduard Hanslick, Wilhelm Tappert, Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein) reveal their profound awe of Vischer, but do not raise musical matters. Their respect relies on the fact that Vischer represented an authoritative way of thinking that was considered indispensable for all intellectual endeavours. Manuscript sources 177 D-Ma DLA (Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar, Germany) Writings and miscellaneous documents: Twelve cases of Vischer’s writings containing - poetry (various loose poems and sketches) - dramatic works (preparatory work for his Faust parody) - prose (preliminaries for his novel Auch Einer and for his Aesthetics, philosophical essays, sermons, lectures, postscripts to his Aesthetics) - personal writings (diary notes and travel journals) - drawings by him and by David Friedrich Strauß from their time in Blaubeuren - photos - lecture notes of Vischer’s lectures by students Sources referred to in this study: DLA A: Vischer 42472 ‘Tagebuchaufzeichnungen vom Parlament in Frankfurt und Stuttgart 16.05.184819.06.1849’ (Chapter One [17]) DLA A: Vischer 42532 (42820) ‘Ricciardini Carradowsky der edle Viehmensch im Gletscherwald Patagoniens oder die Genesis des Dicht-Tondichters. Räuber- u. Schauder-Roman’ (Chapter Two [37-38]) Letters from and to Vischer: The larger and more relevant part of Vischer’s Nachlass consists of the letters he wrote and received. Music plays a negligible role in Vischer’s correspondence. Few conclusions can be drawn solely from this fact, as not writing about music in one’s letters does not necessarily mean that one is not interested in music, but it confirms the findings in this study derived from other sources, that Vischer generally avoided discussing musical matters (Chapter Three [47]). Letters to Vischer from: Friedrich Hebbel, Gottfried Keller, Eduard Mörike and Eduard Zeller, among others. Letters from Vischer to: Heinrich Adolf Köstlin, Eduard Mörike, Richard Pohl, David Friedrich Strauß, Christiane Regine Vischer (his sister) and Robert Vischer (his son), among others. A number of recipients cannot be retraced (DLA A: Vischer 75.828 [16 December 1875]; 65.1154 [15 May 1879]; 82.194 [5 May 1882]). The content of these letters does not suggest in any way that these recipients could have been musicians, music critics, or music experts. As is the case with most of Vischer’s letters, music is not addressed. 178 Appendix III Letters referred to in this study: DLA: Vischer 6519 Letter from Vischer to Richard Pohl, 5 July 1874 (Chapter Three [47n]) A rejection of an offer to give a lecture (no indication of the subject); the letter does not address any musical matters. DLA: Vischer 8933 Letter from Vischer to Heinrich Adolf Köstlin, 1 March 1882 (Chapter Three [47n]) Vischer tells Köstlin about his encounters with Josephine Lang, who died in 1880. He elaborately discusses her good character and her strength, but does not mention her musical abilities. It is revealing for Vischer’s view on music and for his view on women (Chapter One [17n]). DLA: Vischer 41828 Letter to Vischer from Friedrich Hebbel, 1 June 1862 (Chapter Two [39]) Letters from music critics to third parties (publishing houses, colleagues): Letters from Karl Köstlin to the famous and influential publishing house Cotta from 8 May and 23 May 1864 (DLA Cotta Br. [no access number]), to Otto Elben (his cousin) of the Comité Schillerfeier on 6 November 1859 (DLA B: K.R.Köstlin 21812), and to an anonymous recipient 15 October 1886 (DLA A: Comité Schillerfeier 91.85.42) do not contain any references to Vischer or to his treatise on music Letters from the music critic Gustav Schilling to Cotta (1846 & 1848 DLA Cotta Br. [no access number]), from the Beethoven biographer Wilhelm von Lenz to Cotta (1845 & 1854 DLA Cotta Br. [no access number]), from Robert Zimmermann to Cotta (1865-1866 DLA Cotta Br. [no access number]), and from the music critic Richard Pohl to Cotta (1881 DLA Cotta Br. [no access number]) do not mention Vischer or his Aesthetics, even when contemporary aesthetics and art criticism are addressed. The letters do not suggest that Vischer was especially important in the eyes of these music critics as far as music was concerned. It is doubtful whether any conclusive remarks about Vischer’s relationship to the music-critical discourse can be drawn from this. Manuscript sources 179 D-Tü UB (University Library of Tübingen University) Letters from and to Vischer Letters to Vischer from: Eduard Hanslick, Karl Köstlin, Wilhelm Tappert, Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein, Mathilde Wesendonck and Gustav Hotho, among others. Letters referred to in this study: Tü UB Md 787-360 Letter (with visiting card) to Vischer from Eduard Hanslick, 2 October 1854 (Chapter Five [90], transcribed and translated in Appendix IVc [192]) Tü UB Md 787-453 Letter to Vischer from Heinrich Gustav Hotho, 23 April 1845 (Chapter One [14n]) Original in Appendix IVa [184]. Hotho apologizes to Vischer for not earlier taking his side in Vischer’s dispute with the University establishment in Tübingen: ‘Was mich selbst betrifft war ich seit lange schon im Begriff, Ihnen schriftlich wenigstens meinen besten Dank für die gründliche u[nd] freundliche Art auszusprechen mit welchen Sie meine Geschichte der Malerei in den Jahrbüchern besprochen haben. Da kam jedoch Ihre Facultäts- oder vielmehr Universitätsangelegenheit dazwischen, über welche es mir recht spät möglich geworden zur Klarheit zu gelangen; erst als ich Ihre Rede u[nd] den Schwegler’schen Aufsatz in Händen gehabt hatte. Erlauben Sie mir Sie aufrichtig um eine volle Verzeihung zu bitten!’cxiii Hotho emphatically sides with Vischer: ‘Mit welch schmerzlicher Bedauern ich auf die letzten Monaten blicke, welch Sie verlebt haben, werden Sie freundschaftlich glauben wollen. Statt einer verdoppelten erfreulichen Thätigkeit sind Sie in einen Streit gerathen gegen Feinde, gegen welche es Wohlgesinnten u[nd] Edlen an allen Waffen fehlt. Denn die einzig gebrauchbare Waffe gründlichster Verachtung reicht hier nicht aus.’cxiv Tü UB Md 787-539 Nineteen letters to Vischer from Karl Köstlin, 1857-1882 (Chapter Three [62], Chapter Seven [127]) Original in Appendix IVb [186]. These letters date from after the appearance of the music volume that was written by Köstlin. There may be letters dating from before 1857 – the letter from 2 April 1857 (transcribed and translated in Appendix IVb) does not read like the first letter of a correspondence – but I have not been able to retrace earlier ones. We might conclude that there is no bibliographical evidence that points at a regular exchange of aesthetic ideas during or before the emergence of the music treatise in 1857. 180 Appendix III Tü UB Md 787-1057 Letter to Vischer from Wilhelm Tappert, 6 February 1881 (Chapter Two [40]) Tü UB Md 787-1165 Letter to Vischer from Mathilde Wesendonck, 30 January 1867 (Chapter Two [36]) Tü UB Md 787-1188a Letter to Vischer from Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein [no place, no date (after 1857)] (Chapter Two [36], Chapter Six [108-109]) Original in Appendix IVd [204]. From the fact that the letter has not been dated or signed and does not have a salutation, one could conclude that the letter has never been sent. However, since it is part of Vischer’s Nachlass, it must have been in his possession. In somewhat peculiar French, the Princess asks for Vischer’s autograph: En attendant permettez-moi de vous demander une complaisance, si petite en elle même; que je me fais d’autant moins de scrupule de la réclamer de votre obligeance, qu’elle causera un bien grand plaisir à un de mes amis, collectioneur d’autographes, lequel possède déjà une quantité de pièces si précieuses qu’il a légué d’avance sa collection à une Bibliothèque publique. Il m’a demandé si je ne pouvais obtenir de vous, Monsieur, un page contenant soit une citation d’un de vos ouvrages, soit une pensée, une sentence, un aphorisme encore inédit, et signés de votre nom.cxv The Princess politely stresses the importance of Vischer’s theories, his musical ones included, for contemporary artistic practice: Entre temps je vous ai ecrit [sic!] pour vous remercier de votre admirable volume. Je l’ai lu avec un interêt dont vous ne saviez douter. Votre manière de voir gagne de plus en plus de partisans en Allemagne et à l’heure qu’il est vous pouvez vous dire que vos jugements sur la poesie et les arts, dident la majorité de ceux qui sont employés dans une application quotidienne. La partie musicale a été aussi étudié que les autres et ce n’est pas sans une vive satisfaction que j’ai vu combien la théorie s’adaptait aisément aux formes nouvelles à l’élan nouveau que cet art prend de nos jourscxvi Manuscript sources 181 Tü UB Md 787-1257a Four letters from Vischer to Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein (Chapter Two [36], Chapter Six [108-109]) Originals in Appendix IVd [200-203]. * Zurich, 16 November 1856 Vischer announces that he will give a lecture on Shakespeare the next day and he takes the opportunity to bring his volume on music to the Princess’s attention: ‘Die letzte Abtheilung meiner Aesthetik (Musik u.[nd] Poesie) ist noch nicht erschienen, sondern eben im Druck begriffen, die Lehre von der Musik nicht von mir – der ich Ignorant bin –, sondern von einem Freunde, den die Vorrede nennen wird, ausgearbeitet.’cxvii * Zurich, 23 November 1856 Vischer addresses his music volume once more: ‘Sie möchten, wenn die nächsten Lieferungen meiner Aesthetik erscheinen, gefälligst zuwarten, bis die ganze letzte Abtheilung (Musik u.[nd] Poesie) da ist, indem ich Sie bitten werde, dieselbe von mir anzunehmen, – ein freilich sehr … Zeichen des Andenkens an die geistig belebten Stunden, die ich Ihre Güte verdanke. […] Empfehlen Sie mich Herrn Liszt u.[nd] Ihrer Fräulein Tochter bestens u.[nd] erhalten Sie Ihr Wohlwollen. Ihren tiefstergebenen Fr. Vischer’cxviii * Zurich, 27 January 1857 (Published in VISCHER/SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN 1906, 357-359, with an incorrect date: 27.01.1859 and omitting the first paragraph.) * Zurich, 27 June 1858 (Published in VISCHER/SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN 1906, 312-313, omitting the first paragraph.) 182 Appendix III D-St SA (Stadtarchiv in Stuttgart) The Stadtarchiv in Stuttgart possesses 165 files containing letters from and to Vischer, manuscripts and personal files on microfilm. Letter referred to in this study: St SA A: 8802 Letter from Vischer probably to Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein, 27 October 1856 (Chapter Two [36], Chapter Six [108-109]) Original in Appendix IVd [199]. This is Vischer’s rejection of an invitation by the Princess, referring to the spirited and interesting conversations they usually have. His formulations bear witness of a common nineteenth-century politeness, but are also consistent with the way in which he refers to the Princess in letters to friends and acquaintances (see Chapter Two [36]): Eure Durchlaucht haben die große Güte gehabt, mich auf diesen Abend in Ihre Gesellschaft zu laden. Selbst meine Unpäßlichkeit würde mich nicht abhalten, eine so ehrenvollen Einladung u.[nd] der Aussicht auf eine zo erziehende u.[nd] geistvolle Unterhaltung zu folgen, - wenn es nicht gerade eine solche wäre, welche die Organe belästigt, mit denen man denkt u.[nd] spricht, u.[nd] welche keine Stimmung zuläßt. Ich werde mich beehren, wenn ich wieder … mehr Mensch bin, Ihnen persönlich für den mir zugedachten hohen Genuß zu danken u.[nd] Ihnen die tiefe Ergebenheit auszudrücken, mit der ich bin Ihr Diener Fr. Vischercxix Appendix IV Transcriptions and translations of unpublished letters a. Gustav Hotho to Vischer, Berlin 23 April 1845 See Appendix III [178]: Tü UB Md 787-453 where the relevant parts of the letter have been transcribed with translations in endnotes. b. Karl Köstlin to Vischer, Tübingen 2 April 1857 (Tü UB Md 787-539) Fully transcribed and translated. c. Eduard Hanslick to Vischer, Vienna 2 October 1854 (Tü UB Md 787-360) Fully transcribed and translated. d. Correspondence between Vischer and Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein See Appendix III [179-181]: Tü UB Md 787-1188a, Tü UB Md 787-1257a, and St SA A: 8802 where the relevant parts of the letters have been transcribed with translations in endnotes. Letters from Vischer: - Zurich, 27 October 1856 - Zurich, 16 November 1856 - Zurich, 23 November 1856 Manuscript sources 185 Letter to Vischer [no place, no date (after 1857)], in French 186 187 188 189 Tübingen den 2. Apr. 1857 man diesen Theoretiker, den ich einige Anregungen verdanke, für die Schrift interessieren könnte. Da [Name] allem Anschein nach nicht mehr nach T. [übingen] kommt, so lege ich Ihrem Brief an ihn bei. Indem ich Ihnen zur Vollendung Ihres Werks gratuliere, die es Ihnen möglich machen wird, Ihre Stimme auch wieder über speciellere Gegenstände der Aesthetik und Litteratur wahrnehmen zu lassen, dank ich nochmals für das Vertrauen, das Sie mir bewiesen, und grüße Sie herzlich. Ihr ergebensten Köstlin. Verehrtester Herr Professor! Aus verschiedenen Ursachen kommt dieser Brief Ihnen viel später zu, als ich früher selbst beabsichtigt hatte. Schon Anfangs März wollte ich Ihnen schreiben, um Ihnen sowohl für die Abtheilung über Poesie selbst als für die über Verdienst ehrenvolle Weise zu danken, in welcher Sie daselbst meiner gedacht haben. Allein theils Geschäfte, wie sie sich am Ende des Semesters anzuhäufen pflegen, und unter denen dießmal besonders eine gerade mir angefallene Mit- oder leider Nacharbeit, die Revision von Schweglers Geschichte der Philosophie, mich scharf in Anspruch nahm, theils vor Allem der Wunsch, die Poesie wegen der Verwandtschaft dieser Kunst mit der Musik vorher zu lesen und mich zu vergewissern, ob meine Arbeit in allen auf diese Verwandtschaft bezüglichen Punkten, wie Begriff von Ballade, Romanze, mit der Ihrigen in Einstimmung (es ist so) sich befinde, hielt mich so lange hin, dass ich erst jetzt zum Schreiben komme. Ich hatte dazwischen auch eine Reise nach Stuttgart zu unternehmen (auf der ich hörte, daß Sie für einige Zeit sich in Ulm aufhielten); auch diese war Ursache der Verzögerung, die ich Sie mithin bestens zu entschuldigen bitte. Mit einem kleinen Schreck sah ich, daß meine Arbeit im Verhältniß zu der Abtheilung über Poesie zu groß ist, von welcher letzteren ich im Stillen vorausgesetzt hatte, sie werde zu noch umfangreicheren Dimensionen anschwellen; doch, denke ich, werden Sie und das Publikum dieß mit der gerade bei der Musik vorhandenen Nothwendigkeit der Exposition formeller Dinge zurechtlegen, die wenigen allgemein bekannt und weniger unmittelbar klar sind. Es freute mich, daß Gugler sich sehr zufrieden über die Arbeit aussprach; der philomusische Helfer Planck in Heidenheim hat sie sogar dazu benützt, seinen Schulmeistern einige Begriffe über Wesen der Harmonie beizubringen. Wir können somit hoffen, daß ich Ihren Werk nicht geschadet habe. Das feinere Gepräge der ideellere Haltung, das die anderen Abtheilungen an sich tragen, weil sie die speciellen Künste trotz der konkreten Behandlung doch mehr von allgemein ästhetischen Standpunkt aus beleuchten, fehlt der meinigen freilich; aber die Musik ist so populär und so allgemein Angelegenheit des Tages, daß das herabsteigen zu einer weniger streng wissenschaftlichen Besprechung bei ihr nicht auffallend sein werd. Für das Register ist hier Niemand zu finden; die Zeiten sind vorüber, wo namentlich im Stift sich Leute dazu herbeigedrängt hätten. Eher glaube ich könnte einer Ihren Suttgarter Freunde Ihnen Jemand nennen. Da ich S.[eite] 1010 lin[ea]. 1-6 v.[on] u.[nten] dem Herrn Brendel, obwohl ohne ihn zu nennen, direkt opponirte, so wiederrieth ich Mäcken, das Buch ihm zur Anzeige zu schicken, fügte jedoch bei, daß ich es nicht gerade unbedingt für unthunlich halte. Ich möchte Sie bitten, hierüber definitiv zu entscheiden. Für den Fall, daß sie den Mäcken nicht selbst schreiben wollen, erbiete ich mich zur Besorgung Ihrer Antwort. Ich rieth ihn Bischoffs Niederrheinische Musikzeitung, die Zeitung Echo in Berlin und das Kunstblatt. Wer der Verfasser der “Fliegenden Blätter für Musik” ist, weiß man bei uns nicht; es wäre aber nicht übel, wenn 254 Tübingen 2 April 1857 one could raise the interest of this theorist for the writing; I owe him a couple of suggestions. Since [somebody] will probably not come to T.