The 'demoralisation'of abortion

1 The ‘de-moralisation’ of abortion Paper for the DMAP Conference, Cardiff University, April 2002 Comments should be addressed to: Dr Ellie Lee, Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Southampton [email protected] Do not quote or cite from this paper without permission from the author INTRODUCTION Abortion is a moral problem. The existence of a moral problem presupposes some conflict of values or goals or interests. A solution to a moral problem is a resolution of such conflict; the purpose of moral principles is to tell us how to resolve the moral conflicts. What is at stake for the fetus is life itself….What is at stake for the woman is autonomy – control of the use to be made of her body. (L. W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory, 1981). In much literature on the subject, the abortion has been considered a ‘moral’ problem. At the heart of the debate on the morality of abortion, as Sumner suggests, has been a contest between two competing moral visions, which emphasise differently what is ‘at stake’ in abortion; the interests of the fetus on the one hand, and on the other the interests of women, in particular their claim to bodily autonomy. The abortion debate has come to be associated with a clash between these competing moralities, which have been embodied by opposing social movements. The abortion debate has consequently been viewed as a contest that, in essence, is about moral convictions. This paper focuses on the terms in which debate about abortion is currently conducted. How is the question of what is ‘at stake’ in abortion debated? Is the representation of the abortion debate outlined above, as one in which participants appeal to clear moral precepts, still accurate? In what follows, the case is made that this perception is misplaced; in Britain at least, the abortion debate has come to be dominated by language and themes that in fact have little overt moral content. The burden of the argument in this paper is that while individual participants in the abortion debate may consider abortion to be a moral issue, there is a reluctance to communicate this idea in public. In this circumstance, it is debatable whether abortion can still be considered a ‘moral’ question, or if it is to be thought of in this way, the meaning of the term ‘morality’ rests on a conception of morality that is very different from the past. Arguments made by opponents of abortion form the starting point for this paper and, as I will illustrate, it is clear that their case about what is at stake regarding abortion is no longer made, in public at least, in overtly moralised terms. In exploring the shifting rhetoric of the anti-abortion movement I contend, however, that the adoption of arguments that are framed in terms other than moralised ones has emerged in a context where supporters of legal abortion have also retreated from making a case based on principle. It is not the case that anti- abortion argument has become uniquely ‘demoralised’. Rather, the dominant paradigm that has emerged in the abortion debate throughout is one where arguments are, in general, rarely articulated in principled or moral terms.  2 ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENT TODAY Organisations opposed to abortion make it clear that arguing the moral case against abortion is their primary aim. According to Life, for example, the organisation was founded ‘To oppose all abortion in principle’ and ‘To put the absolutist case to the world – to argue for the absolute right of the unborn child’ (Life, undated). The aims of Britain’s other main anti-abortion organisation, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) include: ‘To affirm, defend and promote the existences and value of human life from the moment of conception’ (SPUC, undated). It is on this basis that abortion opponents have come to epitomise the moralist. They, more than perhaps any other social movement members, have been expected to make their case in moralised terms. Reflecting its commitment to the absolute value of human life, from the moment of conception, the anti-abortion movement has frequently presented itself as a movement that exists to oppose legal abortion, and to defend the 'right to life' of the 'unborn child'. The claim that abortion destroys a human life, an existing person, has been framed in both religious and medical terms. The fetus has been deemed a person both on the grounds God said it is so, and also more recently through contending that medicine has proved this is the case (Franklin 1991). Anti-abortionists have come to make extensive use of ultrasound images to show that a developing fetus looks like a baby. They have also emphasised such medical facts as that the fetal heart starts beating at six weeks gestation, or that a fetus can respond to stimuli such as sound, and on this basis contend that science has proved the fetus is a living person. All of these arguments focus, however, on the 'personhood' of the fetus. The anti-abortion movement has on these grounds presented itself as primarily to opposed to the moral wrong done by the destruction of the lives of 'unborn children'. However, it seems that this project has become severely compromised, in practice at least. Whilst abortion opponents may still believe that their cause is that of saving the lives of the ‘unborn’, it appears to be increasingly difficult for them to communicate this project with confidence in public arenas, as the following account of the current public profile of abortion opponents makes clear. Women’s Health According to the website of the anti-abortion organisation Life, visitors to the site can read the ‘latest research on breast cancer’. A 44-page study is available which, the site explains, was commissioned by Life and ‘contains much information that will hopefully spark an open and intelligent debate within the medical establishment’ about the causes of this form of cancer. There is, the text continues, ‘much evidence that the hitherto unknown cause of the recent rises in breast cancer can now be identified as abortion’. The new research, it is suggested, can therefore assist women and those who aim to improve their health, by enabling them ‘to know all the facts’ and ‘make an informed choice’ if they are considering terminating a pregnancy. Another area of the site is dedicated to advertising and providing information about Life’s 134 ‘Care Centres’. ‘Pregnant? Had an abortion? Need to Talk?’ asks the site. A ‘hotline’ number is advertised for those do want to discuss their situation, who can attend one of the centres which, the site states, are ‘staffed by experienced and trained counsellors who are there to listen to your problems, not to judge’ and which provide ‘free pregnancy testing, free pregnancy and abortion counselling and counselling after abortion and a wide range of advice and practical support.’ Counselling before abortion, it is claimed, aims to inform women about the medical facts which it is important to know when considering an abortion. After abortion, counselling is provided to help women deal with the ‘trauma’ that, according to Life, frequently follows the procedure. In these examples, the project of the anti-abortion movement is presented as informing women about the health risks of abortion – risks that women, it is alleged, are currently insufficiently aware of. In a letter to The Guardian the Chairman of Life Jack Scarisbrick argued, with reference to the Life-funded research about breast cancer, for the need for ‘major progress in prevention, diagnosis and treatment of what is now the commonest form of cancer’ that ‘horrifyingly large numbers of women could develop the disease…as a result of  3 abortions that have already had’ and that ‘women have a right to be warned’ about the damage abortion can allegedly do to them (Scarisbrick, 2001). In 2000, he argued that this alleged threat to women’s health must be taken more seriously: ‘What this amounts to is hundreds of women are dying every year because of abortions…Doctors are inflicting this on women’ (Rice, 2000). Life has also used opportunities for comment in the media to publicise its concerns about alleged mental health risks of abortion. Following the announcement that Marie Stopes Clinics were to begin providing an abortion service so simple that a woman could end her pregnancy during her lunch break (dubbed ‘lunchtime abortion’ by the press), Scarisbrick responded in such terms. He called the service 'bad news for women because abortion violates women'. He claimed that 'Post abortion trauma is becoming a major women's disease when they try to come to terms with the