[übingen], I am attaching your letter to him. While I congratulate you with the completion of your work, which will enable you to make your voice heard on more particular subjects of aesthetics and literature again, I thank you once again for the trust that you have put in me, and greet you cordially, Yours sincerely, Köstlin Dear Professor! For various reasons this letter reaches you much later than I intended earlier. I wanted to write you already at the beginning of March in order to thank you for the volume on poetry, as well as for the honest way, surpassing the merit, in which you have called attention to me. It took me so long to write, partly because I have been absorbed by commitments that are usually piling up at the end of a semester – in particular my collaboration, or rather (unfortunately) my reworking and revising of Schwegler’s History of Philosophy –, partly and foremost because of my wish to read the volume on poetry in order to make sure that my work is in line with yours (which is the case) as to all of the aspects in which poetry and music resemble each other, such as concepts of Ballade, Romance. In the mean time, I also had to undertake a journey 255 to Stuttgart (on which I heard that you have been staying in Ulm for a while); this too was a reason for delay, for which I hereby would like to apologize. With a little jolt, I saw that my work is too large in relation to the volume on poetry; I had anticipated the latter to grow to even more substantial dimensions; however, I think that you and the public will compensate this with the necessity, particularly present for music, of explaining formal things which are known to few and immediately clear to fewer. It has pleased me that Gugler has declared himself to be very satisfied with the work; the musicalphilosophical cooperator Planck in Heidenheim has even used it to teach some concepts about the nature of harmony to his schoolmasters. Thus, we have reason to hope that I have not harmed your work. The finer imprint of the more ideal attitude, which the other volumes carry with them – despite their tangible treatment still illuminating the particular arts from a general aesthetic point of view – is, indeed, missing in my volume; but music is so popular and so generally a matter of the day, that the work’s descending to a less strictly scholarly discussion will not be too conspicuous. Nobody is willing to take on the index here; the times have passed in which people – especially in the Seminary – queued up for it. I rather think that one of your friends in Stuttgart would be able to mention someone to you. Because I have opposed Mr Brendel, albeit without mentioning him, on page 1010 six lines from below, I have advised Mäcken not to send him the book for review – although I did add that I do not regard it to be entirely impossible. I would like to ask you to make the final decision on this. In case you do not want to write to Mäcken yourself, I am presenting myself as the courier of your reply. I mentioned Bischoff’s Niederrheinische Musikzeiting, the periodical Echo in Berlin and the Kunstblatt to him. We do not know who the author is of the “Fliegende Blätter für Musik”; it would, however, not be bad if 256 194 195 dieser Welt werden kann. Ich darf es nicht wagen, Sie, hochverehrter Herr, um einige Zeilen zu bitten, welche mich über die Aufnahme meiner Sendung beruhigen, doch kann ich nicht verhehlen, daß mich dies unendlich glücklich machen würde. Mögen Sie nun über das Werk urtheilen wie immer, dem Autor müssen Sie ein bischen gut sein um der innigen und unwandelbaren Verehrung willen, mit welcher er sich bekennt als Ihren dankbarst ergebenen Schüler Dr Eduard Hanslick Wien 2. Oktober 1854. |: Meine Adresse: Dr E-H, im [kl.] Unterrichtsministerium:| Wien. Hochverehrter Herr Professor! Ich habe es gewagt, Ihnen ein Exemplar meines so eben bei R. Weigel in Leipzig erschienenen Werkchens “Vom Musikalisch-Schönen” zu übersenden. Könnte mein Herz Ihnen verrathen, wie es bei dieser Exercition in Furcht und Freude geschlagen, so würde ich über die freundliche Aufnahme meines Wagestücks weniger in Sorge sein. Ich kann Ihnen so nicht mehr bedeuten, als der fremde Name eines der tausend Geister, in die Sie sich so mächtig und […]chtvoll eingelebt haben. Wie viel ich Ihnen an Belehrung danke, davon spricht jede Seite meiner Schrift, wie viel aber an 259 Freude und Erhebung reinster, nachhaltigster Art, das möchte ich Ihnen gern einmal selbst erzälen, wenn die Pilgerfahrt nach Tübingen zu Stande kommt, die zu meiner Lieblingswünschen gehört. Als ein kleines Zeichen meiner Verehrung und Dankbarkeit nehmen Sie das Büchlein hin, dem ich mein bestes Streben gewidmet hatte. Daß der Stoff bedeutungsschwer sei, wird Ihnen nicht entgehen, in wie weit ich ihn zu bewältigen vermochte, mögen Sie nachsichtig beurtheilen. Es bedarf wohl kaum der Erwähnung daß ich die Musik in allen ihren Theilen in strenger vieljähriger Schule betrieb, sie auch jetzt, wenngleich der Oeffentlichkeit fremd, als Komponist und ausübender Musiker pflege. Mein trefflicher Meister W.J. Tomaschek in Prag wollte mich auch gänzlich der Musik gewinnen, einige tiefere Blicke in die Armseligkeit des Virtüosenlebens und gegründete Zweifel über die Intensität meiner musikalischen Schöpfungskraft ließen mich jedoch nie zu dem Entschluß kommen, die Musik als ausschließlichen Beruf zu hegen. Meine Vorliebe für philosophische Studien wurde aber bald das reizende Hinterpförtchen, durch welches die vernachlässigte Musik wieder hereinschlüpfte. Sie ist mir seither lieb und werth geblieben. Der Ernst der Forschung wird in meiner Arbeit hoffentlich zu erkennen sein, sollte diese für das Prachtgebäude das wir von Ihnen nunmehr erwarten, einige Klammern oder Spangen abgeben können, so würde ich dies für die höchste Ehre ansehen, die mir auf 260 to me in this world. I do not have the courage, highly honoured sir, to beg you for a couple of lines, which would calm me down as to the reception of my sending, but I cannot hide the fact that this would make me infinitely happy. Now please judge the work, as one does, and be a little kind to the author for the sake of his profound and unshakeable reverence, with which he admits to be Your most gratefully devoted pupil Dr Eduard Hanslick Vienna 2 October 1854. My address: Dr E-H, at the Department of Education Vienna Dear Professor! I have dared to send you a copy of my little work “Vom Musikalisch-Schönen”, which has just appeared with R. Weigel in Leipzig. If my heart could give away to you, how it has been beating in fear and joy during this exercise, I would have to worry less about the friendly reception of my bold venture. I cannot be more to you than the strange name of one of the thousand spirits into which you have infiltrated yourself so powerfully and […]. Every page of my writing will tell how much I owe you with regard to learning; however, the amount of joy and uplifting of the purest and most enduring kind, this I would like to tell you myself at some point, when the pilgrimage to Tübingen works out, which is one of my greatest wishes. As a small sign of my reverence and gratitude, please accept this little book, which I have given my best efforts. You will not fail to notice that the matter is difficult to interpret; to what extent I have been able to master it, you may judge leniently. It hardly needs mentioning that I have practiced music in all its facets in strict long-lasting education, and that I still, if estranged from public appearance, practice it as a composer and a performing musician. My excellent master W.J. Tomaschek in Prague wanted to win me over to music totally; a couple of closer looks at the pitiful lives of virtuosos and legitimate doubt about the intensity of my musical creativity never made me decide to cherish music as an exclusive profession. My penchant for philosophical studies, however, soon became the pleasant back door through which the neglected music sneaked back in. Since then, it has remained dear and precious to me. The seriousness of the investigation should hopefully be recognizable in my work, and if it would provide some strongholds and clasps for the splendid structure [Aesthetics] that we expect from you, I would regard it as the highest honour that could occur 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 Appendix V Music criticism and the idealist discourse a. The attention devoted to music in Hegelian journals in the 1830s and 1840s Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, Berlin. 1827- 1835 Contributors: Prominent writers, artists and aestheticians: Gustav Hotho (who ‘wrote’ Hegel’s Aesthetics), Goethe, Carl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz, August Wilhelm Schlegel (writer), Heinrich Theodor Rötscher (dramaturge and critic), Friedrich Rückert (poet), among others. No composers or musicians. Subject matters: The categories in the systematic index are as follows: I. Philosophie II. Theologie III. Jurisprudenz und Staatswissenschaft IV. Geschichte und Kriegswissenschaft V. Philologie und Kunstkritik VI. Reine und angewandte Mathematik VII. Geographie, Physik und Chemie VIII.Mineralogie, Botanik, Zoologie IX. Physiologie und Medicin 210 Appendix V Category V contains drama (mainly Greek mythology, but also Dante and the Ramayana), linguistics (Latin, Sanskrit, Arabic), contemporary poetry and literature in the form of book reviews, visual arts, architecture. Music hardly addressed. References to music 1831-1835: 1831 – An article on folk music, which addresses the text/lyrics and not the music. 1832 – Amadeus Wendt’s book Hauptperioden der schöne Kunst is reviewed by Hotho, with a couple of remarks on music’s expressive capacities. 1833 – Advertisement for a conservatory 1834 [could not be consulted] 1835 – Announcement of the emergence of the NZfM (Schumann), by Barth (the publisher). – Review by one Winterfeld of A. Kretzschmer’s Ideen zu einer Theorie der Musik, published two years earlier. Winterfeld notes the ‘lack’ of scholarly engagement with music, arguing that Kretschmer’s efforts try to turn the tide: Unsere Tonlehre ist ein blosses, zusammengewürfeltes Aggregat von Regeln und Ausnahmen; sie soll aber eine festgegründete, fortdauernder Verbesserung fähige Wissenschaft werden. Dazu wird sie nimmer gelangen, sofern nicht Alles, was sie vorschreibt und verwirft, aus einer allgemeine Grundlage sich entwickelt. Diese Grundlage, deren sie bis jetzt entbehrte, ist eine ganz einfache: die fortgesetzte Theilung einer Saitenlänge nach Hälften und Vierteln: die aus ihr sich entwickelnde, naturgemässe Tonleiter. (WINTERFELD 1835, 297) Winterfeld’s article illustrates the apparent unwillingness or inability to connect the requested ‘general scholarly basis’ (allgemeine Grundlage) for a theory of music (Tonlehre) with anything other than music’s quantitative features. There is an aversion against explaining it in discursive terms, which was widely employed for explaining the visual arts and literature. Jahrbücher der Gegenwart, Tübingen 1843-1848 Contributors: Vischer, Rötscher, D.F. Strauß, Eduard Mörike, A. Schwegler (archaeologist), Eduard Zeller (philosopher), Gustav Hotho, Gottfried Keller (poet), Karl Köstlin, Karl Christian Planck (philosopher), among others. No composers or musicians. Music criticism and the idealist discourse 211 Subject matters: University politics, history and the state, dramaturgy, poetry, literature, visual arts to a lesser extent, and a couple of contributions on music. References to music 1844-1847: 1845 – an article with the widely-shared view that German opera was a sublation of objective straightforward Italian culture on the one hand, and the subjective profound German culture on the other. The author regularly refers to Vischer in order to support his stance that German opera is the culmination (Kulminationspunkt) of the history of music (RIEHL 1845, 217). 1846 – an article about the contemporary situation of music as compared to the other arts. Bank formulates the idealist objections against music in a nutshell. There is the dichotomy of the impossibility to grasp music in verbal concepts, on the one hand, and the close association of the tone system with Thought, on the other. Music’s spiritual superficiality is hidden by its inaccessible nature. Poetry and the visual arts do not have this inaccessible nature. Die Poesie und die bildenden Künste haben einen in Worten klar ausgesprochenen Sinn oder etwas in Form und Farbe Bestimmtes – Greif- und Fühlbares, der Natur sich anschließendes zu geben. Die Musik soll durch den Ausdruck des flüchtigen, unbestimmten und körperlosen Tonstoffs uns die Gefühlswelt des Menschenherzes und die Eindrücke der äußern Welt darauf schildern, und durch unsere Einbildungskraft in schöner Nachempfindung wieder erwecken. Dieß kann sie um so mehr nur durch das organische Leben und die plastische Klarheit und Einigheit der Fantasie, des Gefühls und der künstlerischen Bildung erreichen, wodurch sie jenen Stoff gestaltet, beseelt, verbindet und zusammenfügt: und in der That ist diesem unbestimmten ätherischen Tonelement eine Bestimmtheit des Ausdrucks durch die primitive Kraft und Wahrheit der Gedanken und das schöne Verhältniß im Gefüge und Gegensätzen derselbe möglich, aber nur dem genialen Geiste vorbehalten. Ohne den höchsten Grad dieser Eigenschaften verliert sich die Musik durch ihr sinnlich zerfließendes Material in die nebelhafteste Empfindungsschwärmerei. (BANK 1846, 989-990) 212 Appendix V b. List of treatises on musical aesthetics during Vischer’s lifetime This is an incomplete list of treatises dealing with music-aesthetic issues, showing the proliferation of the amount of treatises, and the increased use of the word ‘aesthetics’ in the title to determine the content of the book. Titles mentioned in the Bibliography [224] have been consulted for the present investigation. The others could not easily be traced and have been left out of consideration. 1830-1839 1836 Wendt, Amadeus: Über den gegenwärtigen Zustand der Musik, Göttingen 1837/41 Hand, Ferdinand: Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Leipzig [2 volumes] 1840-1849 1837-47 Marx, Adolph, Bernhard: Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition, Leipzig [4 volumes] 1847 Griepenkerl, Wolfgang: Die Oper der Gegenwart, Leipzig 1847 Krüger, Eduard: Beiträge für Leben und Wissenschaft der Tonkunst, Leipzig 1850-1859 1854 Hanslick, Eduard: Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, Leipzig Reprints: 1858, 1865, 1874, 1876, 1881, 1885, 1891, 1896, 1902 1854 Csillagh, C.: Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Pressburg 1856 Ambros, Wilhelm August: Über die Grenzen der Musik und Poesie, Leipzig Reprints: 1872, 1885 1857 Vischer, Friedrich / Köstlin Karl: Aesthetik Volume III/2/4 ‘Die Musik’, Stuttgart 1858 Kullak, Adolph: Das Musikalisch-Schöne, Leipzig 1859 Laurencin, Ferdinand Peter Graf: Dr. Hanslick’s Lehre vom Musikalisch-Schönen: eine Abwehr. Leipzig 1860-1869 1864 Reissmann, August. Allgemeine Musiklehre, Berlin 1866 Krüger, Eduard: System der Tonkunst, Leipzig 1867 Marx, Adolph Bernhard: Das Ideal und die Gegenwart, Jena 1869 Schucht, J.F.: Wegweiser in die Tonkunst, Leipzig Music criticism and the idealist discourse 213 1870-1879 1870 Stade, Fr.: Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, Leipzig 1871 Fuchs, Carl: Praeliminarien zu einer Kritik der Tonkunst, Leipzig 1876 Klengel, P.: Zur Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Leipzig 1877 Hostinsky, Ottokar: Das Musikalisch-Schönen und das Gesamtkunstwerk, Leipzig 1879 Köstlin, Heinrich Adolf: Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Stuttgart 1879 Reissmann, August: Zur Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Berlin 1880-1889 1881 Ehrlich, Karl Heinrich: Die Musik-Aesthetik in ihrer Entwicklung, Leipzig 1884 Engel, Gustav: Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Berlin 1885 Hausegger, Friedrich von: Musik als Ausdruck, Wien 1885 Tannert, Richard: Wider der Zünftelei in der Musik, Oldenburg 1886 Wallaschek, Richard: Aesthetik der Tonkunst, Stuttgart 1886 Hartmann, Eduard von: Idealismus und Formalismus in der Musikaesthetik, Berlin 1887 Seidl, Arthur: Vom Musikalisch-Erhabenen, Regensburg 1888 Meinardus, Ludwig: Die deutsche Tonkunst, Leipzig Appendix VI References to Vischer in music periodicals and treatises Although the frequency of references to Vischer by music critics and aestheticians is limited, this list does not intend to be comprehensive. It provides an impression of where and how Vischer was addressed in the musicointellectual discourse and it bibliographically supports the statements and quotations in the main text. On the one hand, Vischer was distrusted for his systematic philosophical approach to music; on the other hand, he was regarded as an ideological point of orientation surpassing the various musical allegiances of the music critics. The quotations in this Appendix have not been translated into English. NO AUTHOR: [NO AUTHOR = C. KRETSCHMANN] 1849. ‘Dr. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen’ [NO AUTHOR = LUDWIG BISCHOFF] 1857 ‘Ästhetik der Musik: von Dr. Friedr. Theod. Vischer’ [C.K.] 1861. ‘Carltheater: Geibel, Brundhild (Tragödie): Frau Straßmann-Damböck. Mit Auszügen der Urteile Friedrich Vischers und Kotzebues’ [NO AUTHOR = DR. LORENZ] 1861, 33. (see Chapter Five [100]) ‘Indem wir nun die stofflich-formale Seite des Kunstwerks oder seine Form ins Auge zu fassen haben, begnügen wir uns, diese Betrachtung wieder auf das Gebiet der Tonkunst zu 216 Appendix VI beschränken, und im Uebrigen auf die Lehrbücher der Aesthetik (Vischer u.A.m.) zu verweisen.’ References to Vischer 217 [NO AUTHOR] 1869, 172. (see Chapter Two [35]) ‘F. Vischer’s “Handbuch der musikalischen Aesthetik” [sic!] gilt allgemein als die beste Bearbeitung dieser Materie [i.e. ‘Bettelsuppe-Literatur’]. Wir werden jedoch Niemandem rathen, der nicht mit der philosophischen Dialektik und der modern-ästhetischen Terminologie vollkommen vertraut ist, das Vischer’sche Werk, sowohl als die geistvollen Arbeiten auf ästhetischem Gebiete von Köstlin, Carrière[,] Lutze, Zimmermann, Hanslick etc. in die Hand zu nehmen, da jedem unvorbereiteten Leser das Verständniss dieser Schriften verschlossen bleiben wird.’ LUDWIG BISCHOFF: BISCHOFF 1857, 329-332. (see Chapter Two [35]) ‘Um so unverantwortlicher ist es, wenn sie [the critics around Sobolewski] auf ein Werk wie Vischer’s Aesthetik mit Geringschätzung herabblicken und an einigen Orten einen Ton darüber anstimmen, der zu nichts Anderem dienen kann, als ihre Unwissenheit und Unbeholfenheit in den jenigen wissenschaftlichen Dingen, welche die Kunst betreffen, an den Tag zu legen. So heißt es z.B. S. 2: “Eure Aufgabe ist schwer. Schaut ihr doch schon mit Misstrauen auf Vischer’s Aesthetik der Musik, nur weil er S. 1147 von der hohen Bedeutung der Marschner’scher Werke spricht” – S. 4: “Vischer’s Aesthetik ist sehr achtungswerth [wahrhaftig? {L.B.}]; doch kann eine Aesthetik der Musik nur von jemand geschrieben werden, der zugleich Musiker und Philosoph ist. Da Vischer nicht Musiker, wenigstens nicht in dem erforderlichen Grade ist, so kann sein Werk nur in einzelnen Theilen genügen.” [Davon ist gerade das Umgekehrte wahr; im Ganzen, im System ist Vischer’s Werk vortrefflich, und nur im Einzelnen vermisst man hier und da den Musiker. (…)].’ (329/330) ‘Und solche Phrasenmacher wollen einen Denker wie Vischer über die Achsel ansehen, während sie sich an seine Fersen heften sollten, um einmal zu versuchen, sich würdig zu machen, ihm die Schuhriemen zu lösen.’ (332) FRANZ BRENDEL: BRENDEL 1849a. ‘Die wissenschaftliche Bildung des Künstlers’ BRENDEL 1857a, 185. (see Chapter Two [35], Chapter Three [62n]) ‘Wir haben bis jetzt fünf Briefe, Referate über die Vischer’sche Aesthetik aus der Feder des Hrn. E. v. Elterlein enthaltend, veröffentlicht. […] mit dem bereits Gegebenen [ist] das Abstracte beseitigt und alles Spätere bewegt sich auf concreterem Boden. […] Jene grossen wissenschaftlichen Resultate, welche bisher nur das Eigenthum der in sich abgeschlossenen Wissenschaft waren, werden dadurch einem grösseren Kreise mindestens zugänglich […] Gehören doch die Leistungen der Deutschen auf dem Gebiete der Aesthetik zu den grössten geistigen Thaten derselben.’ 218 Appendix VI BRENDEL 1858c, 74n. (see Chapter Seven [118n]) ‘Der nächste Schritt, der zu thun war, bestand, wie bereits vor einiger Zeit einmal erwähnt wurde, in der Bearbeitung der Geschichte der Musik, um erst nach dieser Seite eine Orientirung über die zurückgelegte Enwicklung anzubahnen, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft der Tonkunst im Zusammenhange auffassen zu lernen und dadurch der Aesthetik der Tonkunst zorzuarbeiten. Jetzt wird es dringendes Bedürfniss, dieser selbst näher zu treten, und es soll dies auch geschehen, sobald die nächsten der vorliegende Aufgaben aufgearbeitet sind. Zur Einleitung wurden, wie bereits ebenfalls erwähnt, die Auszüge aus Vischer’s Aesthetik gegeben, die bis auf zwei noch ungedruckte demnächst zu veröffentlichende Artikel erledigt sind.’ ECHO: Berliner Musik-Zeitung Echo 7/15 (19. April 1857), 124 (see Chapter Three [62n]) Professor Vischer’s Aesthetik jetzt vollständig! So eben erschien in Unterzeichneter: Vischer, Dr. Fr. Th., (Professor der Aesthetik und deutschen Literatur an der Universität und dem Polytechnikum in Zürich), Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen. Zum Gebrauche für Vorlesungen. III. Theil. II. Abschnitt. 4. Heft: Musik. 5. Heft: Poesie: oder 20. bis Schlusslieferung der Lieferungsausgabe . Preis fl. 7. oder Rthlr. 4 1/6. Es ist damit dieses Werk ganz vollständig und wollen die Herrn Besitzer der bisherigen Bände oder Lieferungen diese Fortsetzung (wie auch noch etwa sonst mangelnden Bände, Hefte oder Lieferungen) von ihrer Buchhandlung verlangan [sic!]. Prof. Vischer’s A e s t h e t i k o d e r W i s s e n s c h a f t d e s S c h ö n e n. Drei Theile in vier Bänden. Preis vollständig fl. 24. – oder Thlr. 14. nimmt unter den Erscheinungen der Neuzeit eine zu hohe Stelle ein, als dass dieselbe in der Hand des Gebildeten fehlen dürfte.  Zu beziehen durch jene Buchhandlung des In- und Auslandes, namentlich durch Die Verlagsexpedition der Verlagsbuchhandlung von Carl Mäcken Stuttgart. in Reutlingen References to Vischer 219 KARL HEINRICH EHRLICH: EHRLICH 1882, 77-80 (see Chapter Eight [134n]) Very laudatory references: ‘der große Vischer…’; ‘die Vischer treffend bezeichnet als…’ ; ‘keine allgemeine Aesthetik bietet eine so umfassende, eingehende und streng systematische Besprechung der Musik, wie die von Fr. Vischer’; ‘eine unerschöpflicher Born der Belehrung und Anregung’ (77), which are a prelude to cautiously formulated criticism: ‘Trotz dieser genauen Erklärung des großen Aesthetikers können wir nicht umhin, seine Ansicht als nicht ganz richtig zu bezeichnen.’ (79) ‘ich glaube, VischerKöstlin befindet sich hier in einem Irrthume, so schön er auch seine Ansicht dargelegt hat. Was das Buch noch über die Einzelmomente, dann über Instrumentation und Form der musikalischen Kunstwerke sagt, bietet überall höchst Werthvolles und Belehrendes, wenn auch manches mehr ideell gedacht als der Fachkenntniss und Erfahrung gegenüber haltbar erscheinen mag.’ (80) ERNST VON ELTERLEIN: ELTERLEIN , Ernst von 1857a. ‘Vischer’s Aesthetik, eine Fundgrube für denkende Musiker: Briefe an einen Musiker.’ (see Chapter Three [62n], Chapter Seven [134n], Chapter Eight [140-142]) ELTERLEIN , Ernst von 1857b. ‘Die Aesthetik der Musik nach Vischer und Köstlin: Briefe an einen Musiker.’ (see Chapter Three [62n], Chapter Seven [134n], Chapter Eight [140-142]) ELTERLEIN , Ernst von 1858. Beethoven’s Symphonien nach ihrem idealen Gehalt, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Haydn, Mozart und die neueren Symphoniker (1854). (see Chapter Eight [140-142]) ELTERLEIN , Ernst von 1870. Beethoven’s Symphonien nach ihrem idealen Gehalt, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Haydn, Mozart und die neueren Symphoniker. (see Chapter Eight [140-142]) EDUARD HANSLICK: (see Chapter Five, unless otherwise stated) Tü UB: Md 787-360 Unpublished letter to Vischer, 2 October 1854 (Appendix IVc [192]). HANSLICK, Eduard 1890. ‘Begegnungen mit Fr. Th. Vischer’ (1887) HANSLICK 1892b, 241. (see Chapter Six [108n]) ‘Nach der letzten Note stürzten wir Anderen ins Freie, athmeten beglückt die kräftig milde Frühlingsluft und gedachten des überstandenen Lisztschen Alpdrückens nur mehr mit dem Citat aus Vischer’s köstlicher “Faust”-Parodie: “Das Abgeschmackteste / Hier ward es 220 Appendix VI geschmeckt, / Das Allervertrackteste / Hier ward es bezweckt / Das Unverzeihliche / Hier sei es verziehn, / Das ewig Langweilige / Zieht uns dahin!”’ HANSLICK, Eduard 1894, 243. ‘Eitelberger, meines Wissens der erste Privatdozent in Wien (1848), vertrat mit glänzendem Geist und reicher Gelehrsamkeit die Geschichte und Ästhetik der bildenden Künste. Von der Ästhetik hatte es ihn jedoch immer entschiedener abgedrängt zur historischen Erforschung. Als er einmal im Eifer recht geringschätzig über das Werk des von mir verehrten Vischer sprach, wendete ich ein, es sei doch die erste Ästhetik, die ihren Namen verdiene. ‘Ja’, erwiderte Eitelberger, ‘aber sie wird auch überhaupt die letzte sein.’ HANSLICK 1982. ‘Wagner Kultus: ein Postskriptum zu den Bayreuther Briefen’ (1882) from: Aus dem Opernleben der Gegenwart (1884), in Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Schönen. Aufsätze. Musikkritiken, ed. Klaus Mehner. Leipzig: Philipp Reclam jr. (Reclams Universal-Bibliothek; 969), 310-320. HANSLICK 1990, 12. ‘Ich möchte sie [the 6th edition (1881)] am liebsten mit denselben Worten einleiten, welche der treffliche Fr. Th. Vischer so eben im Wiederabdruck einer älteren Abhandlung (“Der Traum”) vorausschickte.’ HANSLICK 1990, 14. ‘Uebrigens hat das weit über mein Erwarten günstige Schicksal der früheren drei Auflagen und der mich hocherfreuende Antheil, mit welchem Männer wie Vischer, Strauß, Lotze, Lazarus u. A., in neuester Zeit vor allem Helmholtz davon Act nahmen, mich überzeugt, dass meine Ideen in der etwas scharfen und rhapsodischen Weise ihres ursprünglichen Auftretens auf gutes Erdreich gefallen sind.’ [Preface to the 4th edition (1874)] HANSLICK 1990, 28 ‘Das Organ womit das Schöne aufgenommen wird ist nicht das Gefühl, sondern die Phantasie, als Thätigkeit des reinen Schauens (Vischer’s Aesth. §. 384.)’ [The reference to Vischer was removed in the 4th edition (1874).] HANSLICK 1990, 47n ‘Vischer (Aesth. § 11 Anmerkung) definirt die bestimmten Ideen als die Reiche des Lebens, sofern ihre Wirklichkeit als ihrem Begriff entprechend gedacht wird. Denn Idee bezeichnet immer den in seiner Wirklichkeit rein und mangellos gegenwärtigen Begriff.’ References to Vischer 221 HANSLICK 1990, 108 ‘Mit Vischer (Aesthetik §. 527) würden wir das Wort “Styl” auch in der Musik absolut gebrauchen und, absehend von den historischen oder individuellen Eintheilungen, sagen: Dieser Componist hat Styl, in dem Sinne als man von Jemand sagt: er hat Charakter.’ 90 HANSLICK 1990, 154n. (see Chapter Two [35]) ‘In diesen allgemeinen Bestimmungen [of natural Beauty] folgen wir Vischer’s vortrefflichen Kapiteln über das Naturschöne im zweiten Band seiner Aesthetik. Bis zur Musik ist dieses Werk bisher noch nicht vorgeschritten.’ [The quotation was removed in the 2nd edition of VMS (1858). Vischer’s music aesthetics had appeared by that time.] HANSLICK 1990, 160. ‘Gewichtige Stimmen behaupten die Inhaltslosigkeit der Musik, sie gehören beinahe durchaus den Philosophen: Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Vischer, Kahlert u. A.’[Vischer’s name is replaced by Herbart’s in the 3rd edition (1865).] HANSLICK 1994, 164. ‘Die Ironie im modernen Sinn, die “perfide Ironie des Geistes,” wie sie Vischer nennt und Hegel verfolgt, ist in der Musik noch durch außerordentlich wenig Beispiele repräsentiert’ ‘Aesthetische Reflexionen über Hoven’s Komposition der Heine’schen “Heimkehr”’ Wiener Zeitung 28.06.1851. HANSLICK 1994, 235. ‘Mit Vischer (Aesthetik [§] 527) würden wir das Wort “Styl” auch in der Musik absolut gebrauchen und, absehend von den historischen oder individuellen Eintheilungen, sagen: Dieser Komponist hat Styl, in dem Sinnen als man von Jemand sagt, er hat Charakter.’ ‘Ueber den subjektiven Eindruck der Musik und seine Stellung in der Aesthetik’ Oesterreichische Blätter für Literatur und Kunst 25.07.1853 HANSLICK 1994, 314. ‘Der Dichter kann keinen Sonnenaufgang, kein Schneefeld beschreiben, keinen Gefühlszustand schildern, keinen Bauer, Soldaten, Geizigen, Verliebten auf die Bühne bringen, wenn er nicht die Vorbilder dazu in der Natur gesehen und studirt oder richtige Traditionen so in seiner Phantasie belebt hat, daß sie die unmittelbare Anschauung ersetzen.’ ‘Die Tonkunst in ihren Beziehungen zur Natur’ Oesterreichische Blätter für Literatur und Kunst 13.03.1854 90 Hanslick must have written this passage in direct imitation of Vischer, which proves his familiarity with Vischer’s work (VISCHER 1923, § 527: 142): ‘Wir nehmen aber das Wort hier absolut, in dem Sinne, den man damit verbindet, wenn man schlechtweg sagt: er hat Styl, oder: das ist (…) Styl, ebenso, wie man sagt: er ist ein Charakter, das ist Charakter’ 222 Appendix VI HANSLICK 2002, 94. ‘Wie Vischer Heinrich Heine die “giftig gewordene Romantik” nannte, so könnte man Verdi als die “giftig gewordene italienische Musik” kennzeichnen.’ Review Giovanni d’Arco in [Wiener] Presse 07.05.1857 OTTO LANGE LANGE 1858, 201. ‘Der Verfasser dieses Werkes [Elterlein] bezeichnet sich vorweg als einen Dilettanten; er widmet dasselbe dem bekannten Aesthetiker Theodor Vischer in Zürich, dessen Ansichten und Grundsätze sich als der eigentliche Lebensfaden durch die Arbeit hindurchziehen’ and ‘Der Verfasser beginnt nach einer philosophischen Einleitung, die im Wesentlichen den Vischerschen Standpunkt repräsentiert, mit Haydn.’ FRANZ LISZT Letter to Franz Brendel – 3 April 1853 (see Chapter Seven [118n]), praising Vischer’s merit for the emergence of Brendel’s journal Anregungen für Kunst, Leben und Wissenschaft.91 JOHANN CHRISTIAN LOBE LOBE 1855, 185. Gives a survey from Plato to now: ‘Hegel endlich trennt das Kunstschöne (das Ideal) von dem Naturschönen und setzt das Erstere so sehr über das Letztere, als der Geist mit seine Erzeugnissen über der Natur und ihren Erscheinungen stehe. Von den neuesten Aesthetikern ist namentlich Vischer zu nennen, welcher das Schöne als die Erscheinung der Idee im Bilde erklärt.’ LOBE 1857, 442. (see Chapter Three [62n]) ‘Hier beginnt jenes politisch-unpolitische Spiel, welches die neuere Zeit erfunden hat, Grundsätze, welche alle Aesthetiker von Aristoteles bis Vischer anerkennen, als neue Entdeckungen anzupreisen, die geschicktesten Ausprägungen derselben aber durch unsere größten früheren Meister als kindisch schwache Versuche zu bezeichnen.’ LUDWIG MEINARDUS: MEINARDUS 1888, 1. (see Chapter Eight [130]) ‘Bis zur Gegenwart herab hat die Tonkunst unter den Musen der bildenden Künste und schönen Literatur das Los eines Aschenbrödels zu tragen gehabt. Die Philosophen, Kulturforscher, Historiker, Volkswirtschaftslehrer und Statistiker, denen allen sie zu denken und zu raten geben möchte, wußten mit der tönenden Sphinx nichts anzufangen. Sie 91 The exact content of this letter remains to be clarified. The reference has been provided by Prof. Dr. Rainer Kleinertz (Universität Regensburg). References to Vischer 223 ließen sie deshalb auf sich beruhen. – Selbst ein Kunstphilosoph wie Fr. Vischer überantwortete dem Tübinger Professor K. Köstlin die Aufgabe, sein großes Lehrsystem der Ästhetik durch kongeniale Bearbeitung des musikalischen Teiles zu ergänzen.’ JOACHIM RAFF: RAFF 1854, 3-8. (see Chapter Two [39-40]) After having been part of the New German incrowd, Raff turns against Wagner’s idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk. He questions its originality, thereby referring to Vischer. Wagner’s starting point, Raff argues, was ‘der historischen Oper der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, sein Ziel ist das “Kunstwerk der Zukunft”. […] Jener Ausgangspunkt prägt sich bei ihm in der Oper “Rienzi” aus, in welcher er alles das, was die historische Oper, welche der Verfasser des Artikels über die Oper im “Conversationslexikon der Gegenwart” und selbst, wenn ich nicht irre, Vischer in den “kritischen Gängen” als Zeitaufgabe darstellten, in Stoff, Styl und Material hergab, zu erschöpfen suchte.’ (8) Raff also argues that ‘wer die Theorieen Hegel’s und Vischer’s aus keinem anderen Grunde ignorirt, als weil ihm die mechanische Ausübung eines Kunsthandwerks, oder auch die bloße Ausbeutung einer, wenn auch reichen, aber in ihrer Einseitigkeit bei den jetzigen Anforderungen doch allzu leicht erschöpfbaren subjectiven Phantasie genüglich vorkommt, der ist nicht berechtigt, auf den Namen eines gebildeten Künstlers Anspruch zu erheben.’ (3) AUGUST REISSMANN: REISSMANN 1864, 308-318. (see Chapter Eight [135-139]) ‘Die Aesthetik dagegen beobachtete wiederum nur ganz einseitig die Wirkung des Kunstwerks und unterschied dadurch verführt Stylarten, die factisch nicht vorhanden sind. In diese Weise fasst den Begriff Styl selbst noch einer der geistvollsten und unterrichtesten Aesthetiker: Vischer in seiner Aesthetik.’ (308) ‘Entscheidener noch tritt dieser einseitige Standpunkt dann hervor, als der berühmte und verdienstvolle Aesthetiker die Nothwendigkeit der verschiedenen Stylarten entwickelt.’ (309). The very last sentences of his book read as follows: ‘Die Manier ist immer der beste Beweis des Mangels einer vollständigen Herrschaft über das ganze Darstellungsmaterial. Wer diese [i.e. Herrschaft] besitzt, wird unter dem zwingenden Einfluss einer bestimmten Idee sich auch einen bestimmten Styl aneignen.’ (318). PRINCESS CAROLYNE VON SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN: Tü UB Md 787-1188a Unpublished letter to Vischer, no date (Appendix III [179]). 224 Appendix VI ARTHUR SEIDL: SEIDL 1887. (see Chapter Eight [134n & 135n]) He mentions Vischer regularly and regards him as an authority, addressing Vischer’s idealist account of the relation between form and content and of the Sublime (VISCHER 1837), which he intends to apply to music (30). Vischer is clearly his point of orientation: ‘Wir haben hier nur wieder die Keime der späteren Vischer’schen Theorie aufgezeichnet’ (35). His theory of the Sublime, involving fear and awe, points back at Vischer. He also refers to Vischer when he talks about an expanded concept of Beauty and states that Reissmann 1864 has been influenced by Vischer considerably. E. SOBOLEWSKI Sobolewski as quoted in BISCHOFF 1857, 329-330. (see Chapter Two [35-36]) ‘Eure Aufgabe ist schwer. Schaut ihr doch schon mit Misstrauen auf Vischer’s Aesthetik der Musik, nur weil er S. 1147 von der hohen Bedeutung der Marschner’scher Werke spricht’ Sobolewski as quoted in BISCHOFF 1857, 329-330. ‘Vischer’s Aesthetik ist sehr achtungswerth; doch kann eine Aesthetik der Musik nur von jemand geschrieben werden, der zugleich Musiker und Philosoph ist. Da Vischer nicht Musiker, wenigstens nicht in dem erforderlichen Grade ist, so kann sein Werk nur in einzelnen Theilen genügen.’ SOBOLEWSKI 1857b, 7. ‘Wäre Vischer 1684 geboren, so hätte er wahrscheinlich Händel, wie heute Liszt und Wagner zugerufen: “Mit dem Wegfallen der bestimmten musikalischen Formen ist Alles zufällig geworden. Die Musik hat Halt und Gehalt verloren.”’ WILHELM TAPPERT: Tü UB Md 787-1057 Unpublished letter to Vischer, 6 February 1881, about Wagner’s reliance on Vischer’s proposal for a German opera (VISCHER 1844d) (Appendix III [179]). RICHARD WAGNER: Letter to Hans von Bülow - 29 November 1856 (see Chapter Two [36]) ‘entsetzliche Professoren-Sucht der Fürstin’ [Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein] Letter to Mathilde Wesendonck – Winter 1857/58 ‘Zum allerbesten habe ich nicht geschlafen, und war soeben schwankend, ob ich trotz Vischer und Eis, heut’ kommen würde.’ References to Vischer 225 Letter to Franz Liszt, Zürich 1 January 1858 ‘Und wenn die Fürstin [Wagner/Liszt 1910, 183. In Wagner 2000, 104: ‘die Kapellmeisterin’] böse ist, so soll sie dafür nächstens nur einmal Prof. Moleschott oder Prof. Vischer u.s.w. tüchtig ausschelten, denn im Grunde genommen ist nur diese Gattung Menschen d’ran schuld, daß ich irgend Jemand bös machen kann.’ WAGNER 1888, 251-252 (see Chapter Five [91]) (also quoted in RECK 1998, 378) Das “Musikalisch-Schöne”. Jenes Libell des Dr. Hanslick in Wien über das “Musikalisch-Schöne” wie es mit bestimmter Absicht verfaßt worden, ward mit größter Hast schnell zu solcher Berühmtheit gebracht, das es einem gutartigen, durchaus blonden deutschen Aesthetiker, Herrn Vischer, welcher sich bei der Ausführung eines großen System’s mit dem Artikel “Musik” herumzuplagen hatte, nicht wohl zu verdenken war, wenn er sich der Bequemlichkeit und Sicherheit wegen mit dem so sehr gepriesenen Wiener Musikästhetiker assoziirte: er überließ ihm die Ausführung dieses Artikels, von dem er Nichts zu verstehen bekannte, für • sein großes Werk. So saß denn die musikalische Judenschönheit mitten im Herzen eines vollblutig germanischen System’s der Aesthetik, was auch zur Vermehrung der Berühmtheit seines Schöpfers um so mehr beitrug, als es jetzt überlaut in den Zeitungen gepriesen, seiner großen Unkurzweiligkeit wegen aber von Niemand gelesen ward. Unter der verstärkten Protektion durch diese neue, noch dazu ganz christlich-deutsche Berühmtheit, ward nun auch die musikalische Judenschönheit zum völligen Dogma erhoben; die eigenthümlichsten und schwierigsten Fragen der Aesthetik der Musik, über welche die größten Philosophen, sobald sie etwas wirklich Gescheidtes sagen wollten, sich stets nur noch mit muthmaßender Unsicherheit geäußert hatten, wurden von Juden und übertölpelten Christen jetzt mit einer Sicherheit zur Hand genommen, dass Demjenigen, der sich hierbei wirklich Etwas denken, und namentlich den überwältigenden Eindruck der Beethoven’schen Musik auf sein Gemüth sich erklären wollte, etwa so zu Muthe werden mußte, als hörte er der Verschacherung der Gewänder des Heilandes am Fuße des Kreuzes zu, – worüber der berühmte Bibelforscher David Strauß vermuthlich ebenso geistvoll erläuternd, wie über die neunte Symphonie Beethoven’s, sich auslassen dürfte. Bayreuther Blätter: HAUSEGGER 1881, 8n. (see Chapter Five [91]) A slightly more decent version of Wagner’s anti-Semitic presentation of the ‘facts’ in 1869 (WAGNER 1888, 251-252): ‘Der klassische Aesthetiker der Neuzeit, Th. Vischer, wusste bekanntlich so wenig mit der Musik anzufangen, dass er sich, als verlegene Stiefmutter, mit Herrn Hanslick zu verbinden genöthigt sah, damit diese moderne Autorität auf dem  Dieses theilte mir Herr Professor Vischer einst selbst in Zürich mit: in welchem Verhältniss die Mitarbeit des Herrn Hanslick als eine persönliche und unmittelbare herbeigezogen wurde, ist mir unbekannt geblieben. 226 Appendix VI musikwissenschaftlichem Gebiete die Kapitel über die Musik in dem grossen Lehrbuche des berühmten Aesthetikers ihm an seiner Statt ausarbeitete – wonach alsdann allerdings ein prächtiger homunculus aus der Wiener Retorte zwischen die gelehrten Paragraphen des grossen Faustkenners hineinschlüpfte.’ (signed with: D.R [= der Redaktion].) RICHARD WALLASCHEK WALLASCHE[C]K, Richard 1886, 35-44. (see Chapter Eight [132-134]) MATHILDE WESENDONCK Tü UB Md 787-1165 Unpublished letter to Vischer, 30 January 1867, in which she requests his opinion on her play Genofeva (Appendix III [179]). Bibliography A number of primary sources are available in English. These sources have been marked with an asterisk (see also Appendix IIc [174]). Manuscript sources used for this study have been listed and annotated in Appendix III (175) Primary sources in print: [NO AUTHOR = ALBERT SCHWEGLER] 1845a. ‘Die Vischer’sche Angelegenheit’ Jahrbücher der Gegenwart (January), 69-104. - 1845b ‘Die freie Wissenschaft und ihre neuesten Ankläger: mit Beziehung auf die Vischer’sche Sache’ Jahrbücher der Gegenwart (February), 184-200. [NO AUTHOR = C. KRETSCHMANN?92] 1849. ‘Dr. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen – Reutlingen u. Leipzig, Carl Mäcken. Bis jetzt 2 Theile in 3 Abtheilungen, 1846-1848’ Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 30/29 (9 April) 157-159, and 30/30 (12 April) 165-168. [NO AUTHOR = LUDWIG BISCHOFF93] 1857 ‘Ästhetik der Musik: von Dr. Friedr. Theod. Vischer’ Niederrheinische Musikzeitung für Kunstfreunde und Künstler 5/33 (15 August) 257-261; 5/34 (22 August) 265-268; 5/35 (29 August) 273-278. [NO AUTHOR = ‘DR. LORENZ’94] 1861. ‘Zeitgemäße Studien über das Wesen des musikalischen Styls’Deutsche Musik-Zeitung, 2/4 (26 January) 25-28; 2/5 (1 February) 33-36. [NO AUTHOR] 1869. ‘Briefkasten’ Berliner Musik-Zeitung Echo. 19/21 (19 May) 172. 92 93 According to Sanna PEDERSON (1995, 216), the review was written by Kretschmann. The article has been listed under the initials ‘L.B.’ in the table of contents of the journal. 94 The article has been listed under the name ‘Dr. Lorenz in Wr.-Neustadt’ in the table of contents of the journal. 228 Bibliography [NO AUTHOR] 1878. ‘Geschichte der selbständigen Wagner-Vereine’ Bayreuther Blätter: Monatschrift des Bayreuther Patronatvereins 1/3 (March), 67-74. 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Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 73-101. Names index Adler, Guido 123n, 136-137, 143, 147-149, 150, 151, 174 Adorno, Theodor Wiesengrund 7, 97-98, 102, 103n, 127, 129n, 173 Ambros, August Wilhelm 141n, 210 Aristotle 52 Bach, Johann Sebastian 69n, 75n Bakunin, Mikhail 21, 79 Baumgarten, Alexander 29 Baur, Ferdinand Christian 16 Beethoven, Ludwig van 69n, 75n, 118, 123, 124, 140, 141, 142, 177, 222 Becher, Julius 79, 167 Berlioz, Hector 36, 79n, 89n, 104-108, 112, 113, 115, 116, 124, 125,, 140, 141, 173, 174 La Damnation de Faust 104-106, 112 Harold en Italie 104n, 107, 112, 113, 173 Benjamin, Walter 77 Bischoff, Ludwig 35, 48, 62n, 133, 189 Bismarck, Otto 27 Bolzano, Bernard 101n Bosanquet, Bernard 25 Names index 245 Brendel, (Karl) Franz 20, 34, 35, 40n, 41, 42, 48, 53n, 62n, 106, 117-129, 133, 141, 145, 146, 147, 150, 174, 189, 219 Burckhardt, Jacob 36 Busoni, Ferruccio 147n, 174 Byron, George Gordon Lord 104n, 112 Carrière, Moriz 142 Cornelius, Peter 117n David, Ferdinand 69n Diez, Max 25 Dorn, Heinrich 39 Dürer, Albrecht 184 Ehrlich, Karl Heinrich 211, 134n Eichendorff, Joseph 76 Elterlein, Ernst (Ernst Gottschald) 62n, 118n, 140-143, 174, 214, 219 Engel, Gustav 33-34, 211 Engels, Friedrich 21, 27, 167 Feuerbach, Ludwig 21, 75n, 77, 160, 167 Fichte, Immanuel Hermann 21 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 21, 160 Freud, Sigmund 26n Gabler, Georg Andreas 117n Gade, Niels 40 Gluck, Christoph Willibald 69n, 118 246 Indices Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 29, 40n, 43, 104, 105, 106, 108n, 112, 207 Gretry, André 69n Griepenkerl, Wolfgang 32, 33, 118, 133n, 210 Grimm, Jacob 14n, 17n Grimm, Wilhelm 14n Gugler, Bernhard 61, 189 Gutt, Bernhard 89n Habermas, Jürgen 77 Händel, Georg Friedrich 69n, 75n, 118, 153, 221 Hagen, Theodor 118 Hand, Ferdinand 31, 33, 34, 131n, 132, 137, 210 Hanslick, Eduard 34-37, 41, 42, 48, 66, 79, 89-106, 115, 120, 122, 123, 129, 132134, 141, 144, 146, 147, 150, 151, 172174, 178, 192-197, 210, 214, 222 Hartmann, Eduard 142, 211 Hausegger, Friedrich 211, 222 Haydn, Joseph 69n, 140n, 219 Hebbel, Friedrich 39, 90n, 176, 177 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 14, 18-23, 25, 30, 33-34, 42, 50, 52, 58, 70-72, 74, 78, 82, 107-110, 128, 149, 171-172, 173 Heine, Heinrich 39, 83, 85, 119, 218, 219 Heinzel, Thekla 17n Helmholtz, Hermann 100, 136, 143, 217 Herbart, Johann Friedrich 91, 134, 218 Herder, Johann Gottfried 41 Herwegh, Georg 76 Herzen, Alexander 79 Hölderlin, Friedrich 16 Hoffmann, E.T.A. 29, 30, 48, 112, 140n, 250 Hostinsky, Ottokar 101n, 211 Hotho, Heinrich Gustav 16n, 34, 109n, 110n, 117n, 171, 172, 173, 178, 184-185, 207, 208 Husserl, Edmund 102, 173 Ibsen, Henrik 39 Jahn, Otto 104-105, 106, 107 Jean Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter) 112 Kahlert, August 32, 33, 133, 218 Kant, Immanuel 7, 20, 29, 30, 44, 47, 50n, 64, 91, 117n, 143, 157, 160, 162, 165, 218 Keller, Gottfried 36, 176, 208 Köstlin, Heinrich Adolf 47n, 174, 175, 176, 177, 211 Köstlin, Karl Reinhold 40, 47, 61-68, 69n, 75n, 83, 84, 91, 108, 109n, 127, 130, 136-139, 142, 143, 162, 166, 177, 178, 186-191, 208, 210, 214, 216, 220 Kretschmann, C. 118n, 224n Krüger, Eduard 31, 33, 131n, 136, 142, 210 Lang, Josephine 47n, 177 Lange, Otto 219 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 49 Lenz, Wilhelm 177 Liszt, Franz 36, 41, 104, 106-109, 112-115, 117, 122-125, 129, 135, 140, 141, 144, 146, 150, 151, 173, 174, 203, 216-217, 222 Faust-Symphonie 106-107 Lobe, Johann Christian 62n Lukács, Georg 24, 27n, 44, 60n, 77n, 81 Mäcken, Carl 127n, 187 Marx, Adolf Bernhard 31, 32, 131n, 210 Marx, Karl 21, 27, 75n, 77, 102, 128, 167 Meinardus, Ludwig 130-131, 132, 135, 136, 139, 142, 144, 211 Luther in Worms 130 Mendelssohn, Fanny 39 Mendelssohn, Felix 39, 69n, 79n Merz, Heinrich 14n Mörike, Eduard 16, 176, 208 Moleschott, Jacob 36, 222 Names index 247 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 64n, 69n, 97, 98, 118, 140n La Clemenza di Tito 97 Die Zauberflöte 64n Nietzsche, Friedrich 27, 44, 143 Oettingen, Arthur Joachim 143 Otto, Louise 40 Planck, Karl Christian 109n, 187, 208 Pohl, Richard 106, 117n, 173, 175, 176, 177 Raff, Joachim 38n, 39, 47n, 117n Rapp, Ernst 36n Reichardt, Johann Friedrich 29 Reissmann, August 135-136, 139, 142, 143, 210, 211, 221 Riemann, Hugo 136, 144, 147, 151n Rochlitz, Friedrich 29 Rößler, Constantin 21 Rötscher, Heinrich Theodor 78, 207, 208 Rosenkranz, Karl 24n, 34, 81n, 172, 207 Rumohr, Carl Friedrich 165 Ruge, Arnold 17n, 21, 27, 31, 77, 118, 119, 167 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Princess Carolyne 26n, 36, 47n, 107-109, 146, 175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 199-205, 221 Schelling, Friedrich 16, 20, 29, 55n, 117n, 157, 160, 165 Schenker, Heinrich 101, 102, 136, 144 Schlegel, August Wilhelm 29, 207 Schlegel, Friedrich 39, 71n Schoenberg, Arnold 102n, 128, 173 Schopenhauer, Arthur 30n, 41, 111, 112, 142-143 Schumann, Robert 30, 31, 32, 40, 124, 153, 208 Schwegler, Albert 14n, 178, 186, 208 Seidl, Arthur 101n, 134n, 135n, 211 Simmerl, Georg 26n Sobolewski, E. 35-36, 131, 135, 150, 214 Spohr, Louis/Ludwig 98, 106n Steffens, Henrik 117n Stendhal (Henri Beyle) 75n Strauß, David Friedrich 14n, 16, 34, 36, 61, 62n, 77, 92, 104n, 172, 176, 208, 217, 222 Strauss, Richard 134n, 152 Tannert, Richard 211 Tappert, Wilhelm 39-40, 175, 178, 179 Teuffel, Wilhelm Sigmund 104n Tieck, Ludwig 29, 48, 250 Turgenev, Ivan 21 Uhland, Ludwig 17n, 39 Uhlig, Theodor 117n Vischer, Robert 17n, 127n, 170-171, 176 Wackenroder, Wilhelm 29, 48 Wagner, Richard 36-41, 44n, 67n, 79, 90-91, 108, 115, 117, 127, 128, 136n, 142, 167, 217, 220, 221 Wallaschek, Richard 48, 101n, 132-135, 136, 139, 142, 144, 173, 211 Warburg, Aby 26n Weiße, Christian 24n, 34, 75n, 117n, 172 Wendt, Amadeus 131n, 208, 210 Wesendonck, Mathilde 36, 90n, 178, 179, 221 Zeller, Eduard 14n, 176, 208 Zelter, Carl Friedrich 105-106, 107 Zimmermann, Robert 89, 91-99, 101, 102, 134, 144, 150, 177, 214 Subject index Absolute, The 18, 20, 23, 29, 157 absolutist thinking 6, 24, 25, 34, 60, 61, 69, 101, 102,132-134, 145, 151, 152, 251 totality 18, 20 ultimate reconciliation with 18, 20, 21, 27, 47, 52, 70, 79, 111, 114 temporary reconciliation with 61, 143 Absolute music 141, 218 Abstraction 23, 65, 67, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 83, 85, 93, 99, 100, 109, 123, 126, 141, 145, 153 Aesthetics 5, 6, 13, 25, 28, 30, 33, 34, 41, 49, 53, 71, 77, 89, 103, 108, 122, 123, 130, 134, 142, 144, 148, 149, 151, 152, 210 of content (Inhaltsästhetik) 84, 89, 101, 102, 133 of feeling (Gefühlsästhetik) 58-62, 66, 68, 84, 93, 109-113, 123, 136, 138, 141, 142 empirically motivated 27, 56, 60, 62 idealist 19, 24, 31-34, 42, 48-50, 56, 101, 102, 107, 111, 119, 128, 133, 134, 138, 143, 145, 146 formalist 89, 91-93, 101, 102, 146, 254, 255 literary premises 29 Subject index 249 (Aesthetics continued) musical 28, 31, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 43, 64, 69, 100, 101, 109, 112, 130-144, 210, 213 related to psychology 58, 123 Antiquity 29, 70, 75n, 76, 82n Anti-Semitism 37, 91, 222 Anti-Wagnerianism 100, 118n, 130, 197n Apprehension (Ahnung) 51, 76 Architecture 6, 22, 31, 100, 170, 208 Art categorization of art forms 23, 25, 30, 38, 63, 65, 132, 134, 142-143, 147 creation of art 19-20, 58, 65, 95, 96 manifestation of Beauty 22-23, 24, 27, 56, 74, 100, 145 manifestation of the Spirit 23, 24, 30, 47, 70, 74, 48, 83, 86, 116, 119, 122 means to respiritualize society 24, 26, 31, 37, 77-78, 80, 92, 119-121, 122, 123 related to nature 95, 133, 146 requirement of objectivity 59, 64 subjected to Thought 70-74, 78, 85, 100, 113-114, 117, 141 work concept 19-20, 29, 149 Artist interfering in social environment 76-78, 81, 83, 120, 122 observing subject (anschauender Mensch) 19-20, 50 136, 137, 139 genius 65, 97, 113, 137 Austria (Habsburg Empire) 79n, 132 Autonomy of mankind 18, 20, 52 of music 50, 60, 67, 84, 98, 100, 101, 109-110, 113, 132, 150-151 Beauty 17, 25, 26, 43, 135, 144-145, 151, 152 future return of 78, 80-81, 85, 112, 121, 123 historicized 95, 97, 98, 99 musical 34, 85, 89-90, 97, 100, 101, 144, 146, 151 related to Coincidence (Zufall) 55 related to Thought 71, 76, 80, 121 related to truth 6, 24, 55, 80, 123 related to ugliness 81, 121, 123 93, 95 as a manifestation of the Spirit 23-27, 29-30, 54-56, 58, 69, 74, 81, 110, 118, 123, 129, 143, 145 as spiritual substantiality 94, 97, 99, 101, 113 Berlin 21, 31, 40n, 167, 184, 187, 207, 215 Bildungsbürgertum 6, 24, 26, 31, 44, 54, 57, 78-81, 102, 121, 124, 133, 147 Blasphemy 49, 53 Categorization idealist 24, 31-32, 47, 61-64, 66, 68, 110, 143, 207-208 of the artistic material 65 of a work of art’s relation to its culture 152153 Category 26n, 69, 114, 126 genre 44n, 62-64, 68, 108, 136-139 present as separate 20n, 77-78, 128 style 62-64, 136, 139, 142, 143 Characteristic 85, 99, 114, 160 Classicism (antiquity) 29, 70, 75n, Classicism (18th c) 29, 137 Coincidence (Zufall) 26n, 39, 55 Consciousness (Bewußtsein) 57, 117, 121, 122 as the domain of Thought 49, 52, 56, 57, 58, 60, 108, 111-114, 115, 117, 123, 125, 146 new form of 76-77, 80, 83, 117, 120-126, 145 of the present 27, 32, 83, 117, 125, 126 self-consciousness 18, 23, 76, 80, 111, 120, 121, 126 Concept 18, 30, 41, 42, 49, 52, 69, 89, 111, 112, 114, 120, 126, 142, 147, 150, 209 conceptualization 23, 41, 42, 48, 51, 56, 57, 60, 66, 72, 93, 111, 114, 117, 126, 137, 144, 147, Content (Inhalt) Musical 89, 134 Conceptual 30-32, 52, 61, 64, 107, 109, 114, 125, 126, 129, 134, 141, 144-147, 149-152 Comic 17, 26n, 44 Criticism art 14, 21, 24, 29-31, 33, 42, 69, 72, 95, 97, 101, 118, 120, 121, 177, 248, 250, 252 literary 29-30, 49n, 126, 148, 150, 208, 209 modernist 74, 86, 127, 128 of the visual arts 126 Culture 152-153 French 57 German 38-39, 41, 57, 81n, 103n, 118, 123, 125, 139, 209, 222 Italian 57, 209 imagination of 19-20, 64-66, 68, 95-96, 100, Christianity 16, 49, 50n, 53, 70, 91, 128 residing in a work of art’s outer features 92, 149, 150, 152 Subject index 251 (Culture continued) middle-class 17, 24, 27, 74, 79, 119 non-Western 132, 146 (Emotion continued) related to Thought 23, 54, 59-60, 111 related to musical genres 68, 137-138 Determinacy (Bestimmtheit) 31, 96, 125, 140, 209 Empathy (Einfühlung), theory of 23, 26n Democratic upheavals 1848 14, 17, 21, 26, 32-35, Empiricism 25, 27, 34, 56, 58, 60, 62, 91, 109, 41-43, 79-81, 85, 92, 94, 118, 121, 125, 128, 145 Development from feeling to emotion 111-113 historical 41, 71, 78 logical 14, 18, 71, 78 of art 72, 75, 81, 82, 85, 86, 95, 116 of idealist aesthetics 42, 43, 143 of mankind 18, 23, 26, 30, 32, 47-49, 52, 60, 65, 95, 119-120, 132, 149 of music 140-141 of music criticism 13, 29, 32, 42-43, 69, 89 towards reconciliation with Absolute 18, 20, 23, 30 Devil 47, 52, 106 Diabolical 49, 54, 85, 105, 107, 108, 126, 143, 153 Dialectics 6, 18-21, 22, 29, 43, 50, 52, 63, 66, 77, 80, 111, 114, 121, 136-138, 150-152 negative 127 Dresden 79 Dualism dialectic 72, 114n, 136, 148 harmonic 136, 143, 144n Education 6, 17, 80n, 122 of the people 26, 121-122 art 80, 158 music 30 Emotion (Empfindung) 111-114, 57-59 as the content of music 31, 56, 66, 84, 98, 153 emerging from inner realm of feeling 57-59, 66, 68, 111-113, 143 as femininity 53 related to feeling 58, 68, 107, 112 Form related to content 6, 51, 63, 70, 85, 94, 115, 135, 139, 140-141, 209 as artistic material 82-83, 89, 96-98, 119-120, 122, 135 as ‘Wesensform’ 84, 93-94, 100 musical 68, 82, 95, 113 structuring of colours, tones 98-99 emerging from the programme 105, 113 114, 123n, 132n, 143, 147n, 148 England 6, 167 Enlightenment 48, 51, 75, 78 Entelechy 52 Epistemology 30, 50, 63, 64, 89, 93, 100, 146 Faust 112-113 Berlioz 104-107, 115 Goethe 40n, 43, 104-106, 108n Liszt 106-107, 108n Vischer 40n, 43, 108n, 176, 217, 223 Feeling (Gefühl) ‘aesthetics of’ (Gefühlsästhetik) 58-62, 66, 68, 84, 93, 109-113, 123, 136, 138, 141, 142 as the content of music 57, 91n, 109 modern feeling 39 process of feeling 107, 110, 112 realm of pure feeling (reines Gefühl) 49, 57, 58, 66, 91n, 107-108, 109-112, 137, 138, 141, 146 related to emotions (Empfindungen) 58, 68, 113 related to Thought 57, 60, 111, 114 Femininity music as 53, 83, 126 Formalism 28, 91-93, 101, 146 related to idealism 89, 90, 92, 101-102 France 77 Franco-Prussian war 1871 27 Frankfurt am Main 17 Frankfurt Parliament 17, 21, 79, 176 Freedom opposed to necessity 52, 75n, 139 music’s aesthetic freedom 63, 72, 84, 139 political 13, 18, 21, 74, 120 reconciliation with the Absolute 18, 20, 21, 52, 70, 74, 80, 121 Young Hegelian ideal of 21, 25, 26, 27, 33, 118 Freemasonry 54 Gender 17, 53, 83, 126 Genre categorization of 44n, 62-64, 66 68, 136 generic hybridity 105, 108, 122, 141 musical 63, 66, 68, 105, 136-138, 146 related to ‘aesthetics of feeling’ 68, 138 related to artistic material 62-64, 66, 82, 136-138, 139 related to sentient imagination 67, 136-137 related to style 136, 139 Germany German exiles 36 German states 14, 79 German unification 17, 26, 27, 42, 79 Bismarckian empire 26, 27, 37 Gesamtkunstwerk 38, 39, 67n, 108n, 115, 211, 220 God 5, 23, 52-53, 54, 55, 69, 158 History determined by 82-84, 95-96, 99, 120, 136, 138, 139 logicality/necessity of 20, 21, 71, 76-77, 79, 82, 94, 97, 119-120, 124, 126, 136, 142 stages in 26, 70, 76, 83, 98, 153 of mankind 18, 23, 41, 66, 70, 120, 152 historicism 119, 133, 148, 149, 