guilt, grief and anger at the loss of life' (Brown, 1997). Nuala Scarisbrick, also speaking on behalf of Life, commented, ‘However safe and wonderful this method might be there is always a risk of making subsequent conception more difficult and women should understand this’ (Hall, 1997). The ‘problem’ of abortion, in the terms of these claims about the procedure, is that it is bad for women’s health. The impression communicated is that Life primarily provides medical and therapeutic services, which women considering abortion would be well advised to seek out. Indeed, visitors to the organisation’s website can also find out about the ‘Life Fertility Programme’, which aims to ‘promote and support reproductive health and fertility’. The programme offers ‘body-friendly treatment’ through providing women with ‘counselling, support and treatment for women….experiencing problems with their menstrual cycle, fertility and pregnancies……in relation to their fertility and in need of advice on their health’. This representation of Life, as an organisation that believes abortion matters because it is concerned for women’s health, utilises a vocabulary which departs very obviously from the moralised claim that abortion matters because it destroys an already existing human life. For example, where might have been expected that Marie Stopes Clinics’ new abortion service would be opposed on the grounds that it will lead to the immoral destruction of more 'unborn babies’, instead, the criticism of ‘lunchtime abortion’ was that it would be bad for women's mental health. From morals to ethics Recent instances where abortion has become a subject of public discussion also suggest the terms of reference for opposition to abortion have shifted, away from the morality of abortion per se, to focus instead on the ‘ethical problems’ of certain types of abortion. In such discussions what appears to be at issue for anti-abortionists is not the morality of abortion in general. Abortions carried out at late gestational stages have recently been a focus for concern, in particular on the grounds that fetuses that are aborted late in pregnancy may feel pain. Abortion on the grounds that there is a risk of abnormality in the fetus has also generated significant ‘ethical’ debate and discussion. What is notable about these abortion debates is that those who have expressed concern about abortion in the first place are groups or individuals unrelated to the anti-abortion movement. The issues at stake are not framed by them in terms of moral convictions for the ‘right to life’ but through reference to concerns that appear to have little overt moral content. Yet the anti-abortion movement has appeared to be prepared to adapt to this agenda. The debate about fetal pain originated with discussion that began in the late 1980s. Advances in fetal surgery, which include placing valves into the heart and injecting red blood cells into the liver to prevent anaemia, meant that neonatal surgeons and experts in embryology were becoming more and more concerned about the potential consequences for fetuses of medical procedures. This concern was given a major boost when Dr Anand, then of the John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, demonstrated that new-born babies (neonates) undergoing surgery did better if they were given anaesthetics of a kind usually used only in adult surgery (until very recently, neonates were not given anaesthetic before surgery). In 1992, the New England Journal ran an editorial calling on clinicians to 'Do the Right Thing' concluding that 'it is our responsibility to treat pain in neonates and infants as effectively as we do in other patients' (Rogers, 1992). Since this time, extensive discussion has taken place in the pages of medical journals about the nature of pain, with many eminent scientists concluding that they have  4 much more to learn about this phenomenon, and endorsing the idea the fetus, as much as the pregnant woman, is a patient. At times, this discussion has spilled over to include the issue of ‘late’ abortion (that is, abortion carried out during the second part of the middle trimester, or during the third trimester, of a pregnancy). It is notable that the reason why the question of pain and ‘late’ abortion have become connected is not only because the anti-abortion lobby have exploited the issue. In fact concerns have been expressed very prominently by some doctors. For example, Professor Vivette Glover of Queen Charlotte's Hospital has frequently expressed concern that fetuses undergoing ‘late’ abortion may feel pain. Her case is that the present state of knowledge about pain does not allow us to be sure that fetuses do not feel pain, hence we should 'err on the side of caution' and give fetuses anaesthetic when a ‘late’ abortion is to be performed (Highfield, 2000; Highfield, 2000 (b); Meek, 2000; Macdonald, 1998). The concern is ‘fetus-centred’; while Professor Glover has stated she does not want to alarm women, it is the (highly contested) claim that the fetus fells pain that is her key concern, rather than the experience of those women undergoing a ‘late’ abortion. Yet such ‘fetus-centred’ preoccupations do not carry with them support for the view that abortion is morally wrong, or that it should be prohibited, even at later stages in pregnancy. Rather, there appears to be a sense on the part of some doctors that they have an ethical obligation to express concern for the fetus to be aborted (even though guidelines from the RCOG (1997) recommend that measures to stop the fetal heart should be taken in all terminations after 21 weeks gestation, to ensure that there is no possibility of the abortion resulting in a live birth, which will of course also ensure that no awareness of stimuli would be possible). Regardless of its uncertain morality, abortion opponents have appeared willing to relate to such concerns about fetal pain (BCT, 1994). Although its basis does not rest in commitment to the interests of the fetus per se, only that of certain fetuses, and the legality of abortion is not contested, only the way in which abortion is carried out, this has not prevented anti- abortion organisation attempting to relate to the discussion of whether a fetus feels pain during an abortion. In 1994, following the publication of an article in The Lancet that suggested fetuses may feel pain at pregnancies of 20 weeks or more, Jack Scarisbrick commented that Life ‘has been saying for some time that children are hurt and frightened in the attack made on them by abortion’ (Bradley, 1994, p11). In 1997, following the publication of the RCOG guideline on fetal pain, he commented, ‘There is a lot of evidence that the unborn child can feel pain…and anaesthetics should be used at 14 weeks just in case’ (Hope, 1997, p2), and that ‘There is a gradual slope up to pain, so if we are to try and avoid pain we should anaesthetise much earlier than 25 weeks, maybe 10 weeks earlier’ (Boseley, 1997, p14). While anti-abortion argument thus presented the point in gestation at which ‘fetal pain’ should be considered a concern to occur earlier than did the medical experts, that abortion would take place was not disputed, only how it should be conducted. Abortion for fetal abnormality has also become increasingly contentious (see, for example, Hubbard, 1997; Daniel, 1996; Jackson, 2000; Shakespeare, 1998; Cunningham-Burley, 1998). As with the issue of fetal pain, discussion of the alleged problem of this kind of abortion emanates from other sources other than the anti-abortion movement, most significantly some in the medical profession, and some sections of the disability rights movement. In these cases, abortion in general is either accepted, or considered positive (many critics of abortion for fetal abnormality in the disability rights movement claim to support women’s ‘right to choose’ for example (Hubbard, 1997; Fletcher, 2002) and, like disability rights campaigner Tom Shakespeare, suggest that they are ‘struggling to reconcile support for a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, on the grounds that the baby may suffer an impairment, with support for the rights of people with disabilities’ (The Guardian, 2000)). Many in the medical profession appear uncomfortable with the onus placed on them under the law to make judgements about whether a particular request for abortion meets the terms of the Abortion Act. The clause in the Act which caters for abortion for fetal abnormality is worded in an imprecise way, stating that this kind of abortion is permissible where there is ‘substantial risk’ of ‘serious abnormality’, but there is no specification of what is a 'substantial risk' or what is a 'serious abnormality'. This vagueness reflects the outlook of the medical profession at the time the Act was passed, which was reluctant to allow parliamentarians to  5 interfere with matters of clinical judgement. Today, rather than wanting to 'play God' however, many it seems would prefer it more specific guidelines were drawn up to guide them when they make decisions about whether a request for an abortion on the grounds of fetal abnormality is legal (Chervenak et al. 1995, Green, 1993). Chervenak et al. quote one authority in obstetrics and gynaecology as stating; ‘These are the cases [requests for late abortion for fetal abnormality] that I find agonizingly difficult. Is there any deep axiom to relieve me of this heavy emotional burden?’ (1995, p434). This outlook has led to calls for the creation of lists, specifying which conditions are 'serious' and which are not. Some eminent professors have argued that abortion in the third trimester should be deemed ethically impermissible unless the fetus has an abnormality that can be diagnosed with certainty as leading to early death or cognitive developmental capacity, ruling out Down's syndrome or spina bifida as conditions warranting legal abortion. The movement for the rights of disabled people has become increasingly influential in recent years. With the completion of the mapping of the human genome, the prospect of the detection of a increasing number of genetic markers has generated a great deal of debate, which centres on the notion that 'eugenic' abortion may result. Some disability rights activists suggest that as knowledge increases about the human genome, it will bring with it attempts to 'screen out' embryos and fetuses whose genes are not 'perfect' (Shakespeare, 1998, Cunningham-Burley, 1998, Deaf Worlds, 1997). Abortion for fetal abnormality, as an ‘end point’ of ante-natal screening, is in this approach presented not a choice made by an individual woman and her partner, regarding simply their personal futures, but a decision that is shaped by, and will shape, society more broadly, and do so for the worse (Hubbard, 1997, Fletcher, 2002). As with fetal pain, abortion opponents seem prepared to attempt to co-opt such concerns. Organisations opposed to abortion in principle have attempted to encourage the notion that this kind of abortion is ‘eugenic’, and to find common ground with the concerns of those involved in disability rights organisations. Life produces a leaflet called 'Pre-Birth Screening: Something Wrong With Baby?' which argues that '...to destroy a child because he or she is not perfect is especially unjust and elitist’, and asks '...are we not really sending a message to the disabled: you are inferior, you should never have been born?' (Life, undated (b)). SPUC contends '...abortion of the handicapped is …an offence to the disabled, sending them the message that they are inferior and of less value than the able bodied' (SPUC, undated (b)), and has a specific ‘handicap division’ which works to ‘promote a positive view of disabled people’ (SPUC, undated (c)). In a result that it deemed a ‘considerable victory’, Life applauded the decision in 2002 by the Government-appointed Disability Rights Commission to deem the clause in the Abortion Act that allows abortion to be legally performed on the grounds that there is ‘substantial risk’ of ‘serious abnormality’ if the baby were born, ‘offensive to many people…it reinforces negative stereotypes of disability’ (Hall, 2002). According to Jack Scarisbrick, Life had been involved in a ‘long battle’ to push the Commission to make such a statement. It is unclear, however, that the outcome is such a ‘victory’ for those who support the ‘right to life’. Its more likely effect is simply to fuel the notion that while abortion of ‘normal’ fetuses is ethically acceptable, where the fetus is ‘abnormal’ its acceptability is less clear. Opposition to abortion on moral grounds is unlikely to increase in this circumstance. Other Issues As well as shifting their arguments, to emphasise health-based objections to abortion and the ‘ethical problems’ of certain kinds of abortion, those associated with anti-abortion organisations have come to devote their time and energy to other issues. Opposition to reproductive technologies, such as Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis and also to cloning technologies, has more and more become a focus for activity. This shift away from the abortion issue is reflected in the names of new organisations such as ‘Campaign on Reproductive Ethics’ established by prominent members of Life and ‘Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics’ initiated by SPUC. Peter Garrett, spokesperson for Life, argued in 1996 that ‘Since 1990 we have expanded our remit to focus more on genetics and reproductive ethics’ (Daniel, 1996, p20).  6 Promoting opposition to cloning techniques in particular has become a central task of abortion opponents. Key members of organisations opposed to abortion now describe themselves as ‘anti-cloning activists’ and the ‘anti-cloning lobby’ (Meek, 2002). In their comments on this issue, moralised rhetoric has been apparent. The ‘Pro-Life Alliance’, established initially to field candidates in elections in order to promote opposition to abortion, brought the recent High Court case that claimed, successfully, that the law the Government was intended to use to ban human reproductive cloning (the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act) would not in fact do so. Explaining their decision to bring the action, the Alliance explained it opposes cloning because it involves ‘the deliberate creation and destruction of human life’ (Rozenberg, 2001). Jack Scarisbrick defended opposition to therapeutic as well as reproductive cloning on the grounds of ‘commitment to the principle that the utmost respect is due to human life at all stages…this is the foundation stone of justice and hence civilisation,’ (2001(b)). It may be that abortion opponents imagine they will find more common ground with others on this issue than on abortion. It also seems that these shifts in emphasis have caused, or at least contributed too, the emergence of difficulties in retaining internal coherence on the part of anti-abortion organisations. In 1999, following the resignation of its head for more than 30 years, Phylis Bowman, a report from SPUC argued that the organisation was suffering from ‘scope creep’, by which it mean the ‘widening and expanding [of] the definition of the organisation’s mission and remit which dilutes its focus on core objectives’. The report explained that ‘SPUC currently lacks a well-defined and clearly articulated vision…..[and] frequently fails to prioritise tasks or anticipate difficulties….This not only makes effective campaigning difficult, it also leads to serious financial difficulties). It also contended that the society had failed ‘to facilitate…the smooth, efficient and effective performance of its key objectives’, and that a membership drive had proved a failure’. A number of other key members of SPUC were reported to have resigned with Bowman, leading MPs belonging to the Parliamentary Pro-Life group to write to the National Council of SPUC, stating ‘MPs no longer have confidence in you as a campaigning organisation’ (Johnston, 1999). These developments in the public presentation of argument against abortion indicate that ‘holding the line’ become difficult for even the most committed moralist. Yet a reluctance on the part of abortion opponents to make the case for the ‘sanctity of life’ in public arenas cannot be explained simply as a reaction to high levels of support for the idea of choice. It is not the case that opposition to abortion has become ‘demoralised’ simply as a response to the successful articulation of the opposing principle. Rather, as the following discussion indicates, it emerges in a context where the abortion debate as a whole has become increasingly dominated by pragmatism. The kind of arguments outlined above constitute an adaptation to a context where moral precepts are generally eschewed as the appropriate prism through which to debate abortion. In the following section, I consider the way in which abortion has been debated in Parliament. There are other locations in which public debate about this issue has taken place, but the outcome of debate amongst politicians has been a particularly important component of the context in which other participants in the abortion debate have come to frame their arguments. This is because of the centrality of the issue of the statute that regulates access to abortion within argument about abortion. The matter of how the moral contest regarding what is ‘at stake’ in abortion has been resolved in Britain has come to rest in substantial part with the kind of statute politicians have decided there should be. Thus the approach they have taken to the question of the morality of abortion has very powerfully informed the nature and course of the abortion debate generally. ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF PRAGMATISM Abortion was made legally permissible in Britain in 1967, but on terms which are highly significant in relation to the abortion debate. Under the 1967 Abortion Act, abortion remained formally a criminal offence since the existing legislation was not repealed. The procedure remained regulated by sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, which set a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for attempting to procure an abortion and criminalised anyone, including the woman herself, who attempted to do so. From 1968 onwards (when the 1967 Abortion Act came into force), however, the 1861 Act had to be read  7 in conjunction with the 1967 Act. A defence was provided in the latter statute against the offences defined in the prior legislation because in 1967 Act doctors were empowered to carry out legal abortion on the grounds specified in its clauses (Bridgeman 1998: 76-7; Simms 1985: 79). Under British law, women therefore have no right to abortion. In contrast, the right to decide whether or not a woman can legally end a pregnancy rests in the hands of two doctors, who can agree to the request for abortion on medical grounds. The 1967 Abortion Act has been amended only once, in 1990, through section 37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. The Abortion Act 1967 (as amended) is as follows: A person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion formed in good faith - (a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or (b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or (c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or (d) that there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. According to the British philosopher Janet Radcliffe-Richards (1982), the key feature of this law is that it does not have any overt moral basis. British law is not based on stated principles regarding the morality of abortion. As a result, there is no clear ascribing of rights to either the pregnant woman, or the fetus. Rather, throughout pregnancy, the abortion decision is made according to medical judgement. The construction of the terms under which women can legally terminate abortion in Britain, as a matter best decided by medical discretion, has been termed the 'medicalisation of abortion' (Sheldon 1997, p3). The background to and reasons for the emergence of this kind of statute have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Paintin, 1998, Simms, 1998, Simms and Hindell, 1971, Sheldon, 1997). What is of interest for the purposes of this paper is the fact that regardless of the clear deficiencies of this statute from a perspective which emphasises the importance of moral coherence, it has proved to be remarkably durable. Since 1967 MPs, including those who consider the statute problematic either because it fails to recognise in law the interests of the ‘unborn’, or those of pregnant women, have decided to accept the ‘demoralised’ regulatory framework represented by medicalised abortion law. As I will go on to argue, the outcome in political life has been that abortion is now more eschewed than ever as a matter for debate. Abortion and the ‘moral right’ Parliamentary debate about abortion was most prevalent over the 1970s and 1980s, and its impetus was sentiment opposed to increased access to abortion. There were 15 parliamentary bills attacking the 1967 Act between 1967 and 1989, which aimed to restrict the terms on which abortion could take place (Moore, 1992). The main Bills were introduced in 1974 (the White Bill), 1979 (the Corrie Bill) and 1987 (the Alton Bill). Others were introduced in 1977, 1978, 1985, 1986 and 1987 (there were three anti-abortion bills this year, other than the Alton Bill). While none of these bills aimed to outlaw abortion, or introduce a ‘right to life’ into the law, they can be considered ‘anti abortion’. They sought to alter the terms of the 1967 Abortion Act in a restrictive direction, by amending the clause in the Act that deals with conscientious objection on the part of doctors, to make it easier for doctors to opt out of providing abortion; by specifying that one of the certifying doctors had to be a consultant of doctor of equivalent status; by limiting the terms under which abortion was provided by independent sector (non-NHS) organisations; by tightening the wording of the Act, to allow abortion only in cases of ‘serious’ risk of ‘grave’ injury to the woman of her family; or, most  8 commonly, by lowering the gestational ‘time limit’ for abortion (Millns and Sheldon, 1998, p11). While such bills fell short in their objectives of the central goal of anti-abortion organisations (a ban on abortion), their support was offered to the MPs who put them forward through provision of information, publicity, and lobbying and campaigning activities. Through achieving more limited aims, anti-abortion organisations hoped they would eventually move forward to their final goal of re-criminalising abortion. This assessment of the situation in the event proved misplaced; none of these bills succeeded in bringing about legal change. While they did succeed in generating an unusually full debating chamber, and much heated discussion, none had a legislative effect, and the result has not been the emergence of a political climate amenable to more thoroughgoing restriction on abortion. This outcome of the abortion debate over this period of time is interesting, from the point of view of the subject of this collection of papers, since it was a time when the issue of the 'moral crisis' allegedly facing Western societies was a major public and political preoccupation. The decade as a whole has been considered one in which ‘…‘moral panics’ over issues such as Aids, abortion, child abuse, hooliganism and delinquency’ emerged in many advanced industrialised countries, reflecting a ‘widespread sense of a loss of consensus concerning basic values and beliefs’ (Furedi, 1992, p88). In the latter part of the 1980s in particular, the notion that Britain was facing a collapse of values, and that a process of moral regeneration was in order, had high visibility and apparent social resonance. As Martin Durham has described, in his informative study of this period, 'in article after article' at this time 'rising divorce rates, one-parent families, abortion, homosexuality, pornography - all have been cited as indices of a nation facing moral collapse' (1991, p5). At the heart of this argument about ‘moral collapse’ was the notion that people's behaviour had come to be guided not by a sense of right and wrong, but by narrow, self-oriented concerns. A range of issues including crime, changes in relationships and families, and in sexual behaviour were through this notion found to be connected, since they were allegedly commonly characterised by a tendency on the part of people to place individual gratification above acceptance of ‘traditional, moralised norms. Within this complex of issues that made up the debate about Britain’s alleged ‘moral crisis’, abortion figured prominently. It was discussed commonly at the time as an exemplar of the problem British society allegedly faced. According to right wing philosopher Ronald Butt, for example, ‘The old restraints that once governed conduct have been dismantled and new conventions created….It has been morally respectable, if regrettable, for life to be conceived only to be destroyed within 28 weeks’ (1987). For Charles Moore, of the Daily Telegraph, abortion was part of a common pattern, and ‘cannot be isolated from the social and moral changes of the past 20 or more years’. It reflects a ‘lack of respect for out common humanity’, which is manifested in numerous ways, ‘in crime, particularly violent crime, and in vandalism; it is more visible in more minor matters like rudeness or impatience’ (1987). Writing in The Independent, consultant gynaecologist Pamela Simms argued similarly, ‘Is the abortion mentality part of what is wrong with our society today? It is mere coincidence that the value of human life seems to have been cheapened – that alongside abortion we have escalating child abuse, muggings of the elderly and so on?’ (Phillips, 1988). Some considered it to be the case that this view of the problem facing British society was politically influential. It appeared there was evidence that a political ‘moral right’ was emergent in Britain, akin to the politically influential ‘moral majority’ in the US. At the very least, moralisation of the political agenda was considered a significant component of Thatcherism; according to Jeffrey Weeks, the success of the Thatcherite project depended on it offering 'a coherent political and social philosophy and strategy which promised to overcome what was perceived as a deep-seated crisis of British society and state'. This was not a project, argued Weeks, restricted to religious forces, but came 'from what were essentially political forces which we can usefully bring together under the label of the 'new Right’’ (1989, p293). The abortion issue was considered to have a place in this political agenda, and the trajectory would be for policy in general, and on abortion in particular, to move in increasingly restrictive and illiberal direction. Miriam David thus argued in her collection of essays The Ideology of  9 the New Right that moral questions relating to abortion, fertility technologies and sex education 'have become central political issues. The Right has taken the initiative because it is able to express with certainty issues which both liberals and the left have been unable to clarify' (1986, p163). There did, at certain points, appear to be significant support in Parliament for anti-abortion bills. For example, on the publication of the Alton Bill in 1987, daily papers carried a full-page advert sponsored by 52 MPs, depicting a photograph of a fetus with the caption ‘We’ve abolished the death sentence for murderers and terrorists, shouldn’t we abolish it for him?’, and papers devoted may pages to informing readers of the things that 28-week old fetuses, that could still be legally aborted, could do (for example, dance to pop music) (Phillips, 1988). Yet the predictions that a new ‘moral right’ would prove decisive in politics proved wrong, at least if the measure is taken as actual legislative and policy initiatives. As Berer noted, looking back on the 1970s and 1980s, ‘every one of the now fifteen bills to restrict abortion……have always seemed to have a majority of Parliamentary support, yet every bill has fallen’ (1988, p28). In no instance was it the case that such bills were clearly defeated by an opposing ‘pro- choice’ point of view. Rather, they often failed because of the procedural tactics used by opposing MPs (walking out of committees, to ensure they were inquorate, or filibustering to stop there being a vote). Those that got furthest were the White Bill, the Corrie Bill and the Alton Bill. The first lapsed at the end of the parliamentary session when it was introduced. The second, which reached the stage of its second reading at the point when the Conservative Party had a very large parliamentary majority in 1979 and was thus predicated by many to be likely to succeed, was talked out through the tabling of a large number of amendments. The Alton Bill, discussed in 1987 and 1988 when the moralisation of politics appeared to be at a peak, ran out of parliamentary time before a vote was put (Millns and Sheldon, 1998). The only way in which this pattern could have been altered would have been for the Government to allocate time to ensure a bill was voted on. The fact that this never happened suggests that while in abstract terms, moralism may have appeared attractive to many MPs, the propensity for this to translate into the Government enacting a political programme based on moralised precepts was exaggerated by those commentators who believed Britain was witnessing the emergence of a ‘moral majority’ or ‘moral right’. On sexuality at least, as Martin Durham’s study of the Thatcher administration during the 1980s makes clear, there was a reluctance on the part of the Government to commit to policies and laws to ‘remoralise’ society. The reasons why the Conservative Party in the 1980s did not take further the project of politicising issues associated with sexual behaviour cannot be discussed fully in this paper. It seems clear in retrospect, however, that the defence of ‘family values’ and of sexual propriety was only half-heartedly embraced at this time. While it is undoubtedly the case that a great deal of rhetorical support was offered to a moralistic agenda at certain moments, very few examples of policy or legal developments based on this agenda can be found. As Durham argues, the anti-abortion campaign was 'not part of a Thatcherite offensive but, on the contrary, was an attempt to force Thatcherism to move in a direction it was plainly unwilling to go' (Durham 199, p38). Even when at its most influential, the anti-abortion movement was not able to convince sufficient numbers of politicians to pass legislation to restrict the terms of the 1967 Abortion Act, never mind protect the rights of the 'unborn child'. This outcome is only true for abortion, but, in legislative and policy terms, a high degree of reluctance to follow through a moralistic agenda in practical terms is apparent in other areas such as sex education, the provision of contraception, and embryo research (Durham, 1991; Thomson, 1994). Even at the highpoint of the ‘moralisation’ of politics, the terms of the 1967 Act proved preferable to the Government than more restrictive laws. A medically justified defence against the criminal act of an ‘offence against the person’ was endorsed, rather than legal framework that restricted access to abortion on moralised grounds. A matter of choice?  10 If moralised opposition to abortion was eschewed in favour of the medicalised regulation of abortion provided through the 1967 Abortion Act, what of articulation for support for the principle of choice? As noted above, the response to anti-abortion bills over the 1970s and 1980s from supporters of legal abortion was to use Parliamentary procedures to prevent voting on the issue, rather than risk victory for abortion opponents. An absence of attempts to articulate the case for the principle of choice, on the part of supporters of legal abortion, is perhaps more significant, however. Such tactics, however valid, were not coupled with attempts to argue the case for choice. Rather, when abortion was debated in Parliament during this time, legal abortion was defended on grounds that avoided articulation of this principle (Sheldon 1997, Franklin 1991, Burton, 1988). At a point when it was clear that there was little enthusiasm amongst British politicians for modifying the Abortion Act in an overtly restrictive direction, it was clear also that this was not coupled with the emergence of sentiment supportive of the principle of choice, and therefore in favour of liberalising reform of the abortion law. In 1990, Parliament did amend the Abortion Act, through a Bill which became Section 37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, an Act that deals mainly with the regulation of embryo research and the provision of infertility treatment. In contrast with previous abortion Bills, the Government did allocate time for debate. It did so on order aim to ensure an amendment was passed that would specify a time limit on abortion in the Act, and thus finally resolve the issue which had formed the main focus for debate through the 1980s. In the end, after a very protracted debate and series of votes, the time limit proposed by the Conservative MP Geoffrey Howe, that specified a time limit of 24 weeks with exceptions where the life of the woman was at risk or where there was ‘substantial risk of serious abnormality’ in the fetus, was accepted. This process included the defeat of alternative, lower time limits, of other amendments to the Abortion Act (including one to allow abortion ‘on request’ up to 12 weeks), and of an attempt to reverse the new amendment (Millns and Sheldon, 1998, p17). In practice the new amendment changed little (Sheldon, 1997). The number of abortions carried out after 24 weeks, for reasons other than fetal abnormality, was tiny. In 1989, the year before the Act was amended, only 22 were performed after 24 weeks, and of these 18 were for fetal abnormality, and four to save the women’s life (Mihill, 1990). In fact it had been the case since the 1967 Act was passed that the vast majority of abortions were preformed in the first 14 weeks of pregnancy. In political terms, however, the 1990 debate was highly significant. It signalled a clear intention to put an end to debate about the Abortion Act in Parliament; it was widely reported that the reason why the Government chose to allow time for debate about abortion at this point was to put an end to discussion of the