151, 153 Idea (Idee) as Absolute 18, 67, 101, 138 related to reality 82, 139, 142-143 reconciliation with reality 76, 78, 80, 81-84, 121, 125, 127, 145 induced from reality 26, 56, 61, 69 erosion of the 35, 55-56, 102, 137, 139, 140, 142-144 engendering a work of art 64, 91-92, 94, 100, 133, 139 music’s ideality 51-52, 72 poetic idea 113, 122, 141 Idealism idealist philosophy 16, 18, 23, 29, 33, 78, 82, 102, 148-149 turning away from Hegel 33-35, 69, 97, 101-102, 108-109, 111, 119, 128-129, 132 retreat of idealist philosophy 25, 31, 33, 34, 61, 101, 133, 135-144 idealist prejudices against music 31, 34, 48, 49-54, 56, 89, 100, 107, 119, 133-134 mediated 60, 63, 69, 81, 125, 139, 143 unmediated 63, 169 related to formalism 89, 90, 92,, 101-102 related to music criticism 32, 34-35, 41-42, 131, 145, 207-209 Identity of art 72, 121, 144 of music 144 of the present 85 German national 39 Hegelian 17, 111, 114, 121, 150, 151, 152 Image (Bild, Abbild) of the Absolute 23, 27, 31 prefiguration (Urbild) 61, 111 product of representation 48, 50, 58-60, 68, 84 Tonbilder 31 Subject index 253 Imagination (Phantasie) emotional aspects of 58-60, 72-73, 111 intellectual aspects of 59-60, 72-73, 111, 134 human act 60 transcendental act 60 formative (bildende) 58, 69, 85 sentient (empfindende) 58-60, 66, 67, 69, 85, 110-111, 136-138, 143 related to Beauty 22-23 related to God 23 related to artistic material 19, 65-66, 68, 82, 95-96, 134-138 related to genre 67, 136-138 related to style 65, 82, 95-96 Imagination (Einbildungskraft) 58n, 111 ‘In-between time’ (Zwischenzeit) 76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 120, 121, 123, 125 Inclination (Lust) / Reluctance (Unlust) 58, 140 Inwardness (Innerlichkeit) 50, 51, 109, 110 Irony 72, 218 Italy 57, 75n, 77, 209, 219 Judeao-Christian tradition 53 Kantianism 29, 30, 44, 47, 56n, 91, 117n, 162 Legitimation of art 129 of music 32, 41, 48, 53n, 56, 93, 98-100, 107-108, 122, 128, 143, 144, 145 of modernity 79-86, 123 of music criticism 118, 126, 147 of musicology 149-150 of programme music 107, 112-116, 122 Leninism 128 Marxism 24n, 27n, 77n, 81n, 128, 159 Masculinity 53, 83 Material 64-66 historicized 66, 69, 82-84, 95, 97-98, 102, 119-120, 138 musical (the tone) 50, 54, 62, 66, 68, 84-85, 94-99, 100, 134, 209 Mind Spirit 53, 82, 112 brain 58, 109, 110, 112, 113 psyche 19, 50, 60 82, 99, 112, 113, 138 related to senses 49-51, 52, 77, 110 Misogyny 53 Modernism 44 modernist art 127, 139 modernist art criticism 95, 127-129, 145, 152 postmodernism 149-150, 152 Modernity as complexity 59-60, 71, 74, 76, 77 as superficiality 6, 50, 79, 81, 92, 121 as an ‘in-between time’ 74-77, 119 related to materialism 79-80, 92 (Material continued) natural 19, 50, 64, 82, 95 sensory (sinnlich) 65-66, 82, 95 related to ‘aesthetics of feeling’ 68 related to imagination 19, 65-66, 95-96, 137, 138 related to genre 136, 139 related to style 65, 82, 95-96, 135, 139 Materialism 91-92 of the modern state 80, 92, 163 Mathematics 53-54, 66, 68, 92, 95, 99, 209, 213, 220 Matter (Stoff) 64, 66, 81, 83-84 Meaning conceptual 42, 66, 89, 114, 115, 146, 147, ideal 32, 92, 94, 95, 131 musical 89, 93, 95, 100, 134, 135, 144, 147 Metaphysics of Beauty 22, 55, 145 of the Idea 18, 29-30, 48, 55, 65, 69, 95, 124, 143 universality as opposed to particularity 22n23n, 33, 53-54, 60 61, 74, 91n, 99, 114 Middle Ages 75n (Modernity continued) related to music 83-86, 99, 119, 125-126, 142 related to reflectivity 70, 78-79 related to subjectivity 72, 75, 84, 139 Music absolute music 141, 218 aesthetic position of 90, 92, 107, 122, 126, 147 diabolical powers of 49, 54, 85, 105, 107, 108, 126, 142, 143, 153 idealist prejudices against 31, 34, 48, 49-54, 56, 89, 100, 107, 119, 133-134 herald of art’s dissolution into philosophy 70-72, 83, 113, 141 herald of truth 86, 125-126 lack of objectivity 49-50, 53, 64, 83-84, 100, 132-134, 142 instrumental 41, 62n, 66-68, 104n, 106-107, 110, 112-114, 122, 124, 125, 137-141, 143, 146, 171-172 vocal 62n, 66-68, 106-107, 113, 137-141, 171 Musicology (Musikwissenschaft) 101-102, 135-137, 143, 145, 147, 150, 151 historical 148 systematic 148 music ethnology 132-133, 144, 146, 150 new musicology 149, 150, 151 current literature on 19th c music criticism 13, 32, 33-34, 42, 44, 48, 77, 79, 89, 128, 148 Music theory 28, 131, 135, 144, 146 Köstlin’s ‘music theory’ 68n, 138n Nationalism (German) 37, 57, 80n, 81n, 128 Nature engendering artistic material 19, 50, 65, 69, 82, 95, 134, 137, 146 human nature 55, 56, 143 model for a work of art 50, 64, 133, 218 Subject index 255 (Nature continued) objective outer world 19, 50, 209, 218 related to the Spirit 109n, 137, 146, 219 natural as objective/universal 23, 50, 83, 100, 134, 137, 146 New German School (Neudeutsche Schule) 33n, 35, 39, 78n, 106, 117, 123, 125-126, 129n, 135, 220 Objectivity lack of objectivity in music 49-51, 64, 84, 113, 122, 126, 133, 134, 142, 148-149 related to subjectivity 19-20, 22-23 29, 55, 67, 72, 113, 138, 151, 209 the Spirit’s objectification 19-20, 66, 72, 123, 133 Observation (Anschauung), theory of 26n, 56, 58, 81, 91, 98-99, 111, 218 Observation (Wahrnehmung) 58n, 98-99 Opera 104-105, 153 German tradition of 32, 38-40, 67, 139, 209, 220, 221 opera seria 82, 97 Oratorio 69n, 104, 115, 130, 139 Originality 82n, 98-99, 220 Outwardness (Aüsserlichkeit) 109 Pantheism 13, 250 Parody Wagner 37-38 Faust 40n, 43, 108n, 176, 217 People education of the 24, 26, 80-81, 121-122 German people 39, 109 power of the 17n Pietism 13, 16 Poetic 113-114, 122, 125, 141 Politics 17-18, 79, 128, 209 art and politics 79-80, 118, 121, 128 music and politics 32, 119, 149 use of Hegel’s philosophy 21, 24, 26, 32, 33, 74, 79, 117n, 118, 120 (Politics continued) Vischer’s political U-turn 6, 26, 37, 81n Power of the aristocracy/church 17 of art/Beauty 55, 71, 129 of idealist philosophy 14, 18, 33, 77, 100, 107, 128, 149, 171 of music 41, 49-54, 56, 57, 63, 68, 107-108, 112, 117, 118, 142, 143, 146, 153 of the Spirit 41, 49, 71, 111, 129, 142, 144 Present (Gegenwart) aftermath of romanticism 33, 71 anticipation of the future 78, 83, 85, 117-118, 121, 124-128 present’s consciousness 32, 48, 75-78, 82, 85, 120, 124-128 separate critical category 6, 17, 39, 75-77, 80-81, 85, 117, 119-121, 125-126, 128 Programme music 104, 107-108, 112-115, 122, 125, 133, 141, 146 Progress 26, 77-78, 121, 152 political progressiveness 24, 26, 74, 79, 118 progressive music criticism 21, 34, 128 Psyche 56-58, 60, 108, 110, 112, 113, 117, 123, 132n, 142 Psychology 58, 60, 123, 132-133 psychoanalysis 25, 26n, 28, 56 psychological perception 91n, 146 related to aesthetics 56-58, 60, 100, 122-123 Reality domain in which Beauty manifests itself 19, 22-23, 50, 123, 133 related to the Idea 18, 52, 82, 139 reconciliation with the Idea 76, 78, 80, 81-84, 121, 125, 127, 145 Religion 23, 50n, 55, 70, 74, 158 Reluctance (Unlust) / Inclination (Lust) 58, 140 Representation lack of representation in music 49, 53, 64 of the Spirit 50n, 66, 143 (Representation continued) of reality 30, 49n, 50n, 59, 142, 146 of feeling 31, 59, 63, 111 of a literary programme 106 related to Beauty 93, 142 Rhetoric 34-35, 42, 80, 93, 107, 117, 121 Romanticism early 19th c romanticism 29, 33-34, 48, 79, 98, 112 opposed to modernity 70, 74-76 romantic as harmonious 53n, 125 Second Viennese School 102, 128 Self self-consciousness 18, 23, 50, 52, 77-78, 84-85, 111, 120-121, 126, 152 self-determination 18, 20, 23, 30, 47, 77, 80, 84, 100, 115, 121, 150 absolute self 18, 20, 23, 85, 149 inner self 72 Senses related to mind 49-51, 52, 55, 77, 110, 111, 143 sensory manifestation of the Spirit (art) 23, 50, 70-72, 74, 77, 85, 112, 121 sensory material 65-66, 82, 95 sensory perception 18, 23, 50, 58, 67, 83, 92, 143, 144 sensitivity 60, 100, 111 sensuality (Sinnlichkeit) 65-66, 95 Soul human soul 50, 52, 53, 67, 72, 83, 111, 112, 113, 114, 137 music as soul 51, 137 the present’s soul 85 Spirit (Geist) the Absolute as 6, 18, 20, 23, 26, 30, 32, 34, 48, 55, 60, 99, 123, 124, 144 historicized 136, 139 human 52, 60, 67, 69, 82, 95, 99, 101, 146 politicized 118 Subject index 257 (Spirit continued) related to nature 109n, 137, 146, 219 objectification of 19-20, 66, 72, 123, 133 spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit) 6, 35, 49, 62, 72, 85, 96, 99, 101, 114, 119, 122, 129, 132, 138, 146 lack of spiritual substantiality (Geistlosigkeit) 49-52, 72, 74, 132, 145, 209 spiritualization (Vergeistigung) 100, 120, 123 the spiritual (Das Geistige) 80, 93, 97, 111-112, 114 Speculation 43, 91, 147n Stoff (see Matter) Stuttgart 7, 26, 61, 176, 187 Style 63, 68, 218, 220 balance between form and content 135, 139 categorization of 62, 63-64, 136-139, 142, 143 historicized 83, 95, 138, 139 related to ‘aesthetics of feeling’ 63 100, 137, 139 related to genre 62, 136, 138, 139, 146 related to imagination 82, 95-96, 100, 137 related to technique 135 Subjectivity of German culture 209 of music 72, 84, 113, 126, 133, 139, 145 of the present 75, 126, 145, of vocal music 137 related to objectivity 19-20, 22-23 29, 51, 55, 67, 72, 113, 137, 138, 151, 209 Sublation (Aufhebung) 19, 23n, 52, 55, 75n, 67n, 77, 121, 125, 141, 209 Sublime 17, 44, 51, 221 Substance (Gehalt) 84, 100, 113, 134 Switzerland 17, 36-37, 79, 90, 91, 108, 167 Time movement of 6, 39, 41, 66, 70, 74, 82, 95 music’s emergence in 50, 55, 66, 109 timeless as opposed to modern 77, 149 zeitgemäß 96-99, 102, 117, 126 Transcendentalism of music 51, 53-54, 68 related to particularity 26, 33-34, 56, 60, 71, 82, 97, 102, 123, 136, 143-145 Truth 20, 24, 31n 55, 56, 72, 76, 79, 80, 85, 95n, 120, 123, 125-126, 129n, 209 136n, 142, 172, 178, 188, 193 Vernunftteleologie 20, 33, 94, 122n Vienna 79, 93, 100, 101, 167, 217, 222, 223 Vormärz 17, 26, 32, 37, 57, 77, 97, 119-121, 125, 126, 128 Wagnerianism 35, 40n Young Hegelians (Junghegelianer) 21, 24, 32, 118, 120 Zukunftsmusik 123, 127 Zurich 17, 36-37, 79, 90, 91, 108 Teleology 18, 20, 33, 74, 78, 94, 102n, 122n, 128n-129n, 143 Theology 13, 16, 207 Thought act in the human brain 52, 72, 108, 111, 112, 114, 116, 141, 209 related to Beauty 23, 26, 54, 71, 76, 78, 80, 113, 121, 126 related to God 23, 54, 71 supreme manifestation of the Spirit 20, 23, 54, 71, 110, 113, 150 related to artistic material 62, 65, 82, 95, 96, Tübingen 13, 14, 16, 26, 61, 91, 104n, 109n, 130, List of figures Figure 1 [15] The compilation of volumes of Vischer’s Aesthetics in the first and the second edition Figure 2 [19] Idealist dialectical presentation of the Spirit’s search for objective manifestation in a work of art Figure 3 [22] Hegelian dialectical classification of the manifestations of Beauty and the arts, as a starting point for the structure of Vischer’s Aesthetics Figure 4 [59] Vischer’s interpretation of inner life being expressed Figure 5 [63] Vischer’s account of the individualization of a style as a perfect balance between form and content Figure 6 [65] Idealist account of a style as an adaptation to, and individualization of, the material through imagination Figure 7 [67] Köstlin’s dialectical classification of genres according to sentient imagination Figure 8 [73] Hegel’s account of music exemplifying the process of art turning against itself Abbreviations AMZ NRM NZfM VMS Manuscript sigla: D-Ma DLA D-Lu SM D-St SA D-Tü UB Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung Niederrheinische Musikzeitung Neue Zeitschrift für Musik Vom Musikalisch-Schönen Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar, Germany Städtisches Museum in Ludwigsburg, Germany Stadtarchiv in Stuttgart, Germany Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen University, Germany Summary He shook up German academic life with courageous and rebellious lectures about pantheism and freedom of speech. He engaged in passionate rows with Richard Wagner about aesthetics and German culture. His ardent art criticism was taken as a model by Eduard Hanslick, who revered him. Frequenting the soirees of Princess Carolyne von SaynWittgenstein in Zurich, he regularly discussed the latest political, cultural and philosophical events with Franz Liszt, Mathilde Wesendonck and Jacob Burckhardt, among many others. Around 1850, dropping the name of Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807-1887) was the best way to lend one’s statements intellectual credibility. Most German-speaking intellectuals and artists had read his work, a huge nine-volume treatise called Aesthetik, oder Wissenschaft des Schönen (1846-1857), and many of them took his intellectual authority for granted. Up to the First World War, Vischer enjoyed celebrity status as one of the most prominent German thinkers. The reason for his fame during his lifetime and his relative obscurity to date is his strong association with the powerful academic tradition of German idealist philosophy, a philosophical discourse which is generally acknowledged to have exerted an unprecedented influence on German intellectual life in the nineteenth century. Investigations into idealist philosophy, however, are often limited to the achievements of its standard bearers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The role of their followers in the development of the discourse remains ill-defined. Vischer was well able to synthesize the philosophical and aesthetic views that surrounded him. Thanks to the wide availability of his thought, his writings – particularly the adaptations he carried out on Hegel’s philosophy – turned out to be decisive for the growth and nature of German music criticism in the nineteenth century. In the context of idealist philosophy, music’s status as an art was considered dubious. Drawing on eighteenth-century aesthetic premises, Hegel had argued that music was a 262 Summary problematic art since, unlike the others arts, it emerged in time rather than in space, it did not represent a model in its natural environment and one could not establish what a musical work was ‘about’. Hegel interpreted these features as a threefold lack of ‘objectivity’: a material, a representational and an epistemological one. The alleged threefold inability of music to become manifest bothered Vischer too. In his 1857 volume on musical aesthetics, Vischer implicitly attributed diabolical features to music. He considered music to be unfathomable due to its organisation according to complex numerical structures. Only a closed circle of experts, initiated into the tricks of the trade, had access to the technical knowledge that led to music’s capability to exert an emotionally destabilizing spell on its listeners. Music triggered the senses without the mediation of words or intellectual reflection. It was, therefore, uncontrollable and potentially manipulative. The theological dimension of Vischer’s distrust of music stemmed from the importance he attributed to the λογος, the Word as the precondition for creation. Thanks to its ‘non-objectivity’, music enjoyed divine privileges of power and sublimity, while still embodying human sin in triggering instinctive emotional drives. It was a ‘fallen’ art. Thus, Vischer considered music’s ephemerality, invisibility and ‘unknowability’ to be a blasphemous unwillingness rather than an inability to become manifest. Another aspect of idealist aesthetics that determined the general academic engagement with music in the nineteenth century was music’s consistent association with modernity. Hegel had built his philosophical theory on the assumption that mankind as a whole develops through stages of increasing self-knowledge and self-consciousness towards the ultimate goal of freedom and total self-determination (Selbstbestimmung). In order to present and describe the development of mankind as a unified development, Hegel used the concept of the Absolute as Spirit (or the Absolute as Idea), with which mankind would eventually be reconciled, once it had fully (i.e. absolutely) recognized itself as indepedent and self-contained. The Spirit manifested itself in three manners of human expression. They indicated how far mankind had developed towards its ultimate destination of reconciliation with its absolute self. The three manners of human expression – religion, art and philosophy – could only reach their peak when their form transmitted their respective contents appropriately. Whilst religion and philosophy improved over time, reaching their peak in modern times, Hegel argued that art had reached its peak in ancient Greece and had been in decline ever since. Human interaction of the time, requiring an increasing sense of judgement and discussion, had become so complex and took place on such highly abstract levels that what Hegel considered to be a purely sensory means of expression such as art could not contribute to this. He observed that art’s intellectual dimension, more than its sensory and creative aspects, became of primary importance. Art thus seemed to qualify its own sensory identity: it became ironic, dismembered and dissonant. Contemporary art could only be spiritually substantial (geistvoll) if it allowed philosophy into its domain, but in the end, art’s increasing complexity and abstraction would lead quite literally to spiritual emptiness Summary 263 (Geistlosigkeit): the Spirit would abandon art as a medium in which to appear, and would move on to philosophy. Hegel openly stated that music was the herald of art’s dissolution into philosophy. Music’s subjective nature initiated the process of retreat into the isolation of the inner self, a path that, eventually, all arts would be travelling. Music’s sensory features were subjective to such an extent that their manifestation required an accompaniment by Thought in the form of skilful musical technique (empty virtuosity) or conceptualization (an explanation through music criticism) in order to communicate its content. Music thus existed in