issue. Kenneth Clarke, the Secretary of State for Health told the House of Commons, ‘…this is a suitable opportunity for the House to have a day at the end of which it can come to a conclusion, which should last a long time, on the time limits and future operation of the 1967 Act’ (Millns and Sheldon, 1998, p15). This was taken as ‘direct warning to anti-abortionists MPs not to use the private members’ bill procedure again to bring about changes’ (Wintour, 1990). It also apparent that there was little impulse to disrupt this process of ending the abortion debate by shifting the terrain onto terms of women’s choice. The idea that abortion is about choice for women, and that the view of the woman concerned as to whether she wants to continue or end the pregnancy should take priority, was almost entirely absent from the 1990 debate. Any kind of ‘woman-centred’ argument was confined to a very small number of MPs. In the process of amending the Abortion Act, one ‘pro-choice’ amendment was put forward, which sought to allow for abortion on request up to 12 weeks of pregnancy (from Conservative MP Emma Nicholson). It was notable that this amendment which was, in terms of the idea of choice, very moderate was not selected for debate. It is indicative of the lack of support for the idea of choice that while Parliament could accept a law that allowed legal abortion up to 24 weeks where two doctors agreed to it, it would not even debate a bill that gave legal recognition to the woman as the sole decision maker in abortion up to 12 weeks. In the actual debate, a pro-choice position was voiced most overtly by the Tory MP Teresa Gorman:  11 They [opponents of abortion] have regarded women as little more than flower pots in which future generations of children, preferably boy children, are reared. Time and time again we hear people pay lip-service to a woman’s rights in this, yet when it comes down to it they legislate to give priority to the rights of the foetus that she carries. Whatever time limit they come up with, whether 18 weeks or some other, their motivation is to prevent a woman from controlling her fertility (Hansard, 1990, p230). Others did talk about women, but did not raise the issue of the importance of women’s rights in the regulation of abortion. Rather, women’s access to legal abortion was defended through presenting them as deserving of sympathy, rather than rights. Abortion was justified on the grounds that abortion is, for women, a ‘tragedy’ (V. Bottomley MP, Hansard, 1990, p182), ‘a decision women agonise about…that is never reached lightly’ (Mahon MP, Hansard 1990, p. 236), ‘a difficult and traumatic decision’ and ‘not a legitimate form of contraception…a desperate measure for desperate situations’ (Primarolo MP, Hansard 1990, p246-7) or that those who are concerned about women’s well-being should looks for ‘ways of removing the trauma and stress that is suffered by all women who have to endure an abortion’ (Doran MP, Hansard, 1990, p214). The few that did argue against reducing the time-limit for abortion did so on the grounds not that women should be able to decide what happens to their bodies, but that vulnerable groups, such as ‘young girls’ would be threatened (Richardson MP, Hansard, 1990, p186). Alternatively, women’s need for abortion rights was justified through appeal to their desire to be good mothers: ‘it is because mothers are concerned about the quality of life for their whole families that they have abortions’ (Gordon MP, Hansard 1990, p209). This kind of argument, made by those who are pro-choice, has been termed the ‘awfulisation’ of abortion. As feminist writer Janet Hadley has pointed out, the language of ‘choice’ in the public debate on abortion is ‘blurred and softened and polished’ (1997, p7). It has tended to avoid the question of women’s rights, and instead has contended that: abortion is indeed an evil (but is a necessary evil); abortion is always a tragedy; abortion is always a last resort for ‘desperate’ women; having an abortion is always a reluctant choice; being ‘pro-choice’ is consistent with being ‘pro-family’; abortion can never be promoted as a method of contraception (Hadley, 1997, p7-8). Such language resists making a moral, principled case for legal abortion, and instead attempts to legitimise abortion by downplaying its moral or political aspects. The dominant argument made by supporters of legal abortion did not in fact refer to women at all. Rather, it emphasised that medical opinion was the arbiter of the issue, and once the law was in line with this opinion, there was no more need for debate. As Frank Doran MP, put it: We need to establish a principle that is related to the best medical practices. We should not have to debate the matter year in, year out but should place our trust in medical practitioners and give them a legal framework within which they can operate and which the public can understand (Sheldon 1997, p104). Many participants in the debate inside Parliament and outside pointed out that the 24 week limit should be supported since it was the one which gynaecologists and the medical profession preferred: ‘There are few supporters for retaining the present 28 week time limit, as the medical consensus is that babies are viable from 24 weeks…..Twenty four weeks in the period repeatedly recommended by medical bodies such as the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, and the BMA’ (The Guardian, 1990). An editorial in The Guardian, in support of the terms of the reform of the law, articulated this case for this approach particularly clearly: The vote to bring down the upper time limit for most abortion…displayed a cool pragmatism in the face of hysterical emotion and marches in step with the vast body of public opinion…The legal premise that abortion could take place until 28 weeks’ gestation….has simply been overtaken by the march of science…Most medical opinion now agrees that an infant is capable of sustaining independent life at 24 weeks, and in practice the vast majority of abortions already take place within that  12 limit…So reducing the limit to 24 weeks is a sensible acknowledgement in law of current reality already acknowledged in practice (Editorial, 1990). The terms of fetal ‘right to life’ are in this approach decided on through scientific advance and medical opinion. This right is granted at the point where science makes survival outside the woman’s uterus possible. Legal abortion is pragmatically accepted, and thus the question of women’s rights, and the moral issue of bodily autonomy, is entirely absent as a question for consideration. In sum, a ‘muddy middle’, where the issue of the morality of abortion could be hidden through articulation of the case for its legality on medicalised grounds, was almost entirely dominant in 1990. In so far as women were mentioned in the debate, the case for their access to abortion was almost always ‘awfulised’. The decision taken in Parliament in 1990 was reported to be a blow for abortion opponents (Wintour, 1990 and 1990 (b)) and indicative of their decreasing influence over Parliamentary debate. The end result of the voting was undeniably advantageous for women seeking abortion in practice, in that it did not restrict access to abortion in practice, and codified a later time-limit for legal abortion than that in countries with more liberal laws on abortion at earlier stages of pregnancy. However, regarding the morality of abortion, the debate indicated clearly that when it had become clear that no ‘moral right’ had emerged in politics, no coherent force to push for change based on liberal morality had developed either. In Britain, for politicians, legal abortion had become established as functional, with the terms of its provision based not on support for choice, but on a-moral, medicalised grounds, with women deserving of sympathy but not rights. Keeping abortion out of politics The 1990 reform does appear to have led to a situation where MPs opposed to abortion have accepted that they are likely to make little headway in the political arena. During the debate in Parliament itself, staunch abortion opponent Anne Widdecombe, ‘appeared to give an undertaking in the Commons that no private members’ bills [would] be introduced in the lifetime of the parliament’ (Wintour, 1990 (b)), arguing that anti-abortion MPs would ‘allow a decent interval’ before bringing any further attempts at reform (Knewstub and Linton, 1990). In so far as Parliamentary debate on abortion has taken place subsequently it has been through early day motions and adjournment debates, which clearly have little import in relation to the statute, and constitute no more than a symbolic measure which aims to in some way keep the abortion alive. The content of such measures is significant in relation the difficulties faced by abortion opponents, in that issues only on the fringes of the provision of abortion have been highlighted, such as whether fetuses at late stages in gestation feel pain, ‘sex selection’ abortion, abortion for Down’s Syndrome, and very late term abortion. Under a New Labour government, it seems less likely than ever that abortion will become an issue in Parliament. This administration has made it very clear it is hostile to Parliamentary debate about the abortion issue, and in particular is entirely opposed to New Labour being associated with a position on the issue (to the disappointment of those who considered that this government would be supportive of the idea of women’s choice in abortion). In October 1996, in the run up to the general election, the Labour Party came under fire from the Roman Catholic Church, when it published its official briefing on how Catholics should vote, in which it advised that they should heed the Church’s views on abortion, and thus implied vote for candidates opposed to it (Combe, 1996). The Scottish Catholic Cardinal, Cardinal Winning, in particular made comments to the media in the issue, and condemned ‘Christian politicians’ in the Labour Party, and Blair in particular, because they had ‘consistently avoided condemning abortion’. In response, Tony Blair ‘told friends’ he was ‘personally opposed to abortion’, but in an interview with the Daily Telegraph stated he strongly disagreed with attempts by anyone to turn abortion into a political issues, and that ‘I intend to do everything in my power to keep abortion out of party politics’ (Wastell, Baldwin and Knowsley, 1996). According to media comment, then spokeswoman on ‘women’s issues’ for the Labour Party Janet Anderson indicated there would be ‘virtual silence’ from new Labour regarding the issue of women’s need for abortion, when she refused to provide any comment on the abortion issue (Bennett, 1996).  13 The position of Tony Blair as ‘personally opposed’ to abortion, but who views it as a matter of personal conscience, not an issue that should be considered suitable for political debate, has been re-iterated whenever the abortion issue has become subject for debate in the media subsequently. The notion that abortion has nothing to do with ‘women’s issues’, as they exist in politics, has also been confirmed. Queries to the Government Women’s Unit, where reference is made to the abortion issue, elicit the response that the matter is one which falls outside the remit of the Unit, and is dealt with by the Department of Health (personal correspondence, 2001). It is also seems that some of those in Parliament who consider themselves 'pro-choice' are in practice unprepared to countenance a debate about abortion, and thus depart from New Labour’s official view. A campaign entitled Voice for Choice was launched in 1998, on the anniversary of the implementation of the Abortion Act, which aimed to work with ‘pro-choice’ MPs to bring about liberalisation of the law. Support was offered to the campaign by Teresa Gorman, who argued: ‘The ball is firmly in the court of the Labour women who have been elected in such numbers’. If they used their ‘tremendous power’ to bring about change, they would be supported by ‘old soldiers in the Tory party’ like Gorman, who ‘shared their objective’ (Newton, 1998, p8). In 1998, a female New Labour MP who had indicated she might be prepared to take a bill supporting law reform to allow abortion on request in early pregnancy drew 2nd place in the ballot for Private Members Bills (Roberts, 1998, p7). However, it seems that senior figures from New Labour made it clear she should not take the Bill, on the grounds that New Labour will not countenance a debate about the issue. The view that abortion should not be a matter for political debate seems to be shared by the Conservative party leadership, which has swiftly contained attempts to raise the issue from its ranks. For example, Shadow Health Secretary Liam Fox did so in 2001, in the run-up to the general election. Abortion, he argued, should be an election issue, and there ‘should be a huge restriction if not abolition’ of the current law. As Andrew Lansley, then Shadow Cabinet Office Minister, explained on the Today programme in response, however, the Conservative Party have no plans to make abortion and election issue, or to attempt to change the law. It seemed clear, from his obvious embarrassment about Fox’s comments, that the last thing the Tory Party wanted was to become associated with the ‘pro-life’ lobby (Lee, 2001). In sum, moralised argument that presents the interests of the fetus as ‘at stake’ in abortion have been not so much defeated by a ‘pro-choice’ viewpoint as circumvented; claims for fetal rights have not been debated in Parliament and a clear conclusion reached, rather they have been avoided and side-lined. Evidence suggests that abortion has been accepted on highly pragmatic grounds, where legal abortion is endorsed either through silence on the issue, or on medicalised grounds. The outcome, above all, is a political consensus that morality or principle is an undesirable starting point for debate on abortion. What is unacceptable is to hold an ‘absolutist’ position on the issue, and what is preferable is a pragmatic approach. MARGINALISATION CONTINUED It is in this context, where hostility to ‘extremist’, moralised argument means opposition to abortion based on principle is considered problematic, that the trajectory to re-frame the terms of opposition to abortion, as outlined at the start of this paper, has emerged. To what extent have such alternative modes of argument enabled abortion opponents to negotiate the problems associated with moralism? The example of anti-abortion argument that seeks to problematise abortion in regard of its effects for women’s mental health suggests these difficulties have not been successfully dealt with. The most significant attempt to promote the claim that women may need to be informed of the mental-health risks of abortion took place in 1994 with the publication of the report of the Rawlinson Commission on the ‘physical and psycho-social effects of abortion on women’ (Rawlinson, 1994). This commission was headed by Lord Rawlinson of Ewell, a respected member of the British Parliament, and administered by Christian Action Research and Education (CARE). Its stated aim was to carry out an investigation into the health effects of abortion, rather than to discuss the ethics of abortion. It took evidence from a range of  14 sources, including representatives of Life, and of British Victims of Abortion (BVA), an organisation sponsored by SPUC. While those who initiated the Rawlinson Committee may have hoped that its findings would provoke a response and generate debate, this in fact was not the outcome. The response of medical and scientific bodies to the report was minimal. Only one organisation, the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP), responded to dispute a statement made in the report about the RCP's position on abortion. In its press release about its findings, the Rawlinson Commission claimed that the Royal College of Psychiatrists had given written evidence to the Commission that there are 'no psychiatric indications for abortion'. The press release claimed that this 'raises serious questions given that 91 per cent of abortions are carried out on the grounds of the mental health of the mother'. The RCP subsequently issued a statement to say that this was 'an inaccurate portrayal of the College's views on abortion' and asked for a public retraction of the statement. The RCP also choose to restate its opinion that 'the risks to psychological health from the termination of pregnancy in the first trimester are much less than the risks associated with proceeding with a pregnancy which is clearly harming the mother’s mental health. There is no evidence of an increased risk of major psychiatric disorder or of long lasting psychological distress [following abortion]' (RCP, 1994). In an interview, Margaret Oates of the RCP, who gave evidence to the Rawlinson Commission, explained she was ‘furious’ about the press release. ‘What I actually told them is that having an unwanted baby is the biggest tragedy in the world but that you couldn’t guarantee that a psychiatric condition would deteriorate if a woman didn’t get an abortion’. In the same article, Diana Mansour, director of a large contraceptive clinic in London argued similarly, ‘You can be sure that there is far more trauma associated