a no man’s land between imagination in its purest sensory form (subjective) and imagination as a merely reflective and intellectual capacity (objective). It was undecided between the two, and was no longer able to connect the one with the other. Hence, the Spirit could not objectify itself in music. Although left-wing Hegelians like Vischer held different views about contemporary art, they consciously connected art’s orientation towards philosophy with the alleged complexity and fragmentation of modern society. They also explicitly described music as the contemporary art par excellence. Musicological studies into nineteenth-century music criticism often elaborate on the assumption that nineteenth-century aesthetics glorified the ineffable qualities of music. This assumption should be thoroughly revised. Early Romantic thinkers who glorified music, such as Ludwig Tieck, the Schlegel brothers and E.T.A. Hoffmann, may have been gratefully regarded as models by later music critics, but they were not nearly as influential as idealist philosophers for German intellectual life throughout the century. Music’s ineffability hampered idealist thinkers in establishing what music’s function could be in the past, present and future development of mankind. In other words: they could not determine in what way music was a manifestation of the Spirit. For them, music quite literally remained spiritually empty (geistlos). Music critics were painfully aware of this and – irrespective of their often divergent musical backgrounds and allegiances – were all primarily concerned with legitimizing music as a proper fine art by establishing a spiritual content for music. This legitimization project entirely determined the growth and nature of German music criticism in the mid-nineteenth century as well as the subsequent establishment of an academic discipline called Musikwissenschaft in the later nineteenth century. The efforts to legitimize music as an art that possessed as much spiritual substantiality as its sister arts did not stand a chance in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the 1820s and 1830s, the number of journals containing thorough intellectual engagement with literature, poetry, drama, the visual arts and cultural history exploded as a result of the idealist requirement of spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit). The necessity felt to explain works of art as a manifestation of the Spirit initiated increasingly sophisticated discussions about art’s relationship with the other two manners of human expression: religion and philosophy. This forced art critics to engage with questions about the work of art’s content, substance and meaning in relation to aspects that lay outside itself. 264 Summary However, music journals intending to explain the content and meaning of music were sparse in comparison to the other arts. Conversely, in Hegelian journals of the 1820s and 1830s, all art forms were addressed but music. There was a distinct hesitation, felt among philosophers as well as music experts, to question music for its relationship with the other forms of human expression because it was considered difficult to grasp music in concepts. The lack of connection with ‘the rest of the world’ made it very hard to establish music’s content, meaning or essence. This resulted in a music criticism which kept the reader informed about musical events, about recently published music or music education, but was in no way part of the mainstream Hegelian field of art criticism. Over the course of the 1840s, this situation changed dramatically. Music critics increasingly felt the need to engage with Hegelian interpretations of art, actively seeking recognition from an established intellectual movement, especially because music was considered to be a problematic art form by idealist aestheticians. This attempt to find recognition essentially lasted for decades and lost its relevance only gradually in the 1860s and 1870s, when idealist thought itself had lost its aesthetic normativity. The way in which music criticism developed in the 1840s up to the 1880s was largely determined by the search for the aesthetic recognition of music, and also left its traces on the establishment of the study of music as an academic discipline in the 1880s. However, acquiring an insight into the way in which idealist philosophy exerted its influence on the development of music criticism between 1848 and the late 1880s is complicated, since the period is characterized by a gradual transformation of Hegelian thought. The concepts Hegel used to set up his philosophical system (of which his aesthetics were part) slowly lost their viability, but they remained in use. Hegel’s followers, in disseminating and fitting Hegel’s thought into their own time, started to adapt the meaning of aesthetic concepts such as form (Form) and content (Inhalt), genre (Gattung), style (Stil), imagination (Phantasie) and artistic material (Material). In doing so, they unintentionally undermined the supremacy of the Spirit and the Idea in Hegel’s philosophy. The way music criticism developed is largely determined by the way idealist philosophy was gradually eroded from within by idealist followers. They had hardly anything to say about music, but they determined the aesthetic climate of their time. This may be one of the reasons for the fact that the period from 1848 to roughly 1870 is underrepresented in musicological and cultural historical research to date. Musicologists and cultural historians do not want to burn their fingers on fluctuating and often ambivalent interpretations of context-related philosophical concepts. Conversely, many philosophers with an interest in music, and the Anglo-Saxon ones in particular, dismiss the German idealist philosophical tradition as absolutist and obsolete, whereas engagement with idealist philosophy could provide them with valuable leads concerning the relationship between music and conceptualization. The development of German music criticism, its anticipation of the institutionalization of musicology in the later nineteenth-century and the consequences of this heritage for present musicology cannot be understood without Summary 265 addressing the way in which philosophical concepts changed after 1848. This study intends to fill this gap in the history of thinking about music. The aesthetics of Friedrich Theodor Vischer are used as a focal point in this study in order to reveal those adaptations of Hegel’s philosophy that were carried out after 1848, when the failure of the democratic upheavals indicated that Hegel’s transcendental system – and the ambitious political prospects connected to it by his left-wing followers – needed thorough revision. Before 1848, Vischer was admired for his obstinate left-wing Hegelian essays on art criticism announcing a ‘new form of consciousness’ that could be prepared by creating and observing contemporary art. Between 1846 and 1858, he produced his treatise on aesthetics, addressing the metaphysical dimension of Beauty as a manifestation of the Spirit as well as Beauty’s earthly manifestation in art, with a volume for each art form. The volume on music was written in 1857, the larger part of it by Vischer’s colleague, the aesthetician Karl Köstlin (1819-1894), since Vischer himself felt insufficiently versed in music in order to write an aesthetic treatise about it. Throughout his life, Vischer adhered to an idealist Weltanschauung. His idealism, however, became increasingly less metaphysical and more empiricist, focusing on earthly manifestations of the Spirit rather than on its metaphysical counterpart, and absorbing new scientific and scholarly approaches. In this capacity, Vischer carried out a number of adaptations to Hegel’s aesthetics that were used by music critics to put music on the map as a spiritually substantial art. Thanks to Vischer’s adaptations, the consensus among idealist aestheticians about music’s material, representational and epistemological lack of objectivity was undermined. One of Vischer’s admirable achievements in the field of aesthetic theory was the manner in which he described the interaction between the material of art on the one hand and the imagination of the artist on the other, adapting Hegel’s interpretation of the artistic material. Vischer explored the widely used idealist dogma that the imagination of the artist cannot be activated without the involvement of raw material such as stone or paint. Conversely, this artistic material does not have any meaning without the artist’s imaginative prefiguration of the work of art. The artist chooses his material on the basis of imagining his work of art. The mutual dependence of material and imagination led Vischer to the conclusion that the material of art is not only made up of stone for a sculpture or paint for a painting, but also of human-made, changeable and often historically determined artistic practices, fashions or cultural movements, such as a villanelle for a poem or the use of perspective for a painting. Since this kind of material has been subject to earlier actions of imagination already, imagination is tied closer to the material. Thus, the material becomes almost more important than the artist, because the artist’s imagination is not necessarily his own individual imagination, but is rather dependent on the material (fashions, techniques) shared by several artists in a certain time or tradition. In Vischer’s aesthetics, the material is not universal, like in Hegel’s aesthetics, but bound to a period in history or a culture, because it is man-made. In this context, the allegedly intangible material of music – the 266 Summary preformed, man-made system of tones – became more accepted in idealist respect, capable of communicating spiritual substantiality just like the other human-made and changeable kinds of artistic material. Another of Vischer’s adaptations of Hegelian philosophy appeared in his evaluation of modernity. Hegel’s infamous statement that art was about to lose its relevance for the further development of mankind was one of many expressions of discomfort with contemporary art production. Whereas Hegel had regarded modernity as the deplorable aftermath of romanticism (the period immediately following antiquity) in an artistic respect, Vischer’s generation acknowledged that modernity did not have much to do with Romanticism, since the Enlightenment had severed the one from the other. Vischer argued that modernity should be judged on the basis of its own complex, fragmented and abstract merits. He believed that contemporary art, rather than being obsolete, helped its present to become conscious (bewußt) of itself – a Hegelian/Aristotelian entelechy. Furthering a ‘new form of consciousness’ by exposing people to contemporary art was one of the present’s most important tasks, preparing the imminent rebirth of Beauty as the supreme manifestation of the Spirit in a future stage of history. Even when this next stage of history did not immediately arrive, when the democratic upheavals in 1848 failed to have any consequence for the greater freedom and self-determination of mankind, Vischer remained convinced that modernity was a temporary era connecting a monumental artistic past with a glorious artistic future. A third departure from Hegel’s aesthetics can be found in Vischer’s efforts to determine a spiritually substantial content for music. In the introduction to his 1857 treatise on musical aesthetics – which he himself wrote, not his collaborator Karl Köstlin – Vischer argued that the philosophy of music lagged behind because nobody had made the effort to investigate its content, which he considered to be the inner realm of feeling. With this premise at the back of his mind, Vischer wrote one of the most balanced and fastidious musical ‘aesthetics of feeling’ of the nineteenth century. Meticulously, Vischer described the realm of inner feeling as a domain that functioned independently from conscious (i.e. conceptualized) spheres of the human spirit. He also acknowledged that this was the exclusive realm of music. Vischer’s ‘aesthetics of feeling’ were instrumental to his attempt to neutralize music’s blasphemous spell by presenting its allegedly uncontrollable powers as straightforward transmitters of a relatively well-defined content. The result of this project, however, was that the realm of inner feeling could be considered as an almost equal alternative to the realm of consciousness. Vischer implicitly suggested that it could contain meaning independently from conscious (i.e. conceptual) understanding. This undermined Hegel’s insistence on concepts and cognitive knowledge as the supreme carriers of meaning, which had put music in such awkward aesthetic position. Four case studies exploring the writings of a number of influential music critics reveal how, after 1848, Vischer’s adaptations, taking place in the idealist aesthetic mainstream, allowed limited space for music to be described as a spiritually substantial art in idealist Summary 267 respect. This is the reason why music critics often gratefully refer to Vischer, despite the fact that Vischer was entirely ignorant with regard to music, and was, moreover, not particularly favourable towards music either. In musicological research, Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904) is regularly portrayed as a formalist, associated with the aesthetic formalism of his friend Robert Zimmermann (18241898). A closer investigation of Hanslick’s concept of form reveals that it was indebted to Vischer’s historicized interpretation of the artistic material, more than to Zimmermann’s definition of form: a work of art’s tangible outer features – relationships of structures, colours or tones. Hanslick often reverentially refered to Vischer when talking about form or musical material, imagination and style. The prominent function Vischer attributed to the artistic material in the creation of a work of art, being closely intertwined with the artist’s imagination, the artist’s sense of style and, ultimately, the historical period to which the artist belonged, enabled Hanslick to highlight those capabilities of the musical material that absorbed and contained features that indicated the extent in which the development of music itself had advanced. This was essential for Hanslick’s aim to explain music’s spiritual substantiality (Geistigkeit) in its own musical terms. Hegel’s interpretation of the artistic material as universal and essentially unchangeable would not have given Hanslick the opportunity to do this. Similarly, Robert Zimmermann’s formalism did not have anything to offer to Hanslick in his effort to develop a concept of musical Beauty that could compete with the spiritual substantiality of the other arts. Franz Liszt (1811-1886) too, assisted by the philosophically well-versed Princess Carolyne von Sayn-Wittgenstein, presented his idea of programme music in the context of mid-nineteenth century idealist aesthetic requirements, formulated by Vischer in his treatise on aesthetics. In the context of Hegel’s aesthetics, music did not stand a chance of expressing epistemological content without the assistance of text. Liszt selectively ‘quoted’ Hegel’s Aesthetics, actively seeking connection with the authoritative intellectual discourse that Hegel represented, but was in fact drawing on Vischerian responses to Hegel’s aesthetics. Like Vischer, Liszt focused on the content of music, inner feeling, as a selfcontained realm in the human psyche, something that Hegel would never have agreed with. Vischer, however, investigated the content of purely instrumental music (the inner realm of feeling) in such detail that he granted music its own meaningful domain. Liszt grabbed this chance by revealing how programme music – expressing a literary programme with purely musical means – was in fact better able to access and communicate the more profound psychological developments of the literary programme than literature itself, because they belonged precisely to this inner realm of feeling. Thus, he could argue that programme music was indispensible for the further development of music as an art, countering the often fierce attacks on programme music by music critics such as Eduard Hanslick. Still, Liszt was floundering when it came to safeguarding the autonomy of instrumental music from the realm of consciousness. He remained unclear about how the 268 Summary literary programme is able to make the content of instrumental music determinate, without submitting it to conceptual (i.e. extra-musical) meaning. Franz Brendel (1811-1868) took up Vischer’s positive evaluation of modernity in order to put music on the map as the art that could best prepare a ‘new form of consciousness’. Due to its abstract and subjective qualities, music was best able to express its own abstract and subjective time, which Brendel interpreted, like Vischer, as a necessary preparation for the glorious return of Beauty. Whereas Vischer did not say anything about music’s role for future art, Brendel eagerly did: if the present were a preparation for a grand artistic future, music, the modern art par excellence, was the herald of this grand future. Brendel’s 1859 announcement of the existence of the New German School, consisting of Wagner, Liszt and Berlioz, should be viewed in this context. For Brendel, the kind of music that was able to express the present necessarily safeguarded the very future prospects of music as an art as well as the future prospects of art as a manifestation of the Spirit. Thus, choosing in favour of or against the New Germans was the equivalent of choosing whether to grant music a place in the idealist pantheon of the arts. The various attempts to construct and describe a realm that exclusively belonged to music were instigated by the idealist requirement that music be described as a manifestation of the Spirit. This requirement gradually became less important during the second half of the nineteenth century. Whereas all-encompassing systematizations and classifications of musical features were still considered to be normative in the 1870s and 1880s, the urge to attribute a conceptual meaning to music (which was the basis for these classification attempts in the first place) was increasingly getting out of sight. There was a distinct tendency to describe music in its own musical terms, without the necessity felt to think about what these musical terms might be or might mean. Thus, musical genres and styles could at last be described according to musical features rather than to discursive or representational ones. Aesthetic formalism, music analysis, scientifically orientated research of acoustical and psychological perception, and social-scientific investigations into the music of nonWestern cultures slowly acquired scholarly respectability, because these areas of musical investigation consciously interpreted the requirement of spiritual substantiality in their own terms. The concepts of Spirit and Idea had now become completely eroded, functioning as rhetorical reference points, but no longer carrying the problematic idealist requirement of music being a conceptual art. The acceptance of Arthur Schopenhauer’s theory, simply making music superior to the ideas as conceptualizations of the Will, confirmed that music no longer needed to be described in terms of conceptual meaning. These developments undoubtedly contributed to the emancipation of an independent musico-intellectual discourse, that could more freely handle an increasing range of aesthetic concepts regarding the musical material, musical style and musical imagination. One could wonder, however, whether this musico-intellectual discourse, acquiring a basis as an academic discipline (called Musikwissenschaft at an increasing number of German Summary 269 universities), was truly capable of formulating its own intellectual premises. The awkward relationship between music and conceptualization remained, but the existential questions for music that had emerged from this awkward relationship, interrogating music for what it is, what it means, and what it does were increasingly left aside by musicologists themselves, focusing instead on the conceptualization of its outer features. It could be argued that musicology to date is still struggling with this, being unaware of the fact that the set-up of the discourse stems from attempts in the nineteenth century to legitimize music as a proper fine art. i Translations Chapter One C Truth is completeness. Completeness, however, is nothing more than an existence that finalizes itself through its development. One could say about the Absolute that it is essentially a result; only at the end it is what it truly is, and this constitutes its nature to be a reality, a subject, or a development into itself. i ii The philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel can be regarded as the starting point, the peak and the end point of the majority of the humanities between 1830 and 1870. iii Particularly through this work, having an impact and influence that went far beyond the German borders, Vischer became one of the most important figures in the history of postHegelian aesthetics, for Lukács the most important post-Hegelian aesthetician full stop. iv ‘the most important aesthetician among the Hegelians’ ‘one of the leading representatives of German aesthetics’ ‘the foundations of cultural studies in the twentieth century’ v A hundred years ago, the question what Vischer would have to say about it or had said about it, was asked by anybody who read German newspapers and journals, whether it concerned a political crisis or an artistic event. vi everything experienced by the bourgeois consciousness as a discrepancy between ideal and reality, thought and observation, the abstract and the sensory. vii We emanate from the same nature as tree, air and stone. We belong to the same humanity as all characters; and since everything that exists is our next of kin, all significant spirits are closely related to the system of the world. viii Beauty restores the complete human being from the divided one; it enables him to enjoy the full congruence of his own being with itself and with the world. Beauty brings peace. In this respect, through its formation it acts as a connecting and an associating force. As the power from which it stems is harmonic and strives for consonance, it is a generally human affair, and establishes harmony in life. It reigns everywhere. Chapter Two ix artistic reflection of a general stirring that tremblingly penetrates nature, in its highest manifestation as a mirror of life circling all around. x It is not only about music, but, while it is about music, it is also and particularly about the very important question: How do music and its creations relate to the sharply distinguished outlines of the present historical situation? xi ‘the political gravity of the present has knocked down the romantic Weltanschauung’ ‘romanticism has broken the political power of the German nation’ xii Vischer’s Aesthetics is very respectable; however, an aesthetics of music can only be written by someone who is both a musician and a philosopher. Since Vischer is not a musician, at least not of sufficient proficiency, only few parts of his work are satisfactory. xiii the princess’s horrible craving for scholars a damn’ clever, spirited woman xiv xv Once I had to accept an invitation from, I think it was Wesendonck, because she wanted me to meet Wagner. Wagner was brimming with eloquence about all sorts of things; towards the end of the dinner he started to remonstrate heavily about the Germans, and he called them a vile nation. It made me fly into a rage. What I find vile, I exclaimed, is a German abroad discrediting his own nation. This caused an uncomfortable silence; I picked up my hat and walked out. Maybe this is why Wagner hates me so much; since it is unlikely he has read my books. xvi a poetry monster living in the fir forest xvii It penetrated deeply and did not separate from the candle stick, because it had been put in there very tightly. xviii Mortal fear had accumulated inner gases in the desperate man. xix It is mildly warm, the tallow has melted at the surface. He devours it. where poetry and music are rising towards extraordinary levels of artistic vitality. a phantom, a monster, a fatigue, a utopian delusion xx xxi xxii When historians, after the eclipse of Hegelianism, shrank from writing speculative history; when the prevalent mode of thought among educated people increasingly reflected the methodology of the natural sciences; and when philosophy alternated between moods of positivism and metaphysics. (DAHLHAUS 1980, 8) xxiii So far, Vischer’s Aesthetics has not been subject to very much scholarly investigation, despite its wide availability in the nineteenth century. Investigation of his musical aesthetics is practically non-existent, whereas it has been of substantial importance particularly for the nineteenth-century form- and genre-theory, not to mention its systematic aesthetic approach. Chapter Three xxiv Music makes the woman and the soft and intimate man happy, it does not satisfy the sharp thinking mind. xxv the idea of the eternal creation of the world by means of the Logos xxvi Especially in recent times music has torn itself free from a content already clear on its own account and retreated in this way into its own medium; but for this reason it has lost its power over the whole inner life, all the more so as the pleasure it can give relates to only one side of the art, namely bare interest in the purely musical element in the composition and its skilfulness, a side of music which is for connoisseurs only and scarcely appeals to the general human interest in art. (HEGEL 1999, 899) xxvii The entirety of these basic assessments reveals the intrinsically ambiguous character that distinguishes music from the other arts. Music is the ideal itself, the uncovered soul of all the arts, the secret of all form, an anticipation of laws that could build a world xxviii With its mere pure ideality music is just as much not true ideality. When it comes to mind, dark and foreshadowing, it has the whole world, in clear reality it has nothing. It is the richest art: it articulates the most intimate, says the unsayable, and it is the poorest art, it does not say anything. With its disembodied rapture, it seizes the pure mind at that dark point where the cerebral phosphor flashes in the delicate threads of the nervous system, and at the same time, these threads are like the highest and ultimate extraction of the sensual, the carriers of the most sublime and precisely therefore the most sensual sensuality. xxix It is free, has extracted its foot from the ground, the bird among the arts. xxx Despite the apparent contradiction, the sharpness of mathematical distinction gets along perfectly well with an art form that generally should be called female. xxxi Counting, always counting, in order take the windiest path through absolute frost towards the point where the heart’s ardour can pour out in total lifelessness, in a calculated nothing. xxxii If it were not for Beauty, there would be no point where the two extreme sides of human nature, the Spirit and the sensory, meet, truly and entirely merge, and there would be no point where the perfection, the harmony briefly illuminates the divinity of the universe. This is merely the subjective and the objective turn of one and the same truth: the beams of perfect life, scattered round the universe, gather at one point in space and time; truths of nowhere and everywhere, of never and ever, become a here and a now, namely in the observing man, who, through observing, reconciles the basic differences of his being and acquires harmony with himself. No other main activity of the Spirit, none of the other ideal realms bridges this gap; the achievement of Beauty is irreplaceable. xxxiii Nothing is beautiful, which does not generally affect people by disclosing to them in a lasting manner the truth of humanity common to all, thus touching man in man. In all Beauty the observer wants and needs to find himself, because he is man and man is the solved riddle of the world. xxxiv If one takes a closer look in the dark, the eye recognizes a rich world of inner distinctions in it xxxv Feeling in its purity, that is, without an accompanying consciousness, empirically occurs only as a passing moment. As it is much more in accordance with its nature to be on the verge of changing into the determinate intellectual world that points out objects, feeling is trying to rely on a situation in art too, in which another art-genre that names the object, assists feeling in its darkness and gives it determinate content. xxxvi What impinges on the mood, has to be grasped and appropriated by the soul first, before it causes a particular feeling, inclination or reluctance. xxxvii as the activity of pure observation xxxviii According to this definition, feeling actually is the unsayable, the unpronounceable, for without all and every assistance of objective prediction it is basically impossible to find a word that tells how I feel; but we will see how imagination as a sentient ability fills up exactly this gap xxxix No image, no word is able to express the most typical and most inner features of the heart as articulately as music, its intimacy is incomparable, it is irreplaceable, a purely independent being, existing in pure self-containment. The examination of music should actually even be undertaken according to a totally different scale to the other arts, in psychology. xl I am tormenting myself with music at the moment. I am working passively, as I am not even near to writing things down, and I am working without pleasure, because the subject matter remains dark and does not suit me, I am therefore easily distracted. xli Who understands music and has received our scholarly education. Köstlin is still not ready with his music xlii xliii Köstlin is ready, but I got a right jolt when I received his entire work: the music volume now encompasses 23 sheets, is larger than all the other parts, even the theory of poetry! I did not know early enough to restrain him. The lack of proportion will annoy me every time I even look at the book, for as long as I live. xliv the sensory, as it reaches out into the Spirit and seizes the material that agrees with it. This enables a division within the individual categories of the material too Chapter Four xlv Therefore, our present is generally unbeneficial to art xlvi What works of art arouse in us now is apart from immediate enjoyment also our judgement because we submit the work of art’s content and means of representation, as well as their adequacy and inadequacy to our thoughtful consideration. Therefore, we now need the science of art much more eagerly than in the times in which art for its own sake provided full satisfaction. Art invites us to thoughtful consideration, and this does not serve the purpose of regenerating art, but rather of scientifically acknowledging what art is. xlvii In every respect, art is and remains obsolete if considered in the context of its highest designation [as one of the three manifestations of the Spirit]. Thus it has also lost its genuine truth and liveliness for us. xlviii Now if in general we may regard activity in the realm of the beautiful as a liberation of the soul, as freedom from oppression and restrictedness (since, by presenting figures for contemplation, art itself alleviates the most powerful and tragic fates and makes them become satisfying), music carries this liberation to the most extreme heights (Hegel 1999, 895-896). Knox misinterprets the word ‘letzte’ here, which is in fact crucial in the understanding of the message Hegel wants to put across. xlix After all, between the two there is the yawning gap of the Enlightenment, which modern art never should nor can renounce as its negative premise, it is the free subjectivity beyond authority looking back from a rationally coherent world order, the separation of art from religion, the secularization of art. l A fruitful period of poetry lies behind us. A knowledge, a knowledge of its value and of its deficiencies is our heritage. It is our aspiration and our yearning to transform this knowledge into an existence and a genesis again, into a feature from which a new beam of creative formation is launched. This will not succeed, and there is no help before this knowledge has become a total knowledge. We are, however, not yet beyond the halfhearted knowledge, and precisely this is bogging down in reflectivity and does not find the transition towards the overcoming of knowledge, towards the transformation of it into action. li The rich world of thoughts in our present urges and wrestles in all directions for a turnover of reality; the more Spirit, the more depth and power it has in this respect. And all the more it resists the immediate conversion into actual poetry, as it is pathological, it is a mood of dissatisfaction, reflectivity mixed with bolts of angry impatience, criticism, disintegration, anticipation, prediction, but it is never poetry. lii As the third main form I am positioning the modern ideal. The solution of the previous oppositions into this last form of the ideal reveals that the concept of Beauty is now ready to enter the truthful and highest form of its realization. liii the blood of the historical Spirit, which builds a new, free empire for itself on the ruins of the declining world, has to pour out into the veins of poetry liv In dark pains, our era works on the creation of this new form of consciousness. How will it be realized? What will its particular substance be? Nobody knows, but everybody realizes that the old form has died. lv In brief, the formulation of the question is as follows: the present as content and Stoff of art makes it impossible for art to reach a manifestation represented by the category ‘Beauty’ in its conventional guise. This unfavourable character of the present for the realization of ‘Beauty’ needs to be recognized by aesthetic theory. However, Hegel’s conclusions should not be drawn from this situation; rather the concept of Beauty should be expanded in such a way as to enable it to incorporate the tendencies of modern art as ‘moments’. lvi Style, communicated from one people to another, encompasses the more general significance of appearing as the expression of the Spirit of a whole group of people, of all civilized peoples even, at a certain historical stage of their Weltanschauung. This means that the various manifestations of the Ideal become embodied in existing technical forms and the history of the Ideal is called from henceforth the history of styles. lvii Lack of vigorous power, of straightforward manliness, of nature. lviii Modernity as such should not be dismissed, it is a form of music, contained in music’s development. It has got its right to exist in the self-conscious freedom of musical thought, musical expression and musical effect, which are in command of the Stoff; but it is obvious that the danger of sensationalism, of glamour, of lack of substance etc. is near, and also that this modernity is merely a transit point, that it needs saturation in the form of a concrete content of feeling. lix This form of the visible of embodiment, music has left behind, and it has not found yet the recovery of this form in a higher manner. lx Modernity admits that it is devoid of content and has to search for content, at the