with continuing an unwanted pregnancy than terminating it’ (Rogers, 1994). The Rawlinson Commission made a number of recommendations regarding policy on abortion provision. Is there evidence that the kind of policies recommended have been adopted in British policy on abortion provision? One recommendation was for the kind of information given to women considering abortion to be altered. The Rawlinson Commission Report argued, with reference to evidence given by Life, BVA and CCFL (Christian Caring For Life), that there was ‘credible evidence’ that women were not given adequate information before abortion by abortion providers, in order to permit an ‘informed decision’, and as a result women ‘experience regret afterwards at having made what they subsequently considered the wrong decision’. The Commission urged the Department of Health to introduce policy that would require abortion providers to give ‘essential information as to the risk of physical and emotional consequences and stages of fetal development’. The Rawlinson Commission report also argued that there was evidence that counselling before and after abortion, which aimed to reduce the ‘trauma’ of abortion, was inadequate. The Report stated the Commission ‘would like to see the issue of both pre and post abortion counselling urgently addressed in order to minimise the distress experienced by women who have undergone abortion without adequate opportunity to address the emotional turmoil they are often experiencing’ (1994). In recent years, since the Rawlinson Commission, the Department of Health (DoH), and the British Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG), have issued guidelines that make reference to the kind of information women requesting abortion should be given, and which provide guidance about counselling before and after abortion. The RCOG guideline does make reference to the issue of counselling and the psychological effects of abortion, and states, 'Only a small minority of women experience any long term adverse psychological sequelae after abortion…Early distress, although common, is usually a continuation of symptoms present before the abortion. Conversely, long-lasting, negative effects on both mothers and their children are reported where abortion has been denied’ (Boseley, 2000). The guideline recommends, on this basis, that counselling should be offered to women considering abortion, but that the guideline development group 'favours the use of the term 'support' rather than counselling' and that 'services should have access to counsellors….and should refer the minority of women who will require such specialist help' (RCOG, 2000, p32). Thus, the guideline separates out the provision of psychological or psychiatric 'counselling', which it suggests most women do not need, from 'support', that it considers it the responsibility of abortion providers to provide. After abortion, the guideline contends a 'small  15 minority' only of women 'experience long term post abortion distress' and that 'further counselling' should be mad available for them (2000, p60). The Rawlinson Commission report can perhaps be considered to have influenced the case made in the guideline, in so far as it was deemed necessary to address the issue of whether counselling is needed after abortion. However, if this is a response to the PAS claim it is an implicit one, and one that rejects, on the grounds of available evidence, the idea that abortion leads to psychological problems. Subsequent to 1994, arguments and activities related to the claim that abortion damages women’s mental health have become a focus for discussion. In each instance however, they have been treated with scepticism. For example, anti-abortion organisations fund and staff ‘crisis pregnancy counselling’ centres, and offer women counselling to warn them, before abortion, of the alleged health risks of the procedure, and afterwards to offer them the help it is alleged women need to deal with ‘post abortion trauma’. Such counselling has become the subject of media reports, which in general has been unfavourable. One journalist who, feigning pregnancy, visited a counselling centre run by Life wrote critically that the counsellor she saw ‘starts off in a non-direction…but the end of her first sentence gives the lie to its beginning….I hear about the guilt of ‘post-abortion syndrome’, the scarring that ‘many women suffer’….how I will have to bear the secret alone for the rest of my life [A leaflet] tells me how ‘abortion violates women’ (Wynne Jones, 1997, p11). A report in 1995 for the Independent on Sunday, by a journalist visiting an abortion clinic, argued critically that anti-abortion ‘sidewalk counsellors’ outside the clinic were on a ‘crusade’ to dissuade women from having an abortion, by handing out leaflets on ‘PAS, post-abortion syndrome’ which aim to ‘deter women from going ahead with their terminations. Sexual dysfunction, nightmares, inability to sustain intimate relationships, suicidal impulses, they are told, could all be in store for them’ (Glass, 1995, p3). Another journalist reported in 1997 how, having visited a counselling centre run by an anti-abortion group, pretending to be pregnant, that ‘Pro-life’s trump card is vicious: abortion is devastating and you can never escape the scars of guilt and shame’ (Aitkenhead, 1997, p17). Attempts to problematise abortion on health grounds appear to have done little to increase the influence of abortion opponents. It seems to have proved difficult for those who claim abortion leads to a mental health problems to appear credible as either advocates for women’s health needs, or of scientific evidence. Indeed it could be argued that, if anything, the credibility of abortion opponents has been undermined, by their attempts to promote the notion that their concern is not fetal life after all, but women’s health. CONCLUSION It appears to have proved extremely difficult for those who believe that life is inviolate from the moment of conception to sustain this argument, at least in public. While undoubtedly those involved in such organisations remain committed to this point of view, its articulation in public arenas and through practical campaigning strategies is less and less apparent. The kinds of activities pursued by abortion opponents suggest they have experienced a considerable degree of difficulty in sustaining campaigns that project the idea that what is at stake in abortion as the sanctity of fetal life. In so far as abortion is opposed in practice, activities that are focussed on the alleged risks abortion presents for pregnant women have become the priority, and moralistic argument is projected in relation to issues other than abortion. This approach appears to have done little, however, to revive the fortunes of the anti-abortion movement. In so far as abortion is construed a problem in public debate, it is not presented as such on moralised grounds. Rather, in so far as the abortion ‘problem’ is debated today, the focus for such debate is ‘ethical concerns’, such as whether fetuses that are aborted at late stages of gestation feel pain, or whether abortion of fetuses that are impaired is more problematic than where they are not. Abortion opponents may try to relate to such debates, but they are unlikely to be able to do so consistently, or to much effect, since their basis is not moralistic.  16 The fact that claims for fetal interests are rarely made confidently, and that the anti-abortion movement is weaker than ever, will for many appear as no loss to society. But heed should be paid to the fact that the idea that a woman’s right over her body is not to be diminished because she is pregnant commands little consistent respect either. The loss of direction of anti-abortion opinion cannot be considered simply a gain for supporters of ‘choice’ in abortion. The terms on which this development has taken place, as the Parliamentary debate indicates, are instrumentalist and pragmatic. The argument has not been won, and is now rarely even made, for the legality of abortion as positive for women and their autonomy. Rather, abortion is accepted as a ‘fact of life’; as a medically authorised and accepted procedure the moral content of which is secondary. Most strikingly of all, in this context it becomes possible to deem abortion ‘outside’ politics. This, above all, suggests the ‘demoralisation’ of the abortion debate is of concern.  17 REFERENCES Aitkenhead, Decca. ‘A carefree abortion can be embarrassing’, The Guardian, 14 March 1997. BCT, ‘Briefing: do late abortions cause pain to the fetus?’, London: Birth Control Trust, July 1994. 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