same time, it firstly jumps up towards total absoluteness, it removes those forms which attend music’s autonomy as an art, it thus takes away music’s ability to unfold and uses it for itself, robbing music of its element of imagination. lxi Music as the art of unobjectified feeling would be exactly the right form for the elevation of the mind to the invisible Spirit of the whole, and to replace the loss of formative imagination with the profound movements of sentient imagination. lxii deeper movements of the sentient imagination lxiii Thus, art will now be allowed to leave the visibility of the embodied world, in order to search for it again, it has not obliterated this visibility, but in fact only hidden it. Through its deficiency, every art will point at the other arts, but no art does this so palpably, so soaringly as music. Chapter Five lxiv I yearned for the Alps near Bern and for the Vierwaldstädt Lake, but almost as fervently I wished to meet Vischer in Zurich, whom I so deeply respected. lxv If you had lived nearby – as is necessary for such a connection – then your writing would have prompted me to approach you for this purpose. lxvi Here was this musical expression of Jewish beauty, at the heart of a full-blooded Germanic aesthetic system. The most peculiar and most difficult questions concerning the aesthetics of music, which had been raised by the greatest philosophers with only assumptions and uncertainty, were now taken up by Jews and fooled Christians with such confidence that all those who wished to think seriously on these matters felt as if they were listening to the peddling of the Saviour’s garments at the foot of the Cross. lxvii Robert Zimmermann in the ‘History of aesthetics’ labels me as a substantialist, and I will use this opportunity to approach the issue more precisely once more. It is devilishly difficult, but still it is the ABC of aesthetics. lxviii Three times when I wanted to start, I got stuck, had another look at Robert Zimmermann and became entangled so much that I did not get anywhere. lxix rotten aesthetics of feeling sounding forms of motion lxx In music, how is inspired form to be distinguished from empty form in a scholarly manner? I meant to distinguish inspired form, but my opponents reproached me for distinguishing empty form. Vischer himself in his ‘Self-criticism’ admits how extraordinarily difficult it is to conceptualize “form” and “content”, which, when in harmony together, engender Beauty. This is difficult in aesthetics in general, but in music in particular. ‘Form is nothing but the form of content, the outer of the inner; the two aspects cannot be separated, because the one is in the other, the other in the one, they should both be taken into account; they are not two principles, but only one principle.’ lxxi a unified execution of the basic thought a clearly grasped idea lxxii Not entirely correctly translated by Geoffrey Payzant as ‘we grasp that the active imagination is the real organ of the beautiful’ (HANSLICK 1986, 5). lxxiii We are inclined to understand style in the art of music, regarded from the point of view of music’s specifically musical determinations, to be consummate technique as it shows itself in the expression of creative ideas as if by second nature (HANSLICK 1986, 48). lxxiv the appropriate way for every art to handle the material as a habitual exercise that is determined by the necessary conditions of this way of handling lxxv the objectively musical assignments lxxvi There is no art which wears out so many forms so quickly as music. Modulations, cadences, intervallic and harmonic progressions all in this manner go stale in fifty, nay, thirty years, so that the gifted composer can no longer make use of them and will be forever making his way to the discovery of new, purely musical directions. Without inaccuracy we may say, of many compositions which were outstanding in their own day, that once upon a time they were beautiful. Out of the primordially obscure connections of musical elements and their innumerable possible combinations, the imagination of the gifted composer will bring to light the most elegant and recherché. It will construct tone-forms which appear to be devised out of free choice yet are all necessarily linked together by an imperceptible, delicate thread. Such works or details we do not hesitate to call works of genius. (HANSLICK 1986, 35-36) This translation is confusing, because Payzant does not seem to know what to do with certain aspects of Hanslick’s statement. The ‘works of genius’ he refers to, for instance, are in fact ‘spiritualized artistic practices’ (i.e. material), as becomes clear in my interpretation of this passage in the main text. Also, the tone-forms are not ‘necessarily linked together by an imperceptible, delicate thread’ as Payzant argues, but ‘are linked by an imperceptible, delicate thread to necessity’ itself (see Chapter Five [97n] and Chapter Seven [121n]). lxxvii It is common knowledge that much of Spohr’s music sounds Mozartian. There are passages in Mozart’s later work, however, which give rise to the spontaneous remark that they sound like Spohr. Mostly, they are featured by a harmonic chromatism that is hardly used by Mozart and moments of heightening, which sound like a prefiguration of the romantic school. lxxviii It does not matter that Hanslick, like Vischer, calls the act of considering objective Beauty ‘Anschauung’, and the ability to do this ‘Phantasie’, because he certainly means nothing but the purely intellectual conception of these relationships from the perspective of the observer, a conception that brings about the disinterested aesthetic judgement of acclaim or disapproval. His designation remains dangerous, however, because Anschauung in Hegelian respect is understood as the observation of the infinite in the finite, and Phantasie as the ability to perform this observation. With these concepts, a determinate and notably an exclusive content of Beauty is being pointed out, which negates the important recognition that Beauty is mere form. lxxix Composing is a work of mind upon material compatible with mind. […] the composer’s imagination […] builds, not like the architect, out of crude, ponderous stone, but out of the after-effects of audible tones already faded away. Being subtler and more ideal than the material of any other art, the tones readily absorb every idea of the composer. Since tonal connections, upon the relationships of which musical beauty is based, are achieved not through being linked up mechanically into a series, but by spontaneous activity of the imagination, the spiritual energy and distinctiveness of each composer’s imagination make their mark upon the product as character. (HANSLICK 1986, 31) lxxx From the assumption that the tone-poet is forced to think in tones, it obviously follows that music is devoid of content, since every conceptual content needs to be thought in words. Chapter Six lxxxi We Germans do not only have the right but also the duty to protest against such a disgraceful mutilation and grotesque deformation of a work that is appreciated and loved by the nation. If the French like this spruceness, if they can enjoy it in this form, we will not deny it to them; for us Germans, it is and always will be a changeling, which should not be brought into our house by goblins. lxxxii an abscess, a “deformed foetus” which emerges from horrid incest lxxxiii What I sense, is that I grasp the sensed only in the Idea. Through thought I am a man in general respect. This is the form in which the highest and loftiest content has been put; while I sense this content, it is mine. This is the sphere of emotions. lxxxiv When text is not available, one searches for particular images, or one gets bored, as music is unthinkable without content. There is no basis of passions, particular emotions. The performance is no longer governed by a process of passion. The emotion remains more or less empty, which is actually the intrinsic disposition of the tone. lxxxv it is basically impossible to find a word that tells how I feel the separation of pure feeling from its amalgamation with consciousness irreplaceable and, exactly because of this, called upon to found an independent art lxxxvi lxxxvii form lxxxviii However, we are in the realm of aesthetics, we are not talking about feeling as such, but about imagination as feeling, in other words about the kind of feeling in which the power of imagination settles and implements the entirety of its activity. In this way, the observation, the empathy and the construction of the pure inner prefiguration occur here as in other fields, but in another respect, in another form. lxxxix Music embodies feeling without forcing it – as it is forced in its other manifestations, in most arts and especially in the art of words – to contend and combine with thought (LISZT 1965, 109). xc Every incongruity between word and tone, initially manifested only in singing, is not solved but aggravated by the redoubled power of music. Music’s zest has been boosted so much by its increased weightiness, that it threatens to rip apart and swamp the word. Against this, the aim could be set to tie music even closer to the word, but then one could object that music, enchained, cannot unfold properly the expanded richness of its means. Chapter Seven xci Spirit and life have fled from the earlier forms; we only have an external appearance of those forms, a sham appearance; the new Spirit, however, has not manifested itself yet in the new forms. Thus we see this inner unhealthiness, artificiality, and emptiness; this lie and hypocrisy, which permeates the entire existence, the curse of our days. xcii The truthful expression of the present should be employed as a vanguard. Raising ‘obsolete stances’ all the time is an injustice towards the artists who try to move on. It patronizes the public and works in the interest of regression. Nobody will deny that our time is unbeneficial to art, but history seeks for higher purposes than the greater or lesser well-being of single generations. Those who have recognized these purposes defer to this necessity, and they feel elevated while they perceive the voice of the world spirit. Only the wretched, bare, mundane beings, whose lives lack all spiritual goods, are moaning. xciii Today’s feeble half-hearted enthusiasts complain so bitterly about how reflectivity and criticism are suffocating both the delicate little soul of invention and the solemn force of creativity. But this complaint leads us mostly backwards, because it obstructs innovation without furthering creativity, because it can neither know nor dare. xciv The most important thing is that the new form in being artistically beautiful is psychologically true with regard to its content. xcv In this respect I can firmly and definitely articulate the conviction that Liszt’s works are the ideal of our time in the realm of instrumental music. They are a necessary step for any real progress, they are the most important our time possesses in this realm, they have already been aimed at by Schumann and Berlioz. xcvi The conditions of our time are no longer favourable to romantic reverie and the onesided indulging in musical emotion. Therefore, an ideal has been put forward in Liszt’s works, which corresponds with the proportions of this time. This particular grasping of the programme, the unification of the conscious and the subconscious, is exactly what instrumental music maintains for our time and for the future. xcvii The advocates of the music of the future tell us that thanks to the ‘musical melody’ that still ‘resonates in our ears’, our present musical taste has been spoilt to such an extent that it can longer understand a declamatory melody if it is not musical enough. They claim we are, therefore, unable truly to appreciate the newest direction. These claims are tremendously mistaken. Chapter Eight xcviii Even now, music still bears the fate of Cinderella among the muses of the visual arts and fine literature. The philosophers, cultural scholars, historians, political economists and statisticians, whom she wanted to provide with substance for thought and advice, did not know what to do with the sounding sphinx. They left her alone. – Even an art philosopher like F. Vischer entrusted to the Tübingen Professor, K. Köstlin, the task of supplementing his great instructive aesthetic system through a congenial reworking of his music volume. xcix The interesting question here is how and for which reasons non-Western music moves towards the centre of attention, even though it initially could not be subject to aesthetic investigation because it was considered as primitive and inartistic. One cause for this change – undoubtedly not the only cause – can be found in a development within aesthetic theory itself. Thanks to a domineering scientific influence, aesthetic theory developed from a philosophical-metaphysical approach into a psychological-scientific discipline. With the acknowledgement of the cultural diversity of aesthetic value judgements, ethnological research becomes an indispensable supplement for aesthetic theory. c one of the most inspiring and educated aestheticians the famous and creditable aesthetician ci The special kind of style is determined by the particular way in which it appears in forms and by the particular embodiment of the material. cii Individuality will be able to express itself in music, but only ‘surmisively’. It will vanish in the dark, too indeterminate, at the very moment one wants to seize it. ciii an apologist of the mixtures of styles and genres civ Dedicated to Prof Friedrich Theodor Vischer in Zurich, with profound adoration and sincere gratefulness. cv However, the aspiration for the highest possible particularity of expression leads to the end of music as music. Such can never be music’s highest principle because it is, at least potentially, suicidal for it. This line of reasoning will be further explored when Berlioz and Liszt are addressed. cvi granted music equality with the other arts beautiful free humanity cvii Epilogue cviii scientifically guarded bridge between musicology and music culture Appendix I cix the sensory, as it reaches out into the Spirit and seizes the material that agrees with it. This enables a classification within the various categories of the material. cx cxi Style as a gradually habitual adaptation to the inner requirements of the Stoff Appendix II A List of changes made after F.T. Vischer’s own copy. cxii cxiii The artist on the other hand (and only few are artists) should develop inner substance Appendix III A As for me, I have been intending for a while to express in writing my sincere gratitude for the thorough and friendly way in which you have discussed my ‘History of Painting’ [Geschichte der deutschen und niederländischen Malerei] in the Jahrbücher [der Gegenwart]. But then your Faculty, or rather University affair came up, and it took me a really long time to acquire a clear view of what was going on; this only happened when I read your lecture [VISCHER 1844b] and Schwegler’s essay [NO AUTHOR = SCHWEGLER 1845a & 1845b]. Allow me to offer you my sincere and full apologies! cxiv You will, in friendship, believe the poignant regret with which I am looking back on the past months you have spent. Rather than in a gratifying occupation, you have ended up in a battle against enemies, in which well-meaning and noble people are entirely unarmed. For the only weapon one could use, profound contempt, does not suffice here. cxv In the mean time, allow me to ask you a small favour; I do not mind being obliged to you, for it will be a truly great pleasure to one of my friends, a collector of signatures, of which he already possesses such an amount of precious pieces that he has bequeathed his collection in advance to a public library. He has asked me whether I could not obtain from you, Sir, a page containing either a quotation of one of your publications, or a thought, a sentence, an unpublished aphorism, and signed with your name. cxvi Meanwhile I have written you to thank you for your admirable volume. I have read it with an interest which you would not know how to doubt. Your approach gains more and more fighters in Germany and on this moment you may say to yourself that the majority of your judgements about poetry and the arts are employed for a contemporary application. The musical part is as learned as the others, and it isn’t without a vivid satisfaction, that I have seen how easily the theory adapts itself to new forms, to the new élan that this art adopts in our days cxvii The last part of my Aesthetics (music and poetry) has not appeared yet, but it is already in print; the theory of music – of which I am ignorant – has not been worked out by me, but by a friend, who will be mentioned in the preface. cxviii You are most welcome to wait for the entire last part (music and poetry) until the next deliveries of my Aesthetics appear, but I would like to ask you to accept them from me – an indeed very … souvenir of the spirited hours that I owe your goodness. Give my best regards to Mr Liszt and your daughter and preserve your benevolence. Yours most sincerely F. Vischer. cxix Your Highness has had the great goodness of inviting me to your company this evening. Even my indisposition would not have kept me from accepting such an honourable invitation and the prospect of such an exciting and spirited conversation – if it were not exactly such an ailment which pesters the organs that one uses for thinking and speaking and which does not allow a good mood. I will be honoured, when I am human again, to thank you in person for the pleasure you have intended for me and to express the profound faithfulness with which I am your servant F. Vischer.